New York Law Review

Tag: Cooperation Agreement

  • People v. Johnson, 27 N.Y.3d 190 (2016): Right to Counsel Extends to Intertwined Cases

    27 N.Y.3d 190 (2016)

    When a defendant cooperates with police on a new investigation to gain leniency in a pending case, the right to counsel in the pending case extends to the new investigation, requiring a valid waiver before questioning.

    Summary

    Raul Johnson, represented by counsel on a burglary charge, offered information about a stabbing to gain leniency. He met with police, signed a cooperation agreement, and later, without his attorney present, confessed to the stabbing. The New York Court of Appeals held that Johnson’s right to counsel was violated because the stabbing investigation was intertwined with his burglary case. The court reasoned that his attorney’s duty extended to advising him on the potential implications of his cooperation. Without a valid waiver of counsel, the confession was inadmissible, and the conviction was reversed.

    Facts

    Defendant Raul Johnson was arrested for burglary. He offered information about an earlier, unrelated stabbing in a supermarket parking lot in exchange for leniency in his burglary case. Johnson met with police and his attorney, John Schwarz, and signed a “Queen-for-a-Day” agreement. During the meeting, Johnson implicated Sunny Bajwa in the stabbing, but police found inconsistencies in his story. Later, Johnson was released from jail with the People’s consent. Without his lawyer present, Johnson met with police officers again where his version of events changed multiple times, eventually confessing to the stabbing.

    Procedural History

    Johnson was charged with attempted murder and assault for the stabbing. The Supreme Court denied his motion to suppress his statements. Johnson was convicted of both crimes. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the police were not barred from questioning Johnson about the stabbing because the two charges were unrelated. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the police questioning of Johnson about the stabbing violated his right to counsel, given that he was represented by counsel on a pending burglary charge and was cooperating in the stabbing investigation to obtain leniency in the burglary case.

    2. Whether Johnson validly waived his right to counsel at the April 19 meeting with police.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under these circumstances, Schwarz’s duty to his client required him to concern himself with both cases.

    2. No, because there was no express waiver of the right to counsel, nor could a waiver be inferred from the circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that because Johnson’s cooperation in the stabbing investigation was directly linked to his hope for a favorable outcome in the burglary case, his attorney’s representation extended to the stabbing investigation. The court stated, “Schwarz’s obligation in defending the burglary case included an obligation to be alert to, and to avert if he could, the possibility that defendant’s cooperation would hurt rather than help him.” Therefore, the police should not have questioned Johnson about the stabbing without a valid waiver of his right to counsel. The Court emphasized the need for an express waiver, preferably in writing, where a defendant seeks leniency through cooperation. It noted that even if a limited waiver existed for interviewing Johnson as a potential witness, that waiver could not extend to the point when police realized Johnson was a suspect. At that point, police should have contacted Schwarz. The dissent argued that the two cases were unrelated and the detectives acted properly by interviewing him about the stabbing. The majority’s opinion states that, “Once an attorney enters the proceeding, the police may not question the defendant in the absence of counsel unless there is an affirmative waiver, in the presence of the attorney, of the defendant’s right to counsel” (People v Arthur, 22 NY2d 325, 329 [1968]).

  • People v. Bartee, 89 N.Y.2d 339 (1996): Prosecution’s Duty to Disclose Cooperation Agreements

    People v. Bartee, 89 N.Y.2d 339 (1996)

    The prosecution must disclose the full terms of cooperation agreements with witnesses, but a court’s finding that no obligation to testify against the defendant was part of the agreement is not reviewable by the Court of Appeals if supported by factual evidence.

    Summary

    Bartee was convicted of drug offenses. He argued that the prosecution violated Brady by failing to disclose the full terms of a cooperation agreement with a codefendant who testified against him. Bartee claimed the agreement required the codefendant to testify against him for a recommendation of lifetime probation, an obligation not disclosed. The County Court, after a hearing, found no such agreement existed. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the lower courts’ factual finding that no agreement existed regarding the codefendant’s testimony was supported by the record and thus beyond further review.

    Facts

    Bartee was convicted of criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance. A codefendant, who pleaded guilty to lesser charges and was a People’s witness at Bartee’s trial, had a cooperation agreement with the District Attorney’s office. Bartee alleged that this agreement contained an undisclosed provision requiring the codefendant to testify against him in exchange for a recommendation of lifetime probation.

    Procedural History

    Bartee was convicted in County Court. He moved to vacate the conviction under CPL 440.10, arguing a Brady violation due to the undisclosed term of the cooperation agreement. The County Court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction and the denial of the motion to vacate. Bartee appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence (Brady material) by not revealing the full terms of a cooperation agreement, specifically an alleged requirement for a codefendant to testify against the defendant in exchange for a sentencing recommendation.

    Holding

    No, because the lower courts found, based on factual evidence, that no agreement existed requiring the codefendant to testify against Bartee as a condition of the cooperation agreement; this factual finding is not reviewable by the Court of Appeals.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, emphasizing that the lower courts had conducted an evidentiary hearing and made a factual finding that no agreement or understanding existed requiring the codefendant to testify against Bartee. The court noted that because this finding was supported by the record, it was beyond the Court of Appeals’ power to review. The Court cited People v. Blim, 46 N.Y.2d 934, 935 and People v. Gruttola, 43 N.Y.2d 116, 122, to support this principle of limited appellate review of factual findings. The Court thus deferred to the factual determinations made by the County Court and Appellate Division, stating that “our own examination of the record reveals factual support for the findings of the lower courts, the denial of defendant’s motion to vacate is beyond this Court’s further review”. The court also concluded that the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to establish Bartee’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

  • People v. Inniss, 83 N.Y.2d 653 (1994): Admissibility of Evidence for Witness Impeachment

    83 N.Y.2d 653 (1994)

    A trial court does not err in excluding evidence offered solely to impeach a witness’s credibility on a collateral matter when the witness’s bias and interest have been exhaustively explored during cross-examination.

    Summary

    Kenneth Inniss was convicted of murder and weapon possession. The key witness against him, Richard Saunders, had a cooperation agreement with the prosecution. Inniss appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to admit testimony from Saunders’s alleged victim in a dismissed robbery case and the transcript of Saunders’s cooperation agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence was offered only to impeach Saunders’s credibility on a collateral matter, and Saunders’s bias had already been thoroughly explored. The court also found that the refusal to give a specific “interested witness” charge was not reversible error because the jury was aware of Saunders’s potential bias.

    Facts

    Richard Saunders, awaiting trial on robbery charges, contacted authorities claiming knowledge of Brian Rich’s killer. Saunders testified that Inniss offered him $10,000 to kill Rich, which he declined. On August 3, 1986, Saunders witnessed Inniss shooting Rich with an Uzi. Saunders had a cooperation agreement with the District Attorney’s office, promising dismissal of his charges in exchange for truthful testimony. Saunders testified about incriminating conversations with Inniss before and after the murder. Forensic evidence supported Saunders’s account. Inniss presented an alibi defense but was convicted.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Inniss. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to admit testimony of the complainant in Saunders’s dismissed robbery indictment and the transcript of the cooperation agreement between Saunders and the prosecution.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give an interested witness charge specifically regarding Saunders’s testimony.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence was offered solely to impeach Saunders’s credibility on a collateral matter, and Saunders’s bias and interest were exhaustively explored during cross-examination.
    2. No, because the charge as a whole, including the instruction that the jury could consider the interest or bias of any witness, was sufficient to convey the need to scrutinize Saunders’s testimony with care.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Inniss only sought to introduce the evidence to contradict Saunders’s denial of guilt in the dismissed robbery charges, which was a collateral matter. The court cited People v. Pavao, stating that the collateral impeachment rule bars the admission of evidence used to establish “perjury” on collateral issues. Furthermore, the court noted that the terms of the cooperation agreement and Saunders’s interest and bias were “exhaustive[ly]” explored on cross-examination, making the documentary evidence cumulative, citing People v. Chin. The Court also addressed the refusal to give an interested witness charge regarding Saunders’s testimony, finding that because Saunders’s bias and interest were heavily emphasized, the jury was sufficiently informed to scrutinize his testimony. The court stated that the jury “intensely scrutinized Saunders’ testimony,” and thus, the omission was not reversible error, citing People v. Warren. The court emphasized that the key issue was whether any benefit Saunders received affected the truthfulness of his testimony. Judge Smith dissented, arguing that the trial court failed to produce Brady and Rosario material by withholding the cooperation agreement and minutes from the proceeding dismissing the robbery charge. The dissent also argued that it was essential for the trial court to give more than the standard interested witness charge.

  • People v. Morgan, 76 N.Y.2d 493 (1990): Admissibility of Grand Jury Testimony as Declaration Against Penal Interest

    People v. Morgan, 76 N.Y.2d 493 (1990)

    Grand Jury testimony given pursuant to a cooperation agreement is not sufficiently against the declarant’s penal interest to be admissible at trial as a declaration against penal interest, especially where the declarant had a motive to minimize his role and implicate others.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that Grand Jury testimony of an accomplice, Flihan, given under a cooperation agreement, was inadmissible as a declaration against penal interest at the defendant Morgan’s trial. Flihan refused to testify at trial, and the prosecution sought to introduce his Grand Jury testimony. The Court distinguished this situation from a guilty plea allocution, where statements are inherently against penal interest. The Court reasoned that Flihan’s testimony lacked the necessary reliability because the cooperation agreement provided him with a motive to minimize his own role and potentially implicate others falsely to curry favor with the prosecution.

    Facts

    Defendant Morgan and others were indicted following an undercover drug operation. Flihan and Fata were arrested at the scene of the drug sale, while Morgan and Cefola were arrested at a nearby hotel room. Flihan entered into a cooperation agreement with the Task Force, agreeing to testify before the Grand Jury and at trial in exchange for the Deputy Attorney-General accepting Flihan’s guilty plea to a charge of second-degree conspiracy in full satisfaction of all “potential charges”. Flihan testified before the Grand Jury, admitting to selling cocaine and acting as a “broker” for the deal. At Morgan’s trial, Flihan refused to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege.

    Procedural History

    The trial court allowed portions of Flihan’s Grand Jury testimony to be read into evidence as a declaration against penal interest over the defendant’s objection. Morgan was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that admitting Flihan’s Grand Jury testimony was an abuse of discretion and violated the defendant’s constitutional right to confront witnesses. The People were granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Grand Jury testimony given pursuant to a cooperation agreement can be admitted at trial as a declaration against penal interest when the declarant is unavailable to testify.
    2. Whether, under the specific circumstances of this case, Flihan’s Grand Jury testimony satisfied the criteria for admissibility as a declaration against penal interest.

    Holding

    1. The Court did not explicitly rule that Grand Jury testimony can *never* be admitted as a declaration against penal interest.
    2. No, because Flihan’s Grand Jury testimony, given under a cooperation agreement, lacked sufficient indicia of reliability, as he had a motive to minimize his role and implicate others falsely.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished the case from People v. Thomas, where a guilty plea allocution was deemed admissible. The Court emphasized that due process requires careful scrutiny of declarations from unavailable witnesses used to inculpate a defendant. The Court applied the four-step guide from Thomas, noting that while Flihan was unavailable, his testimony lacked the necessary adversity to his penal interest. The Court highlighted that Flihan’s cooperation agreement gave him a motive to minimize his role in the drug sale, potentially at the expense of others. The Court stated, “Key to our holding is that Flihan in the circumstances presented did not face immediate or certain conviction and sentence after testifying.” The Court found that Flihan’s testimony was not “wholly disserving” and did not carry the same safeguards of reliability as a plea allocution. The Court stated, “Under the circumstances, there was at least the possibility that Flihan was ‘using’ the system, rather than unburdening his conscience, the linchpin of this hearsay exception.” The Court concluded that the trial court’s jury instructions could not offset the erroneous admissibility ruling.

  • People v. Frederickson, 36 N.Y.2d 231 (1975): Enforceability of Plea Agreements When Sentencing Recommendations are Not Followed

    People v. Frederickson, 36 N.Y.2d 231 (1975)

    A prosecutor fulfills obligations under a plea agreement by recommending a specific sentence, even if the sentencing court does not follow that recommendation, provided there was no explicit promise by the court itself regarding sentencing.

    Summary

    Frederickson, a police detective under investigation for corruption, entered into a cooperation agreement with the District Attorney, promising information and testimony in exchange for a misdemeanor plea covering all charges and a recommendation of probation. After Frederickson cooperated, the trial court accepted his guilty plea but ultimately sentenced him to imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the District Attorney fulfilled the agreement by recommending probation, and the court’s decision to deviate from the recommendation did not violate the defendant’s rights, as long as the judge never committed to a specific sentence.

    Facts

    Frederickson, a Newburgh police detective, was a target in a corruption investigation. He negotiated a “cooperation agreement” with the District Attorney’s office. He agreed to provide information, testify before the grand jury, and waive immunity. In return, the DA agreed Frederickson could plead guilty to a misdemeanor to cover all pending charges (except homicide) and that the DA would recommend probation. At the time of the agreement, Frederickson hadn’t been formally charged. He was later indicted on 50 counts across 19 indictments, including burglary, larceny, perjury, and bribery. Frederickson complied with the agreement, providing information and testifying.

    Procedural History

    Frederickson applied to plead guilty to one count of petit larceny, a misdemeanor, as per the agreement. The trial court was reluctant, leading to a hearing regarding alleged additional commitments. The trial court ultimately accepted the plea but did not commit to the sentencing recommendation. Frederickson was sentenced to one year of imprisonment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the District Attorney’s recommendation of probation, as per the cooperation agreement, was the full extent of the promise, or whether additional promises (specifically concerning sentencing) were made, and if so, whether the trial court’s sentencing of imprisonment violated the agreement.

    Holding

    No, because the District Attorney fulfilled his obligations by recommending the agreed-upon sentence, and the trial court’s discretion in sentencing was not constrained by the agreement, absent an explicit promise from the court itself regarding the sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the District Attorney had fulfilled his obligations under the agreement by consenting to the misdemeanor plea and recommending probation. The court distinguished between the acceptance of the plea and the sentencing, noting that sentencing involves the trial court’s discretion. The defendant could not object simply because the recommendation was not followed. The court stated, “As sentencing involves the exercise of discretion by the trial court, the defendant cannot now object merely because the District Attorney’s recommendation as to sentence was not followed by the court.” The court also noted conflicting testimony regarding whether the District Attorney represented that the judge had pre-approved the sentencing recommendation. The Court deferred to the lower courts’ findings that representations only related to the acceptance of the plea, not sentencing. Finally, the Court reiterated the importance of creating a clear record of all agreements and representations made during plea negotiations, citing People v. Selikoff. The Court emphasized having “as complete a record as possible of the agreements, promises and representations which have been made by either the prosecutor or by the judiciary and which have led to a guilty plea.”