New York Law Review

Tag: controlled substances

  • People v. Doshi, 93 N.Y.2d 422 (1999): Addressing Spillover Errors and Brady Violations in Criminal Convictions

    People v. Doshi, 93 N.Y.2d 422 (1999)

    When an error affects some counts in a multi-count indictment, the remaining counts are reversed only if there is a reasonable possibility that the error influenced the jury’s verdict on those counts in a meaningful way; the prosecution is not required to disclose information that the defendant knew or should have known.

    Summary

    Doshi, a psychiatrist, was convicted on multiple counts related to the illegal sale of controlled substances. The trial court erred by instructing the jury that good faith was irrelevant for four counts concerning lorazepam 2.5 mg. The Appellate Division vacated these counts, but Doshi argued this error tainted the remaining convictions. The Court of Appeals held that the error did not warrant reversal of the remaining counts because the jury was properly instructed on the element of good faith for those charges, and the jury acquitted on other counts. The Court also found no Brady violation, as Doshi knew of the Medicaid records he claimed were improperly withheld.

    Facts

    Doshi, a psychiatrist, was accused of illegally selling controlled substances and prescriptions. Sara Cordova, a former addict and police informant, testified that she purchased drugs from Doshi for resale, and that Doshi was aware of this. Thomas Creelman, an undercover agent, also purchased drugs from Doshi. Doshi claimed he acted in good faith as a psychiatrist. He was convicted on multiple counts, but the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that “good faith” was irrelevant for counts related to lorazepam 2.5 mg.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Doshi. Doshi moved to vacate the judgment, arguing a Brady violation. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to vacate but reversed four counts relating to lorazepam 2.5 mg. Doshi appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction on four counts of the indictment had a prejudicial “spillover effect” on the remaining counts, requiring reversal of those convictions.

    2. Whether the People’s failure to turn over certain Medicaid records constituted a violation of the People’s disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland.

    Holding

    1. No, because there is no reasonable possibility that the trial judge’s erroneous charge influenced the jury’s decision to convict on the remaining counts.

    2. No, because Brady does not require prosecutors to supply a defendant with evidence when the defendant knew of, or should reasonably have known of, the evidence and its exculpatory nature.

    Court’s Reasoning

    1. The Court applied the standard from People v. Baghai-Kermani, focusing on whether there was a “reasonable possibility” that the jury’s decision to convict on the tainted counts influenced its guilty verdict on the remaining counts in a “meaningful way.” The Court found the tainted counts distinguishable because the jury was specifically instructed that “good faith” was irrelevant for the lorazepam 2.5 mg counts, while the remaining counts required a showing of absence of “good faith.” The Court also noted the jury acquitted Doshi on five other counts, demonstrating they were capable of distinguishing between the charges.

    2. The Court stated that the Brady doctrine requires prosecutors to turn over material exculpatory evidence to defendants but does not require prosecutors to supply a defendant with evidence when the defendant knew of, or should reasonably have known of, the evidence and its exculpatory nature. The billing statements were generated by Doshi himself when he submitted claims to Medicaid. The Court found that Doshi knew of the Medicaid payment records because he billed Medicaid and received payment, thus, the People had no obligation to disclose them. As stated in the opinion, “the existence of the Medicaid payment records was necessarily known to defendant by virtue of his having billed Medicaid and received payment.”

  • People v. Jones, 73 N.Y.2d 427 (1989): Sufficiency of Expert Testimony to Identify Controlled Substances

    People v. Jones, 73 N.Y.2d 427 (1989)

    Expert testimony identifying a controlled substance must be sufficient to establish that the substance falls within the statutory definition of a proscribed drug; merely stating an opinion without adequate foundation or reference to the controlled substance list is insufficient.

    Summary

    In People v. Jones, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the sufficiency of expert testimony in identifying a controlled substance. The defendant was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The prosecution’s expert testified that the substance was propoxyphene but did not adequately establish that this specific substance was proscribed by the Public Health Law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal of the conviction, holding that the expert’s testimony, without more, was insufficient to prove the substance was a controlled substance under the relevant statutes. The court emphasized that the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to demonstrate the substance’s inclusion on the controlled substance list.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested and found to be in possession of a substance. At trial, the prosecution presented a chemist as an expert witness. The chemist testified that she analyzed the substance and determined it to be propoxyphene. The expert described the tests performed but did not explicitly connect propoxyphene to the list of controlled substances defined by the Public Health Law. The defense argued that the prosecution failed to prove that the substance was a controlled substance as defined by law.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendant. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that the prosecution had failed to establish that the substance possessed by the defendant was a controlled substance under the Public Health Law. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the expert testimony presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance possessed by the defendant was a controlled substance as defined by the Public Health Law.

    Holding

    No, because the People failed to establish that the substance obtained from the defendant was proscribed by the Public Health Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The court emphasized that the mere identification of the substance as propoxyphene by an expert was not enough. The prosecution was required to present evidence demonstrating that propoxyphene was, in fact, a controlled substance listed in the relevant statutes. The court noted that the expert’s qualifications were not in question, but the substance of her testimony was lacking. The court stated, “the People did not prove by any other acceptable source which substance on the controlled substance list defendant possessed.” The concurring opinion further clarified that the error was not in the admissibility of the expert’s opinion but in the insufficiency of her identification of the substance tested. While the expert was qualified to render an opinion, the opinion itself was legally insufficient to establish the case against the defendant because it did not adequately link the substance to the controlled substance list. The court’s decision underscores the importance of establishing a clear and direct connection between the identified substance and the statutory definition of a controlled substance to secure a conviction for drug-related offenses. This case serves as a reminder for prosecutors to provide explicit evidence linking the substance to the controlled substance list, and for defense attorneys to challenge the sufficiency of such evidence when it is lacking. The failure to do so can be grounds for reversal, as demonstrated in this case.

  • People v. Shepard, 50 N.Y.2d 640 (1980): State Power to Criminalize Marijuana Possession

    People v. Shepard, 50 N.Y.2d 640 (1980)

    A state may constitutionally criminalize the possession of marijuana for personal use within the home, as this does not violate an individual’s right to privacy because the legislature has the right to make such judgements.

    Summary

    Martin Shepard was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance after police found nine marijuana plants at his home. He argued that the law criminalizing possession violated his right to privacy, as marijuana was harmless and the state had no legitimate interest in prohibiting its use. Shepard presented expert testimony supporting his claim. The prosecution countered with evidence suggesting marijuana’s harmful effects. The trial court upheld the law’s constitutionality, and the Appellate Term affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the judiciary should not substitute its judgment for the legislature’s regarding the dangers of marijuana.

    Facts

    Martin Shepard was found to be in possession of nine marijuana plants at his home in Sagaponack, New York.

    Shepard conceded possession but argued the criminal possession statute violated his right to privacy.

    Shepard presented evidence and expert testimony suggesting marijuana’s harmlessness, arguing no significant harm or health danger existed for users.

    The District Attorney countered with evidence asserting marijuana’s harmful effects, including brain damage, genetic damage, and impaired lung function.

    Procedural History

    Shepard was initially charged in the Justice Court of the Town of Southampton with felony possession, later reduced to a misdemeanor.

    The trial court denied Shepard’s motion to dismiss, finding he failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality.

    Shepard was convicted and fined $100.

    The Appellate Term affirmed the trial court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State can constitutionally criminalize the possession and cultivation of personal use quantities of marijuana within the privacy of the home without violating the right to privacy.

    Holding

    No, because the Court of Appeals deferred to the legislature’s judgment regarding the potential harms of marijuana use, stating that it is the legislature’s role to make laws and the court’s role to apply them; therefore, the judiciary should not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the individual’s right to privacy in matters such as marriage, education, procreation, contraception, and family relationships, as established in cases like Loving v. Virginia, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Skinner v. Oklahoma, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Prince v. Massachusetts and Griswold v. Connecticut. However, the court distinguished these cases from the possession of controlled substances, citing the Supreme Court’s footnote in Stanley v. Georgia, which stated that the decision protecting the private possession of obscenity did not infringe upon the power of the State to criminalize the possession of narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods.

    The court emphasized the role of the legislature in enacting laws, particularly in areas of legitimate controversy. While acknowledging disagreement regarding the effects of marijuana, the court stated that the statute represented the current judgment of the elected Legislature acting on behalf of the people of the State. Empirical data concerning the vices and virtues of marijuana for general use is far from conclusive.

    The court deferred to the legislature’s judgment, stating, “It is the business of the court to apply the law, and while we have the power, we clearly lack the right to substitute our own sense of what is a dangerous substance for the considered judgment of the Legislature. Nothing would be more inappropriate than for us to prematurely remove marihuana from the Legislature’s consideration by classifying its personal possession as a constitutionally protected right.” The court emphasized the limited scope within which it could declare a legislative act unconstitutional. Quoting Cardozo, the court noted that “The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of goodness”.

  • People v. Scarborough, 49 N.Y.2d 364 (1980): Jury Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses

    People v. Scarborough, 49 N.Y.2d 364 (1980)

    A lesser included offense should only be submitted to the jury if there is a rational basis for the jury to acquit the defendant of the greater offense while convicting on the lesser offense.

    Summary

    Defendants Scarborough and Codrington were convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. At trial, the judge declined to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of possession of a controlled substance. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that a lesser included offense instruction is only required when there is a rational basis for the jury to conclude the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. Because the prosecution’s case rested on the testimony of a single undercover officer and the defendants presented a blanket denial, there was no rational basis to distinguish between the sale and possession, making the instruction unwarranted.

    Facts

    Undercover Officer Hewitt arranged to buy heroin. He entered a storefront where Codrington was present. Hewitt told Codrington he wanted to buy 20 bags of heroin. Codrington called Scarborough inside and directed her to give Hewitt 25 glassine envelopes from a brown paper bag. Scarborough took $200 from Hewitt and gave him the envelopes, which contained heroin. A back-up officer corroborated Hewitt’s testimony and took photographs of the events.

    Procedural History

    Scarborough and Codrington were jointly indicted and tried for criminal sale of a controlled substance, as well as criminal possession. The trial court only submitted the sale charge to the jury, refusing the defense’s request to also submit the lesser possession charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted review and affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit counts of possession of a controlled substance as lesser included offenses of the charge of criminal sale of a controlled substance.

    Holding

    No, because no rational basis existed for the jury to reject the undercover officer’s testimony regarding the sale while accepting his testimony regarding possession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated that CPL 300.50 dictates when a lesser included offense must be submitted to a jury. The key is whether “there is a reasonable view of the evidence which would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser offense but did not commit the greater.” The court emphasized that a lesser-included offense instruction is not required in every case. The court cited People v. Mussenden, 308 N.Y. 558 (1955), holding that a lesser crime instruction is only justified where there is some basis in the evidence for finding the accused innocent of the higher crime, yet guilty of the lower one.

    The Court found the general rule to be: “if, on the whole record, there is not some identifiable, rational basis on which the jury could reject a portion of the prosecution’s case which is indispensable to establishment of the higher crime and yet accept so much of the proof as would establish the lesser crime, then the lesser included offense may not be submitted.” An example of a rational basis would be when the defendant denies only the element of the criminal transaction which is a necessary component of the greater crime and either admits or does not deny the elements of the lesser offense.

    The court distinguished cases where the defendant admitted to acts establishing the lesser crime or where there were inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case. Here, the only evidence came from one witness, Officer Hewitt, and the defendants issued blanket denials. There was no basis for the jury to selectively believe part of Hewitt’s testimony (possession) while disbelieving another part (sale). The court held that allowing the jury to choose would be “to countenance its arbitrary sorting of the testimony of a single witness.” As such, the instruction on the lesser included offense was not warranted.

    The court rejected the argument that the jury has the right to engage in a wholly arbitrary, even irrational, selection from the proof.

  • People v. Preston, 41 N.Y.2d 505 (1977): Admissibility of Prior Criminal Conduct Evidence

    People v. Preston, 41 N.Y.2d 505 (1977)

    Evidence of prior criminal conduct is inadmissible to show criminal propensity, but it may be admissible if directly probative of the crime charged and its probative value outweighs the potential prejudice to the defendant.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The prosecution presented evidence of a prior transaction between the defendant and an undercover officer, as well as testimony that the defendant had previously directed the officer to pay a third party. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence of the prior transaction was admissible because it was inextricably interwoven with the crime charged and highly probative. The court also found that while the testimony regarding payments to a third party was inadmissible, the trial court’s prompt curative instruction to the jury was sufficient to prevent prejudicial error. The court emphasized the importance of balancing the probative value of prior bad acts evidence against its potential for prejudice.

    Facts

    An undercover officer arranged a drug purchase from the defendant through two intermediaries. During the transaction, the defendant and the officer referred to a prior drug deal, with the defendant claiming the officer owed him money from that earlier transaction. This conversation was taped and introduced as evidence. The officer eventually purchased cocaine and heroin from the defendant, with the intermediaries facilitating the exchange.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted and convicted by a jury for criminal sale of a controlled substance. The defendant appealed, arguing that the admission of evidence of prior criminal conduct constituted reversible error. The Appellate Division sustained the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting the undercover officer’s testimony regarding a prior drug transaction with the defendant.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing the undercover officer to testify that, on prior occasions, the defendant directed him to make payments to a third party.

    Holding

    1. No, because the evidence of the prior transaction was inextricably interwoven with the present crime charged and was highly probative, outweighing any potential prejudice.
    2. No, because the trial court recognized the inadmissibility of the statement regarding payments to a third party and immediately directed the jury to disregard it, thereby curing any potential prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while evidence of uncharged criminal conduct is generally inadmissible to show criminal propensity, it can be admissible if offered for a relevant purpose other than to show a criminal disposition. Citing People v. Molineux, the court noted that such evidence might be admissible to prove motive, intent, absence of mistake, a common scheme or plan, or identity. The court emphasized that the Molineux categories are illustrative, not exclusive. In this case, the conversation about the prior transaction was “intrinsic to the bargaining between defendant and Officer Molfetta” and concerned the price to be paid and the quality of the drugs. This evidence was deemed highly probative and directly related to the crime charged. As the court stated, “[w]hen the conversation is so inextricably interwoven with the crime charged in the indictment it may be received in evidence…where, as in this case, the value of the evidence clearly outweighs any possible prejudice.”

    Regarding the officer’s testimony about prior payments to a third party, the court found that this evidence did not adequately demonstrate a common plan or scheme. However, the trial court’s prompt curative instruction to the jury was sufficient to negate any prejudice to the defendant. The court noted that the trial judge sustained the objection and directed the jury to disregard the statement, declaring, “[i]t is not evidence in this case.” The court concluded that, considering the admissibility of the initial conversation and the curative instruction, there was no prejudicial error warranting a new trial.