New York Law Review

Tag: controlled substance

  • People v. Watson, 19 N.Y.3d 252 (2012): Agency Defense Does Not Apply to Criminal Facilitation

    People v. Watson, 19 N.Y.3d 252 (2012)

    The agency defense, which can negate the “sale” element in a drug sale charge, does not extend to a charge of criminal facilitation because the facilitation statute focuses on aiding the commission of a crime, irrespective of whether the defendant acted as an agent of the buyer.

    Summary

    Tyrone Watson was charged with selling cocaine, facilitating the sale, and possessing narcotics after he assisted an undercover officer in purchasing drugs. At trial, Watson claimed he was acting as the agent of the buyer. The trial court acquitted him of the sale charge based on the agency defense but convicted him of facilitation and possession. The New York Court of Appeals held that the agency defense does not apply to criminal facilitation, emphasizing that facilitation focuses on aiding the commission of a crime and that the agency defense is only relevant to the element of “sale.” The court affirmed the conviction for criminal facilitation.

    Facts

    An undercover narcotics sergeant asked Tyrone Watson where he could find some “rock.” Watson made phone calls to locate cocaine. He then suggested they go to a specific location. The officer gave Watson $40. Watson introduced the officer to “JD Blue,” stating his companion wanted two bags of crack. Watson handed the money to Blue. Blue gave Watson the drugs, which Watson then passed to the officer. Watson was arrested and found to be in possession of cocaine and a crack pipe.

    Procedural History

    Watson was indicted for felony sale of a controlled substance, misdemeanor criminal possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor criminal facilitation. The trial court acquitted Watson of the sale count, applying the agency defense, but convicted him of criminal facilitation and possession. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the agency defense, successful in negating a charge of criminal sale of a controlled substance, also applies to a charge of criminal facilitation.

    Holding

    1. No, because the agency defense is specific to the “sale” element of a drug sale charge, whereas criminal facilitation focuses on aiding the commission of a crime, irrespective of the defendant’s role as an agent of the buyer.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that criminal facilitation occurs when a person, believing they are aiding someone intending to commit a crime, engages in conduct that provides the means or opportunity for the commission of that crime. This statute assigns culpability to someone who knowingly aids a crime but lacks the mental culpability required for accomplice liability. The court emphasized the plain language of the statute, noting Watson brought the officer to the dealer and provided the dealer the opportunity to sell cocaine. The court stated, “the facilitation statute plainly was intended to cover the type of conduct engaged in by defendant: he brought the undercover officer to JD Blue and provided the dealer with the opportunity to intentionally sell cocaine, thereby aiding the commission of that felony.”

    The court distinguished criminal facilitation from the sale of controlled substances, noting that the agency defense is “a well-established interpretation of the statutory definition of the term ‘sell.’” Since “sale” is not an element of facilitation, the agency defense is inapplicable. Penal Law § 115.10 (3) specifically states the fact that defendant was neither an accomplice to the sale nor guilty of that crime does not provide a defense to facilitation.

    Furthermore, the Court highlighted the original purpose of the agency defense—to mitigate the harsh penalties of the Rockefeller Drug Laws by reducing a defendant’s culpability from a serious felony to a possessory offense. In Watson’s case, both facilitation and possession are misdemeanors, indicating a legislative calibration of punishment that does not necessitate the agency defense. The court added that “It would be incongruous to allow a facilitator, who clearly acts as the buyer’s conduit to the drug seller and actively participates in the consummation of the transaction, to escape all criminal liability as long as that person never touches the drugs.”

  • People v. Mike, 92 N.Y.2d 996 (1998): Proximity Required for Attempt of Criminal Sale

    People v. Mike, 92 N.Y.2d 996 (1998)

    To be guilty of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance, a defendant’s actions must come dangerously near completion of the sale, and be so near that there is a very high likelihood that the crime would have been completed except for some unforeseen intervention.

    Summary

    Defendant Mike was convicted of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance. The deal fell apart when the buyer, an undercover officer, refused to front the money. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reducing the conviction to attempted criminal sale. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant’s actions did not come close enough to completing the sale to constitute an attempt. The Court emphasized that the defendant’s actions must be in dangerous proximity to the completed crime.

    Facts

    An undercover officer arranged to purchase cocaine from the defendant. The defendant stated his intent to arrange the acquisition of cocaine. The deal failed because the undercover officer refused to provide upfront money for the purchase.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after a bench trial of attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reducing the conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the original conviction of attempt.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s actions came dangerously near completion of the sale and thus constituted attempted criminal sale of a controlled substance.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s actions did not come dangerously near completion of the sale, and the circumstances were such that there was not a high likelihood that the crime would have been completed except for some unforeseen intervention.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that an attempt to commit a crime requires that the defendant has “engaged in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime”. The Court cited People v. Warren, 66 N.Y.2d 831 (1985). The Court stated, “We have consistently held that to constitute an attempt, the defendant’s conduct must have come ‘dangerously near’ commission of the completed crime”. The Court found that the evidence had to establish that defendant’s actions were “so near to the accomplishment that in all reasonable probability the crime itself would have been committed, but for timely interference.” The Court found that the transaction here did not progress to the point where completion of the sale was “assured or practically certain”, because several aspects of the sale remained unresolved. The buyer had refused to front the money and the quantity of the drugs had not been decided. Because of these uncertainties, the Court found the defendant’s actions insufficient to support a conviction for attempt. Judge Bellacosa dissented, stating that the defendant’s admission and the circumstances leading up to the failed deal were sufficient to sustain the charge.

  • In re Jahron S., 88 N.Y.2d 402 (1996): Sufficiency of Field Tests in Juvenile Delinquency Petitions

    In re Jahron S., 88 N.Y.2d 402 (1996)

    A juvenile delinquency petition supported by an undercover officer’s deposition detailing a positive NIK field test for narcotics is legally sufficient to establish the element of a controlled substance, even without a formal laboratory report.

    Summary

    This case addresses the evidentiary standard for juvenile delinquency petitions, specifically whether a “buy and bust” petition is legally sufficient when supported only by the “buy” officer’s deposition stating a NIK field test confirmed the presence of a controlled substance. The New York Court of Appeals held that such a petition is legally sufficient. The Court reasoned that the NIK test, when performed by a trained officer, provides a “reliable basis” for inferring the presence of a controlled substance, meeting the prima facie standard required for a juvenile delinquency petition. This aligns with the standard for indictments, ensuring a valid basis for subjecting a juvenile to prosecution.

    Facts

    On April 15, 1996, an undercover officer observed Jahron S. sell heroin on a Manhattan street. Jahron was arrested, and a juvenile delinquency petition was filed, charging him with criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance. The petition included a supporting deposition from the undercover officer, stating that Jahron sold him glassines containing heroin in exchange for pre-recorded buy money. The officer further stated that a NIK field test, a reliable test routinely used to determine controlled substances, indicated the substance was heroin. The officer affirmed extensive training in narcotics identification and NIK test procedures, having performed at least twenty such tests previously.

    Procedural History

    Jahron S. moved to dismiss the petition, arguing the officer’s identification of the narcotic was insufficient. The Family Court denied the motion. At the fact-finding hearing, the parties stipulated to admit a laboratory report confirming the substance was heroin. The Family Court then placed Jahron with the Division for Youth. The Appellate Division modified the Family Court’s order, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a juvenile delinquency petition charging the sale and possession of a controlled substance is legally sufficient when supported only by the “buy” officer’s deposition, which states that a NIK field test established the presence of the controlled substance.

    Holding

    Yes, because the undercover officer’s supporting deposition, relying on the NIK field test to establish the existence of a controlled substance, constituted legally sufficient evidence to meet the prima facie standard.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior decision in People v. Swamp, 84 N.Y.2d 725 (1994), which held that an uncontradicted field test result could provide legally sufficient evidence of the presence of a drug at the Grand Jury stage. The court reasoned that a juvenile delinquency petition, like an indictment, requires a prima facie showing, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court stated that “a stringent test [is appropriate] when construing challenges to the facial sufficiency of a juvenile delinquency petition to assure that there is a valid and documented basis for subjecting the juvenile to prosecution”. Citing Family Court Act § 311.2(3), the court noted that the petition must “establish, if true, every element of each crime charged and the [juvenile’s] commission thereof”. The Court found the officer’s deposition and his reliance on the NIK field test to meet this standard. The court also rejected the argument that the officer’s assertions of expertise were conclusory, noting that “prima facie evidence of the presence of a controlled substance need not be based on expert testimony. All that is required is a ‘reliable basis’ for inferring such presence”. The court emphasized that questions regarding the officer’s ability to conduct the field test go to the weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence. The court noted that if the presentment agency relied solely on the field test at the fact-finding hearing, the accuracy and reliability of the test would have to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in this case, defense counsel stipulated to the admission of a laboratory report confirming the substance was heroin, rendering this point moot.

  • People v. Roche, 88 N.Y.2d 974 (1996): Agency Defense in Criminal Sale of Controlled Substance

    People v. Roche, 88 N.Y.2d 974 (1996)

    A jury instruction on the agency defense in a criminal sale of a controlled substance case is sufficient when it accurately conveys that the jury can consider any benefit received from the buyer as supportive of the defense.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree for selling crack cocaine to an undercover officer. At trial, she argued an agency defense, claiming she bought the drugs on the officer’s behalf. She appealed, arguing the trial court’s charge to the jury on the agency defense was insufficient under People v. Andujas. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the jury instruction was adequate because it correctly stated that the jury could consider any benefit received from the buyer when deciding if the defendant acted as the buyer’s agent.

    Facts

    The defendant sold two vials of crack cocaine to an undercover police officer.

    At trial, the defendant claimed the officer asked her to get crack for him and offered to “get her high.”

    She testified she bought four vials, kept two for herself, and expected to barter sex later for the officer providing her with crack.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree.

    She appealed, arguing the trial court’s jury charge on the agency defense was insufficient.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in its jury instruction regarding the agency defense, specifically whether the instruction failed to adequately convey that any benefit received from the buyer could support the defense.

    Holding

    No, because the jury charge, taken as a whole, accurately instructed the jury that it could consider any benefit received from the buyer as supportive of the agency defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found no merit in the defendant’s argument that the trial court should have expanded its charge on the agency defense under People v. Andujas, 79 N.Y.2d 113.

    The court correctly instructed the jury that it could consider any benefit received from the buyer as supportive of an agency defense.

    The Court determined that, “in that context, the charge as a whole accurately provided the jury with the proper instruction (see, e.g., People v Fields, 87 N.Y.2d 821; People v Warren, 76 N.Y.2d 773).”

    The Court emphasized that the key is that the charge as a whole conveys the proper understanding of the law. It did not require a specific formulation beyond ensuring the jury understood that benefits from the buyer could support the defense.

  • People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 509 (1995): Defining ‘Sale’ of Narcotics Under New York Law

    People v. Starling, 85 N.Y.2d 509 (1995)

    Under New York Penal Law, the term “sell,” concerning controlled substances, includes any transfer of a controlled substance from one person to another, even without monetary exchange or commercial benefit.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a “handoff” of narcotics between two individuals to avoid police detection constitutes a “sale” under Penal Law § 220.00(1). The police observed Starling passing a bag of cocaine to a juvenile. Starling was charged with criminal sale and possession with intent to sell. The Court held that the transfer of drugs, even without monetary consideration, falls within the statutory definition of “sell,” which includes “give or dispose of to another.” The Court affirmed the conviction, emphasizing the legislature’s intent to encompass any form of transfer, regardless of commercial nature.

    Facts

    Police officers observed Starling handing a small paper bag to a juvenile on a street corner after observing Starling exchanging an item from the bag for what appeared to be paper currency with an unknown third party. Upon approaching Starling, he handed the bag to a juvenile. The juvenile discarded the bag, which was found to contain seven ziplock bags of cocaine. $376 was recovered from Starling during arrest.

    Procedural History

    Starling was indicted on charges of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39[1]) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16[1]). Starling moved for a trial order of dismissal, arguing the prosecution failed to prove a “sale” or intent to sell. The trial court denied the motions. The Appellate Division affirmed Starling’s conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under Penal Law § 220.00(1), a “handoff” of narcotics between two individuals, absent evidence of monetary exchange or other consideration, constitutes a “sale”?

    Holding

    Yes, because the statutory definition of “sell” includes “to give or dispose of to another,” encompassing any transfer of a controlled substance, regardless of whether it is commercial in nature.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the broad statutory definition of “sell” in Penal Law § 220.00(1), which includes “to sell, exchange, give or dispose of to another.” This definition demonstrates the Legislature’s intent to include any form of transfer, rejecting the need for commercial elements. The Court cited People v. Lam Lek Chong, 45 NY2d 64, 72 stating that the legislative intent was to “include any form of transfer of a controlled substance from one person to another”. The court also referred to People v. Herring, 83 NY2d 780, 782, emphasizing that “a defendant may be guilty as a seller even if he does not receive any consideration for the transfer of drugs to the buyer”. The Court rejected Starling’s argument that the transfer could not be a sale because the juvenile may have jointly possessed the drugs. The Court stated that the record lacked sufficient evidence that the juvenile exercised any control over the contraband prior to the handoff. Therefore, the trial court properly declined to charge the jury on the concepts of joint, constructive and temporary possession. Regarding Starling’s claim that the court failed to comply with the notice requirements of CPL 310.30 in responding to the jury’s notes, the Court found that because the court read the content of the jury’s notes in open court prior to responding, this case was distinguishable from People v. O’Rama, 78 NY2d 270. Defense counsel was given notice of the contents of the jury notes and had knowledge of the substance of the court’s intended response and counsel’s silence at a time when any error by the court could have been obviated by timely objection renders the claim unpreserved and unreviewable.

  • People v. Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705 (1988): Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence for Constructive Possession

    People v. Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705 (1988)

    When the evidence of constructive possession is entirely circumstantial, the prosecution must prove that the evidence is inconsistent with the defendant’s innocence and excludes to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis.

    Summary

    Rivera was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance based on constructive possession of cocaine found in a car. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding the circumstantial evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rivera exercised dominion and control over the drugs. The Court emphasized that the evidence did not exclude other reasonable hypotheses, particularly that someone else placed the drugs in the car without Rivera’s knowledge.

    Facts

    Rivera attended a meeting with his parole officer. He was followed by other parole officers after the meeting. Rivera approached the passenger side of a red Camaro where a woman was seated. Parole officers detained Rivera and searched the car. A package containing 100 vials of crack cocaine was found on the floor of the driver’s side. Rivera’s parole officer testified she had seen Rivera driving the Camaro a week prior. Rivera did not own the car, and it hadn’t been reported stolen. Rivera possessed the car’s registration and insurance card. The woman was in the car at the time of the arrest. Rivera was away from the car for two hours prior to his arrest.

    Procedural History

    Rivera was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Rivera constructively possessed the cocaine found in the red Camaro.

    Holding

    1. No, because the circumstantial evidence presented was not inconsistent with Rivera’s innocence and did not exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that because the evidence was entirely circumstantial, the prosecution was required to prove that the evidence was inconsistent with Rivera’s innocence and excluded to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis. The court found that the evidence failed to meet this standard. Although Rivera had been seen driving the car a week earlier, he wasn’t seen driving it on the day of the arrest. He did not own the car, and the keys were not in his possession. Moreover, the presence of another person in the car at the time of the arrest created a reasonable doubt as to whether Rivera had knowledge or control over the drugs. The court stated, “In fact, the evidence presented at trial is fully consistent with a finding that the woman or someone else had placed the cocaine in the car without the knowledge or participation of the defendant.” The Court reasoned that the evidence did not exclude the possibility that the cocaine was placed in the car without Rivera’s knowledge, thus failing to prove constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt. The court relied on precedent such as People v. Giuliano, 65 N.Y.2d 766, 767-768 and People v. Benzinger, 36 NY2d 29, 32.

  • People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61 (1982): Establishing Lesser Included Offenses in New York

    People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61 (1982)

    A defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense charge only if (1) it is theoretically impossible to commit the greater crime without also committing the lesser crime, and (2) a reasonable view of the evidence supports a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals clarified the two-pronged test for determining when a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense. The Court emphasized that the first prong requires a theoretical, abstract comparison of the statutory definitions of the crimes, not an examination of the specific facts of the case. The second prong requires that there be a reasonable view of the evidence in the particular case that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. In this case, the court found that it is theoretically possible to sell drugs without the intent to aid another person in committing a Class A felony. Therefore, the defendant was not entitled to a charge of criminal facilitation as a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree. At trial, the defendant requested that the court also charge the jury on criminal facilitation in the second degree as a lesser included offense.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s request to charge the jury on criminal facilitation. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to charge the jury on criminal facilitation in the second degree as a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree.

    Holding

    No, because it is theoretically possible to commit the greater crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance without also committing the lesser crime of criminal facilitation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals articulated a two-pronged test for determining when a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense charge. The first prong, derived from CPL 1.20(37), requires that it be “impossible to commit the greater crime without concomitantly, by the same conduct, committing the lesser offense.” This is determined by comparing the statutes in the abstract, without reference to the specific facts of the case. The second prong, prescribed by CPL 300.50(1), requires “an assessment of the evidence of the particular criminal transaction in the individual case and a determination that there is a reasonable view of such evidence which would support a finding that, while the defendant did commit the lesser offense, he did not commit the greater.”

    The Court found that the defendant failed to satisfy the first prong. The Court reasoned that “it would be theoretically possible for a defendant illegally to sell a drug without intending to aid anyone else in the commission of a class A felony (as, for instance, when the criminal transaction involved only the defendant and an undercover police buyer).” Because the defendant could not satisfy the first prong of the test, the Court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on criminal facilitation.

    The Court explicitly overruled prior cases like People v. Johnson, People v. Cionek, and People v. Hayes, “to the extent that our decisions…may be read as at variance with this application, they are no longer to be followed.” These cases had resolved the first inquiry by examining only the criminal transaction on which the particular prosecution was predicated.

  • People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78 (1978): Establishing Agency Defense in Drug Sales

    People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78 (1978)

    In a prosecution for the sale of a controlled substance, a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on the agency defense if there is a reasonable view of the evidence to suggest they acted solely as the buyer’s agent, without any independent commercial interest in promoting the transaction.

    Summary

    Roche was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. At trial, he requested a jury instruction on the agency defense, arguing he acted solely as the buyer’s agent. The trial court denied the request, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Roche’s testimony presented a reasonable view of the evidence supporting the agency defense. The court emphasized that if Roche procured the drugs solely to accommodate a friend without any profit motive, he acted as an agent, and the jury should have been instructed accordingly. The indictment charging a sale to a specific person does not preclude an agency defense based on transferring the substance to another individual. Thus, the failure to charge agency was reversible error.

    Facts

    Undercover Officer Fargione and informant Bowe went to Roche’s apartment to buy cocaine, pre-arranged by phone calls between Roche and Bowe. According to the prosecution, Roche handed Bowe an envelope containing cocaine. Bowe took some, added flour, and gave the rest to Fargione. Fargione tried to pay Roche, but Roche directed the money to Bowe, who then gave it to Roche.

    Roche testified that Bowe repeatedly asked him to get cocaine. Roche procured one gram for $125 as a favor, making no profit and having no interest in the transaction. He gave the cocaine to Bowe, who added flour, and Bowe paid him in Fargione’s absence. Roche stated this was the first time he had ever procured cocaine for another.

    Procedural History

    Roche was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the agency defense. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Roche then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the agency defense, given Roche’s testimony suggesting he acted solely as an agent for the buyer.

    Holding

    Yes, because Roche’s testimony provided a reasonable view of the evidence that he acted solely to accommodate a friend (Bowe) without any commercial interest in promoting the transaction, thus entitling him to a jury instruction on the agency defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the agency defense applies when a defendant acts solely as the buyer’s alter ego in procuring drugs. If there is a reasonable view of the evidence supporting the claim that the defendant acted as an instrumentality of the buyer, the court must instruct the jury on the agency defense. The court stated, “In this case, failure to grant defendant’s timely request to charge agency constitutes reversible error. Defendant’s testimony raised the question of whether he simply purchased and delivered a small quantity of drugs solely to accommodate a friend without any commercial interest in promoting the transaction — the quintessential agency relationship.”

    The court dismissed the argument that the transfer of drugs from Bowe to Fargione invalidated the agency defense, stating that under Roche’s version of the facts, these were two distinct transactions. The court also rejected the argument that the indictment charging a sale to Fargione precluded the agency defense. The court stated, “The corpus delicti of the crime charged was the transfer of a controlled substance (Penal Law, § 220.00, subd 1); the person to whom that substance was transferred was immaterial to this conviction.” The court noted that denying the agency defense in this circumstance would be “tantamount to a ruling that the transfer constituted a sale as a matter of law without putting the People to their burden of disproving an agency relationship.” The court concluded that the People cannot deprive a defendant of the agency defense by charging them with a sale to whomever ultimately obtains the drugs.

  • People v. Cullen, 50 N.Y.2d 168 (1980): Establishing Geographical Jurisdiction for Possessory Crimes

    People v. Cullen, 50 N.Y.2d 168 (1980)

    For the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance, jurisdiction requires that knowledge and possession occur simultaneously; the element of knowledge cannot occur before possession for the purpose of establishing jurisdiction.

    Summary

    Paul Cullen was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Nassau County lacked jurisdiction because the drug sale occurred in New York County. The Court of Appeals reversed and remitted, holding that evidence existed for the jury to find jurisdiction based on possession in a vehicle traveling through multiple counties. The court clarified that while a jury could find jurisdiction if the location of the crime was unknown and the crime occurred in a vehicle traveling through multiple counties, as per CPL 20.40(4)(g), the jury instructions were deficient, and also clarified that intent to possess formed in one county cannot confer jurisdiction if possession occurred in another. The court also noted that the defendant’s admission of guilt should have been suppressed because he was not provided counsel, because the defendant was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant.

    Facts

    A confidential informant contacted Paul Cullen to purchase peyote. The informant and an undercover officer drove to Cullen’s Nassau County home, picked him up, and proceeded to New York County for the sale. In New York County, the officer paid Cullen for the drugs, and Cullen obtained the drugs. The three men then returned to Nassau County.

    Procedural History

    Cullen was indicted in Nassau County for criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance. His motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction was denied. The jury found him guilty of second-degree criminal possession but not guilty of the other charges. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction, finding that Nassau County lacked jurisdiction because the sale occurred in New York County. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find that Nassau County had geographical jurisdiction over the offense of criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was evidence presented at trial that the defendant possessed the drugs in a private vehicle during a trip extending through both New York County and Nassau County.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the Appellate Division erred in finding no evidence to support Nassau County’s jurisdiction. The informant testified that the drugs were passed around in the car during the return trip to Nassau County, and the defendant had possession of them at one point. Therefore, the jury could have found that the offense of possession occurred in a vehicle traveling through multiple counties, satisfying CPL 20.40(4)(g). The court clarified the standard for CPL 20.40(4)(g), noting that its use is only appropriate when the location of the crime is unknown, in accordance with People v. Moore. The court emphasized that the trial court’s charge on jurisdiction, although potentially erroneous, became the law of the case because the defendant did not object. Regarding the element of intent, the court stated that for possession crimes, “knowledge” and “possession” must occur simultaneously. The court found the defendant’s admission of guilt inadmissible, stating that “a defendant cannot waive his rights in the absence of counsel after being arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant,” citing People v. Samuels. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division to determine whether the jury’s finding of jurisdiction was against the weight of the evidence. The court concluded that if jurisdiction is sustained, the defendant is entitled to a new trial due to the inadmissible confession.

  • People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78 (1978): The Agency Defense in Drug Sales

    People v. Roche, 45 N.Y.2d 78 (1978)

    A defendant who acts solely as the agent of a buyer in a drug transaction, without a profit motive or direct interest in the sale, is not guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance.

    Summary

    The case addresses the “agency defense” in drug sale cases, where a defendant claims to have acted solely as the buyer’s agent. Roche was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division reversed this conviction, holding that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the agency defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a reasonable view of the evidence supported the agency defense because Roche did not initiate the drug transaction, appeared to be acting as a go-between, and did not personally profit. The court emphasized that the agency defense is applicable when the defendant acts solely on behalf of the buyer, without any independent interest in promoting the sale. However, the court affirmed Roche’s conviction for criminal possession, as agency is not a defense to possession.

    Facts

    Undercover officer Lugo befriended Roche. Lugo expressed interest in buying narcotics, and Roche indicated he could help. After Lugo repeatedly contacted Roche, they met, and Roche directed Lugo to a bar in Manhattan to “see the man” (the seller). Roche entered alone, returning to Lugo with the price: $4,000. Lugo gave Roche the money, and Roche re-entered the bar. Roche then directed Lugo to a discotheque for the drug delivery. At the discotheque, Lugo saw a man hand Roche a package, which Roche then gave to Lugo. The package contained heroin. Lugo later complained about the heroin’s quality, but Roche offered no adjustment.

    Procedural History

    Roche was indicted for criminal sale and criminal possession of a controlled substance. At trial, the court denied Roche’s request for a jury instruction on the agency defense. The jury convicted Roche. The Appellate Division modified the judgment by reversing the sale conviction and ordering a new trial on that count, while affirming the possession conviction. Both Roche and the prosecution appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the agency defense, where the defendant acted solely as the buyer’s agent in a drug transaction, is still valid under New York law.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the agency defense, given the evidence presented.

    3. Whether agency is a defense to criminal possession of a controlled substance.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Legislature has not abolished the defense, indicating its acceptance of the ameliorative judgment not to punish a person who merely facilitates a buyer’s acquisition of drugs.

    2. Yes, because a reasonable view of the evidence suggested that Roche acted as a mere instrumentality of the buyer, warranting a jury instruction on the agency defense.

    3. No, because agency is not a defense to criminal possession, as knowingly possessing the heroin, even briefly, constitutes the crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reaffirmed the validity of the agency defense, stating that one who acts solely as the procuring agent for the buyer is a principal or conspirator in the purchase rather than the sale. Since the statutes are aimed at sellers, not buyers, someone assisting only the buyer incurs no greater liability than the buyer. This defense is a common-law attempt to recognize medical and sociological aspects that complicate a defendant’s participation. The court emphasized that the agency defense requires the agent to have no direct interest in the contraband being sold and no profit motive. The court outlined factors to consider when determining agency, such as salesman-like behavior, touting the product’s quality, bargaining over price, previous acquaintance with the supplier, and whether the accused advanced their own funds. The court found that there was an issue of fact on the question of agency because Roche did not initiate the transaction, Lugo pursued him, and there was no proof of material benefit to Roche. The court stated: “so long as there is some reasonable view of the evidence that the defendant acted as a mere instrumentality of the buyer, determination of the existence of an agency relationship should be submitted to the jury with appropriate instructions”. The court emphasized that agency is not an affirmative defense but negates the “sale” element of the crime. The court distinguished between sale and possession and concluded since Roche had possessed the drugs, even briefly, agency was not a defense to the possession charge.