New York Law Review

Tag: Continuing Wrong Doctrine

  • Capruso v. Village of Kings Point, 21 N.Y.3d 631 (2013): Applying the Continuing Wrong Doctrine to Public Trust Violations

    Capruso v. Village of Kings Point, 21 N.Y.3d 631 (2013)

    The continuing wrong doctrine tolls the statute of limitations for ongoing violations of the public trust doctrine related to unauthorized non-park use of dedicated parkland.

    Summary

    The Village of Kings Point sought to build a Department of Public Works (DPW) facility on a portion of dedicated parkland. Residents and the State of New York sued, alleging violations of the public trust doctrine. The Village argued the statute of limitations had expired because the non-park use of the land began decades earlier. The Court of Appeals held that the continuing wrong doctrine applied, allowing the challenge to proceed despite the passage of time because the ongoing non-park use constituted a continuous violation of the public trust.

    Facts

    The Village of Kings Point acquired Kings Point Park in the 1920s. In 1938, the Village leased the park to the Great Neck Park District. In 1946, the Village amended the lease to exclude the “Western Corner” of the park, intending to use it for a pistol range and storage. The Village renewed the lease with this exclusion. The Village erected structures, including a garage and a Quonset hut, on the Western Corner. In 2008, the Village proposed building a 12,000-square-foot DPW facility on the Western Corner, involving deforestation, regrading, and fencing.

    Procedural History

    Residents sued the Village in 2009 to enjoin the DPW project and current use of the Western Corner. The State of New York filed a similar suit. Supreme Court denied the Village’s motion to dismiss and granted a preliminary injunction. The Appellate Division affirmed. After discovery, Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the residents and the State, permanently enjoining the DPW project and ordering the removal of materials from the Western Corner. The Appellate Division modified the order, deleting the award of attorney’s fees, and affirmed. The Village appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statute of limitations barred the action challenging the proposed DPW facility, given the Village’s prior non-park use of the land.

    2. Whether the continuing wrong doctrine applies to toll the statute of limitations for the Village’s ongoing non-park use of the Western Corner.

    3. Whether laches barred the claims brought by the plaintiffs and the State.

    Holding

    1. No, because the proposed DPW facility was a substantial change in the nature and scope of the existing non-park use.

    2. Yes, because the ongoing non-park use of parkland constitutes a continuous violation of the public trust doctrine.

    3. No, because laches does not apply to the State acting in a governmental capacity, nor does it apply when plaintiffs allege a continuing wrong.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court reasoned that the proposed DPW facility was not merely a change in the scope of existing non-park use but a substantial new intrusion. Therefore, the cause of action challenging the facility was not time-barred. Regarding the ongoing non-park use, the Court applied the continuing wrong doctrine, which tolls the statute of limitations when the harm is not traced exclusively to the initial objectionable act but is ongoing. The Court stated that “[t]he harm sustained by the public when structures having ‘no connection with park purposes . . . encroach upon [parkland] without legislative authority plainly conferred’ . . . cannot be traced exclusively to the day when the illegal encroachment began” (quoting Williams v Gallatin, 229 NY 248, 253 [1920]). Because the Village’s violation of the public trust doctrine was continuous, a new cause of action accrued with each successive day, allowing the plaintiffs to challenge the use despite the passage of time. The Court also rejected the Village’s laches defense, noting it did not apply to the State acting to protect a public interest, nor to ongoing wrongs. The court emphasized the unreasonableness of expecting ordinary citizens to know whether a municipality has obtained legislative approval for parkland uses. The court explicitly distinguished this case from a one-time event like the sale of parkland, leaving that issue for another day.

  • 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 814 (1978): Statute of Limitations on Unconscionable Leases

    8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 814 (1978)

    A cause of action to rescind a lease based on unconscionability accrues at the execution of the lease, and the statute of limitations begins to run from that date, even if the effects of the lease continue over time.

    Summary

    8200 Realty Corp. sued Lindsay to rescind a lease, claiming it was unconscionable. The lawsuit was filed more than six years after the lease was signed. The court considered whether a newly enacted law regarding unconscionable leases could revive the time-barred claim and whether the lease constituted a continuing wrong that would restart the statute of limitations. The court held that the claim was time-barred because the statute of limitations began when the lease was executed, and the new law did not retroactively revive claims already expired. The court rejected the argument that the unconscionable lease was a continuing wrong.

    Facts

    8200 Realty Corp. (landlord) entered into a lease agreement with Lindsay (tenants). More than six years after the lease was executed, the landlord filed a lawsuit seeking to rescind the lease, alleging it was unconscionable. The landlord argued that Section 235-c of the Real Property Law, enacted after the action commenced, provided grounds for relief. The landlord also argued that the unconscionable lease constituted a continuing wrong, which would restart the statute of limitations.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts likely ruled against the plaintiff, leading to an appeal to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division’s order was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Section 235-c of the Real Property Law, enacted after the commencement of the action, revives a claim to rescind a lease based on unconscionability that is already time-barred?

    2. Whether an unconscionable lease constitutes a continuing wrong such that the statute of limitations is continuously renewed throughout the duration of the lease?

    Holding

    1. No, because an intent by the Legislature to revive already time-barred claims must be clearly and unequivocally expressed, and the language of Section 235-c does not demonstrate such an intent.

    2. No, because the execution of the unconscionable lease is the event giving rise to the claim, and the cause of action accrues at the time of execution, regardless of the lease’s continued effect.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that statutes should not be applied retroactively to revive claims already barred by the statute of limitations unless the legislature clearly intended such a result. The court found that the language of Section 235-c of the Real Property Law, and its legislative history, did not express a clear intent to revive time-barred claims. The court stated, “An intent on the part of the Legislature to effect so drastic a consequence must be expressed clearly and unequivocally (Hopkins v Lincoln Trust Co., 233 NY 213, 215).”

    Regarding the continuing wrong theory, the court held that the cause of action accrued at the execution of the lease, even though the effects of the lease continued. The court distinguished between the event giving rise to the claim (the execution of the unconscionable lease) and the continuing effects of that event. The court emphasized that the question of whether a defense of unconscionability would be available beyond the limitation period was not at issue.