New York Law Review

Tag: constructive possession

  • People v. Diaz, 22 N.Y.3d 455 (2013): Establishing Dominion and Control in Drug Possession and Unlawfully Dealing with a Child

    People v. Diaz, 22 N.Y.3d 455 (2013)

    To establish constructive possession of illegal drugs, the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the area where the drugs were found. Additionally, a person can be found guilty of unlawfully dealing with a child if they knowingly permit a child to remain in a place where drug-related activity is occurring.

    Summary

    In People v. Diaz, the defendant was found guilty of seventh-degree criminal drug possession and four counts of unlawfully dealing with a child. Police executed a search warrant at her apartment and discovered heroin and drug paraphernalia in her bedroom. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the evidence supported a finding that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the drugs, as they were found in her bedroom, which she leased, and that she knowingly permitted children to remain in a place where drug-related activity was taking place. The court emphasized that the defendant had a sufficient level of control over the premises where the contraband was discovered and was aware of the presence of the drugs, thus supporting the convictions.

    Facts

    Police executed a search warrant at Sandra Diaz’s apartment where she resided with her children and her niece, along with her children’s father, Matías Rivera. Officers found approximately 30 glassine envelopes of heroin, Suboxone pills, and drug paraphernalia in Diaz’s bedroom, mixed with her personal belongings. Diaz was the leaseholder of the apartment. Both Diaz and Rivera were charged with multiple drug-related offenses, including possession with intent to sell and unlawfully dealing with a child. Diaz claimed she was unaware of the drugs. The jury acquitted her of possession with intent to sell but convicted her of lesser-included possessory crimes and unlawfully dealing with a child.

    Procedural History

    Diaz was convicted in the trial court of seventh-degree criminal drug possession and four counts of unlawfully dealing with a child. The Appellate Division affirmed her conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted Diaz leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that Diaz exercised dominion and control over the heroin and drug paraphernalia.
    2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict Diaz of unlawfully dealing with a child under Penal Law § 260.20 (1).

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the drugs were found in Diaz’s bedroom, and she was the leaseholder, the jury could reasonably infer dominion and control.
    2. Yes, because sufficient evidence existed demonstrating the presence of drug activity in Diaz’s apartment, and Diaz knew or should have known of the activity and the presence of the children in the residence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that Diaz exercised dominion and control over the narcotics because they were found in her bedroom, and she was the leaseholder of the apartment. The court referenced People v. Manini, stating that dominion and control can be established by a sufficient level of control over the area where the contraband is found. The court also cited People v. Reisman, noting that “generally, possession suffices to permit the inference that the possessor knows what he possesses, especially, but not exclusively, if it is . . . on his premises.”

    Regarding unlawfully dealing with a child, the court held that the evidence supported Diaz’s conviction under Penal Law § 260.20 (1). The statute requires that the defendant knowingly permits a child to enter or remain in a place where drug activity is occurring. The court found that the jury could reasonably conclude that Diaz knew about the drug-related activity and that children were present in the apartment, even though she was not convicted of the related paraphernalia charges. The court noted that the co-defendant, Rivera, was convicted of criminal use of drug paraphernalia, constituting commercial drug-related activity within the apartment. The court found that the evidence established Diaz’s guilt even under her narrower interpretation of the statute.

  • People v. Kims, II, 24 N.Y.3d 421 (2014): Limits of the ‘Drug Factory’ Presumption

    People v. Kims, II, 24 N.Y.3d 421 (2014)

    The “drug factory” presumption of Penal Law § 220.25(2), which allows jurors to infer possession based on proximity to drugs in plain view, does not apply when a defendant is apprehended outside the premises and not in immediate flight.

    Summary

    Stanley Kims was convicted of drug possession charges. The prosecution relied on the “drug factory” presumption, arguing Kims was in close proximity to drugs found in his apartment even though he was arrested outside. The New York Court of Appeals held that the presumption was improperly applied because Kims was not in “close proximity” to the drugs at the time of his arrest, as he was outside the apartment and not fleeing. The Court reversed the convictions for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees, ordering a new trial on those counts, but affirmed the remaining convictions.

    Facts

    Detective McNitt received information that Kims was operating a drug stash house. Kims’ parole officer, Glennon, visited Kims’ residence and saw Kims and his cousin, Sawyer, exit the building. Glennon called out to Kims, who then reversed his car. Glennon observed Kims reach into the vehicle’s console area. Officers drew their guns and ordered Kims and Sawyer to exit the vehicle. Drugs were found on Sawyer and in the car. After Kims’ arrest, officers conducted a protective sweep of the apartment and found drugs and drug paraphernalia in open view. A search warrant later revealed more drugs and cash.

    Procedural History

    Kims was indicted on drug possession charges. The trial court denied Kims’ motion to suppress the evidence found in the apartment. The jury convicted Kims on all counts. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reversing the convictions for criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and third degrees and ordering a new trial on those counts, while affirming the remaining convictions. Both the People and Kims were granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in charging the jury on the presumption of knowing possession under Penal Law § 220.25(2) when the defendant was apprehended outside the premises.

    2. Whether, if the charge was given in error, the error was harmless.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendant was not in “close proximity” to the drugs as required by Penal Law § 220.25(2) when he was apprehended outside the premises and not in immediate flight.

    2. No, because it is impossible to determine whether the jury based its verdict on the improper presumption or the alternative charge of constructive possession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Penal Law § 220.25(2) allows a jury to presume knowing possession when a defendant is in “close proximity” to drugs in open view, under circumstances evincing a drug sale operation. The purpose of this “drug factory” presumption is to assist police in identifying culpable individuals involved in a drug business within premises being used for drug operations. The Court emphasized that “close proximity” requires the defendant to be sufficiently near the drugs to suggest participation in the drug operation, and that structural barriers may be a factor. However, once a defendant has left the premises, the justification for the presumption weakens, unless the defendant is caught in immediate flight. In Kims’ case, he was outside the premises, had entered his vehicle, and was not fleeing when apprehended. Therefore, the “drug factory” presumption did not apply. The Court applied the precedent set in People v. Martinez, stating that when a jury renders a general verdict and it’s unclear whether the verdict was based on an erroneous charge (the drug factory presumption) or a proper one (constructive possession), the error isn’t harmless. Because the jury could have based its verdict on the improper presumption, a new trial was ordered. The Court further held that while references to Kims’ alleged gang affiliation were improperly admitted, the error was harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt. Additionally, the protective sweep was justified by exigent circumstances. The Court found Kims’ other claims to be without merit or unpreserved.

  • People v. Jones, 90 N.Y.2d 52 (1997): Establishing Reasonable Suspicion During a Vertical Sweep

    People v. Jones, 90 N.Y.2d 52 (1997)

    Police detention of a suspect during a vertical sweep of an apartment building requires reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.

    Summary

    During a vertical sweep of an apartment building known for drug activity, police encountered the defendant under suspicious circumstances. The Court of Appeals held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant. The court reasoned that the defendant’s presence near an open apartment door, his reaction to seeing the officer, and the context of a vertical sweep in a building known for drug activity, provided sufficient grounds to suspect the defendant of trespassing, which justified the brief detention. The court affirmed the conviction, also finding sufficient evidence for constructive possession of the drugs found in the apartment.

    Facts

    On March 29, 1996, NYPD officers conducted a vertical sweep of a four-story apartment building in Manhattan, pursuant to a trespass affidavit indicating the building was plagued by illegal drug trade. An officer encountered the defendant on the third floor near the open door of apartment 3D after hearing someone call out to an individual known for narcotics arrests. The defendant appeared surprised upon seeing the officer, then turned as if to knock on apartment 3C, but instead walked toward a staircase. The officer then observed coffee grounds and drug paraphernalia in plain view inside the open apartment 3D.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance based on constructive possession. The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress money found during a search incident to arrest. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. This appeal followed after a judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police had reasonable suspicion to detain the defendant during a vertical sweep of an apartment building?

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant’s presence outside an open apartment door in a building known for drug activity, his suspicious behavior upon seeing the officer, and the observation of drug paraphernalia inside the apartment provided reasonable suspicion that the defendant was trespassing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the principle that police seizure of a suspect must be justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, citing People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444, 447 (1992). The court referenced People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223 (1976), noting that permissible police intrusion intensifies with escalating evidence of criminal activity. It reasoned that the purpose of the vertical sweep was to apprehend trespassers, and Penal Law § 140.05 only requires illegal entry or remaining on the premises to constitute trespassing. The court determined that the defendant’s presence near the open apartment door, his reaction to the officer, and the context of the sweep provided reasonable suspicion of trespassing, justifying the brief detention. The court also found sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the apartment, supporting the constructive possession charge, citing People v. Kennedy, 47 N.Y.2d 196, 201-202 (1979). The court emphasized that the determination of reasonable suspicion is a mixed question of law and fact, which is beyond their review if supported by the record.

  • People v. Torres, 89 N.Y.2d 920 (1996): Establishing Constructive Possession in Drug Factory Cases

    People v. Torres, 89 N.Y.2d 920 (1996)

    Evidence beyond mere presence, indicating a defendant’s connection to a drug factory operation, can establish constructive possession of narcotics and weapons found within the premises.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of controlled substances and a weapon. The evidence established more than the defendant’s mere presence at the apartment. The jury could reasonably infer that the defendant was a trusted member of the drug operation and thus had constructive possession of the drugs, money, and weapons that were in plain view inside the apartment. The court also noted that because the jury could infer that some drugs were part of the drug factory’s supply, they could infer that all the contraband was controlled by the factory’s operatives.

    Facts

    Police charged the defendant with multiple counts of criminal possession related to controlled substances and weapons. The charges stemmed from evidence discovered in an apartment where a large cache of drugs, money, and weapons was found in plain view. A photograph of the defendant suggested a connection to the drug factory operation within the apartment.

    Procedural History

    The trial court submitted one count to the jury based on the drug factory presumption and the remaining eight counts on constructive possession. The jury convicted the defendant on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions based on the theory of constructive possession. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish the defendant’s constructive possession of the narcotics and weapons found in the apartment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence established more than the defendant’s mere presence at the apartment; it showed the defendant’s presence under a set of circumstances from which a jury could infer possession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the trial evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant’s possession of all narcotics and weapons recovered. The court relied on the principle that possession can be inferred from circumstances indicating the defendant’s control over the contraband, citing People v. Tirado, 38 N.Y.2d 955, 956. In addition to the defendant’s photograph, the court reasoned that a reasonable jury could conclude that only trusted members of the operation would be allowed into an apartment containing a large quantity of drugs, money, and weapons in plain view. “In the particular facts of this case, the jury could also infer that, if the drugs to which the statutory presumption applied were part of the drug factory’s supply, all the contraband found must have been controlled by the factory’s operatives.” The court highlighted that the Appellate Division properly affirmed the convictions based on constructive possession.

  • People v. Andrews, 78 N.Y.2d 88 (1991): Limits of Automatic Standing in Possessory Crimes

    People v. Andrews, 78 N.Y.2d 88 (1991)

    Automatic standing to challenge a search and seizure is limited to cases where the criminal possessory charge is rooted solely in a statutory presumption attributing possession to the defendant; it does not extend to charges based on ordinary constructive possession.

    Summary

    Defendant Andrews was convicted of drug and weapons charges. He sought to suppress evidence, arguing he had standing. The Court of Appeals held that automatic standing only applies when the possessory charge is *solely* based on a statutory presumption. Since the weapon and paraphernalia charges were based on constructive possession, not solely on a statutory presumption, Andrews had to demonstrate a personal expectation of privacy in the searched premises, which he failed to do. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, limiting the application of automatic standing.

    Facts

    Police searched an apartment and found controlled substances, a weapon, and drug paraphernalia. Andrews was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance, criminal possession of a weapon, and criminally using drug paraphernalia. The drug charge was based on Penal Law §220.25 (2), a statutory presumption. The other charges were based on constructive possession. Andrews did not reside at the apartment.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially denied Andrews’ motion to suppress for lack of standing. The Appellate Division held the appeal in abeyance and remitted for a hearing on the suppression motion. On remittal, the Supreme Court held Andrews had automatic standing to challenge the drug charge but needed to demonstrate a personal expectation of privacy for the other charges. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reversing the drug conviction but affirming the others. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the standing issue for the weapon and drug paraphernalia charges.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant should be accorded automatic standing to challenge the search and seizure of the weapon and drug paraphernalia, where one charge (drug possession) was rooted in a statutory presumption, but the other charges were based on ordinary constructive possession.

    Holding

    No, because automatic standing is a narrow exception limited to cases where the criminal possessory charge is rooted *solely* in a statutory presumption attributing possession to the defendant. Since the charges related to the weapon and paraphernalia were based on ordinary constructive possession, the defendant was required to demonstrate a personal expectation of privacy in the searched premises.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the distinction between statutory presumption-based possession and ordinary constructive possession. Citing People v. Wesley, the Court stated that when a charge is based on ordinary constructive possession, standing is available only if the defendant demonstrates a “personal legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises.” The Court refused to extend the automatic standing exception established in People v. Millan, which applies when possession is attributed solely through a statutory presumption, to cases involving constructive possession based on other evidence. The Court reasoned that expanding automatic standing would undermine the general rule requiring a personal expectation of privacy. The Court quoted People v. Ponder, stating that a defendant must ” ‘establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy’ ” to challenge a search. The court emphasized that the “unfairness… perceived in Millan is not present in cases where a defendant is charged with constructive possession on the basis of evidence other than the statutory presumption”.

  • People v. Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705 (1988): Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence for Constructive Possession

    People v. Rivera, 71 N.Y.2d 705 (1988)

    When the evidence of constructive possession is entirely circumstantial, the prosecution must prove that the evidence is inconsistent with the defendant’s innocence and excludes to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis.

    Summary

    Rivera was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance based on constructive possession of cocaine found in a car. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding the circumstantial evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rivera exercised dominion and control over the drugs. The Court emphasized that the evidence did not exclude other reasonable hypotheses, particularly that someone else placed the drugs in the car without Rivera’s knowledge.

    Facts

    Rivera attended a meeting with his parole officer. He was followed by other parole officers after the meeting. Rivera approached the passenger side of a red Camaro where a woman was seated. Parole officers detained Rivera and searched the car. A package containing 100 vials of crack cocaine was found on the floor of the driver’s side. Rivera’s parole officer testified she had seen Rivera driving the Camaro a week prior. Rivera did not own the car, and it hadn’t been reported stolen. Rivera possessed the car’s registration and insurance card. The woman was in the car at the time of the arrest. Rivera was away from the car for two hours prior to his arrest.

    Procedural History

    Rivera was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and dismissed the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Rivera constructively possessed the cocaine found in the red Camaro.

    Holding

    1. No, because the circumstantial evidence presented was not inconsistent with Rivera’s innocence and did not exclude to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that because the evidence was entirely circumstantial, the prosecution was required to prove that the evidence was inconsistent with Rivera’s innocence and excluded to a moral certainty every other reasonable hypothesis. The court found that the evidence failed to meet this standard. Although Rivera had been seen driving the car a week earlier, he wasn’t seen driving it on the day of the arrest. He did not own the car, and the keys were not in his possession. Moreover, the presence of another person in the car at the time of the arrest created a reasonable doubt as to whether Rivera had knowledge or control over the drugs. The court stated, “In fact, the evidence presented at trial is fully consistent with a finding that the woman or someone else had placed the cocaine in the car without the knowledge or participation of the defendant.” The Court reasoned that the evidence did not exclude the possibility that the cocaine was placed in the car without Rivera’s knowledge, thus failing to prove constructive possession beyond a reasonable doubt. The court relied on precedent such as People v. Giuliano, 65 N.Y.2d 766, 767-768 and People v. Benzinger, 36 NY2d 29, 32.

  • People v. Manini, 79 N.Y.2d 561 (1992): Establishing Constructive Possession of Contraband

    People v. Manini, 79 N.Y.2d 561 (1992)

    Mere presence in a public place, even one where contraband is in plain view, is insufficient to establish dominion and control over the contraband necessary for constructive possession.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed in part the Appellate Division’s order, finding insufficient evidence to support the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a controlled substance. The defendant was arrested while exiting a back room of a grocery store where cocaine was in plain view. The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the defendant owned, rented, controlled, or had a possessory interest in the store or back room, or that he was involved in any drug-related activities there. The mere presence in the room, even with visible contraband, was insufficient to establish constructive possession.

    Facts

    Police officers entered a grocery store and observed the defendant and three other individuals exiting a back room, walking quickly toward the front exit. In the back room, contraband (cocaine) was in plain view. There was no evidence presented that the defendant owned, rented, or had any control or possessory interest in the grocery store or the back room itself. Furthermore, there was no evidence linking the defendant to any drug-selling or related operations within the store.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted on multiple counts, including criminal possession of a controlled substance. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented by the People was legally sufficient to establish that the defendant had constructive possession of the cocaine found in the back room of the grocery store.

    Holding

    No, because the People failed to establish that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the cocaine or the area where it was found. Mere presence in a room where contraband is visible is insufficient to prove constructive possession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the requirements for establishing constructive possession. Constructive possession requires demonstrating dominion and control over the contraband itself or the area where the contraband was located. The Court emphasized that the prosecution failed to provide any evidence linking the defendant to the grocery store or the back room. Specifically, there was no proof of ownership, rental agreement, or any other possessory interest held by the defendant. Furthermore, the prosecution did not present evidence that the defendant was involved in any drug-selling activities occurring at that location. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Tejeda, where a statutory presumption of possession applied because the drugs were found in an apartment where the defendant was present. The Court cited People v. Headley, stating that “Presence in a public place does not itself prove dominion and control over contraband discovered there.” The court found the evidence insufficient to establish the defendant’s constructive possession of the cocaine, requiring vacatur of the conviction on those counts.

  • People v. Wesley, 73 N.Y.2d 351 (1989): Standing to Challenge Search Based on Constructive Possession

    People v. Wesley, 73 N.Y.2d 351 (1989)

    A defendant does not have standing to challenge a search based solely on an allegation of constructive possession of contraband; the defendant must demonstrate a personal, legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises.

    Summary

    Wesley was convicted of drug and weapons possession after a search of his girlfriend’s house, where police found drugs, weapons, and items with Wesley’s identification. Wesley sought to suppress the evidence, but the trial court denied his motion for lack of standing, based on Wesley’s prior grand jury testimony stating that he did not reside at the premises. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the People relied on constructive possession to charge Wesley, they could not simultaneously deny him standing to challenge the search. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Wesley failed to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises, a prerequisite for challenging the search, and that the constructive possession charge did not automatically confer standing.

    Facts

    Police searched the house of Jacquelin Glass, Wesley’s girlfriend, pursuant to a “no-knock” warrant, acting on information that a large quantity of marijuana had been delivered there. Wesley attempted to prevent the police from entering. During the search, police found approximately 75 pounds of marijuana, a handgun, and $800 in cash in a bedroom closet. Men’s clothing and masculine toiletries were in a dresser, along with a shoe box containing Wesley’s identification. Additional identification, mail addressed to Wesley, and photographs of Wesley were found throughout the house. Glass initially told police that “all the stuff upstairs” belonged to Wesley.

    Procedural History

    Wesley and Glass were charged with drug and weapons possession. Both moved to suppress the evidence from the search. Wesley’s motion was denied for lack of standing based on his Grand Jury testimony denying any privacy interest in the residence. Glass’s motion was denied after a hearing. Wesley was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed Wesley’s conviction, citing the constructive possession doctrine as a basis for automatic standing, and the inadequacy of the search warrant, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant has standing to challenge a search that results in the discovery of contraband based solely on the allegation that he constructively possessed the contraband.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant must demonstrate a personal, legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises to have standing to challenge the search. Simply being charged with constructive possession is insufficient.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the exclusionary rule aims to deter unlawful police conduct, balancing the loss of probative evidence against deterring lawless conduct. Citing Rakas v. Illinois, the court stated that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and limit the exclusionary remedy to those whose own protection has been infringed by the search and seizure. The Court explicitly rejected the concept of “automatic standing” derived from Jones v. United States, which had previously granted standing to defendants charged with possessory offenses without requiring them to assert ownership or possession of the property or premises. The court relied on People v. Ponder, which abrogated the automatic standing rule in New York, requiring a defendant to demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises. The court reasoned that a defendant’s possession of seized property does not automatically confer standing; a defendant must assert a cognizable privacy interest in the searched area. The court distinguished the narrow exception created in People v. Millan, applicable only to cases involving the statutory presumption of gun possession in a vehicle, which is not applicable here. The Court emphasized that placing the burden on the defendant to assert an interest in the searched premises is fair because the defendant knows his or her connection with the searched area. The Court stated, “To point out that a defendant has failed to meet the burden of asserting facts showing a legitimate expectation of privacy is not a denial that the defendant had any connection to the premises; it is simply an insistence that the required personal privacy interest be asserted by the defendant”.

  • People v. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d 514 (1987): Standing to Challenge Search Based on Statutory Presumption

    People v. Millan, 69 N.Y.2d 514 (1987)

    When the prosecution’s case for criminal possession of a weapon relies solely on the statutory presumption of possession arising from the defendant’s presence in a vehicle where the weapon was found, the defendant has standing to challenge the legality of both the stop of the vehicle and the search that uncovered the weapon.

    Summary

    Millan was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon based solely on the statutory presumption arising from his presence in a taxi where a gun was found. He moved to suppress the weapon, arguing the stop and search were illegal. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing, finding Millan lacked standing. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that when the prosecution’s case hinges on the statutory presumption, the defendant has standing to challenge the legality of the stop and search. Denying the defendant this right would violate fundamental fairness.

    Facts

    Millan and two companions were passengers in a taxi. Plainclothes officers in an unmarked taxi directed Millan’s taxi to pull over. The officers ordered the occupants out and searched them and the taxi’s passenger compartment without consent. A gun was found in a black leather bag on the back seat. The prosecutor stated the police stopped the cab because the occupants made “suspicious moves”. Millan was charged with criminal possession of a weapon based on Penal Law § 265.15(3), which presumes possession by all occupants of a vehicle where a firearm is found.

    Procedural History

    Millan moved to suppress the weapon, arguing the stop and search were illegal. The suppression court denied the motion without a hearing. Millan was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant, charged with criminal possession of a weapon based solely on the statutory presumption arising from their presence in a vehicle where the weapon was found, has standing to challenge the legality of the search of the vehicle.

    2. Whether a passenger in a vehicle has standing to challenge the legality of the stop of that vehicle.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the People cannot rely on the statutory presumption to establish constructive possession and simultaneously deny the defendant the right to challenge the search that yielded the evidence supporting that presumption.

    2. Yes, because a passenger has a right to be free from unreasonable seizures, and an unlawful stop constitutes such a seizure.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the People’s reliance solely on the statutory presumption to establish Millan’s guilt of constructive possession gave him standing to challenge the search. Citing People v. Mosley, the court stated that when the prosecution relies on the discovery of evidence to establish constructive possession, the defendant has standing to contest the legality of the search that produced that evidence. The court distinguished People v. Ponder, which eliminated “automatic standing,” because Millan’s claim was not based on a right to possess the gun or on the mere accusation of a possessory crime, but on the circumstances giving rise to the presumption.

    The court emphasized the unfairness of allowing the government to use the legal fiction of constructive possession to prosecute passengers while denying them the right to challenge the search. It stated that such a rule offends fundamental tenets of fairness inherent in New York criminal jurisprudence.

    The court further held that Millan had standing to challenge the stop of the taxi, regardless of the legality of the search. An illegal stop constitutes an unlawful seizure, and a passenger has a right to be free from such seizures. The court found that the stop, search, and discovery of the gun were part of a continuous chain of events, and there was no evidence that the taint of the allegedly improper stop had been attenuated. Quoting Wong Sun v. United States, the court stated that the gun was “‘come at by exploitation of that illegality’” and should be suppressed if the stop was unlawful.

    The court concluded that the moving papers were sufficient to warrant a hearing, and any objection to their sufficiency was waived by the suppression court. The court modified the order of the Appellate Division and remitted the case for a suppression hearing.

  • People v. Torres, 68 N.Y.2d 677 (1986): Establishing Constructive Possession of Contraband

    People v. Torres, 68 N.Y.2d 677 (1986)

    Circumstantial evidence, such as being a named tenant, having keys, and exercising dominion and control over a premises, can establish constructive possession of contraband found within, even if the defendant is not physically present and others have access to the premises.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for criminal possession of a controlled substance and other charges, holding that sufficient evidence existed to prove constructive possession. The evidence showed that the defendant was a named tenant on the lease of the apartment where drugs and paraphernalia were found, had keys to the apartment, and exercised dominion and control over it, even though he was in Puerto Rico when the contraband was discovered. The Court found that these circumstances provided a sufficient basis for the jury to conclude that the defendant had constructive possession, despite his absence and the possible presence of others in the apartment.

    Facts

    The defendant leased a luxury apartment with his girlfriend. Police seized methaqualone tablets, cocaine, narcotics paraphernalia, a gun, and ammunition from the apartment. The defendant had left for Puerto Rico the day before the seizure. The doorman saw the defendant 25-30 times in the month leading up to the seizure. The defendant had keys to the apartment. He left the apartment the morning of the seizure carrying a suitcase, leaving behind his safe, gun, and other effects. Upon arriving at a hotel in Puerto Rico, he provided the apartment address as his home address and called the doorman to inquire whether the marshal (who executed an eviction warrant) had “found anything.”

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted by a jury of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first and seventh degrees, criminal use of drug paraphernalia in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion. The defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish that the defendant had constructive possession of the contraband seized from the apartment.

    Holding

    Yes, because the circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s status as a named tenant, possession of keys, frequent presence at the apartment, and control over the premises, was sufficient for the jury to find constructive possession, even though he was absent and others may have had access.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the standard of proof in this circumstantial evidence case. The court emphasized that circumstances such as being a named tenant, having keys, and exercising dominion and control over a premises, even in absence, can establish constructive possession of contraband. The court cited People v. Robertson, 48 N.Y.2d 993 and People v. Diaz, 34 N.Y.2d 689 to support the proposition that constructive possession can be found even if the defendant is absent from the apartment or others have use of it. The court also stated that “possession, even if joint, is still possession” (citing People v. Tirado, 38 N.Y.2d 955). The court dismissed the defendant’s argument that the drugs belonged to others using the apartment, reasoning that the evidence sufficiently linked the defendant to the apartment and the contraband. The court also found no merit in the defendant’s contention that the jury instructions regarding constructive possession were erroneous, noting that he failed to object to any material departure from the standard charge at trial. The court concluded that the evidence linking defendant to the apartment and to the contraband sufficiently supported the verdict.