New York Law Review

Tag: construction site safety

  • Ortiz v. Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 N.Y.3d 335 (2011): Establishing Elevation-Related Risk Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Ortiz v. Varsity Holdings, LLC, 18 N.Y.3d 335 (2011)

    To establish liability under New York Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the task performed created an elevation-related risk requiring safety devices and that the absence or inadequacy of such devices was a proximate cause of the injury.

    Summary

    Luis Ortiz, a demolition worker, was injured while rearranging debris in a dumpster. He claimed violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). The Court of Appeals addressed whether Ortiz’s task created an elevation-related risk under § 240(1). The Court held that while a simple descent from a low height might not trigger § 240(1), Ortiz’s specific task—standing on a narrow ledge atop a six-foot-high dumpster to rearrange debris—presented a factual question as to whether safety devices were necessary. The Court denied both the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff’s cross-motion, finding triable issues of fact.

    Facts

    Luis Ortiz was demolishing an apartment building owned by Varsity Holdings and managed by Mag Realty Corp. Ortiz and his coworkers filled a six-foot-high dumpster with debris. To maximize space, they climbed onto the dumpster and rearranged the debris. While standing on the dumpster’s narrow ledge, Ortiz, holding a wooden beam, lost his balance on the slippery, rain-soaked surface and fell, sustaining injuries.

    Procedural History

    Ortiz sued, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6). Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denied Ortiz’s cross-motion for summary judgment on the § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division affirmed, simultaneously granting Ortiz leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and certifying the question of whether its order was properly made. The Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the task of rearranging debris in a dumpster, requiring a worker to stand on a narrow ledge six feet above the ground, constitutes an elevation-related risk covered by Labor Law § 240(1)?

    2. Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to warrant summary judgment in his favor?

    Holding

    1. No, the defendant is not entitled to summary judgement because, on the record, the court cannot say as a matter of law that equipment of the kind enumerated in section 240(1) was not necessary to guard plaintiff from the risk of falling from the top of the dumpster.

    2. No, because Ortiz failed to adduce evidence establishing that he was required to stand on or near the ledge to perform his assigned task and because there is a triable issue of fact regarding whether the task Ortiz was expected to perform created an elevation-related risk.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from Toefer v. Long Is. R.R., where a simple descent from a flatbed trailer was deemed not to present an elevation-related risk under § 240(1). The Court reasoned that Ortiz’s task of standing on a narrow ledge atop a six-foot dumpster to rearrange debris presented a more precarious situation. The Court emphasized that the defendants failed to prove that safety devices would not have prevented the fall. “On this record, therefore, we cannot say as a matter of law that equipment of the kind enumerated in section 240 (1) was not necessary to guard plaintiff from the risk of falling from the top of the dumpster.”

    However, the Court affirmed the denial of Ortiz’s cross-motion for summary judgment, holding that he had not sufficiently proven that standing on the ledge was necessary to perform his task. The Court noted that while his affidavit asserting this necessity was enough to ward off summary judgment for the defendants, it was insufficient for him to win summary judgment himself. The Court also pointed out that Ortiz needed to establish that a specific safety device could have prevented his fall, and this remained a triable issue of fact.

    The Court emphasized that when considering the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion, the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the defendants, and a question of fact remained regarding whether Ortiz’s task created an elevation-related risk that § 240(1) aims to protect against.

  • St. Louis v. Town of North Elba, 16 N.Y.3d 411 (2011): Interpreting Industrial Code for Construction Site Safety

    St. Louis v. Town of North Elba, 16 N.Y.3d 411 (2011)

    The applicability of a specific safety regulation within the Industrial Code depends on the function of the equipment used at a construction site, not solely on the equipment’s designated name.

    Summary

    Ryan St. Louis, a maintenance worker, was injured when a pipe he was welding fell from a front-end loader. He sued the Town of North Elba, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6) and Industrial Code 12 NYCRR 23-9.4(e). The court addressed whether this regulation, specifically mentioning power shovels and backhoes, applied to a front-end loader used for material handling. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ denial of summary judgment, holding that the Industrial Code’s safety requirements extend to a front-end loader used for material handling in the same manner as power shovels and backhoes.

    Facts

    Ryan St. Louis, a maintenance worker at the Olympic Jumping Complex, was injured while welding pipes being held by a front-end loader’s clamshell bucket. The bucket unexpectedly opened, causing the pipe to fall and injure St. Louis. No chains or safety devices secured the pipe in the bucket at the time of the incident. The work crew had previously used chains to secure loads.

    Procedural History

    St. Louis sued the Town of North Elba, alleging violations of Labor Law § 241(6). The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. The Appellate Division affirmed this denial, holding that the Industrial Code section 23-9.4(e) could apply to front-end loaders under these circumstances. The Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether 12 NYCRR 23-9.4(e), which specifies safety requirements for power shovels and backhoes used for material handling, also applies to a front-end loader used for the same purpose.

    Holding

    No, the Appellate Division did not err; the order is affirmed. Yes, 12 NYCRR 23-9.4(e) does apply to a front-end loader, because the regulation focuses on the function of the equipment (material handling) rather than solely on its name (power shovel, backhoe).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that subpart 23-9 of the Industrial Code, covering power-operated heavy equipment in construction, applies to the front-end loader because a front-end loader qualifies as “power-operated heavy equipment”. The court emphasized that “construction work” includes pipe laying, further solidifying the Code’s relevance. While the Code does not list every machine used for suspending materials, 23-9.4(e) aims to prevent materials from falling. The Court stated, “The same danger that exists for a worker using a power shovel or backhoe with an unsecured load exists for a worker using a front-end loader with an unsecured load.” The court cited testimony indicating the common practice of securing loads with chains and the accident report noting that chains could have prevented the injury, reinforcing the industry’s awareness of the risks. The Court explained that the Industrial Code should be “sensibly interpreted and applied to effectuate its purpose of protecting construction laborers against hazards in the workplace.” Ultimately, the Court determined that considering equipment function, not just name, is crucial for applying the Industrial Code effectively, acknowledging that different machines can achieve the same risky objective. The court noted that factual issues of proximate cause and comparative negligence remained to be determined by a jury.

  • Gallagher v. New York Post, 13 N.Y.3d 86 (2009): Duty to Provide Safety Devices Under Labor Law § 240(1)

    13 N.Y.3d 86 (2009)

    Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), a property owner is liable for a worker’s injuries if adequate safety devices were not provided, unless the worker knew the devices were readily available, was expected to use them, and chose not to for no good reason, making their own negligence the sole proximate cause of the injury.

    Summary

    Hugh Gallagher, an ironworker, was injured when he fell through an opening while removing metal decking. He sued NYP Holdings, Inc. (New York Post), alleging violations of Labor Law § 240(1) for failure to provide adequate safety devices. Gallagher and another worker stated no safety devices were provided. NYP argued safety devices were available and Gallagher’s prior injury was the sole cause. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting Gallagher summary judgment, holding that NYP failed to show Gallagher knew safety devices were available and chose not to use them, and that his prior injury could not be the sole cause of the fall.

    Facts

    Hugh Gallagher, an ironworker, was assigned to remove metal decking from a building owned by NYP. While using a powered saw, the blade jammed, propelling him through an uncovered opening, resulting in injuries. Gallagher contended no safety devices were provided at the work site. The assistant project manager testified safety harnesses were available and there was a standing order to use them, but could not confirm the order was communicated to the workers. Gallagher had a prior hand injury and the project manager testified that Gallagher told him that he had fallen as he reached to grab the jammed saw with his other hand.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially denied Gallagher’s motion for summary judgment, finding a factual question about the availability of safety devices. Upon reargument, the court acknowledged an affidavit stating no safety devices were provided but still denied the motion, suggesting Gallagher’s premature return to work and grip weakness might be the sole proximate cause. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding factual issues about the availability of safety devices and instruction to use them. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, granting Gallagher summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether NYP violated Labor Law § 240(1) by failing to provide adequate safety devices to Gallagher, and if so, whether Gallagher’s actions or prior injury were the sole proximate cause of his injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because NYP failed to demonstrate that Gallagher knew safety devices were available and unreasonably chose not to use them. Further, Gallagher’s prior injury could not be the sole proximate cause of his fall.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Gallagher presented a prima facie case of a Labor Law § 240(1) violation through affidavits stating no safety devices were provided. The burden shifted to NYP to raise a factual question. Citing Montgomery v. Federal Express Corp., the court distinguished the case, noting there was no evidence Gallagher knew where to find safety devices or that he was expected to use them. The court emphasized that the assistant project manager’s testimony about a “standing order” was insufficient, as he couldn’t confirm it was communicated to workers. The foreman’s affidavit corroborated the lack of safety devices. The court stated that even if Gallagher’s grip was weakened due to a prior injury, it would only contribute to his loss of balance, not be the sole proximate cause of the fall. The court found that NYP failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether Gallagher knew of the availability of safety devices and unreasonably chose not to use them, thus reversing the Appellate Division and granting summary judgment to Gallagher.

  • Walsh v. Turner Construction Company, 4 N.Y.3d 861 (2005): Establishing Statutory Agent Liability Under Labor Law § 240(1)

    Walsh v. Turner Construction Company, 4 N.Y.3d 861 (2005)

    A construction manager can be held liable as a statutory agent of a property owner under Labor Law § 240(1) if they possess supervisory control and authority over the work that caused the plaintiff’s injury, particularly when the manager acts as the owner’s representative in the absence of a general contractor.

    Summary

    In Walsh v. Turner Construction Company, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a construction manager could be liable under Labor Law § 240(1) as a statutory agent of the property owner. The Court held that Turner Construction, acting as the construction manager, was indeed liable because it had broad supervisory control and authority over the construction site, acted as the owner’s representative, and had the contractual duty to oversee the work and ensure worker safety. This liability arose because Turner’s role extended beyond that of a typical construction manager, essentially functioning as the owner’s eyes and ears, especially in the absence of a general contractor.

    Facts

    The Massapequa Union Free School District contracted with Turner Construction Company to manage capital improvement projects at its schools. Separately, the school district hired Jordan Construction Company to replace windows at McKenna Elementary School. The plaintiff, an employee of Jordan, fell while constructing scaffolding and sustained injuries. Turner’s contract with the school district gave it responsibility for all contractor compliance, the ability to stop unsafe work, the duty to monitor trade contractor performance, and the authority to minimize loss of life and property damage. Turner also had a safety policy mandating zero tolerance for safety violations.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued Jordan and Turner, alleging violations of Labor Law § 240(1). The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff, finding Turner to be a statutory agent of the school district. The Appellate Division affirmed this decision, with one Justice dissenting in part. The Court of Appeals then granted leave to appeal and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division’s order was correct.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a construction manager, absent a general contractor, can be held liable as a statutory agent of the property owner under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries sustained by a worker when the manager has broad supervisory control and authority over the project and the work being performed?

    Holding

    Yes, because Turner had significant supervisory control and authority over the construction site, acted as the owner’s representative in the absence of a general contractor, and had a contractual duty to oversee the window replacement work and ensure worker safety.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principle established in Russin v. Picciano & Son, stating that a party may be vicariously liable as an agent of the property owner under Labor Law § 240(1) if they have the ability to control the activity that brought about the injury. The court reasoned that “[w]hen the work giving rise to [the duty to conform to the requirements of section 240 (1)] has been delegated to a third party, that third party then obtains the concomitant authority to supervise and control that work and becomes a statutory ‘agent’ of the owner or general contractor” (citing Russin, 54 NY2d at 318). The Court distinguished Turner from a typical construction manager, emphasizing that Turner acted as the owner’s representative, possessed broad responsibility for coordinating and supervising all work, and had a contractual obligation to monitor Jordan’s work and protect its employees. The court noted that Turner’s representative acknowledged that Turner had the authority to control activities and stop unsafe work practices at the site. The Court concluded that based on (1) the contractual terms creating agency, (2) the absence of a general contractor, (3) Turner’s duty to oversee the construction site and the trade contractors, and (4) Turner’s authority to control activities and stop unsafe practices, Turner was liable as a statutory agent. The Court dismissed Turner’s “recalcitrant worker” defense as unsupported.

  • Martinez v. City of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 322 (1999): Scope of Labor Law § 240(1) and Inspection Work

    Martinez v. City of New York, 93 N.Y.2d 322 (1999)

    Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes liability on owners and contractors for failing to provide proper safety equipment for elevation-related work, does not extend to preliminary inspection work conducted prior to and separate from any actual construction, repair, or alteration activities enumerated in the statute.

    Summary

    Walfredo Martinez, an environmental inspector, was injured while measuring an insulation-covered pipe during an asbestos inspection at a school. He sought recovery under Labor Law § 240(1), arguing that the lack of proper safety equipment caused his fall. The New York Court of Appeals held that Martinez’s inspection work, which was preliminary to any actual asbestos removal and performed by a separate entity, did not fall within the scope of Labor Law § 240(1). The Court emphasized that the statute applies to specific activities like erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning, or pointing of a building, none of which were taking place during Martinez’s inspection.

    Facts

    Martinez was hired as an environmental inspector to work for Kaselaan & D’Angelo Associates, which contracted with the New York City School Construction Authority for asbestos inspection services. His job involved inspecting school buildings, identifying asbestos problem areas, and cataloging the asbestos for future removal. While inspecting P.S. 85 in Queens, Martinez attempted to measure an insulation-covered pipe by climbing onto a desk placed against a tall closet. While reaching for the pipe, he fell and sustained injuries. The asbestos removal itself was to be done by a different company in a later project phase.

    Procedural History

    Martinez sued the City of New York and others, alleging negligence and violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The Supreme Court denied Martinez’s motion for partial summary judgment on the Labor Law claim and granted the defendants’ cross-motions for dismissal. The Appellate Division affirmed, with a divided vote. The Court of Appeals granted an appeal based on the two-Judge dissent and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an environmental inspector, performing preliminary inspection work to identify asbestos prior to any actual removal or abatement, is engaged in an activity covered by Labor Law § 240(1).

    Holding

    No, because Martinez’s inspection work was merely investigatory and did not constitute “the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure” as required by Labor Law § 240(1).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Labor Law § 240(1) should be liberally construed to protect workers. However, the Court emphasized that the statutory language should not be strained to encompass activities the Legislature did not intend to include. The Court found that Martinez’s work was purely investigatory and preliminary. No actual repair, alteration, or other covered activity was underway at the time of his injury. The Court explicitly rejected the lower court’s “integral and necessary part” test, stating that it improperly expanded the scope of the statute. The Court quoted Gibson v. Worthington Div. of McGraw-Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 1108, 1109 stating that the plaintiff was “not a person ‘employed’ to carry out the repairs as that term is used” in section 240(1). The key factor was that Martinez was not engaged in any of the enumerated activities listed in the statute, meaning that summary judgment was inappropriate. The dissent in the appellate division argued that this type of inspection work was “an integral and necessary part of a project that was within the purview of’ Labor Law § 240 (1).” However, the majority found that this would improperly enlarge the reach of the statute.

  • Corning v. Allied Piping Inc., 86 N.Y.2d 261 (1995): Establishing Liability Under New York’s Labor Law § 240(1) for Elevated Risks

    Corning v. Allied Piping Inc., 86 N.Y.2d 261 (1995)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors when a worker’s injuries are proximately caused by the failure to provide adequate safety devices to protect against elevation-related risks at a construction site.

    Summary

    This case concerns a painter who fell from a ladder while attempting to paint an alcove, falling over a wall and through a suspended ceiling. The New York Court of Appeals held that Labor Law § 240(1) was violated because the contractor failed to provide any safety device to protect the painter from the specific risk of falling over the alcove wall. The court affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiff and held the painting subcontractor liable for common-law indemnification to the general contractor because the subcontractor supervised the work. The ruling emphasizes the non-delegable duty of owners and contractors to provide adequate safety measures against elevation-related hazards.

    Facts

    Corning Incorporated owned a property called Sullivan Park and contracted with Wellco to perform construction work. Wellco subcontracted with Cook to perform painting work. Plaintiff, an employee of Cook, was injured while painting an alcove. He was positioned on a ladder, reaching over an eight-foot alcove wall to paint, when he lost his balance and fell over the wall and through a suspended ceiling to the floor below. No safety devices were provided to prevent a fall over the alcove wall.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued Corning and Wellco, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240, 241, and 200. The Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs against Corning and Wellco on the issue of liability under Labor Law § 240(1). Corning was granted contractual indemnity against Wellco, and Wellco was granted common-law indemnity against Cook. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted Cook leave to appeal from the Supreme Court judgment awarding damages.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether summary judgment on liability was properly granted to the plaintiffs under Labor Law § 240(1)?

    2. Whether the general contractor Wellco is entitled to indemnification from Cook in the absence of a showing of negligence by Cook and in view of the contractual indemnification agreement between the parties?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the contractor failed to provide any safety device to protect the plaintiff from the specific elevation-related risk of falling over the alcove wall and through the suspended ceiling.

    2. Yes, because Cook supervised and controlled the work of the injured plaintiff and is therefore liable for common-law indemnification, which is not superseded by the contractual agreement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that Labor Law § 240(1) places responsibility for worker safety on owners and contractors. The court identified two distinct elevation-related risks: the need to elevate the painter via a ladder, and the risk of falling over the alcove wall. While the ladder itself was not alleged to be defective, the critical failure was the lack of any safety device to protect the painter from falling over the alcove wall. The court cited Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, stating that an owner or contractor who fails to provide safety devices is absolutely liable when the absence of such devices is the proximate cause of injury. The court also referenced Gordon v. Eastern Ry. Supply, noting that a plaintiff need not demonstrate that the precise manner of the accident was foreseeable, only that some risk of injury was foreseeable. The court determined that the absence of protection against a fall through the elevated open area above the alcove was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries as a matter of law. Regarding indemnification, the court found that Cook supervised the work and was therefore liable for common-law indemnification, consistent with Hawthorne v. South Bronx Community Corp. The court clarified that a contractual agreement to indemnify does not supersede the common-law duty to provide indemnification when the subcontractor directly controlled the work.

  • Tamara B. v. Pete F., 80 N.Y.2d 959 (1992): Scope of Labor Law § 241(6) Extends Beyond Building Construction

    Tamara B. v. Pete F., 80 N.Y.2d 959 (1992)

    Labor Law § 241(6), which concerns safety precautions at construction, excavation, and demolition sites, applies not only to building construction but also to other types of projects like highway repaving.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of Labor Law § 241(6) and whether it applies solely to building construction. The Court of Appeals held that § 241(6) extends beyond building sites to include activities such as highway repaving. The court reasoned that the legislative history of the statute and prior case law support a broader interpretation, ensuring worker safety in various construction-related activities. This decision clarifies the applicability of § 241(6) and ensures that workers engaged in non-building construction activities receive the same safety protections.

    Facts

    The claimant, Tamara B., sustained injuries while working on a State highway repaving project. She brought a cause of action under Labor Law § 241(6), alleging that the State failed to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety at the worksite.

    Procedural History

    The Court of Claims denied the State’s motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the cause of action brought under Labor Law § 241(6). The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals then reversed the Appellate Division’s order and reinstated the Court of Claims’ order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the requirements of Labor Law § 241(6) are limited to building construction sites, or whether they extend to other construction, excavation, or demolition work such as highway repaving projects.

    Holding

    No, because the legislative history of Labor Law § 241(6) demonstrates that its scope was not intended to be limited to building construction, and prior holdings by the Court of Appeals support this broader interpretation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on the legislative history of Labor Law § 241(6) and prior case law. The court noted that while the introductory language of § 241 appears to limit the applicability of the subsequent subdivisions to building construction, the history of subdivision (6) shows that its scope was not intended to be so limited. Prior to a 1969 amendment, the statute applied to “[a]ll areas, buildings or structures.” The court referenced Tilkins v. City of Niagara Falls, which examined the legislative history and concluded that the amendment was not meant to narrow the scope of protection. The court also cited its prior decisions in Page v. State of New York and Celestine v. City of New York, which endorsed this reasoning. The Court specifically addressed the contrary interpretation in Matter of Dillon v. State of New York, clarifying that Dillon incorrectly relied on a case arising under an earlier, narrower version of the statute and should not be followed. The Court concluded that the claimant’s allegations fall within the purview of Labor Law § 241(6) because the statute’s protections extend to injuries sustained during a State highway repaving project.

  • Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, Inc., 65 N.Y.2d 513 (1985): Establishes Absolute Liability for Failure to Provide Any Safety Devices Under Labor Law § 240(1)

    65 N.Y.2d 513 (1985)

    Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), an owner or contractor is absolutely liable for injuries sustained by a worker when they fail to provide any safety devices at a building worksite, and this failure is the proximate cause of the injury.

    Summary

    These consolidated cases concern the liability of owners and contractors under New York Labor Law § 240(1) for failing to provide safety devices at construction sites. In Zimmer, an ironworker was injured when he fell while erecting a steel skeleton. In Hunt, an ironworker fell from a roof while welding. In both cases, no safety devices were provided. The Court of Appeals held that an owner or contractor is absolutely liable under § 240(1) when they fail to provide any safety devices, and that failure proximately causes a worker’s injuries. Evidence of industry custom or the feasibility of safety devices is irrelevant when no devices are provided at all.

    Facts

    Zimmer:

    Plaintiff, an ironworker, was injured while erecting a steel skeleton for a building addition.

    He scaled a 31-foot column to direct a crane operator.

    He lost his grip and fell, striking a beam and landing in an excavation.

    No safety devices were provided, though ladders were present but not used for his specific task.

    Hunt:

    Plaintiff, an ironworker, fell 25 feet from a flat roof while welding corrugated decking.

    No safety devices were provided.

    Defendants presented evidence of industry custom and usage, arguing safety devices were not typically used on this type of building.

    Procedural History

    Zimmer:

    The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict, and the jury found for the defendants. The Appellate Division affirmed.

    Hunt:

    The trial court reserved decision on the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict and submitted the case to the jury. The jury found no cause of action. The trial court then granted the plaintiff’s motion for a directed verdict on liability, which the Appellate Division affirmed.

    The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and reversed the Appellate Division in Zimmer and affirmed in Hunt.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an owner or contractor is liable under Labor Law § 240(1) when they fail to provide any safety devices at a construction site, and that failure is the proximate cause of a worker’s injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors who fail to provide any safety devices to workers at a construction site when such failure proximately causes injury, irrespective of industry custom or the feasibility of such devices. The statute’s purpose is to protect workers by placing ultimate responsibility for safety on owners and contractors.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the legislative history of the Labor Law demonstrates an intent to protect workers by placing ultimate responsibility for safety on owners and contractors. The Court emphasized that § 240(1) is to be construed liberally to accomplish this purpose. The Court distinguished between violations of specific statutory provisions like § 240(1) and violations of administrative rules promulgated under § 241(6). A violation of § 240(1), which contains specific safety measures, creates absolute liability, while a violation of § 241(6) does not. In cases where no safety devices are provided, industry custom and usage are immaterial. Evidence of custom and usage is admissible under sections 200 and 241(6) to determine the standard of care in a negligence context, but not for a section 240(1) violation because this section establishes its own unvarying standard. The court quoted Quigley v Thatcher, 207 N.Y. 66, 68, stating that the statute “is one for the protection of workmen from injury and undoubtedly is to be construed as liberally as may be for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was thus framed.” The dissent argued that the statute should not impose liability when no safety devices were available or adaptable to the situation, and that proximate cause is a necessary element that is a jury question.

  • Long v. Forest-Fehlhaber, 55 N.Y.2d 154 (1982): Contributory Negligence as Defense to Labor Law §241(6) Violations

    Long v. Forest-Fehlhaber, 55 N.Y.2d 154 (1982)

    Violation of a rule promulgated by the State Board of Standards and Appeals pursuant to Labor Law §241(6) is merely some evidence of negligence, and therefore contributory negligence (for pre-September 1975 accidents) or comparative negligence (for post-September 1975 accidents) is a defense.

    Summary

    Ernest Long, a concrete finisher, was injured at a construction site when he tripped over an exposed electrical conduit in a dark passageway. He sued the electrical contractor, Forest-Fehlhaber, alleging a violation of Labor Law §241(6) and related safety regulations. The initial trial allowed contributory negligence as a complete defense, resulting in a verdict for the defendant. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that contributory negligence was not a defense. The second trial, without considering Long’s negligence, resulted in a verdict apportioning liability between Forest-Fehlhaber and Long’s employer. The Court of Appeals reversed, clarifying that violating administrative rules under §241(6) is evidence of negligence, not negligence per se, and therefore, contributory or comparative negligence is a valid defense.

    Facts

    On February 3, 1975, Ernest Long, an experienced concrete finisher, was injured at the South Mall construction site in Albany. While walking in a “pitch black” temporary passageway leading to his work area, he tripped over an exposed electrical conduit. The accident occurred approximately 45 minutes before the scheduled start time. Forest-Fehlhaber, the electrical contractor, was responsible for maintaining adequate illumination in the passageway, as per Board of Standards and Appeals rule 23-1.30.

    Procedural History

    Long sued Forest-Fehlhaber. The first trial resulted in a jury verdict for Forest-Fehlhaber, as the judge allowed contributory negligence as a complete defense. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial on the grounds that contributory negligence was not a defense to a §241(6) claim. The second trial, under the Appellate Division’s instruction, found Forest-Fehlhaber liable, apportioning damages. Forest-Fehlhaber appealed to the Court of Appeals from the final judgment after the second trial, bringing up the non-final order from the first appeal for review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether contributory negligence (for pre-September 1975 accidents) or comparative negligence (for post-September 1975 accidents) is a defense to an action premised on the violation of rules promulgated by the State Board of Standards and Appeals pursuant to subdivision 6 of section 241 of the Labor Law.

    Holding

    No, because the violation of administrative rules adopted pursuant to Labor Law §241(6) does not constitute negligence as a matter of law. Therefore, contributory negligence (or comparative negligence, depending on the accident date) is a defense to actions based on such violations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Appellate Division’s interpretation of Allen v. Cloutier Constr. Corp., clarifying that the term “absolute liability” in that case referred to the nondelegable nature of the duty imposed on owners and contractors, not the elimination of all defenses. The court emphasized that Allen recognized that a violation of an administrative regulation is merely “some evidence of negligence” (Allen v. Cloutier Constr. Corp., 44 N.Y.2d 290, 298). The court distinguished between violations of explicit statutory provisions and breaches of administrative rules. A breach of an administrative rule does not establish negligence as a matter of law and, therefore, does not preclude the defense of contributory negligence (or comparative negligence). The court noted that Labor Law §241(6) itself provides only a broad standard, leaving the specifics to the Board of Standards and Appeals. "[V]iolation of the administrative rules adopted pursuant to the authorization of subdivision 6 of section 241 of the Labor Law cannot rise to the level of negligence as a matter of law, contributory negligence was, and comparative negligence now is, a defense to an action based on such a dereliction."

  • Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308 (1980): Intervening Negligence and Foreseeability in Proximate Cause

    Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308 (1980)

    When the acts of a third person intervene between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury, liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant’s negligence; if the intervening act is extraordinary, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or independent of the defendant’s negligence, it may be a superseding cause which breaks the causal nexus.

    Summary

    Felix Contracting Corp. was installing a gas main, and Derdiarian, an employee of a subcontractor, was injured when a driver who had an epileptic seizure crashed into the worksite, causing boiling enamel to spill on him. Derdiarian sued Felix, alleging negligence in failing to provide adequate safety measures. The New York Court of Appeals held that the issue of proximate cause was properly submitted to the jury because the driver’s negligence was a foreseeable consequence of the unsafe work site. The court emphasized that the precise manner of the accident need not be foreseen, only the general risk of injury resulting from the negligence.

    Facts

    Felix Contracting Corp. was hired to install a gas main. Bayside Pipe Coaters, Derdiarian’s employer, was a subcontractor. Derdiarian was working at the site when James Dickens, who had epilepsy and failed to take his medication, suffered a seizure while driving. Dickens’ car crashed through a single wooden barricade at the worksite and struck Derdiarian, causing him to be covered in boiling hot enamel. Plaintiff’s expert testified that accepted safety methods were not used and that a proper barrier would have prevented the car from entering the excavation.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Queens County, entered judgment on a jury verdict in favor of Derdiarian. The Appellate Division affirmed. Felix Contracting Corp. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission, on a certified question from the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s negligent failure to provide adequate safety precautions at a construction site was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, when an intervening act of a third party (a driver having a seizure) directly caused the injuries.

    Holding

    Yes, because the intervening act of Dickens losing control of his vehicle was a foreseeable consequence of the risk created by Felix’s negligent failure to maintain a safe work site. An intervening act may not serve as a superseding cause where the risk of the intervening act occurring is the very same risk which renders the actor negligent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court stated, “Depending upon the nature of the case, a variety of factors may be relevant in assessing legal cause. Given the unique nature of the inquiry in each case, it is for the finder of fact to determine legal cause, once the court has been satisfied that a prima facie case has been established.” The court reasoned that the failure to safeguard the excavation site created a risk that a driver might negligently enter the worksite and injure a worker. It stated that the fact that the driver’s negligence contributed to the accident does not automatically absolve Felix from liability. Citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 449, the court noted that the precise manner of the accident need not be foreseen, as long as the general risk and character of the injuries are foreseeable. The court distinguished the case from situations where the intervening act is independent and divorced from the original negligence, providing *Ventricelli v. Kinney System Rent A Car* as an example where the defective trunk of a rental car was merely the occasion for a subsequent, unrelated act of negligence. The court concluded that the jury could have found that a foreseeable, normal, and natural result of Felix’s negligence was the injury of a worker by a car entering the improperly protected work area.