New York Law Review

Tag: construction accident

  • Cannon v. Putnam, 76 N.Y.2d 766 (1990): Defining ‘One- or Two-Family Dwelling’ Exception to New York Labor Law

    Cannon v. Putnam, 76 N.Y.2d 766 (1990)

    The determination of whether a property qualifies for the ‘one- or two-family dwelling’ exception to New York Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241 depends on a fact-specific inquiry into the nature of the building, considering factors such as structural unification, use, and control.

    Summary

    In this New York Court of Appeals case, the plaintiff, Cannon, was injured during renovations on a property owned by Putnam. The court addressed whether the property qualified for the ‘one- or two-family dwelling’ exception under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241, which would exempt Putnam from liability. The Court of Appeals held that summary judgment was inappropriate because material issues of fact existed regarding whether the semi-attached structures qualified as a one- or two-family dwelling, given their arguably unifying features despite some characteristics of separate dwellings. The court emphasized the fact-specific nature of this inquiry.

    Facts

    Putnam owned two semi-attached, two-family structures. During renovations, Cannon was injured. The buildings shared a single stairway leading to all units, a single metal gate surrounding both, and a common roof. However, they had separate basements, heating systems, doorways, garages, were taxed separately, and had different addresses. Separate work permits were issued for each building, allowing only one- or two-family residential use.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts granted summary judgment to Putnam, sua sponte, dismissing Cannon’s Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241 claims. Cannon appealed, arguing that the ‘one- or two-family dwelling’ exception did not apply. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the common-law negligence claim but modified the lower court’s decision regarding the Labor Law claims. The Court of Appeals further modified the Appellate Division’s order, denying summary judgment to Putnam on the Labor Law claims.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the subject properties qualified for the ‘one- or two-family dwelling’ exception under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241, precluding liability for the owner?
    2. Whether the plaintiff’s common-law negligence cause of action was properly dismissed?

    Holding

    1. No, because material issues of fact existed as to whether the semi-attached structures, with both unifying and separating features, qualified as a one- or two-family dwelling under the Labor Law exception.
    2. Yes, because the Appellate Division properly dismissed the plaintiff’s common-law negligence cause of action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the presence of both unifying features (shared stairway, gate, roof) and separating features (separate basements, heating systems, entrances, tax assessments, addresses) created a triable issue of fact regarding the applicability of the ‘one- or two-family dwelling’ exception. The court referenced Khela v. Neiger, 85 NY2d 333, emphasizing the fact-specific nature of determining whether a property qualifies for the exception. The Court noted, “These disputed and conflicting facts and circumstances raise a legitimate fact dispute about the availability of the one- to two-family dwelling exemption under the Labor Law.” The court also acknowledged a potential issue of fact regarding the commercial versus residential nature of the improvements, citing Van Amerogen v. Donnini, 78 NY2d 880, 883. Because neither party was entitled to summary judgment on the exemption issue based on the record, the lower court’s decision was reversed. The Court agreed with the Appellate Division’s reasoning for dismissing the common-law negligence claim. This case serves as a reminder that application of the one- or two-family dwelling exemption requires a careful examination of the specific facts and circumstances of each property.

  • Melber v. 6333 Main St., Inc., 91 N.Y.2d 783 (1998): Defining Elevation-Related Risks Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    91 N.Y.2d 783 (1998)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1) applies to elevation-related risks where a worker or object falls from a height, not to situations where an object on the same level is propelled horizontally due to the failure of a hoisting or securing device.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, while dismantling a coal conveyor system in an underground vault, was injured when a cable, used to hoist equipment, snapped, causing a 200-pound tension ball to strike him. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the injury did not result from an elevation-related hazard within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1). The court emphasized that the statute protects against risks stemming from elevation differentials, not from the horizontal propulsion of an object on the same level.

    Facts

    Plaintiff was dismantling a coal conveyor system in a subterranean concrete vault. Dismantled machinery was lifted out of the vault by a crane at ground level, its cable lowered through an opening. A 200-pound metal tension ball was attached to the cable, used to drag dismantled machinery across the vault floor for hoisting. Equipment snagged on the uneven vault floor. Unaware, the crane operator continued to exert tension. The cable snapped, propelling the tension ball against the plaintiff, causing injury.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiff’s Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court’s order, reversing the dismissal of the § 240(1) claim, concluding the work exposed the plaintiff to risks associated with elevation differentials. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff’s injury, caused by a horizontally propelled object due to a snapped cable during dismantling work, constitutes an elevation-related hazard covered under New York Labor Law § 240(1)?

    Holding

    No, because the injury did not result from an elevation-related hazard as contemplated by Labor Law § 240(1). The statute applies to risks associated with falling from a height or being struck by a falling object, not to situations where an object on the same level is propelled horizontally.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Labor Law § 240(1) is designed to protect workers from elevation-related hazards, specifically risks arising from work performed at heights or involving the falling of persons or objects. The court distinguished the case from situations where a worker falls from a height or is struck by a falling object due to inadequate safety devices. Here, the plaintiff’s injury was caused by the horizontal propulsion of the tension ball, which was not a consequence of an elevation differential. The court cited Rocovich v Consolidated Edison Co. (78 NY2d 509) and Ross v Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co. (81 NY2d 494) to reinforce the principle that § 240(1) applies to situations where the elevation differential itself poses a risk. The court focused on the mechanism of injury, noting it did not involve a gravity-related event where the worker or the object fell a significant distance. The decision emphasizes a narrow interpretation of § 240(1), limiting its application to scenarios where gravity-induced risks are directly implicated.

  • Stolt v. General Foods Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 918 (1993): Duty to Provide Safety Devices Extends to Accessing Materials

    Stolt v. General Foods Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 918 (1993)

    Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), the duty to provide adequate safety devices extends not only to the immediate work area but also to the routes workers must take to access necessary materials for their assigned tasks.

    Summary

    Stolt sued General Foods under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries sustained when he fell from an abutment while retrieving lumber necessary for his work. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for Stolt, holding that the state’s arguments regarding the “recalcitrant worker” doctrine and the location of the accident were unavailing. The court reasoned that the “recalcitrant worker” defense only applies when a worker refuses to use provided safety devices, and that the failure to provide guardrails directly caused the accident. The Court further clarified that the duty to provide safety extends beyond the immediate work site to areas needed to obtain materials.

    Facts

    The claimant, Stolt, was employed by a contractor hired by the State to erect a ramp. Stolt was working on an abutment on the east side of a road construction site and was instructed to retrieve a 16-foot board located near the abutment on the west side of the road. He crossed the road via an overpass, walked down the west abutment, picked up the lumber, and attempted to return via the same route when he fell from the west abutment, which was 18 inches wide with rebar rods protruding from its surface.

    Procedural History

    Stolt sued the State, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The lower court granted partial summary judgment to Stolt on the issue of the State’s liability. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the “recalcitrant worker” doctrine applies when a worker is allegedly told not to use a particular route but is not explicitly refusing to use provided safety devices.
    2. Whether a worker’s own negligence in choosing an unsafe route can be considered a “supervening cause” when the injury resulted from a failure to provide adequate safety devices.
    3. Whether the State can avoid liability under Labor Law § 240(1) if the area where the injury occurred was not the worker’s primary work area at the time of the accident.

    Holding

    1. No, because the “recalcitrant worker” defense is limited to cases where the worker refused to use available safety devices provided by the employer or owner.
    2. No, because the accident was a direct result of the failure to supply guardrails or other appropriate safety devices.
    3. No, because the wood needed to complete the claimant’s job was stored next to the abutment, making it functionally part of the work site.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the State’s argument that Stolt was a “recalcitrant worker,” clarifying that this defense only applies when a worker refuses to use available safety devices. The court stated that the State’s allegations that Stolt was told not to walk across the abutment were insufficient to establish this defense. The court also dismissed the State’s claim that Stolt’s negligence in using an unsafe route was a “supervening cause,” emphasizing that the lack of guardrails or other safety devices was the direct cause of the accident.

    The court found unpersuasive the state’s argument that the abutment was not part of the work area. The court emphasized, “the record contains no support for that claim. To the contrary, the State’s own witness stated that the contractor was in the process of backfilling the west abutment wall at the time of the accident. Moreover, the wood needed to complete claimant’s job had been stored next to it.” Therefore, the location was considered part of the worksite as it was used to store materials necessary to complete the job.

    This case is significant because it clarifies the scope of the employer’s duty under Labor Law § 240(1), emphasizing that the duty extends to providing safe access to materials necessary for the completion of assigned tasks. The Court’s reasoning underscores the importance of providing appropriate safety devices to prevent foreseeable risks, even in areas that are not the primary focus of the worker’s immediate task.

  • Hagins v. General Foods Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 921 (1993): No Recalcitrant Worker Defense When No Safety Device Provided

    Hagins v. General Foods Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 921 (1993)

    The “recalcitrant worker” defense to Labor Law § 240(1) liability is unavailable when the owner or employer fails to provide adequate safety devices; an instruction to avoid unsafe equipment is not a substitute for a safety device.

    Summary

    Hagins sued General Foods for injuries sustained in a fall from a broken ladder, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). General Foods impleaded Hagins’ employer, C.P. Ward, Inc. Hagins was instructed not to climb the ladder without assistance, but did so when his supervisor left. The Court of Appeals held that Hagins’ contributory negligence was not a defense and that the “recalcitrant worker” defense did not apply because no adequate safety devices were provided. The Court affirmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment on the issue of General Foods’ liability.

    Facts

    Hagins was injured when he fell from a ladder at a General Foods plant. The ladder, owned by Hagins’ employer, C.P. Ward, Inc., was broken a week prior to the accident. Hagins was instructed not to climb the ladder unless someone secured it. Hagins climbed the ladder unassisted when his supervisor left the area.

    Procedural History

    Hagins sued General Foods, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). General Foods impleaded C.P. Ward, Inc. The trial court granted Hagins’ motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of General Foods’ liability. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “recalcitrant worker” defense applies to a Labor Law § 240(1) claim when the employer provides no adequate safety devices, but instructs the worker not to use unsafe equipment?

    Holding

    No, because the “recalcitrant worker” defense requires a showing that the injured worker refused to use safety devices that were provided by the owner or employer. An instruction to avoid using unsafe equipment is not itself a “safety device.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that contributory negligence is not a defense to a Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The Court stated, “It is well settled that the injured’s contributory negligence is not a defense to a claim based on Labor Law § 240 (1) and that the injured’s culpability, if any, does not operate to reduce the owner/contractor’s liability for failing to provide adequate safety devices.”

    The Court also rejected the “recalcitrant worker” defense, stating that the defense “requires a showing that the injured worker refused to use the safety devices that were provided by the owner or employer.” Because no adequate safety devices were provided, the defense was inapplicable. The Court emphasized that an instruction to avoid using unsafe equipment does not constitute providing a “safety device”. The court cited Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, stating that this defense is inapplicable where no adequate safety devices are provided. In effect, the Court clarified that an employer cannot avoid liability under Labor Law § 240(1) by simply telling an employee to avoid unsafe conditions; the employer must affirmatively provide adequate safety devices.

  • Stout v. Mechaniceville Block Co., 93 N.Y.2d 613 (1999): Scope of Liability Under NY Labor Law § 240(1)

    93 N.Y.2d 613 (1999)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for failing to provide adequate safety devices, can extend to tree removal when the removal is integral to a construction or renovation project affecting a building or structure, but the exception for owners of one- and two-family dwellings does not apply when the dwelling is used for commercial purposes.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, injured while removing a tree, sued the property owner (Stout) under Labor Law § 240(1). The New York Court of Appeals considered whether tree removal qualified as work on a “building or structure” under the statute and whether Stout, as a homeowner, was exempt from liability. The Court held that § 240(1) could apply if the tree removal was part of a larger renovation project. However, the homeowner exception did not apply where the renovations were intended to prepare the house for commercial rental. The court reinstated the cause of action for the plaintiff.

    Facts

    Stout contracted to buy property and hired Facchin, Inc. to remove a tree located 10-15 feet from the house. The tree’s branches touched the house and garage roofs. The tree removal was allegedly part of a plan to remodel the house into a two-family dwelling and facilitate paving the driveway and constructing a parking lot for Stout’s nearby funeral home. Plaintiff, an employee of Facchin, was injured when he fell from a ladder while cutting down the tree because a co-worker failed to secure the rope.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the action against the Estate of Von Sothen but denied summary judgment motions by Stout and Facchin. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court decision by dismissing the complaints against Stout and Facchin, concluding that Labor Law § 240(1) did not apply because a tree is not a building or structure. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the tree removal constituted “erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure” within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1)?

    2. Whether Stout qualified for the homeowner exception under Labor Law § 240(1) as an owner of a one- or two-family dwelling who did not direct or control the work?

    Holding

    1. No, not inherently, but Yes because the tree removal was part of a larger renovation project affecting the house and intended for commercial rental purposes.

    2. No, because the renovations were intended to prepare the house for commercial rental, negating the protection of the homeowner exception.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while a tree is not inherently a building or structure, § 240(1) should be liberally construed to protect workers in construction-related activities. The tree removal was intertwined with the house renovations and paving, thus falling within the statute’s scope. The Court quoted Lewis-Moors v Contel of N. Y., 78 NY2d 942, 943 defining a building or structure as ” ‘any production or piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner’ ” quoting Caddy v Interborough R. T. Co., 195 NY 415, 420. Regarding the homeowner exception, the Court emphasized it was designed to protect unsophisticated homeowners, not those using their properties for commercial gain. Since Stout intended to rent the renovated house, he could not claim the exception. The Court stated, “It was not intended to insulate from liability owners who use their one- or two-family houses purely for commercial purposes.” The burden of proving the applicability of the homeowner exception falls on the defendant, as stated in Massie v Crawford, 78 NY2d 516, 519. This case is significant because it clarifies the boundaries of § 240(1) and the homeowner exception, emphasizing the importance of considering the context and purpose of the work being performed, informing legal reasoning in similar situations.

  • Groves v. Land’s End Housing Co., 80 N.Y.2d 978 (1992): Prematurity of Summary Judgment in Labor Law § 240(1) Cases

    Groves v. Land’s End Housing Co., 80 N.Y.2d 978 (1992)

    Summary judgment may be premature in Labor Law § 240(1) cases if outstanding discovery exists, especially regarding the use and existence of safety devices, and the plaintiff’s version of the accident may not support a finding that the statute was violated.

    Summary

    In this Labor Law § 240(1) action, the plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment on liability against the site owner and general contractor. The Appellate Division denied the motion as premature due to outstanding discovery, specifically the defendants’ need to depose eyewitnesses and other witnesses regarding safety devices. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the denial of summary judgment was proper because the defendants asserted the need for more discovery and the discovery timetables had not expired. The Court also noted that the plaintiff’s initial account of the accident may not support a violation of Labor Law § 240(1).

    Facts

    The plaintiffs, laborers, brought an action under Labor Law § 240(1) against the site owner and general contractor for injuries sustained during work. The specific details of the accident were initially unclear, with varying versions presented by the plaintiffs. The defendants asserted that they needed to depose witnesses regarding the use and existence of safety devices at the work site.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. The Appellate Division denied the motion, deeming it premature due to outstanding discovery sought by the defendants, citing CPLR 3212(f). The Appellate Division also relied on a prior case, Yaeger v. New York Tel. Co., suggesting that summary judgment was improper because not every version of the accident involved work performed at heights. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division erred in denying the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment as premature due to outstanding discovery.
    2. Whether summary judgment was inappropriate because the plaintiff’s initial account of the accident, as set forth in the complaint, may not support a finding that Labor Law § 240(1) was violated.

    Holding

    1. Yes, the Appellate Division did not err because the defendants asserted the need for more discovery to depose witnesses regarding safety devices, and the discovery timetables had not yet expired.
    2. Yes, summary judgment was also inappropriate because the plaintiff’s initial account of the accident may not support a finding that Labor Law § 240(1) was violated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision based on two grounds. First, the defendants had asserted in their affidavits that they needed more discovery time to depose witnesses regarding the use and existence of safety devices. Given the outstanding discovery and the fact that the discovery timetables had not yet expired, the Court found no error in the Appellate Division’s disposition. Second, the Court addressed the Appellate Division’s reliance on Yaeger v. New York Tel. Co., clarifying that Labor Law § 240(1) applies not simply to work performed at heights but to work involving risks related to differences in elevation, as established in Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co. While the Court acknowledged that Yaeger did not correctly state the law, it upheld the denial of summary judgment because the plaintiff’s initial account of the accident might not support a finding that the statute was violated. The Court quoted the Appellate Division, stating that “plaintiff[ ] [laborer’s] account of the accident as set forth in the complaint may not support a finding that this statute was violated.”

  • Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509 (1991): Defining Elevation-Related Risks Under New York Labor Law § 240(1)

    Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509 (1991)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability for elevation-related risks inherent in construction work, requiring protective devices when a difference in elevation creates a hazard, but does not apply to general workplace hazards.

    Summary

    Rocovich, an insulation worker, was injured when he slipped and fell into a trough of hot oil while working on a power plant roof. He sued Consolidated Edison, alleging a violation of Labor Law § 240(1). The Court of Appeals held that § 240(1) did not apply because the injury was not caused by an elevation-related risk requiring protective devices like scaffolding or ladders, but rather from a general workplace hazard. The Court emphasized that § 240(1) is specifically targeted at elevation risks, not all dangerous conditions.

    Facts

    Rocovich, an employee of King Insulation Company, was repairing insulation on pipes located in a recessed area on the roof of Consolidated Edison’s power plant. The recessed area contained a trough, 18-36 inches wide and 12 inches deep, filled with hot oil. While attempting to step across the trough, Rocovich slipped and fell, immersing his foot and ankle in the hot oil, causing injury.

    Procedural History

    At trial, Rocovich moved for a directed verdict based on Consolidated Edison’s violation of Labor Law § 240(1), arguing his comparative negligence was irrelevant. The trial court denied this motion and submitted the case under § 241(6), which allows for consideration of the plaintiff’s culpable conduct. The jury found Consolidated Edison 10% at fault and Rocovich 90% at fault. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Rocovich appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) applies to an injury sustained when a worker slips and falls into a trough of hot oil while working on a roof, where the risk is not directly related to an elevation differential requiring protective devices.

    Holding

    No, because Labor Law § 240(1) is intended to protect workers from elevation-related risks requiring specific safety devices like scaffolds and ladders, and does not extend to general workplace hazards, even if dangerous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that while Labor Law § 240(1) is to be liberally construed to protect workers, its application is limited to specific types of hazards: those related to elevation differentials. The statute lists devices like scaffolding, hoists, ladders, etc., which are designed to protect against risks associated with working at heights or with elevated materials. The court reasoned that the legislative intent behind § 240(1) was to address the special hazards of working where gravity poses a risk due to differences in elevation. The court stated, “Manifestly, a violation of the statute cannot ‘establish liability if the statute is intended to protect against a particular hazard, and a hazard of a different kind is the occasion of the injury’ (DeHaen v Rockwood Sprinkler Co., 258 NY 350, 353)”. The court rejected Rocovich’s argument that the degree of the hazard should determine the applicability of § 240(1). Adopting such an interpretation would render Labor Law § 241(6), which governs general workplace safety, virtually useless. The court held that Rocovich’s injury, while unfortunate, stemmed from a general workplace hazard and not an elevation-related risk contemplated by § 240(1). Therefore, the case was properly submitted to the jury under § 241(6), where comparative fault could be considered.

  • Brown v. Bowery Savings Bank, 65 N.Y.2d 778 (1985): Enforceability of Indemnification Agreements in Labor Law Cases

    Brown v. Bowery Savings Bank, 65 N.Y.2d 778 (1985)

    A party is entitled to full contractual indemnification when the intention to indemnify is clear from the agreement’s language, purpose, and surrounding circumstances, even without explicit reference to the indemnitee’s negligence, unless prohibited by statute.

    Summary

    This case concerns an injured painter’s claim under Labor Law § 240(1) and the subsequent contractual indemnity claims among the contractors, architect, and owner involved in a renovation project. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff but modified the order regarding contractual indemnity. The court held that the owner (Bowery Savings Bank) and its agent (Swanke Hayden Connell & Partners) were entitled to full contractual indemnification from the scaffolding contractor (Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co.) and the painter’s employer (Rambusch Decorating Co.) because the indemnity agreements demonstrated a clear intent to indemnify, and such indemnification was not prohibited by the relevant statute at the time of the accident.

    Facts

    A painter, employed by Rambusch Decorating Co., was injured when he fell from scaffolding at the Bowery Savings Bank headquarters, which was undergoing a major renovation. Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co. was contracted to provide, erect, and maintain the scaffolding. The contracts between the bank, Atlantic, and Rambusch contained indemnity agreements requiring each contractor to indemnify the Bank and the Architects against claims arising from their work.

    Procedural History

    The injured painter sued, and a jury found Atlantic, Rambusch, Bowery Savings Bank, and Swanke Hayden Connell & Partners liable. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment in favor of the injured employee. However, the Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, granting Bowery Savings Bank and Swanke Hayden Connell & Partners judgment over against Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co. and Rambusch Decorating Co. on the basis of full contractual indemnity.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Bowery Savings Bank and Swanke Hayden Connell & Partners are entitled to full contractual indemnification from Atlantic Scaffold & Ladder Co. and Rambusch Decorating Co., or whether their recovery should be limited to contribution due to the absence of express language referring to the negligence of the indemnitee in the indemnity clause.

    Holding

    Yes, because the intention to indemnify can be clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement and the surrounding facts and circumstances, and full contractual indemnification was not prohibited by the statute in effect at the time of the accident.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on Labor Law § 240(1), which places a non-delegable duty on owners and contractors to provide safe scaffolding for workers. The court found that Atlantic, as the scaffolding contractor, was properly held liable to the plaintiff for his injuries under this statute. The court also upheld the finding that Swanke, due to its activities at the jobsite, was Bowery’s agent and thus liable under Labor Law § 240(1). Regarding the indemnity claims, the court stated that a party is entitled to full contractual indemnification provided that the “intention to indemnify can be clearly implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement and the surrounding facts and circumstances” (Margolin v New York Life Ins. Co., 32 NY2d 149, 153). The court further noted that, at the time of the accident, General Obligations Law former § 5-322.1 (as amended by L 1981, ch 964) did not prohibit such full contractual indemnification. The court distinguished the case from situations where the indemnity clause explicitly excludes indemnification for the indemnitee’s own negligence. The court emphasized that the indemnity clauses in the contracts at issue demonstrated a clear intent for the contractors to bear the ultimate responsibility for claims arising from their work, even if the owner or architect were also found liable under Labor Law § 240(1). This case underscores the importance of carefully drafting and interpreting indemnity agreements in construction contracts, especially in the context of Labor Law claims. “Each Contractor [to] indemnify the Bank and the Architects against claims arising from his work, to the fullest extent permitted by law”.

  • Bland v. Manocherian, 66 N.Y.2d 452 (1985): Absolute Liability for Improperly Placed Ladders Under Labor Law § 240

    Bland v. Manocherian, 66 N.Y.2d 452 (1985)

    Under New York Labor Law § 240(1), owners and contractors bear absolute liability for failing to provide adequate safety devices, such as properly placed ladders, to protect workers from elevation-related risks, regardless of the worker’s own negligence.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of liability under New York Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries sustained in construction accidents. Bland, a worker, was injured when a ladder he was using collapsed. The jury found that the ladder was not defective but was improperly placed, causing the accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment holding the owner absolutely liable. The court emphasized that the statute imposes a non-delegable duty on owners and contractors to provide adequate safety devices to protect workers from elevation-related risks, and comparative negligence is not a defense.

    Facts

    Bland was hired to make alterations to an apartment building owned by Manocherian. While standing on a ladder to remove window sashes, the ladder collapsed beneath him, causing him to fall through a fourth-story window. A co-worker had brought the ladder into the apartment, and Bland himself positioned the ladder “sideways” to and several inches from the window. The floor where the ladder was placed was bare, polished, and shiny. There was no safety equipment such as safety belts, hard hats, or scaffolding used to protect Bland from falling or to secure the ladder.

    Procedural History

    At the first trial, the court initially refused to instruct the jury that improper placement of the ladder was a statutory violation, but the jury found for the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial. At the second trial, the jury found that the ladder was improperly placed and that the improper placement was a proximate cause of the accident. The trial court directed a verdict for the owners against the employer and reduced damages. The Appellate Division modified, ordering a new trial on damages unless plaintiffs accepted the reduced amount. The Court of Appeals then heard the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors when a worker is injured due to an improperly placed ladder, regardless of the worker’s potential negligence.

    Holding

    Yes, because Labor Law § 240(1) imposes a non-delegable duty on owners and contractors to ensure that safety devices, such as ladders, are placed and operated to provide proper protection to workers, and the worker’s contributory negligence is not a defense to liability under this statute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its recent decision in Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, which established that Labor Law § 240(1) imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for failing to provide necessary safety devices. The court emphasized the legislative intent to place ultimate responsibility for safety practices on owners and general contractors. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the ladder was not “placed so as to give proper protection” and that the improper placement was a proximate cause of the accident. The court noted testimony regarding the job foreman’s description of the work being performed (twisting and forcibly removing window sashes while on the ladder), the condition of the floor (bare and polished), the ladder’s position (sideways and close to the window), and the lack of any safety equipment. The court distinguished this case from Long v. Forest-Fehlhaber, which involved § 241(6), a provision with a more general standard of care. The court also stated that comparative causation, as applied in Arbegast v. Board of Educ., is inapplicable because Labor Law § 240 imposes a “flat and unvarying” duty on owners and contractors. The court directly quoted Labor Law § 240 (1): “All contractors and owners…shall furnish or erect…scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders…and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed.”

  • Glielmi v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 664 (1984): Establishes Indemnification Obligations in Labor Law Cases

    Glielmi v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 62 N.Y.2d 664 (1984)

    A contractor whose negligence contributes to a worker’s injury is obligated to indemnify the owner and tenant under a contractual indemnification provision, even if the owner’s liability is vicarious under Labor Law § 240(1).

    Summary

    This case addresses indemnification obligations in the context of New York Labor Law § 240(1). Angelo, a worker, was injured in a fall from a ladder. He sued the owner-trustees, the tenant (Toys “R” Us), and the contractor. The jury found all three liable. The contractor appealed, arguing it should not be obligated to indemnify the owner and tenant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the order, holding that the contractor was obligated to indemnify the tenant and owner-trustees because the jury found the contractor negligent and the owner’s liability was vicarious. The contractual indemnification provision covered the tenant, and common-law indemnity principles extended the obligation to the owner-trustees.

    Facts

    Angelo fell from a ladder while working at a construction site. The ladder was not secured at the upper end, and no scaffolds were provided. Angelo sustained injuries as a result of the fall. He sued the owner-trustees of the property, the tenant, Toys “R” Us, and the contractor responsible for the work.

    Procedural History

    The trial court instructed the jury to consider the owner-trustees and tenant as a single unit for liability purposes. The jury found the owner-trustees, the tenant, and the contractor liable for Angelo’s injuries. The contractor appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The contractor then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the contractor is obligated to indemnify the tenant and owner-trustees for Angelo’s injuries, given the jury’s finding of the contractor’s negligence and the owner’s vicarious liability under Labor Law § 240(1), and a contractual indemnification agreement between the contractor and the tenant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the jury found that Angelo’s injuries were caused in part by the negligence of the contractor, the contractor was obligated under the indemnification provision of the contract to indemnify the tenant, and this obligation also extended to the owner-trustees, whose liability under Labor Law § 240(1) was vicarious.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision based on several key points. First, the court noted that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find the owner-trustees and tenant absolutely liable under Labor Law § 240(1) due to violations of state safety regulations regarding ladder securement and scaffold provision. Furthermore, the jury instructions, to which no pertinent objection was made, allowed the jury to consider these violations as evidence of the contractor’s negligence. Because the jury found that Angelo’s injuries were partly caused by the contractor’s negligence, the indemnification provision in the construction contract obligated the contractor to indemnify the tenant. The court treated the owner-trustees and tenant as a single unit, extending the indemnification obligation to the owner-trustees as well. Even if they were treated as separate entities, the court reasoned that the owner-trustees would be entitled to common-law indemnity from the tenant and contractor because their liability under Labor Law § 240(1) was vicarious. As the court stated, “inasmuch as their liability under subdivision 1 of section 240 was in this instance vicarious only.” The court cited Kemp v Lakelands Precast, 55 NY2d 1032 and Kelly v Diesel Constr. Div., 35 NY2d 1 in support of this principle. This vicarious liability, coupled with the contractor’s negligence, triggered the indemnification obligation. The decision underscores the importance of contractual indemnification clauses in construction contracts and clarifies their interaction with Labor Law § 240(1) in cases of vicarious liability.