New York Law Review

Tag: Conspiracy Law

  • People v. Washington, 8 N.Y.3d 565 (2007): Enforceability of Conditional Agreements in Conspiracy Law

    People v. Washington, 8 N.Y.3d 565 (2007)

    An agreement to commit a crime can form the basis of a conspiracy charge even if the agreement’s execution is conditional, provided the defendant subjectively believes the condition is likely to be fulfilled.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a conditional agreement to commit murder can be prosecuted under conspiracy law. The defendant, incarcerated on other charges, agreed to pay for the murder of a rival upon his release from prison. He was subsequently convicted of conspiracy in the second degree. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the conditional nature of the agreement (defendant’s release from prison) did not negate the existence of a conspiracy because the defendant reasonably believed the condition would be met. The court emphasized that the agreement to commit murder was concrete and unambiguous, and overt acts were undertaken in furtherance of that agreement.

    Facts

    Defendant, while incarcerated, told a fellow inmate (a government informant) that he was willing to pay to have the complaining witness in his child endangerment case killed. Later, he changed the intended victim to a rival named “Seven,” who allegedly shot him. The informant, working with police, introduced an undercover officer posing as a hitman to the defendant. The defendant instructed the undercover to contact his associates to arrange the killing. He gave the undercover contact information and a description of Seven. The defendant specified that the killing should occur after his release from prison and after he obtained money.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with conspiracy in the second degree. The Supreme Court found the defendant guilty after a non-jury trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for conspiracy where the agreement to commit murder was conditional upon the defendant’s release from prison and his ability to secure funds.

    Holding

    Yes, because the conditions imposed by the defendant did not negate the existence of a conspiratorial agreement, as he reasonably believed the condition (his release from prison) would occur, and the agreement itself was concrete and unambiguous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals referenced Penal Law § 105.15, which defines conspiracy in the second degree as agreeing with one or more persons to engage in conduct constituting a Class A felony, with the intent that such conduct be performed. The court noted that a conspiracy consists of an agreement to commit a crime, coupled with an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. The court addressed the issue of whether conditions placed on an agreement negate the existence of a conspiracy. It surveyed federal circuit court approaches, noting the split between circuits that consider the likelihood of the condition being met and those that deem conditions irrelevant unless they make the agreement illusory. The court aligned itself with the First and Eighth Circuits, indicating that an agreement with a condition is effective if the defendant subjectively believes the condition is likely to be fulfilled. The Court distinguished the case from United States v. Melchor-Lopez, where there was no agreement because the defendant’s conditions were unacceptable to the other party. The court stated: “Here, the conditions that defendant imposed on the performance of the agreement — to commit a murder — were that nothing was to happen to Seven until defendant was released from jail and was able to secure money to pay for the hit. These requirements were not “conditions” negating the existence of an agreement to kill Seven — they were terms of the agreement.” The court further noted that a conspiratorial agreement requires a “concrete and unambiguous . . . expression of [defendant’s] intent to violate the law” (People v. Caban, 5 NY3d 143, 149 [2005]). In this case, the defendant’s intent was clear, and overt acts were committed to further that intent. The court found sufficient evidence of an agreement on the price for the murder, noting that the defendant did not object when the amount was mentioned in front of the undercover officer. The Court concluded, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, that the defendant’s conviction was supported by the evidence presented at trial.

  • People v. Bracetty, 63 N.Y.2d 834 (1984): Admissibility of Co-conspirator Statements

    63 N.Y.2d 834 (1984)

    Once the prosecution establishes a prima facie case of conspiracy, statements of a co-conspirator made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible against the defendant to bolster other evidence of the defendant’s membership in the conspiracy.

    Summary

    Defendant Bracetty was convicted of conspiracy in the fifth degree for arranging a meeting between an undercover officer and a dealer in illegal licenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy through the defendant’s own statements. Once this threshold was met, the statements of the co-conspirator (the dealer) were properly admitted to bolster the proof of the defendant’s involvement. The court also rejected the defendant’s claim that the trial court erred in not charging the jury on entrapment, finding no evidence that the defendant was actively induced or lacked predisposition to commit the crime.

    Facts

    An undercover officer met with the defendant. The defendant arranged a meeting between the officer and a dealer in illegal licenses. The defendant’s statements to the undercover officer indicated his familiarity with the illegal license scheme and an expectation of payment for his referral. The dealer made statements that implicated the defendant in the conspiracy.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of conspiracy in the fifth degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted review and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy, thereby allowing the admission of co-conspirator statements.

    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by not charging the jury on entrapment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendant’s own statements to the undercover officer established a prima facie case that the defendant arranged a meeting with a dealer in illegal licenses, showing an illicit agreement, the defendant’s familiarity with the workings of it, and the defendant’s intent to be paid.

    2. No, because the defendant was not actively induced to engage in criminal activity, nor was any evidence presented suggesting that the defendant had no predisposition to commit this crime.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the introduction of the defendant’s statements to the undercover officer provided a sufficient basis for a prima facie case of conspiracy. The court cited precedent holding that once a prima facie case is established, the statements of a co-conspirator are admissible to bolster other proof of the defendant’s membership in the conspiracy. The court referenced People v. Ardito, People v. Sanders, People v. Berkowitz, and People v. Salko to support this rule. The court emphasized that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, was sufficient to submit the conspiracy charge to the jury. The court found no evidence supporting an entrapment defense, stating that “[t]he defendant was neither actively induced to engage in criminal activity… nor was any evidence presented suggesting that the defendant had no predisposition to commit this crime.” The absence of inducement or lack of predisposition negated the need for an entrapment charge. This case underscores the evidentiary principle that co-conspirator statements are admissible once an independent basis for the conspiracy has been shown, and it clarifies the circumstances under which an entrapment charge is warranted.