In re Daniel C., 63 N.Y.2d 927 (1984)

In private placement adoptions, a consent form signed by the natural mother must fully inform her of her rights and the consequences of executing the form, including the extent of her right to revocation, to comply with statutory requirements and due process.

Summary

This case concerns a natural mother’s attempt to revoke her consent to a private placement adoption. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the mother lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutory provisions because her attorney conceded she wasn’t misled by the consent form. The dissent argued the consent form was statutorily and constitutionally deficient for failing to adequately inform the mother of her rights, particularly regarding revocation, and that the attorney’s statement should not be construed as a binding admission.

Facts

A college senior, Claire C., became pregnant and, to keep it a secret from her family, decided to place the child for adoption after birth. She chose a doctor late in her pregnancy who connected her with prospective adoptive parents (Mr. and Mrs. S.) and an attorney. Three days after the baby, Daniel C., was born, Claire C. turned him over to the prospective adoptive parents’ representative. About six weeks later, she signed an “irrevocable consent” form at her attorney’s office. The form stated the consent would become irrevocable thirty days after the commencement of adoption proceedings unless written notice of revocation was received by the court within those thirty days. Later, Claire C. decided to revoke her consent and notified her attorney, filing a formal revocation notice with the court six days after the adoptive parents initiated adoption proceedings.

Procedural History

The Surrogate’s Court denied the natural mother’s request to withdraw her consent and ordered the adoption petition to proceed. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the mother lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the relevant statutes because her attorney stated she was not claiming to be misled by the consent form. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

Whether the consent form executed by the natural mother complied with the requirements of Section 115-b of the Domestic Relations Law and satisfied basic concepts of due process, specifically regarding the disclosure of her rights and the consequences of signing the form, including the limitations on her right to revoke consent.

Holding

No. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision without reaching the constitutional or statutory questions, holding that the natural mother lacked standing to raise these issues because her attorney conceded she was not misled by the form.

Court’s Reasoning

The majority did not address the merits of the statutory and constitutional arguments. They focused solely on the procedural issue of standing, stating that because the appellant’s counsel conceded she was not misled by the consent form, the adoptive parents were foreclosed from introducing evidence of her awareness of the statute’s provisions. Thus, she lacked standing to challenge the form’s sufficiency.

The dissenting judge, Jasen, argued that the mother *did* have standing and would have reversed the lower courts. Jasen focused on Domestic Relations Law § 115-b, emphasizing that it dictates the requirements for valid private placement consents. The dissent contended that the consent form failed to adequately inform the mother that revocation wouldn’t automatically return the child, that the adoptive parents could oppose revocation, and that the court would ultimately decide the child’s fate based on the child’s best interests, without any presumption favoring the natural mother. The dissent argued the form was misleading because it stated the consent becomes irrevocable 30 days after the adoption proceeding commences “unless written notice of revocation thereof shall be received by this Court within said thirty days,” but failed to mention the limitations on that right of revocation as detailed in DRL § 115-b(1)(d)(ii). According to the dissent, the consent form must *explicitly* state that even with timely revocation, it will only be given effect if the adoptive parents don’t oppose and the court determines revocation is in the child’s best interests. The dissent cited Assemblyman Pisani’s memorandum, arguing that the legislative intent was to ensure the natural mother would be “fully informed as to the consequences of her action and of her right of revocation.” Furthermore, the dissent argued that the consent form was constitutionally infirm as it did not clearly and fully inform the natural mother of the consequences of her actions, thereby violating due process. The dissent noted that “The right of a mother to her offspring is so fundamental that it cannot be abridged except by the most exacting compliance with due process.”