New York Law Review

Tag: consecutive sentences

  • People v. Williams, 29 N.Y.2d 151 (1971): Enforceability of Plea Bargains and Waiver of Statutory Rights

    People v. Williams, 29 N.Y.2d 151 (1971)

    A defendant may knowingly and intelligently waive a statutory right enacted for their own protection as part of a plea bargain.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether a defendant can waive the protection of New York Penal Law § 70.25(3), which limits consecutive definite sentences to a maximum of one year, as part of a plea bargain. The dissenting opinion argues that such a waiver should be permissible when it benefits the defendant, for example, by allowing a shorter sentence in a local jail instead of state prison. This perspective emphasizes the importance of upholding freely entered guilty pleas and promoting efficient plea bargaining processes, especially considering the high percentage of convictions resulting from guilty pleas. The dissent asserts that preventing defendants from waiving this protection undermines the plea bargaining system and may lead to increased trials, further burdening the courts.

    Facts

    The defendants entered guilty pleas to multiple charges, seemingly to allow the court to impose consecutive sentences aggregating two years. A plea to a single felony charge could have resulted in a longer indeterminate state prison sentence. The defendants, through their pleas, effectively agreed to a definite two-year sentence in a local jail, a result attainable only through the consecutive sentences arrangement made possible by the plea bargain. The lower sentence was beneficial to the defendants.

    Procedural History

    The specific procedural history prior to the appeal is not detailed in the provided dissenting opinion. The New York Court of Appeals is reviewing the imposed sentences, implying a prior conviction and sentencing at a lower court level.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive the application of section 70.25 (subd. 3) of the Penal Law, which limits consecutive definite sentences to a one-year maximum, as part of a plea bargain to receive a more lenient sentence than they would have otherwise faced.

    Holding

    No, according to the majority opinion (as reflected in the dissent). The dissent argues that the defendant *can* waive this right because the statute was enacted for the defendant’s own protection and the waiver leads to a beneficial outcome for the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The dissenting judge, Jasen, disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of section 70.25(3) of the Penal Law, which, on its face, appeared to mandate that consecutive definite sentences not exceed one year. Jasen argued that the mandatory language should not prevent a defendant from knowingly and intelligently waiving this right if doing so is beneficial. The dissent analogized the situation to cases where defendants plead guilty to lesser or even impossible crimes to receive reduced sentences, citing *People v. Foster*, 19 N.Y.2d 150. The dissent emphasized the benefits of plea bargaining for both the defendant and the state, stating, “The State has extended a benefit to a defendant who in turn extends a substantial benefit to the State and who demonstrates by his plea that he is ready and willing to admit his crime.” The dissent also referenced *Brady v. United States*, 397 U.S. 742, highlighting the importance of encouraging guilty pleas to manage court congestion. The dissent concluded that the sentences should be upheld because they were “sought by defendant[s] and freely taken as part of a bargain which was struck for the [defendants’] benefit.”

  • People v. Di Lapo, 14 N.Y.2d 170 (1964): Double Punishment for Separate Acts in a Single Transaction

    People v. Di Lapo, 14 N.Y.2d 170 (1964)

    Under New York Penal Law § 1938, multiple punishments are permissible for separate and distinct acts that violate different penal law sections, even if they arise from a single transaction.

    Summary

    Di Lapo was initially convicted of assault with intent to kill following a murder trial. Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to attempted robbery first degree stemming from the same incident. The court sentenced him to consecutive terms for both offenses. Di Lapo argued that Penal Law § 1938 barred the second punishment because the assault and attempted robbery constituted a single act. The Court of Appeals affirmed the consecutive sentences, holding that the acts of attempted robbery and assault, while related, contained distinct elements that justified separate punishments.

    Facts

    Di Lapo and others went to the victim’s house with the intent to rob him. Two accomplices broke into the house, followed by Di Lapo. The victim shouted a warning and fired a gun. Di Lapo returned fire, wounding the victim. The group fled without stealing anything. Di Lapo was later charged with murder, burglary, and attempted robbery. He was acquitted of murder but convicted of assault with intent to kill. He later pleaded guilty to attempted robbery first degree related to the same incident.

    Procedural History

    Di Lapo was initially indicted for murder and several counts of burglary and attempted robbery. He was convicted of assault with intent to kill in the murder trial. Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to one count of attempted robbery first degree. The Erie County Court sentenced him to a consecutive term for the attempted robbery. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed the judgment. Di Lapo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, under Penal Law § 1938, the elements of attempted robbery first degree and assault with intent to kill were so identical that double punishment was impermissible despite the propriety of prosecuting them as separate crimes.

    Holding

    No, because there were separate acts or elements that constituted assault with intent to kill and attempted robbery independently; therefore, double punishment was permissible.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court analyzed Penal Law § 1938, which prohibits multiple punishments for the same act or omission when it is made criminal and punishable in different ways by different provisions of law. The court relied on People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, 2 N.Y.2d 259 (1957), which held that “if separate and distinct acts were committed, and that they violated more than one section of the Penal Law, punishment for each of them would be proper although they arose out of a single transaction.” The court distinguished the attempted robbery, which involved breaking into the house with the intent to steal and putting the victim in fear, from the subsequent act of shooting the victim, which constituted a separate act with a separate intent to kill. The court found it “not impossible to say that there were separate acts or elements making out, separately, assault with intent to kill and attempted robbery, and that double punishment was, therefore, permissible.” Although the two crimes were closely related in time and arose from the same series of events, the court concluded that they were sufficiently distinct to justify separate punishments. The court also noted that a previous denial of habeas corpus relief for Di Lapo did not affect the current question of double punishment because the prior ruling addressed the validity of the indictment itself, not the permissibility of consecutive sentences.

  • Siraguso v. New York, 266 N.Y. 57 (1934): Parole Board Discretion and Consecutive Sentences

    Siraguso v. New York, 266 N.Y. 57 (1934)

    The Parole Board has discretion in determining when to consider a prisoner for parole, especially when multiple consecutive sentences are involved, and is not obligated to act until the combined minimum sentence for all crimes has been served.

    Summary

    Siraguso sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Parole Board to consider him for parole on his first sentence, arguing that its minimum term had been served. He was serving two consecutive sentences. The court held that the Parole Board has discretion in deciding when to consider parole, especially with consecutive sentences. The Board is not legally obligated to act until the combined minimum terms of all sentences have been served. The court emphasized that parole is not a right and the Board’s discretion prevails as long as the prisoner hasn’t served the full term minus good behavior credits.

    Facts

    Louis Siraguso was convicted of robbery in the first degree and sentenced on March 28, 1927, to a term of 20 to 40 years.
    Prior to the robbery conviction, he committed manslaughter in the first degree and was convicted of that crime on June 14, 1927, and sentenced as a first offender to a term of 10 to 20 years, to commence after the expiration of the robbery sentence.
    His minimum term for the robbery sentence expired on May 21, 1934, due to good conduct credits.
    The combined minimum sentence for both crimes would not expire until May 1940.

    Procedural History

    Siraguso applied for a writ of mandamus in Special Term to compel the Parole Board to convene and consider him for parole. The Special Term denied his application.
    The Appellate Division reversed the Special Term and granted the motion for peremptory mandamus.
    The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Parole Board has a legal duty to convene and consider a prisoner for parole on his first sentence when the prisoner is serving multiple consecutive sentences, and the combined minimum term for all sentences has not yet expired.

    Holding

    No, because the Parole Board has discretion in determining when to consider a prisoner for parole, particularly when consecutive sentences are involved. The Board is under no legal duty to act until the combined minimum terms of all sentences have been served. The time of release shall be “discretionary with the board of parole, but no such person shall be released until he has served such minimum sentence.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that sections 210 and 212 of the Correction Law and section 115 of the Executive Law relate to eligibility for “release on parole.” The Board must meet “at such times as may be necessary for a full study of the cases of all prisoners eligible for release on parole and to determine when * * * and to whom such parole may be granted.” (Executive Law, § 115.)
    The court highlighted that the Parole Board has discretion in deciding when to consider a prisoner for parole and is not required to take action until the combined minimum sentences have been served.
    The court emphasized that the minimum sentences for both crimes were already fixed by the court’s sentence and legislative acts. Although the minimum sentence for the robbery had expired, the manslaughter sentence was still running.
    The court noted that no prisoner is entitled to release as a matter of right until they have served their maximum term, minus credits for good behavior, which had not yet occurred in Siraguso’s case.
    Therefore, the court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and affirmed the Special Term’s denial of the writ of mandamus.