New York Law Review

Tag: Conscious Pain and Suffering

  • Gonzalez v. New York City Housing Authority, 77 N.Y.2d 663 (1991): Recovery for Pecuniary Loss by Adult Grandchildren in Wrongful Death Action

    Gonzalez v. New York City Housing Authority, 77 N.Y.2d 663 (1991)

    Adult, financially independent grandchildren can recover pecuniary damages in a wrongful death action for the loss of services, guidance, and support they reasonably expected to receive from their deceased grandparent, even if those services were provided outside of the grandchildren’s households.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether adult, financially independent grandchildren could recover damages for the wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering of their grandmother, who had been murdered in her apartment. The defendant, New York City Housing Authority, argued that the grandchildren had not established pecuniary injury and that there was insufficient evidence of conscious pain and suffering. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the grandchildren presented sufficient evidence of pecuniary loss based on the services and guidance provided by their grandmother, and that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the finding of conscious pain and suffering.

    Facts

    The decedent, a 76-year-old woman, was murdered in her apartment. She was survived by her daughter-in-law and two adult grandchildren, Marta Gonzalez (21) and Antonio Freire (19), whom she had raised. Although the grandchildren were financially independent and did not live with her, the decedent provided regular assistance. She cooked dinner nightly for her daughter-in-law, helped Marta cope with her mother’s mental illness, provided Marta with shelter during a marital crisis, and planned to care for Marta’s child while she returned to school. Antonio visited his grandmother frequently and she regularly prepared his meals.

    Procedural History

    The grandchildren sued the New York City Housing Authority for wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering. A jury awarded the plaintiffs $1,250,000 for wrongful death and $1,000,000 for conscious pain and suffering, which the trial court reduced to $100,000 and $350,000, respectively. The defendant appealed solely on the issue of damages. The Appellate Division affirmed the award, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether adult, financially independent grandchildren can recover damages for pecuniary injuries in a wrongful death action based on the loss of services and guidance provided by their deceased grandparent.

    2. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support an award for the decedent’s conscious pain and suffering prior to her death.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the grandchildren presented evidence of pecuniary injuries they suffered as a result of their grandmother’s death, including loss of services, guidance, and support, and their status as adult financially independent grandchildren does not preclude recovery.

    2. Yes, because there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to conclude that the decedent was conscious when most of the injuries were inflicted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that New York’s wrongful death statute (EPTL 5-4.3[a]) allows recovery for “pecuniary injuries” resulting from the decedent’s death. While recovery is limited to injuries measurable by money and excludes grief or loss of society, it includes loss of support, voluntary assistance, possible inheritance, and medical/funeral expenses. The Court emphasized that the statute defines the class entitled to recover as “distributees,” which includes grandchildren. The Court cited prior cases, including Tilley v. Hudson Riv. R. R. Co., to support the proposition that adult, self-supporting children (or grandchildren) are not automatically barred from recovering for pecuniary loss. The key is whether the decedent provided services or support upon which the distributees reasonably relied. Here, the decedent provided shelter, counseling, and regular meals. The fact that the decedent prepared meals in her daughter-in-law’s home, rather than the grandchildren’s homes, was not significant because the services still needed to be replaced. Regarding conscious pain and suffering, the Court found sufficient circumstantial evidence, noting that the elaborate binding and gagging suggested the decedent was conscious during the assault. The court stated, “As the Appellate Division noted, if she had been unconscious at the outset of the assault there would have been no reason for the murderer to have bound and gagged her elaborately and injured her as he did.”

  • Matter of O’Neil v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 47 N.Y.2d 929 (1979): Late Notice of Claim and Discretionary Extension for Conscious Pain and Suffering

    Matter of O’Neil v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corp., 47 N.Y.2d 929 (1979)

    When a claim for conscious pain and suffering accrues to the injured party who dies before the notice of claim deadline, the court has discretion to grant an extension for filing a late notice of claim, even if the reason for the delay is unrelated to the death.

    Summary

    The case concerns a proceeding brought by an administrator seeking leave to serve a late notice of claim on the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, involving both wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering causes of action. The Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of General Municipal Law § 50-e(5)(1) and (2) to these distinct claims. The court held that while the administrator’s delay in filing the wrongful death claim was not excusable under the statute, the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in allowing the late notice of claim for conscious pain and suffering because the injured party’s death occurred before the expiration of the filing deadline, and no nexus between the death and the delay was required.

    Facts

    The administrator sought permission to file a late notice of claim against the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, encompassing causes of action for both wrongful death and the decedent’s conscious pain and suffering prior to death. The specific facts underlying the medical malpractice claim are not detailed in the opinion, the focus being on the procedural issue of the late notice.

    Procedural History

    The administrator initiated a proceeding under General Municipal Law § 50-e for leave to serve a late notice of claim. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision regarding the conscious pain and suffering claim, finding the denial to be an improvident exercise of discretion. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the court had discretionary power under General Municipal Law § 50-e(5)(1) to grant an extension for filing a late notice of claim for wrongful death when the claimant administrator was neither an infant nor incapacitated.

    2. Whether the court had discretionary power under General Municipal Law § 50-e(5)(2) to grant an extension for filing a late notice of claim for conscious pain and suffering when the injured party died before the expiration of the time limited for service of the notice, regardless of the reason for the delay.

    Holding

    1. No, because the claimant administrator was not an infant or incapacitated, and therefore did not meet the requirements of General Municipal Law § 50-e(5)(1).

    2. Yes, because under General Municipal Law § 50-e(5)(2), there is no requirement to establish a nexus between the excuse for the delay and the death of the injured party when the death occurred before the notice deadline.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished between the wrongful death action and the action for conscious pain and suffering based on who the claim accrued to. The wrongful death action accrues to the personal representative, while the action for conscious pain and suffering accrues to the injured party. Regarding the wrongful death claim, the court found that the administrator did not meet the requirements of either paragraph (1) or (2) of General Municipal Law § 50-e(5). The administrator was not an infant or incapacitated under paragraph (1), nor was the administrator deceased under paragraph (2). Therefore, the court had no discretion to grant an extension for the wrongful death claim.

    Regarding the conscious pain and suffering claim, because the injured party died before the expiration of the time limited for service of notice, paragraph (2) was applicable. The court emphasized that paragraph (2) does not require a nexus between the excuse for the delay and the death. The court stated, “We emphasize the fact that under paragraph (2) there is no requirement to establish a nexus between the excuse and the untimeliness. Therefore, the trial court had the discretion to grant an extension despite the fact that the excuse was totally unrelated to the disability.” The Appellate Division considered the illness of counsel and the lack of prejudice to the defendant, concluding that the trial court’s refusal to grant an extension was an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals found that the Appellate Division did not abuse its discretion in reversing the trial court on the conscious pain and suffering claim.