New York Law Review

Tag: Confiscatory Zoning

  • Reprints, Inc. v. Town of Bedford, 58 N.Y.2d 453 (1983): Establishing a Confiscatory Zoning Claim

    Reprints, Inc. v. Town of Bedford, 58 N.Y.2d 453 (1983)

    To succeed in a claim that a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to a specific property, the property owner must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they cannot obtain a reasonable return on the property under any permitted use (excluding public or quasi-public uses).

    Summary

    Reprints, Inc. challenged the zoning of its property, arguing it was unconstitutional because the permitted residential use was no longer viable due to surrounding commercial developments. The New York Court of Appeals held that Reprints, Inc. failed to meet the high burden of proving the zoning was confiscatory. The court emphasized that the owner must demonstrate the inability to obtain a reasonable return on the property under any of the permitted uses, considering factors such as the property’s purchase price, carrying costs, potential income, and the suitability of the land for permitted uses. The court clarified that a showing of significant economic injury alone is insufficient.

    Facts

    Reprints, Inc. owned a 12.6-acre property spanning the Town of Bedford and the Town/Village of Mount Kisco. Most of the property (11.7 acres) was in Bedford, zoned for two-acre residential use (R-2A), and contained two dwellings. Adjacent properties included a Planned Business-Office (PB-O) zone with medical and office buildings, and land in Mount Kisco zoned for limited office and multi-family residential use. Reprints, Inc. purchased the property in 1978 for $265,000. In 1979, Reprints, Inc. unsuccessfully petitioned to rezone the property to a planned business-office park district.

    Procedural History

    Reprints, Inc. sued for a declaratory judgment and damages, claiming the zoning was unconstitutional and denied due process. The Supreme Court declared the zoning unconstitutional but denied damages. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, declaring the zoning constitutional as applied to the property. Reprints, Inc. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Appellate Division erred in reversing the trial court’s finding that the zoning ordinance was unconstitutional as applied to Reprints, Inc.’s property.
    2. Whether Reprints, Inc. sufficiently demonstrated that its property could not be used for any purpose permitted by the current zoning classification.
    3. Whether the current zoning classification is confiscatory, entitling Reprints, Inc. to a declaration of unconstitutionality.

    Holding

    1. No, because the Appellate Division has broad authority to review facts and render a judgment warranted by the evidence.
    2. No, because Reprints, Inc. failed to sufficiently demonstrate that it could not obtain a reasonable return on the property under any permitted use.
    3. No, because Reprints, Inc. failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the zoning deprived it of any use to which the property was reasonably adapted.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division, emphasizing the high burden of proof required to demonstrate that a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to a specific property. The court stated, “[T]he burden is upon the property owner seeking to have an ordinance declared unconstitutional as applied to his property to overcome the presumption of constitutionality which enshrouds the ordinance by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court rejected the argument that a showing of significant economic injury shifts the burden to the municipality. Instead, the property owner must prove that the zoning deprives the owner of “any reasonable income productive or other private use for which it is adapted and thus destroys its economic value, or all but a bare residue of its value.” The court found Reprints, Inc.’s proof deficient because it did not adequately demonstrate the rate of return earned by similar properties, the owner’s investment in the property, or the potential return from permitted uses. Testimony focused on ‘highest and best use’ was insufficient. The court noted that the price paid for the property must be considered, especially if there was an expectation of rezoning. Finally, the court emphasized that the reasonableness of the return must be measured with respect to the whole tract of land, not just a portion affected by adverse factors. The court concluded that considering Reprints, Inc.’s property as a whole, the evidence supported the Appellate Division’s decision that the zoning was constitutional.

  • Eaton v. Town of Islip, 43 N.Y.2d 879 (1978): Zoning Ordinance Resulting in Confiscation Requires Compensation

    Eaton v. Town of Islip, 43 N.Y.2d 879 (1978)

    A zoning ordinance that deprives a property owner of all practical use of their land is confiscatory and requires just compensation under the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.

    Summary

    Eaton sought to rebuild her house, which was destroyed by a storm, but was denied a building permit due to a town ordinance restricting construction in the “Dune District” to pedestrian dune crossings or fences. Eaton challenged the ordinance as unconstitutional, arguing it deprived her of all practical use of her property. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ rulings, holding that the ordinance, as applied to Eaton’s property, was confiscatory because it deprived her of any reasonable use without just compensation, violating due process.

    Facts

    In 1958, Eaton’s house was built on her property. On February 6, 1978, a violent storm washed the house out to sea. Eaton applied for a building permit to rebuild, but was denied because of Section 68-59.1 of the Town Code of Islip (the “Dune District” ordinance). The ordinance restricted construction in the Dune District to “an elevated pedestrian dune crossing or a fence of a type approved by the Town of Islip which is designed to hold or increase the dune”.

    Procedural History

    Eaton initiated an action challenging the denial of the permit. Both the lower courts found the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to Eaton’s property. The Town of Islip appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Town of Islip’s Dune District ordinance, as applied to Eaton’s property, deprived Eaton of all practical use of her property, thereby constituting a confiscatory taking requiring just compensation under the Due Process Clauses of the Federal and State Constitutions.

    Holding

    Yes, because the ordinance restricted construction to uses that deprived Eaton of all practical use of her property, rendering the restriction confiscatory and requiring just compensation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the Town failed to provide sufficient evidence to dispute the lower courts’ determination that the ordinance deprived Eaton of all practical use of her property. The court emphasized that the permissible uses under the ordinance (pedestrian dune crossing or a specific type of fence) did not allow Eaton to use the property in a way to which it was reasonably adapted. The court stated, “The restriction is, therefore, confiscatory and thus would work such a substantial deprivation of plaintiff’s use of her property, without just compensation, as to violate the due process clauses of our Federal and State.Constitutions.” The court distinguished the town’s right to regulate land for public safety (ecology, safeguarding life and property) from its obligation to provide just compensation when such regulation amounts to a taking. The court acknowledged the town’s valid interest in preserving the ecology of the dunes, stating: “The issue is not whether the town may constitutionally so restrict plaintiff’s land ‘to preserve the ecology of the dunes and grasses and by doing so to safeguard life and property’, but whether it can do so without according plaintiff just compensation. We agree that it cannot.” The court dismissed the argument that a prior offer from the federal government to purchase the property negated the confiscatory effect of the ordinance because the narrowly restricted uses remained.

  • Douglaston Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. Klein, 51 N.Y.2d 963 (1980): Establishes Standard for ‘Uniqueness’ in Zoning Variance Cases

    Douglaston Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. Klein, 51 N.Y.2d 963 (1980)

    Uniqueness, as a requirement for zoning variances, does not necessitate that only a single parcel be affected by the hardship condition, but rather that the condition is not so widespread within the district that granting variances to all similarly situated properties would substantially alter the zoning of the district.

    Summary

    Douglaston Civic Ass’n, Inc. v. Klein addresses the “uniqueness” requirement for obtaining a zoning variance. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of a variance, holding that the swampy condition of the land, while not entirely unique within the residential district, was not so generally applicable as to preclude a finding of uniqueness. The court emphasized that the key consideration is whether granting variances to all similarly situated properties would materially change the zoning of the district. Because the land could not yield a reasonable return as zoned, the court upheld the variance for enclosed tennis courts for a limited period.

    Facts

    The landowner sought a variance to use their property, which was zoned for residential use, as enclosed tennis courts for 15 years. The zoning board found that the land could not yield a reasonable return as zoned because the cost of constructing residences was significantly higher than the potential sales price due to the swampy nature of the property. The board also determined that granting the variance would not negatively impact the character of the adjacent properties or substantially affect traffic or pollution.

    Procedural History

    The zoning board granted the variance. The Appellate Division affirmed the zoning board’s decision. The Douglaston Civic Association appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “uniqueness” requirement for a zoning variance necessitates that only the subject parcel be affected by the condition causing the hardship, or whether a variance can be granted when other properties in the district share similar conditions.

    Holding

    No, because uniqueness does not require that only the subject parcel is affected by the condition causing the hardship. What is required is that the hardship condition be not so generally applicable throughout the district as to require the conclusion that if all parcels similarly situated are granted variances the zoning of the district would be materially changed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a strict interpretation of “uniqueness” would be impractical and unreasonable. The court cited precedent and scholarly commentary to support its view that uniqueness is a relative concept. The court stated, “Uniqueness does not require that only the parcel of land in question and none other be affected by the condition which creates the hardship.” The crucial factor is whether the hardship condition is so prevalent that granting variances to all similarly situated properties would effectively rezone the district, which in this case, the court determined was not the situation. The court acknowledged the confiscatory nature of the present zoning in relation to the subject parcel and the time limit imposed by the board on the variance it granted.

  • Williams v. Town of Oyster Bay, 32 N.Y.2d 78 (1973): Establishing Unconstitutional Zoning

    Williams v. Town of Oyster Bay, 32 N.Y.2d 78 (1973)

    A zoning ordinance is unconstitutional only if it prevents a property owner from using their property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted, and the owner bears the burden of proving such invalidity by demonstrating that the property cannot yield a reasonable return under any permitted use.

    Summary

    The plaintiffs, Catherine and Gene Williams, challenged the constitutionality of the Town of Oyster Bay’s zoning ordinance as applied to their property, arguing it prevented them from using it for business purposes. The property was zoned residential, while adjacent property was zoned for business. The New York Court of Appeals held that the zoning ordinance was constitutional as applied to the plaintiffs’ property, because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the property could not yield a reasonable return under any permitted residential use. The court emphasized the importance of demonstrating that no reasonable return could be obtained from any permitted use before a zoning ordinance can be deemed unconstitutional.

    Facts

    Catherine and Gene Williams owned property in the Village of Massapequa, part of which was zoned for residential use (“Residence D”), and part for business use (“Business F”). The residential portion of their property was located on Merrick Road, surrounded primarily by residential properties, with some non-conforming professional offices and a gift shop nearby. The Williamses sought to have the residential zoning declared unconstitutional, claiming it prevented them from using the property for business purposes. They had previously been denied a business use variance. Evidence regarding the property’s salability for residential purposes was weak, and the lower court found substantial economic loss due to the residential zoning.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court, Special Term, ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring the zoning ordinance unconstitutional as applied to their property. The Appellate Division reversed the Special Term’s judgment, holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the ordinance served no legitimate purpose and was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Town of Oyster Bay’s zoning ordinance, as applied to the Williams’ property, was confiscatory and unconstitutional because it prevented them from using their property for any purpose for which it was reasonably adapted.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that their property could not yield a reasonable return if used only for purposes allowed under the residential zoning ordinance.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a zoning ordinance is confiscatory and unconstitutional only if it prevents a plaintiff from using their property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. The burden of proving the ordinance’s invalidity rests on the plaintiff. The court stated, “If the legislative classification is ‘fairly debatable,’ it must be allowed to control.” The Court analogized the considerations for determining the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance to those used in granting or denying a variance. Referencing the established rule for use variances from Matter of Otto v. Steinhilber, the court highlighted that the plaintiffs needed to show that the land could not yield a reasonable return if used only for a purpose allowed in the zone, that their plight was due to unique circumstances, and that the use authorized by the variance would not alter the locality’s essential character.

    The court emphasized that it is insufficient for the plaintiff to merely show that they would realize a greater return under a less restricted use. The pertinent inquiry is whether the present allowed use is yielding a reasonable return. The court further explained, quoting Matter of Forrest v. Evershed, “In order to establish a lack of ‘reasonable return,’ the applicant must demonstrate that the return from the property would not be reasonable for each and every permitted use under the ordinance.”

    Applying these principles, the court found that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof. The evidence was conflicting regarding the property’s reasonable return and adaptation for residential use, as well as whether the neighborhood’s character had changed due to nonconforming uses and traffic conditions. Crucially, the plaintiffs made no attempt to show that the sale of their property for any of the permitted uses other than one-family dwellings would be impossible or economically impracticable. The court distinguished this case from situations, like in Jayne Estates, where the property was in the middle of a commercial area with little chance of the nonconforming uses disappearing. The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ proper avenue of relief would be an application for a special exception from the town board or board of appeals.

  • Chess v. Town of Glen Cove, 26 N.Y.2d 41 (1970): Upholding Zoning Challenges Based on Economic Unfeasibility

    Chess v. Town of Glen Cove, 26 N.Y.2d 41 (1970)

    A zoning ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to a specific property if it deprives the owner of all economically viable uses of the land, even if some technically feasible uses are permitted.

    Summary

    This case concerns a challenge to a zoning ordinance that reclassified a tract of land from industrial to residential use. The plaintiffs, landowners within the tract, argued the reclassification was confiscatory. The court distinguished between perimeter parcels with existing nonconforming industrial uses and interior vacant parcels. It held the ordinance constitutional as applied to the perimeter parcels, given their existing profitable use. However, the court found the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to the interior parcels, because the surrounding industrial activity rendered any permitted use economically unfeasible, thus depriving the owners of all beneficial use. This case underscores the importance of economic viability when evaluating zoning regulations.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs owned land within a tract originally used as a service area, consisting of an oval-shaped road enclosing undeveloped land. The tract was unzoned until 1926, then residential until 1942. The land had been used for industrial purposes since 1915, and these uses continued. In 1942, it was zoned industrial, but in 1960, the town amended the zoning to “R-2 One-half Acre Single Family Residence,” which prohibited industrial uses. The perimeter plaintiffs had established nonconforming industrial uses. The interior parcels were vacant.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs challenged the 1960 zoning amendment as confiscatory. The trial court found the ordinance unconstitutional as to the vacant interior parcels but upheld it as to the improved perimeter parcels. The Appellate Division affirmed the holding regarding the perimeter parcels but reversed as to the interior lands, thus upholding the ordinance against all plaintiffs. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the 1960 zoning amendment was unconstitutional as applied to the perimeter parcels with existing nonconforming industrial uses?

    2. Whether the 1960 zoning amendment was unconstitutional as applied to the vacant interior parcels, given the surrounding industrial environment?

    Holding

    1. No, because the perimeter plaintiffs had not shown that their properties’ value as nonconforming uses was so disproportionate to their value as permitted uses to amount to an economic taking.

    2. Yes, because the surrounding nonconforming uses rendered any permitted use economically unfeasible, depriving the interior owners of all substantial use of their property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that zoning ordinances are presumed constitutional, and landowners challenging them must prove the regulation is not justified by any reasonable interpretation of the facts under the police power. However, this presumption does not allow a zoning classification to deprive an owner of all beneficial use of their property. The court stated, “To sustain such an attack upon the validity of the ordinance, the aggrieved owner must show that on the facts known or reasonably assumed the enforcement of the ordinance will preclude the use of his property for any purpose to which it is reasonably adapted.” (citing Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 226)

    Regarding the perimeter parcels, the court acknowledged the existence of nonconforming uses could be considered when determining the ordinance’s impact. Since the perimeter businesses were flourishing, the court found no economic taking. The court also noted the plaintiffs failed to prove that their buildings could not be converted to permitted uses such as scientific or laboratory uses.

    Conversely, the court found that the interior parcels were uniquely situated. They were surrounded by industrial buildings, making any permitted use (e.g., residential, governmental, academic) economically unfeasible. The court adopted the trial court’s reasoning that it would offend common sense to expect permitted uses to thrive “amidst the desert of industrial activity which surrounds it.” Mere functional feasibility was deemed insufficient; the test was whether any permitted use was economically unfeasible. The court relied on Summers v. City of Glen Cove, which established that a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional when it effectively precludes any practical use of the property. As in Arverne, the court found that the interior parcels could not be used profitably or reasonably under the ordinance.

    The court acknowledged the potentially anomalous result of allowing industrial development in the interior while the perimeter is zoned residential, expressing hope that the legislative body would review the zoning regulation in light of its ruling.