New York Law Review

Tag: Confidential Informants

  • Matter of Abdur-Raheem v. Mann, 85 N.Y.2d 112 (1995): Prison Disciplinary Hearings and Confidential Informants

    Matter of Abdur-Raheem v. Mann, 85 N.Y.2d 112 (1995)

    A prison disciplinary determination may be based on confidential informant hearsay statements, provided the Hearing Officer independently assesses the informant’s reliability based on objective circumstances; a personal interview with the informant is not always required.

    Summary

    Abdur-Raheem, a prison inmate, was found guilty of violating inmate rules based on information from confidential informants after an investigation into a fellow inmate’s murder. The Hearing Officer didn’t personally interview the informants but relied on written material. Abdur-Raheem challenged the determination, arguing the lack of personal interviews prevented an independent credibility assessment. The Court of Appeals held that while a Hearing Officer must independently assess informant reliability, a personal interview isn’t mandatory. Objective evidence and corroboration can suffice, balancing inmate rights with prison safety needs. The court affirmed the dismissal of Abdur-Raheem’s petition.

    Facts

    Following the murder of inmate Normaul Busjit, Abdur-Raheem was charged with violating prison rules prohibiting assaults and Penal Law violations, based on information from confidential sources. The misbehavior report indicated Abdur-Raheem conspired with others in the assault that led to Busjit’s death in the facility gymnasium. Abdur-Raheem denied the charges, claiming ignorance of the incident and never entering the bathroom where the homicide occurred. Several inmates testified investigators pressured them for cooperation. The Hearing Officer restricted questioning aimed at revealing informant identities or statement contents.

    Procedural History

    A Tier III hearing was conducted where Abdur-Raheem was found guilty based on confidential data deemed coherent, detailed, and believable by the Hearing Officer. The determination was administratively affirmed, resulting in a nine-year Special Housing Unit penalty and loss of privileges, later reduced after a Grand Jury failed to indict Abdur-Raheem for second-degree murder. Abdur-Raheem then filed an Article 78 proceeding, which was dismissed by the Appellate Division. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a Hearing Officer must personally interview confidential informants to assess their credibility when their information forms the primary basis for a prison disciplinary determination.

    Holding

    1. No, because while the Hearing Officer must independently assess the informant’s reliability, a personal interview is not the only acceptable method; objective circumstances and corroborating evidence can suffice to establish reliability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged that prison disciplinary determinations can rely on hearsay, even solely on confidential information, provided it’s sufficiently reliable. A Hearing Officer can’t simply adopt an investigator’s reliability assessment; an independent evaluation is required, mirroring the standard for warrant applications based on informant tips. However, the Court rejected a rigid rule mandating personal interviews, finding that objective indicia of reliability can suffice. Quoting People ex rel. Vega v Smith, 66 NY2d 130, the court emphasized basing determinations on ” ‘the kind of evidence on which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs’.” Corroborating details can validate an anonymous informant’s tip (People v DiFalco, 80 NY2d 693). The Court emphasized the need to protect inmate-informants and defer to prison authorities’ judgments in maintaining order. The Hearing Officer found the confidential information “coherent,” “detailed,” and “made sense,” which are valid bases for credibility assessment. The Court’s in-camera review confirmed the information’s reliability and corroboration by independent evidence. The notice given to Abdur-Raheem was adequate as it provided enough particulars to prepare an effective response.

  • Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 63 N.Y.2d 1031 (1984): Appellate Division Discretion in Discovery Orders

    Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 63 N.Y.2d 1031 (1984)

    An appellate court can substitute its own discretion for that of a lower court in discovery matters, even absent an abuse of discretion by the lower court, and its decision is reviewable by the Court of Appeals only for abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

    Summary

    In a libel action, both plaintiffs and defendants sought disclosure of confidential investigative reports regarding police scandals from a non-party respondent. The respondent opposed disclosure based on the “public interest” privilege, arguing it would lead to reprisals against informants and impair future investigations. Special Term granted the motions but ordered redaction of informants’ names. The Appellate Division reversed, finding an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Appellate Division properly substituted its own discretion for that of Special Term and that no abuse of discretion by the Appellate Division occurred.

    Facts

    Plaintiffs sued Ottaway Newspapers for libel. During discovery, both parties sought access to confidential investigative reports held by a non-party concerning police scandals from 1972. The non-party opposed the disclosure, claiming the reports were privileged due to public interest concerns, as revealing the reports would endanger informants and hinder future investigations.

    Procedural History

    Special Term granted the motion for discovery but ordered the names of informants to be redacted. The Appellate Division reversed Special Term’s order, holding that Special Term had abused its discretion in ordering disclosure. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division had the power to deny the discovery motions in the exercise of its own discretion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division had the power to deny discovery motions in the exercise of its own discretion, even in the absence of an abuse of discretion by the Special Term.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Appellate Division is vested with the same power and discretion as Special Term and may substitute its own discretion, reviewable by the Court of Appeals only for abuse of discretion as a matter of law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, emphasizing the Appellate Division’s broad discretionary power in discovery matters. The Court noted that while determinations regarding special circumstances to support discovery against a non-party typically rest within the sound discretion of the initial court, the Appellate Division shares that discretion. Therefore, even absent an abuse of discretion by the Special Term, the Appellate Division can substitute its own judgment. The Court found the Appellate Division appropriately balanced the litigant’s right to evidence with the public interest in protecting investigations. The Appellate Division determined that redaction of names would not sufficiently safeguard the non-party respondent’s interests, as “speculation, fueled by disclosure of the reports, could subject sources to reprisals and imperil any future investigation of a similar nature.” The Court of Appeals then held that it would review the Appellate Division’s decision only for abuse of discretion, which the appellants did not claim occurred. The Court specifically limited its holding to the question of the Appellate Division’s power and declined to address any other issue.