New York Law Review

Tag: confidential informant

  • People v. Pena, 37 N.Y.2d 642 (1975): Confidential Informant Disclosure Standard

    People v. Pena, 37 N.Y.2d 642 (1975)

    A defendant seeking disclosure of a confidential informant’s identity must demonstrate a basis in fact showing the demand is not improperly motivated and that the informant’s testimony is relevant to guilt or innocence.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed an Appellate Division order directing a new trial for a defendant convicted of drug sale and possession, which was based on the need to disclose a confidential informant’s identity. The Court of Appeals held that the defendant failed to meet his burden of showing that the informant’s testimony was necessary for a fair trial. The court emphasized that the informant’s limited involvement in the drug transactions and the strength of the officer’s independent identification of the defendant justified protecting the informant’s identity.

    Facts

    Patrolman Pantano, working undercover, met the defendant Pena through a confidential informant. The informant introduced Pantano to Pena, who was selling drugs. The informant then left and was not present during the drug sale. A week later, Pantano again met Pena in the same area and purchased more drugs. The informant was present in the neighborhood but did not participate in the transaction. Pantano made a clear identification of Pena immediately after the second sale and again at the time of arrest. Pena’s aunt provided an alibi for Pena, but her testimony was contradicted by police officers. The trial court denied the defendant’s request for the disclosure of the informant’s identity, conducting an in camera hearing instead.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted on all counts of an indictment charging him with the sale and possession of dangerous drugs. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial so that the informer could be produced. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s application for disclosure of the identity of a confidential informant.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant failed to demonstrate that the informant’s testimony was relevant or necessary to his defense, given the officer’s independent identification and the informant’s limited involvement in the actual drug transactions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals balanced the privilege of confidentiality for informants against the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Citing Roviaro v. United States, the court acknowledged that the privilege must yield when a fair trial is imperiled. Referring to People v. Goggins and People v. Brown, the court reiterated that the defendant bears the initial burden of showing a factual basis indicating that the demand for disclosure is not merely an attempt to find weaknesses in the prosecution’s case. The court stated, “Bare assertions or conclusory allegations by a defendant that a witness is needed to establish his innocence will not suffice. Instead he must show a basis in fact to establish that his demand does not have an improper motive and is not merely an angling in desperation for possible weaknesses in the prosecution’s investigation.” The court emphasized the importance of the informant’s relevance to the defendant’s guilt or innocence, quoting Marks v. Beyfus: “[I]f upon the trial of a prisoner the judge should be of opinion that the disclosure of the name of the informant is necessary or right in order to show the prisoner’s innocence, then one public policy is in conflict with another public policy, and that which says that an innocent man is not to be condemned when his innocence can be proved is the policy that must prevail.” The court distinguished the case from Goggins, noting the strength of the officer’s identification, the daylight conditions during the transactions, and the immediate arrest. The court found the facts similar to those in Brown, where disclosure was not required because the informant’s testimony was not relevant. The court concluded that the informant’s limited role in the transactions and the officer’s independent identification justified protecting the informant’s confidentiality.

  • People v. Slaughter, 37 N.Y.2d 596 (1975): Establishing Probable Cause for Search Warrants Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Slaughter, 37 N.Y.2d 596 (1975)

    A search warrant may be issued based on hearsay information from a confidential informant if the affidavit establishes both the informant’s credibility and the reliability of the information provided, and independent police observations corroborate the informant’s statements.

    Summary

    Slaughter was convicted of drug possession and unlawful possession of an unregistered rifle after a search of his hotel room pursuant to a warrant. The warrant was based on an affidavit from a police officer relying on information from a confidential informant. Slaughter challenged the warrant, arguing the informant’s information was inaccurate. He also moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence from two officers who participated in the raid. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the warrant was properly issued because the affidavit established the informant’s credibility and the information’s reliability, and the “new” evidence was not compelling enough to warrant a new trial.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant for Slaughter’s hotel room based on an affidavit stating that a confidential informant had provided information that Slaughter possessed and was selling narcotics and possessed a gun in specific rooms of the Ebony Hotel. The informant was described as reliable, having previously provided information leading to arrests and narcotics seizures. The officer also stated that he had personally observed known narcotics sellers entering the hotel lobby and proceeding to the rooms indicated by the informant. Slaughter presented hotel receipts showing he was out of town on dates the informant claimed to have witnessed the sales.

    Procedural History

    Slaughter was convicted in the trial court. He moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause. The trial court denied the motion after an in camera examination of the informant. After the jury found him guilty, Slaughter moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The trial court also denied this motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. Slaughter appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by leave of a judge of that court.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the affidavit provided probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant, considering the information provided by the confidential informant and the alleged inaccuracies in the dates of the reported observations.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Slaughter’s motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence from two police officers who participated in the raid.

    Holding

    1. No, because the affidavit established both the informant’s credibility and the reliability of the information, which was further corroborated by independent police observations.

    2. No, because the newly discovered evidence did not create a probability that a different verdict would have resulted had the evidence been presented at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the two-pronged test from Aguilar v. Texas, requiring the affidavit to demonstrate both the informant’s veracity and the reliability of the information. The court found the informant’s credibility was established by the fact that the informant had previously supplied information leading to arrests and narcotics seizures. The reliability of the information was bolstered by the officer’s independent observation of known narcotics sellers entering the hotel and proceeding to the rooms identified by the informant. This provided a “substantial basis” for believing the informant.

    Regarding the discrepancy in dates, the court deferred to the trial judge’s finding after an in camera examination of the informant, concluding the inaccuracy did not undermine the informant’s credibility or the officer’s good faith reliance on the information. The court distinguished People v. Alfinito, clarifying that a defendant is only entitled to challenge the truthfulness of allegations in an affidavit when attacking the veracity of the police officer affiant, not merely the credibility of the informant.

    The court held that the newly discovered evidence, consisting of testimony from two additional police officers, did not warrant a new trial. The court pointed out that even if believed, the officer’s testimony merely provided an inconsistent version of events and did not directly contradict the evidence that Slaughter was found with contraband behind a locked door. The court quoted the trial judge who stated the defendant did not meet “the statutory requirement that the new evidence must ‘create a probability that had such evidence been received at the trial the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant.’”

  • People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549 (1975): Establishing Probable Cause with Informant Testimony for Search Warrants

    People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 549 (1975)

    An affidavit supporting a search warrant application based on information from an undisclosed informant must satisfy a two-pronged test: establishing the informant’s veracity and the basis of their knowledge, but warrants are favored and should be upheld in marginal cases.

    Summary

    This case consolidates appeals concerning the validity of search warrants based on information from confidential informants. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the affidavits supporting the warrants established probable cause, specifically focusing on the reliability of the informants and the basis of their knowledge. The court held that both warrants were valid because the affidavits provided sufficient details to establish the informants’ credibility and a basis for believing their information was accurate. The Court reiterated a preference for warrants, presuming police good faith when a warrant is secured.

    Facts

    In Hanlon, a detective obtained a search warrant based on an informant’s tip that marijuana and a weapon were located at Hanlon’s residence, along with the detective’s observation of known narcotics users entering and leaving the premises. The informant had previously provided information leading to arrests. In Rosen and Fredericks, a detective obtained warrants to search the defendants and a printing corporation based on an informant’s detailed description of an illegal football pool operation, which police surveillance corroborated. The informant had a history of providing accurate information.

    Procedural History

    In Hanlon, the County Court denied the motion to suppress the evidence. The Appellate Term affirmed on different grounds. In Rosen and Fredericks, the City Court granted the motion to suppress, finding the affidavit insufficient. The People appealed the disposition in Rosen and Fredericks.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the affidavit in Hanlon sufficiently established the timeliness of the informant’s information and the informant’s reliability.

    2. Whether the affidavits in both cases sufficiently established the basis of the informants’ knowledge.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a common-sense reading of the affidavit suggests the information was recent, and the informant had purchased narcotics from the defendant, provided accurate information previously, and the police corroborated the information.

    2. Yes, because in Hanlon, the detailed nature of the information suggested personal observation. In Rosen and Fredericks, the pattern of activity described by the informant, including specific details, was sufficiently accurate to lead to a reasonable belief that the conclusion was likewise accurate.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the two-pronged test established in Aguilar v. Texas, requiring that an affidavit based on an informant’s tip must establish both the informant’s veracity and the basis of their knowledge. The court found the Hanlon affidavit satisfactory because it indicated that the informant had purchased drugs from the defendant, which is against the informant’s penal interest. The affidavit also stated that the informant had provided accurate information previously. Furthermore, the police corroborated aspects of the informant’s information. The court cited Spinelli v. United States to explain that detailed information can suggest personal observation.

    Regarding the Rosen and Fredericks case, the court acknowledged that the defendants conceded the reliability of the informant, but the defendants challenged the basis of knowledge. The court stated, “The pattern of activity related by the informant, even to the extent of relating the time, day, place and mechanics of the operation, was of such accuracy and detail as to lead to a reasonable belief that the conclusion was likewise accurate.” The court also stated, “As the pattern unfolded the informer’s statements were reinforced by what the defendants did and the defendants’ activity was colored by what the informant said.”

    The court emphasized a strong preference for search warrants, stating that when a warrant has been secured, the good faith of the police will be presumed and the subsequent search upheld in a marginal or doubtful case. The court cautioned against reading search warrant applications in a hypertechnical manner, stating that they must be considered in the clear light of everyday experience and accorded all reasonable inferences.

    “Where a search warrant has been secured, the bona fides of the police will be presumed and the subsequent search upheld in a marginal or doubtful case.”

  • People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 182 (1975): Establishing Probable Cause for a Search Warrant Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Hanlon, 36 N.Y.2d 182 (1975)

    Probable cause for a search warrant can be established when an informant’s tip is corroborated by independent police investigation, even if the independently observed conduct is, by itself, innocuous.

    Summary

    Hanlon was convicted of possessing gambling records after a search of his car, which was conducted with a warrant. The warrant was based on an affidavit from a police officer who stated a confidential informant told him they saw bets being accepted at a steel plant and passed to Hanlon. The officer also saw an unknown person leave the plant and drop a package near the fence, which Hanlon retrieved on multiple occasions. While the officer’s observations alone might not establish probable cause, they corroborated the informant’s information, thus establishing the informant’s reliability. The New York Court of Appeals held that the corroboration of the informant’s information elevated Hanlon’s conduct from innocuous to suspicious, justifying the issuance of the search warrant. The conviction was reinstated.

    Facts

    A confidential informant told a police officer that bets on horse races were being accepted inside a steel plant and then passed through the fence to Hanlon.

    The officer independently observed an unidentified person leaving the steel plant and dropping a package by the fence on numerous occasions.

    The officer observed Hanlon pick up these packages.

    Based on this information, the officer obtained a search warrant for Hanlon’s car.

    Procedural History

    The City Court denied Hanlon’s motion to suppress the evidence found during the search.

    Hanlon was convicted in City Court of possessing gambling records.

    The County Court reversed the conviction, holding that the motion to suppress should have been granted.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order and reinstated the City Court’s conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant established probable cause based on the information provided by a confidential informant and corroborated by independent police observation.

    Holding

    Yes, because the officer’s independent observations corroborated the informant’s information in significant detail, establishing the informant’s reliability, and elevated Hanlon’s observed conduct from innocuous to suspicious.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while Hanlon’s observed conduct alone might be considered innocuous, the independent observations of the officer corroborated the informant’s tip, establishing the reliability of the informant. The Court cited People v. Coffey, noting the importance of independent verification of an informant’s tale. The court stated, “Thus, there was such an independent verification and separate objective checking of the informer’s tale as was sufficient to establish the reliability of the informer in this instance.” The Court emphasized that the informant’s information, combined with the officer’s observations, transformed Hanlon’s conduct from unusual to highly suspicious. This combination provided the necessary probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The Court also dismissed Hanlon’s argument that he was entitled to a transcript or summary of the informant’s testimony before the issuing judge, as the affidavit itself was sufficient to establish probable cause.

  • People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177 (1974): Establishing Probable Cause with Confidential Informants

    People v. Darden, 34 N.Y.2d 177 (1974)

    When probable cause for an arrest hinges on information from a confidential informant, and the defendant challenges the informant’s existence or reliability, the trial court should conduct an in camera inquiry to verify the informant’s existence and the basis of their knowledge while protecting the informant’s identity.

    Summary

    In this case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the issue of establishing probable cause for an arrest based on information provided by a confidential informant. The defendant, arrested based on an informant’s tip, challenged the refusal to disclose the informant’s identity at a suppression hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s order upholding the refusal to disclose the informant’s identity but outlined a procedure for an in camera inquiry by the suppression judge to verify the informant’s existence and reliability. This inquiry aims to balance the defendant’s right to challenge probable cause with the public interest in protecting informants.

    Facts

    On December 24, 1969, Rochester police arrested the defendant at the Rochester airport after he arrived on a flight from New York City. The police seized an attaché case he was carrying, and a search revealed a substantial quantity of heroin. The arrest was based on information from a previously reliable informant who described the defendant’s appearance and indicated he would be carrying an attaché case. The informant had named individuals who provided the information, and the police knew the informant to be reliable based on prior tips leading to drug arrests and convictions. Prior to the informant’s tip, police received an anonymous tip about a large heroin shipment and learned from street inquiries that the local heroin supply was low.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with criminal possession of a dangerous drug. At the suppression hearing, the trial court upheld the District Attorney’s refusal to disclose the informant’s identity and denied the motion to suppress the evidence seized during the search. The defendant then pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the District Attorney’s refusal to disclose the identity of the confidential informant deprived the defendant of a fair hearing on the issue of probable cause for the arrest.

    Holding

    No, because while the informant’s identity need not be disclosed, in cases where probable cause relies solely on an informant’s communication, the suppression judge should conduct an in camera inquiry to verify the informant’s existence and reliability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged the importance of protecting the anonymity of police informants to ensure a continued flow of information crucial to effective law enforcement, citing Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59. However, the court also recognized the defendant’s right to challenge the basis of probable cause for their arrest. Balancing these competing interests, the Court of Appeals proposed a new procedure for cases where probable cause hinges on an informant’s communication. The suppression judge should conduct an in camera inquiry, requiring the prosecution to produce the informant for interrogation. The prosecutor may be present, but not the defendant or their counsel. Defense counsel can submit written questions for the judge to ask the informant. The judge must then make a summary report, available to both the defendant and the prosecution, regarding the informant’s existence and the substance of their communication to the police. The transcript of the in camera testimony is sealed for appellate review. This procedure is designed to protect against the possibility that the informant is imaginary or the communication fabricated while preserving the informant’s anonymity. The court stated that “Assuring the desirable flow of useful information to the police will, of course, depend on predictable and reliable assurances that anonymity of informers will be preserved.” To the extent that this new procedure departs from prior decisions requiring the issue of probable cause be determined solely on the basis of a record fully available to the defendant, the court acknowledged this and indicated that they would depart from those prior decisions.

  • People v. Sutton, 32 N.Y.2d 923 (1973): Establishes Standards for Informant Reliability in Search Warrant Applications

    32 N.Y.2d 923 (1973)

    A search warrant based on information from a confidential informant must demonstrate the informant’s reliability and the basis of the informant’s knowledge to establish probable cause.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that a search warrant was invalid because the affidavit supporting it lacked sufficient information regarding the reliability and basis of knowledge of the confidential informant. The affidavit stated that the informant, who had previously provided reliable information leading to an arrest for drug sales, claimed that Sutton possessed 30 kilos of marijuana. The court found the affidavit deficient because it did not specify whether the informant’s knowledge was based on personal observation or other sources, thus failing to establish probable cause for the warrant.

    Facts

    A detective of the Town of Greenburgh Police Department obtained a search warrant for John Sutton’s apartment based on an affidavit. The affidavit stated that a reliable informant reported that Sutton possessed 30 kilos of marijuana in his apartment. The affidavit claimed the informant’s reliability was based on prior information that led to an arrest for criminal sale of a dangerous drug. The prior instance involved the informant contacting Stanley Coon about purchasing marijuana, leading to Coon’s arrest and indictment after a purchase was made.

    Procedural History

    The trial court upheld the search warrant and admitted the evidence seized. The Appellate Division reversed, finding the affidavit insufficient to establish probable cause due to a lack of detail regarding the basis of the informant’s knowledge. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an affidavit supporting a search warrant based on information from a confidential informant is sufficient to establish probable cause when it fails to adequately detail the source of the informant’s belief and basis of knowledge.

    Holding

    No, because the affidavit lacked any indication of the sources of the informant’s belief, whether on personal knowledge or otherwise, the warrant was improperly issued.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals adopted the dissenting opinion from the Appellate Division, which emphasized the affidavit’s failure to provide any details about how the informant obtained the information about Sutton’s possession of marijuana. The court stressed that the affidavit must show the informant’s reliability and the basis for their knowledge to allow the magistrate to independently evaluate whether probable cause exists. Without knowing whether the informant personally observed the marijuana or relied on hearsay, the magistrate could not make a reasoned judgment about the information’s credibility. The dissent in the Court of Appeals argued that the informant’s reliability had been demonstrated by prior actions, specifically leading to an indictment and arrest in a prior narcotics case. The dissent cited United States v. Harris, 403 U. S. 573, stating that the inquiry should be whether the informant’s present information is truthful or reliable. However, the majority found that, regardless of the informant’s past reliability, the affidavit lacked sufficient detail regarding the source of the present information, rendering the warrant invalid. The court did not elaborate further on why United States v. Harris was not controlling, but its decision emphasizes the need for specificity concerning the basis of the informant’s knowledge, which aligns with Aguilar v. Texas (378 U. S. 108).

  • People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129 (1969): Establishing Probable Cause Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Hendricks, 25 N.Y.2d 129 (1969)

    An affidavit in support of a search warrant relying on information from a confidential informant must demonstrate both the informant’s reliability and the basis of the informant’s knowledge to establish probable cause.

    Summary

    This case addresses the requirements for establishing probable cause for a search warrant when relying on information from a confidential informant. The Court of Appeals held that an affidavit must demonstrate both the informant’s reliability and the basis of their knowledge. The affidavit in this case was deemed insufficient because it only established the informant’s past reliability but failed to provide any details about how the informant obtained the information about the defendant possessing a weapon and stolen property. Consequently, the evidence seized and the defendant’s subsequent admissions were suppressed.

    Facts

    Detective Mugan obtained a search warrant for John Hendricks and his residence based on an affidavit stating that a reliable informant told him Hendricks possessed an illegal revolver and stolen property. Upon executing the warrant, officers found a loaded gun and airline tickets in Hendricks’s briefcase and more weapons in his home. After being confronted with the evidence, Hendricks admitted ownership of the weapons.

    Procedural History

    Hendricks was indicted on weapons and forgery charges. The trial court suppressed the airline tickets but not the weapons. After a hearing, the court upheld the warrant’s validity. Hendricks pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor weapons charge. The Appellate Division affirmed. Hendricks appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the affidavit supporting the search warrant established probable cause based on the informant’s information.
    2. Whether the defendant’s admissions should be suppressed as fruits of an illegal search and seizure.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the affidavit only established the informant’s reliability but failed to show how the informant obtained the information about Hendricks’s possession of the weapon and stolen property.
    2. Yes, because the admissions were directly linked to the illegal search and seizure, and the taint of the illegality had not been attenuated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the two-pronged test from Aguilar v. Texas and Spinelli v. United States, requiring the affidavit to demonstrate both the informant’s reliability and the basis of the informant’s knowledge. While Detective Mugan’s affidavit established the informant’s reliability by citing past instances where the informant provided information leading to arrests and convictions, it failed to provide any details about how the informant obtained the information about Hendricks’s possession of the weapon and stolen property. The court stated, “There must be more than an ultimate conclusion of probable cause or the affiant’s mere assertion that the information received was reliable.”

    The court distinguished this case from situations where the informant provides detailed information, suggesting firsthand knowledge, or where police independently corroborate the information. Here, the informant’s assertion was a mere conclusion, similar to the insufficient affidavits in Aguilar and Spinelli.

    The court rejected the argument that it should presume the informant saw the weapon, stating it would be impermissible, as it was in Giordenello v. United States, to presume that the informant had firsthand knowledge. A remand for a further hearing to establish the basis of the informant’s knowledge was also rejected, because “it would be manifestly unfair to the defendant to now allow the People to offer proof that the informer told the officer he saw the defendant in possession of the gun.”

    The court further held that the defendant’s admissions made after being confronted with the illegally seized items should also be suppressed. The court explained that these admissions were “tainted by the primary illegality” of the search and seizure because the link between them was “straight but short and immediate” and the taint was not attenuated.

  • People v. Montague, 17 N.Y.2d 120 (1966): Establishing Probable Cause for a Search Warrant Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Montague, 17 N.Y.2d 120 (1966)

    A search warrant may be issued based on information from a confidential informant if the affidavit supporting the warrant application provides sufficient detail for a neutral magistrate to independently determine probable cause, including verifying the informant’s reliability and basis of knowledge.

    Summary

    Montague was convicted of possessing cannabis after a search pursuant to a warrant revealed the contraband. The warrant was based on an affidavit from Detective-Sergeant Taubenkraut relying on information from a confidential informant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the affidavit provided sufficient information for the issuing magistrate to determine the informant’s credibility and the reliability of his information. The court emphasized that the informant’s detailed account, verified actions, and delivery of purchased contraband provided a substantial basis for the magistrate’s probable cause determination, ensuring he was not merely a “rubber stamp” for the police.

    Facts

    Detective-Sergeant Taubenkraut investigated marihuana sales in Ossining and received information from a confidential informant. The informant claimed he could purchase marihuana from Montague and Joseph Fisher. Over 19 days, the informant contacted the suspects and, following a pre-arranged plan, purchased four marihuana cigarettes from them. The informant then turned these cigarettes over to another police officer. The informant also detailed plans for another purchase the following night and mentioned purchasing a medicinal compound at a drugstore, signing his name in the register.

    Procedural History

    Based on Detective-Sergeant Taubenkraut’s affidavit and the four marihuana cigarettes, a Police Justice issued a search warrant for Montague. Montague was arrested and searched, and additional contraband was found. He was convicted after his motion to suppress the evidence was denied. Montague appealed, arguing the affidavit was insufficient to establish the informant’s reliability. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit presented to the Police Justice provided sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, specifically regarding the reliability of the confidential informant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the affidavit contained sufficient details, verified actions, and corroborating evidence to allow a neutral magistrate to independently determine that probable cause existed for the warrant to issue.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the affidavit established probable cause because it provided sufficient underlying circumstances to assess the informant’s credibility and the reliability of his information. The court noted that while prior reliable tips leading to convictions can establish credibility, it is not the only way. Here, the informant’s credibility was shown by providing a detailed account of his planned activities, which the police could have easily verified. Moreover, the informant’s delivery of the purchased marihuana cigarettes, implicating himself in criminal activity, further supported his truthfulness. The reliability of the informant’s information was further substantiated because he was reporting his own direct participation in illegal activities, not merely relaying suspicious occurrences. As the court stated, the informant “was not merely reporting ‘suspicious’ occurrences, but rather was attesting to his own actual participation with the suspects in their illegal activities, and he had the marihuana to show for it.” Unlike cases where neither the affiant nor informant had personal knowledge, here the informant had firsthand knowledge of the criminal activity. The court emphasized that the detective waited until he had verified the informant’s reliability before applying for the warrant, demonstrating commendable restraint and ensuring the magistrate had a “substantial basis” to conclude that contraband would likely be found on Montague’s person, referencing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271. The court explicitly distinguished this case from Aguilar v. Texas, where the affidavit lacked sufficient detail to allow a magistrate to make an independent assessment of probable cause.

  • People v. Schnitzler, 18 N.Y.2d 457 (1966): Probable Cause Based on Informant Testimony

    People v. Schnitzler, 18 N.Y.2d 457 (1966)

    A search warrant may be based on hearsay information from a confidential informant if the affidavit supporting the warrant details the underlying circumstances, gives reason for crediting the source, and a magistrate finds probable cause.

    Summary

    This case addresses the issue of probable cause for a search warrant based on information provided by a confidential informant. The Court of Appeals held that the warrant was valid because the affidavit presented to the issuing judge detailed the circumstances of the alleged crime, provided a basis for believing the informant’s information, and the judge found probable cause based on the affidavit and the officer’s sworn testimony. The court emphasized that a commonsense, rather than hyper-technical, approach should be used when reviewing warrants and that doubtful cases should be resolved with a preference for upholding the warrant.

    Facts

    A police detective obtained a search warrant for Alfred Schnitzler’s apartment. The detective’s affidavit stated that a confidential informant had told him Schnitzler was selling large quantities of marijuana. The informant claimed to have been present when over 50 pounds of marijuana were delivered to Schnitzler’s apartment. The affidavit included Schnitzler’s name, physical description, and address.

    Procedural History

    A Criminal Court Judge issued the search warrant. Schnitzler was subsequently convicted based on evidence seized during the search. The defendant appealed, arguing that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause. A habeas corpus hearing was held, where the officer testified the judge asked about the informant’s reliability. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case to determine the validity of the search warrant.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the affidavit, coupled with the officer’s sworn testimony before the issuing judge, provided probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the affidavit detailed the underlying circumstances of the alleged crime, provided a basis for believing the informant’s information, and the issuing judge made a determination of probable cause after questioning the officer under oath.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on United States v. Ventresca, which held that probable cause cannot be based solely on an affiant’s or informer’s belief without detailing the underlying circumstances. However, Ventresca also stated that when circumstances are detailed, reason for crediting the source is given, and a magistrate finds probable cause, courts should not invalidate the warrant with hyper-technical interpretations. The court also cited Brinegar v. United States, stating that probable cause deals with probabilities and practical considerations of everyday life. The court noted that hearsay evidence is admissible on the issue of probable cause. The affidavit stated that Schnitzler was selling marijuana in large quantities and that deliveries had been made to his apartment. The court acknowledged that the affidavit lacked a statement of the informer’s reliability, but this information was provided to the judge by the officer’s sworn testimony before the warrant was issued. “The Supreme Court in United States v. Ventresca… said that probable cause cannot be made out by merely stating the belief of an affiant or an informer that probable cause exists without detailing the underlying circumstances upon which that belief is based. But the court went on… to say this: ‘However, where these circumstances are detailed, where reason for crediting the source of the information is given, and when a magistrate has found probable cause, the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting the affidavit in a hyper technical, rather than a commonsense, manner.’” The court emphasized that the judge fulfilled his duty under Section 794 of the Code of Criminal Procedure by examining the officer under oath and supplementing the affidavit with additional information about the informant’s reliability. While the court noted it is best practice to record this additional information, its absence does not invalidate the warrant in this case.

  • People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86 (1965): Informant’s Privilege and Probable Cause for Arrest

    People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86 (1965)

    When probable cause for an arrest depends solely on an informant’s tip, the prosecution must disclose the informant’s identity to allow the defendant a fair opportunity to challenge the basis for probable cause, unless the prosecution presents independent evidence corroborating the tip or the informant’s reliability.

    Summary

    Malinsky and others were convicted of concealing stolen goods. Prior to trial, they moved to suppress evidence seized during their arrest, arguing the search warrant was improperly executed. The trial court ruled the nighttime execution invalid but ordered a hearing to determine if the search was incident to a lawful arrest based on probable cause stemming from an informant’s tip. The defense was denied the ability to question the detective about the informant. The New York Court of Appeals held that while prior statements of a witness must be disclosed under People v. Rosario, the informant’s identity need only be disclosed if probable cause hinges solely on the informant’s tip without independent corroboration. The case was remanded for a new hearing to allow the prosecution to present additional evidence, if any, supporting the informant’s reliability or independent probable cause.

    Facts

    A trailer containing drugs and cosmetics was stolen from a terminal in Boston. Three days later, New York City police, acting on a search warrant, seized the stolen goods as the defendants removed them from a warehouse in Queens. Prior to obtaining the warrant, police had observed the defendants and received a tip from an unnamed informant, who had previously provided reliable information, stating that there was a stolen load of goods at the warehouse and that Malinsky and Lustigman were involved. The police saw the defendants loading cartons onto a truck before arresting them. Only after the arrest did the officers confirm that the goods were stolen from the Boston terminal. The cartons lacked identifiable markings, and the informant did not describe the goods or their packaging.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were indicted and moved to suppress the evidence seized, arguing the search warrant was improperly executed at night. The trial court agreed the nighttime execution was unauthorized but ordered a separate hearing to determine if the search was justified as incident to a lawful arrest. The suppression hearing court denied the motion to suppress, and the evidence was admitted at trial, resulting in the defendants’ convictions. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendants access to the notes made by Detective Sullivan regarding the arrest.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to compel disclosure of the identity of the confidential informant.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under People v. Rosario, defense counsel must be permitted to examine a witness’ prior statement that relates to the subject matter of the testimony.
    2. No, not necessarily, because disclosure of an informant’s identity is only required where probable cause depends solely on the arresting officer’s testimony about the informant’s communications and there is insufficient other evidence to establish probable cause.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the detective’s notes, the court cited People v. Rosario, emphasizing that defense counsel must be allowed to examine a witness’ prior statements related to their testimony, provided the statements don’t contain confidential information. The court held that the Rosario rule applies equally to hearings and trials.

    Regarding the informant, the court acknowledged the government’s privilege to protect the identity of informants to encourage citizens to report crimes, citing Roviaro v. United States. However, this privilege is limited by fairness requirements. Quoting Roviaro, the court stated, “the privilege must give way” where “the disclosure of an informer’s identity, or of the contents of his communication, * * * is essential to a fair determination of a cause.”
    The court noted that when the legality of a search without a warrant relies on an informant’s communications to establish probable cause, the government must disclose the informant’s identity unless there is sufficient evidence apart from the confidential communication to sustain such a finding.”

    The court found that in this case, probable cause rested almost entirely on the informant’s tip, with limited corroborating evidence. The officers’ observations of the defendants loading cartons onto a truck did not, by themselves, establish probable cause without knowing the goods were stolen or that the defendants were not authorized to be there.

    The court remanded the case to allow the prosecution the opportunity to present further evidence to support the informant’s reliability or establish independent probable cause based on the police’s own investigation. The court concluded that “unless the prosecution is required to disclose the informer’s identity— so that he may be produced for possible questioning—the defendants will be denied the opportunity, to which they are entitled, of rebutting the detective’s crucial testimony.” If the prosecution fails to provide additional support, the court indicated that the informer’s identity must be disclosed or the evidence suppressed.