New York Law Review

Tag: confidential informant

  • People v. Horton, 24 N.Y.3d 985 (2014): Establishing Witness Tampering Through Online Communication

    People v. Horton, 24 N.Y.3d 985 (2014)

    Evidence of online communications, including social media posts, can be sufficient to establish witness tampering if it demonstrates the defendant knew the person was a potential witness and wrongfully attempted to induce that person to avoid testifying.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for witness tampering, holding that the defendant’s Facebook posts and YouTube video identifying a confidential informant, combined with threatening comments, were sufficient evidence to prove he attempted to prevent her from testifying in a drug case. The court reasoned that the jury could reasonably infer the online communications were coded threats intended to dissuade the informant from testifying, particularly given the defendant’s knowledge of her role and the pending charges against his friend. The decision highlights the potential for online activity to constitute witness tampering.

    Facts

    A confidential informant assisted the Wayne County Sheriff’s Office in a controlled drug purchase from Clarence Jackson, which was recorded. Jackson was arrested and informed the defendant, Thomas Horton, about his arrest and intention to plead guilty, showing him the videotape. The confidential informant reported that Horton was “outing” her as an informant on Facebook, posting a clip of the surveillance video on YouTube with a link on his Facebook page. Horton and others made denouncing and threatening statements towards the informant on Facebook including “Snitches get stitches” and “I hope she gets what’s coming to her.”

    Procedural History

    Horton was arrested and convicted in Town Court for fourth-degree witness tampering. He was sentenced to one year in jail. Horton appealed to County Court, arguing insufficient evidence that he attempted to prevent the informant from testifying or knew she would testify. The County Court affirmed the conviction. A judge of the Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish that the defendant knew the confidential informant might testify in a proceeding and that he wrongfully sought to stop her from doing so through online communications.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence, viewed favorably to the prosecution, was sufficient for a jury to conclude that the defendant knew the informant might testify and that his online communications constituted a wrongful attempt to prevent her from doing so.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The court emphasized that after learning about Jackson’s arrest and the informant’s role, Horton posted communications online that the jury could reasonably infer were coded threats intended to induce the informant not to testify. The court also noted that Horton was in contact with the informant and her mother via Facebook messages. The court stated, “[A]fter learning about Jackson’s arrest and the confidential informant’s role as a witness against Jackson and, potentially, himself, defendant immediately posted communications on the Internet that the jury might have reasonably inferred were coded threats that were intended to induce the confidential informant not to testify.” The court concluded that Horton’s actions satisfied the elements of Penal Law § 215.10, which defines witness tampering as wrongfully inducing or attempting to induce a person to avoid testifying, knowing that person is or is about to be called as a witness. The court considered the totality of the circumstances, including the context of the Facebook posts and YouTube video, to determine that the defendant’s intent was to dissuade the informant from testifying.

  • People v. Castillo, 22 N.Y.3d 991 (2013): Examining Confidential Informant Testimony for Probable Cause in Search Warrant Applications

    People v. Castillo, 22 N.Y.3d 991 (2013)

    When a search warrant is based on information from a confidential informant, and the warrant application and supporting affidavit alone do not establish probable cause, the court must examine the transcript of the informant’s testimony before the magistrate to determine if probable cause existed and if CPL 690.40(1) was substantially complied with.

    Summary

    Castillo was convicted on drug and weapon charges after a search of his home pursuant to a warrant. The warrant was based on an affidavit from a police officer and the oral deposition of a confidential informant. Castillo moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the warrant lacked probable cause and requesting a Darden hearing. The Supreme Court denied the motion without reviewing the informant’s testimony. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals held that while a Darden hearing was not required, the Supreme Court erred in not reviewing the informant’s testimony to determine if probable cause existed and if the requirements of CPL 690.40(1) were met. The case was remitted for further proceedings.

    Facts

    A police officer obtained a search warrant for Castillo’s home based on her affidavit and the oral deposition of a confidential informant. The affidavit stated the informant purchased cocaine from Castillo at his home on three occasions. The affidavit did not detail the informant’s reliability or track record. During the warrant application process, the confidential informant testified before the issuing magistrate.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Castillo’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the search, without reviewing the transcript of the confidential informant’s testimony. Castillo was subsequently convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding that the denial of a Darden hearing was appropriate. Castillo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Supreme Court erred in failing to examine the transcript of the confidential informant’s testimony before the magistrate to determine if the search warrant was issued upon probable cause.
    2. Whether the Supreme Court erred in failing to determine if the formal requirements of CPL 690.40(1) had been substantially complied with.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because when the search warrant and supporting affidavit do not by themselves establish probable cause, the court must review the transcript of the informant’s testimony to determine if probable cause existed based on the totality of the evidence presented to the magistrate.

    2. Yes, because the suppression court must ensure that there was substantial compliance with CPL 690.40(1) to ensure the regularity of the application process and preservation for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the search warrant and supporting affidavit, standing alone, did not establish probable cause. The affidavit lacked sufficient information to assess the informant’s reliability, failing to demonstrate a proven track record or indicate the informant was under oath. While admissions against penal interest can contribute to probable cause, the informant’s statements lacked sufficient detail and police corroboration. The court distinguished this case from People v. McCann, where the informant provided a detailed, signed statement against their penal interests with the explicit understanding that false statements were a crime.

    Because the warrant application was deficient, the Supreme Court was required to review the transcript of the informant’s testimony to determine if probable cause was established before the magistrate. Furthermore, the court emphasized the importance of complying with CPL 690.40(1), which requires that any examination of a person providing pertinent information be recorded or summarized. This ensures the regularity of the warrant application process and preserves the grounds for issuing the warrant for appellate review. As the court stated, “[t]he suppression court must find that there was substantial compliance with CPL 690.40 (1) in order to provide an ‘assurance of the regularity of the application process and preservation for appellate review of the grounds upon which a search warrant is issued.’” The case was remitted to the Supreme Court to review the transcript and determine if probable cause and compliance with CPL 690.40(1) were established.

  • People v. Adrion, 82 N.Y.2d 628 (1993): Probable Cause Based on Independent Police Observation

    People v. Adrion, 82 N.Y.2d 628 (1993)

    Probable cause for an arrest can be established through an officer’s independent observations, even if the initial information leading to the observation came from a confidential informant; a Darden hearing is not required if probable cause exists independently of the informant’s tip.

    Summary

    Adrion was arrested after a confidential informant provided information to the police about stolen luggage at a specific location. An officer went to the location and arrested Adrion after finding boxes. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the People could not establish probable cause without the informant’s testimony, the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the prosecution was reversed. This case stands in contrast to cases where police make independent observations that establish probable cause separate from informant information.

    Facts

    A confidential informant told the police that stolen luggage could be found in a specific location.

    A police officer went to that location and saw boxes.

    The police officer arrested Adrion.

    Procedural History

    The trial court’s decision is not included.

    The Appellate Division reinstated the prosecution.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether probable cause to arrest Adrion existed independently of the confidential informant’s information.

    Holding

    No, because the People could not establish probable cause without the testimony of the confidential informant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from situations where probable cause can be established by the independent observations of a police officer. The court emphasized that in this case, the officer’s actions (going to the location and seeing boxes) were directly based on the informant’s tip, and without the informant’s information, there was no independent basis for probable cause. The court compared the instant case to People v. Darden, stating that, similarly, the testimony of the confidential informant was necessary to establish probable cause. Because the People could not establish probable cause without the testimony of the confidential informant, this Court reversed the reinstatement of the prosecution by the Appellate Division.

  • People v. Edwards, 95 N.Y.2d 486 (2000): Establishes Mandatory Darden Hearing for Confidential Informants

    People v. Edwards, 95 N.Y.2d 486 (2000)

    When a confidential informant’s information is essential to establishing probable cause for an arrest, a Darden hearing (an in camera examination of the informant) is mandatory unless specific exceptions apply, ensuring the informant’s existence and reliability while protecting their identity.

    Summary

    The case clarifies that a Darden hearing is a mandatory requirement, not a discretionary procedure, when a confidential informant’s information is crucial to establishing probable cause. Johnson Edwards was convicted of murder and attempted murder. His motion to suppress lineup identifications was denied. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in denying Edwards’ request for an in-camera examination of a confidential informant whose information was pivotal in establishing probable cause for his arrest. The Court emphasized the importance of verifying the informant’s existence and reliability through a Darden hearing, balancing the need to protect informant confidentiality with the defendant’s right to challenge the basis of probable cause.

    Facts

    A confidential informant told Detective Neenan that “Tony” confessed to shootings. The informant described “Tony” and provided details about the shootings, including a separate shooting of John Thomas. Subsequently, Thomas identified Johnson Edwards (the defendant) from a photo as the person who shot him. Chester Martin and other witnesses identified Edwards in a lineup as the shooter in the initial incident. Edwards was arrested based on this information and subsequently identified in a lineup.

    Procedural History

    Edwards was charged with murder, attempted murder, and weapons offenses. He moved to suppress the lineup identifications. The trial court denied the motion, finding probable cause for the arrest based on the informant’s information and the lineup results. The Appellate Division affirmed, stating the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Edwards’ motion for an in-camera examination of the informant. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a Darden hearing was required.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court is required to conduct an in camera examination of a confidential informant (a Darden hearing) when the informant’s information is necessary to establish probable cause for an arrest, or whether such a hearing is discretionary.

    Holding

    Yes, because when the informant’s testimony is necessary to establish probable cause, the court must grant the defendant’s request for a Darden hearing to verify the informant’s existence and the basis of their knowledge while protecting their identity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Darden hearing requirement balances the need to protect confidential informants with the defendant’s right to challenge the basis for probable cause. The court emphasized that without a Darden hearing, a defendant’s ability to test the officer’s claim of probable cause is significantly limited, potentially thwarting efforts to challenge the officer’s credibility. The Court explicitly stated that a Darden hearing “is required ‘where there is insufficient evidence to establish probable cause apart from the testimony of the arresting officer as to communications received from an informer.’ ” The Court also clarified exceptions to the Darden rule, such as when the informant cannot be located or refuses to appear due to fear of personal injury, in which case the People may establish the informant’s existence through extrinsic evidence. The Court dismissed the argument that satisfying the Aguilar-Spinelli test obviates the need for a Darden hearing, noting that the Darden rule’s primary purpose is to verify the informant’s existence, not merely the reliability of the tip. The court emphasized that, “the People are required to produce the police informant for an in camera inquiry unless they can demonstrate that the informant is unavailable and cannot be produced through the exercise of due diligence.”

  • People v. Serrano, 93 N.Y.2d 73 (1999): Necessity of Examining Informant Testimony for Probable Cause in Sealed Warrant Cases

    People v. Serrano, 93 N.Y.2d 73 (1999)

    When a search warrant is based on a confidential informant’s testimony, and the warrant affidavit alone is insufficient to establish probable cause, the suppression court must examine the transcript of the informant’s testimony before the issuing magistrate to determine if probable cause existed and if CPL 690.40(1) was substantially complied with.

    Summary

    Serrano was convicted of robbery and homicide. Evidence against him, including photographs, was seized via a search warrant. The warrant was based on a police officer’s affidavit and a confidential informant’s testimony before the issuing judge. Because the prosecution sought to keep the informant’s identity secret, the defense was denied access to the warrant application. The suppression court denied Serrano’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding the warrant affidavit alone established probable cause. The Court of Appeals held that when the warrant affidavit is insufficient on its own, the suppression court must examine the transcript of the informant’s testimony to determine if probable cause existed. The case was remitted for a new suppression hearing.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of killing the occupant of an apartment while robbing him. The prosecution introduced photographs showing the defendant with another suspect and holding a handgun resembling the weapon used in the crime. These photographs were seized from the defendant’s mother’s home pursuant to a search warrant. The warrant was based on a police officer’s affidavit and the testimony of a confidential informant before the issuing Justice.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the evidence. The People requested a protective order sealing the warrant and affidavit to protect the informant’s identity. The suppression court held an ex parte in camera hearing and granted the protective order. The court denied the motion to suppress, finding the warrant affidavit itself established probable cause. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the suppression court erred in failing to hold a Darden-type hearing where the confidential informant would have been produced for in camera examination.
    2. Whether the suppression court erred in failing to examine the transcript of the informant’s testimony before the issuing Justice to determine if probable cause existed and if CPL 690.40(1) was substantially complied with.

    Holding

    1. No, because when the informant had appeared and testified before the magistrate who issued the search warrant, verification of the existence of the informant, and of what was told to the police, will have already been achieved and need not be duplicated before the suppression court.
    2. Yes, because the search warrant and supporting affidavit did not, by themselves, establish probable cause, and the suppression court needed the transcript of the examination of the informant in order to properly determine that there was probable cause to issue the search warrant, and that CPL 690.40(1) was substantially complied with.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that a Darden hearing is not always required when search warrant papers are sealed, especially when the informant has already testified before the issuing magistrate. The purpose of a Darden hearing is to verify the informant’s existence and credibility, which is already achieved when the informant testifies before the magistrate. However, the Court emphasized that the suppression court must examine the transcript of the informant’s testimony to ensure probable cause and compliance with CPL 690.40(1), which requires the examination to be under oath and either recorded or summarized. The Court found that the warrant affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause on its own because it lacked factual averments to determine the informant’s reliability as required by the Aguilar-Spinelli test. The Court quoted People v. Griminger, stating that a warrant application must demonstrate “(i) the veracity or reliability of the source of the information, and (ii) the basis of the informant’s knowledge.” Since the affidavit did not establish the informant’s reliability, the warrant papers did not alone establish probable cause. The failure to examine the transcript and ensure compliance with CPL 690.40(1) frustrated the statute’s objectives of assuring the regularity of the application process and preserving the grounds for appellate review. The Court remitted the case for a new suppression hearing, allowing the People to present the transcript or reconstruct the informant’s testimony. If the warrant was not supported by probable cause or CPL 690.40(1) was not substantially complied with, the judgment of conviction should be vacated, and the motion to suppress granted.

  • People v. Adrion, 82 N.Y.2d 628 (1993): Enforcing Darden When Informant Information is Crucial for Probable Cause

    People v. Adrion, 82 N.Y.2d 628 (1993)

    When a confidential informant’s tip is essential to establishing probable cause, the prosecution must produce the informant for a Darden inquiry, even if the arresting officer observes suspicious circumstances; failure to produce the informant requires suppression of the evidence.

    Summary

    Defendants were arrested after an FBI agent, acting on a confidential informant’s tip, observed them unloading stolen merchandise. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the prosecution could refuse to produce the informant for a Darden inquiry, arguing that the agent’s observations independently established probable cause. The Court held that the prosecution was obligated to produce the informant or forfeit the evidence because the informant’s tip was crucial for establishing probable cause. The Court reasoned that Darden addresses verifying the truthfulness of police testimony about a known informant, a distinct issue from assessing an anonymous tip’s reliability.

    Facts

    The Samsonite Corporation reported the theft of luggage. An FBI agent in New York was informed by the Newark office that a confidential informant stated the stolen luggage was in a Ryder truck at a specific Brooklyn address. The agent found the truck, observed defendant Grado arrive in another Ryder truck, and saw defendants unloading cartons into a garage. The agent noticed the markings on the cartons matched those of the stolen luggage. Grado provided implausible explanations regarding the goods and their destination.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were indicted for criminal possession of stolen property and moved to suppress the evidence. The trial court ordered the People to produce the confidential informant for a potential Darden hearing. The People refused, stating the FBI would not make the informant available. The trial court suppressed the evidence, finding no probable cause without the informant’s information. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, granting the motion to suppress and dismissing the indictment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People may refuse to comply with a trial court’s order to produce a confidential informant for a Darden inquiry when the arresting officer obtained confirmatory information through their own observations.

    Holding

    No, because the Darden procedure addresses the distinct problem of verifying the truthfulness of the police witness’s testimony about dealings with a known informant, ensuring the informant is not “wholly imaginary” or the communication “entirely fabricated.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished between verifying an anonymous tip and verifying police testimony about a confidential informant. People v. Elwell (50 N.Y.2d 231) allows independent police observations to validate an anonymous tip by establishing its reliability and accuracy. However, Darden (34 N.Y.2d 177) addresses a different concern: ensuring the police are truthful about the existence and role of the informant. The Court emphasized that “[w]hat is at stake in Darden situations is the integrity of the proceeding itself.” The Court reasoned that even though the agent observed suspicious activity, he wouldn’t have been at that location without the informant’s tip. Therefore, the tip was crucial to establishing probable cause, necessitating a Darden inquiry. The Court rejected the argument that cross-examination was sufficient to test the officer’s credibility, reaffirming the trial court’s authority to require the informant’s production to ensure a fair proceeding. The Court stated, “[T]here is no satisfactory substitute for the production of the informant — or at least the production of extrinsic proof of the informant’s existence when the informant is demonstrably unavailable.”

  • People v. Lesiuk, 81 N.Y.2d 485 (1993): Standard for Dismissal When Informant Unavailable

    81 N.Y.2d 485 (1993)

    When the prosecution fails to produce a confidential informant, the defendant must demonstrate that the informant’s testimony would tend to be exculpatory or create a reasonable doubt as to the reliability of the prosecution’s case to warrant dismissal.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of criminal sale of marihuana. A confidential informant, Harvey, involved in the transaction, was unavailable at trial. Defendant moved to set aside the verdict based on Harvey’s affidavit stating defendant did not sell him marihuana. The Appellate Division remitted for a determination of the materiality of Harvey’s testimony, applying a “reasonable probability” standard. After a hearing, the motion was denied, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the defendant seeking dismissal due to the prosecution’s failure to produce an unavailable informant must show the testimony would be exculpatory or create reasonable doubt.

    Facts

    An undercover officer observed defendant handing a bag of marihuana to informant Harvey in exchange for $1,650. The arrest was delayed due to the officer’s involvement in another investigation and attempts to use Harvey for another transaction with the defendant. The prosecution attempted to locate Harvey for trial but was unsuccessful.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was convicted in County Court. He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the delay between the crime and arrest violated due process. He also moved to set aside the verdict based on Harvey’s affidavit. The County Court denied the motions. The Appellate Division withheld decision and remitted to County Court to determine the materiality of Harvey’s testimony. Upon remittal, the County Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division applied the proper standard in considering whether the testimony of the unavailable informant, had he been produced at trial, would have created a different result in the outcome of the case.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a defendant seeks dismissal of an indictment for the prosecution’s failure to produce a witness unavailable through no intention of the prosecutors, the defendant must demonstrate that the proposed testimony of the informant would tend to be exculpatory or would create a reasonable doubt as to the reliability of the prosecution’s case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on People v. Jenkins, which established that when a confidential informant is unavailable, the People have a duty to produce them or exert diligent efforts to do so. To compel production or dismissal, the defendant must show the informant’s testimony would be exculpatory or create reasonable doubt. The Court rejected the argument that Harvey’s subsequent statements created reasonable doubt, deferring to the County Court’s assessment of Harvey’s credibility. The Court also addressed the delay between the incident and arrest, finding it justified by ongoing investigations. Quoting People v Singer, the court stated that “a determination made in good faith to defer commencement of the prosecution for further investigation or for other sufficient reasons, will not deprive the defendant of due process of law even though the delay may cause some prejudice to the defense.” Finally, the Court found that the trial court’s inquiry into the juror’s unavailability was proper and complied with precedent.

  • People v. Castillo, 80 N.Y.2d 578 (1992): Confidential Informant Testimony and Defendant’s Right to Participate in Suppression Hearing

    People v. Castillo, 80 N.Y.2d 578 (1992)

    A defendant’s right to participate in a suppression hearing can be limited to protect the confidentiality of an informant when the reliability of probable cause and the necessity for confidentiality are clearly demonstrated.

    Summary

    Castillo was convicted of drug and weapon possession after a search of his apartment pursuant to a warrant. The warrant was based on information from a confidential informant. Castillo sought to inspect the warrant and supporting documents and challenge the probable cause determination. The court denied discovery and held an in camera suppression hearing without Castillo’s participation, finding that disclosure could compromise the informant’s safety. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under these circumstances, the trial court properly denied discovery, balancing the defendant’s rights with society’s need to protect informants.

    Facts

    Police searched Castillo’s apartment on April 6, 1988, pursuant to a warrant authorized by a Supreme Court Justice based on a police officer’s affidavit and sworn testimony from a confidential informant. The Justice ordered the record sealed. The search revealed cocaine, a machine gun, handguns, ammunition, and $28,000 in cash. Castillo was present during the search and arrested. Castillo’s wife alleged that prior to the search, other officers had entered the apartment without permission, which Castillo’s counsel argued tainted the warrant.

    Procedural History

    Castillo was charged with drug and weapon possession. He moved to suppress the evidence, claiming an unlawful search. The suppression court held an in camera hearing, excluding Castillo, to determine if the prior police contact tainted the search. The court found the searches unrelated and denied the suppression motion. Castillo pleaded guilty to reduced charges after the denial. The Appellate Division affirmed, and Castillo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a suppression procedure conducted without the defendant’s participation, due to concerns for a confidential informant’s safety, violates the defendant’s constitutional right to due process and the effective assistance of counsel.

    Holding

    No, because under the circumstances presented in the record, the trial court could properly deny the defendant discovery, balancing the defendant’s right to participate in the defense with society’s need to protect informants.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the defendant’s constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and the right to a suppression hearing. However, it emphasized the difference between a trial and a pretrial suppression hearing, noting that due process requirements for a hearing may be less demanding than at trial. The court balanced the defendant’s right to participate in the defense with society’s need to encourage citizen participation in law enforcement through anonymity.

    The court cited McCray v. Illinois, emphasizing that the exclusionary rule is not aimed at safeguarding the truth-seeking process but is a remedy to discourage police misconduct. The Court distinguished this case from trial situations where disclosure of an informant’s identity is often required if relevant to the defense (citing Roviaro v. United States and People v. Goggins).

    The Court relied on People v. Darden, which endorsed in camera examination of confidential informants. While acknowledging that in this case, none of the factual predicates for probable cause were revealed to the defendant, the court noted that intermediate appellate courts have approved ex parte, in camera review of search warrant applications in similar circumstances (citing People v Rodriguez, People v Peterson, and others).

    The court emphasized the suppression court diligently protected the defendant’s rights, following a four-step procedure based on People v. Seychel to assess the warrant and the need for confidentiality. The court stated that appellate review of probable cause ensures there was a substantial basis for the magistrate’s conclusion, not a reevaluation of accuracy. The Court cautioned that procedures sanctioned are reserved for cases where reliability of probable cause and necessity of confidentiality are clearly demonstrated. The court stated, “Although a defendant who does not have access to the information purporting to establish probable cause will be unable to suggest reasons why probable cause was lacking, this fact does not deprive the defendant of due process or the effective assistance of counsel.”

  • People v. Castillo, 80 N.Y.2d 578 (1992): Establishing Informant Reliability for Search Warrants

    People v. Castillo, 80 N.Y.2d 578 (1992)

    A search warrant application based on information from a confidential informant must demonstrate the informant’s reliability to the issuing judge, independent of police conclusions, and without relying solely on an unverified affidavit signed by the informant.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a search warrant was improperly issued because the application relied on an affidavit from a confidential informant whose reliability was not adequately established. The police investigator’s affidavit lacked details of prior successful uses of the informant, and the informant’s affidavit was signed only as “Confidential Informant.” The issuing judge failed to independently assess the informant’s reliability. The court emphasized that the determination of probable cause rests with the judge, not the police. Therefore, evidence seized during the search was suppressed, and the indictment was dismissed.

    Facts

    A confidential informant told Schenectady Police Department Investigator Galligan that drugs could be purchased from the defendant at her apartment. The informant claimed to have purchased cocaine from the defendant but was not accompanied by police during the purchase. Investigator Galligan applied for a search warrant based on his affidavit and two affidavits signed only as “Confidential Informant.” The investigator’s affidavit did not provide details of any prior instances where the informant’s information led to a conviction or was independently verified. The issuing judge did not question the informant before issuing the warrant. A quantity of cocaine was seized from the defendant’s apartment during the warrant’s execution.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the drugs seized from her apartment. The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s decision, finding that the police knew the informant’s identity and address, the sworn statements provided sufficient probable cause, and the informant acknowledged the statements. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an affidavit signed only by a “Confidential Informant,” without any determination by the issuing judge as to that person’s reliability, can establish the probable cause necessary for a search warrant.

    Holding

    No, because an application for a search warrant based on information from an undisclosed informant must demonstrate the informant’s reliability to the issuing judge. It is the issuing Judge, not the police or applicant for the search warrant, who must be satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for the issuance of the warrant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Article I, Section 12 of the New York State Constitution, which is analogous to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Citing People v. Griminger, 71 N.Y.2d 635, the court reiterated that an application for a search warrant based on an undisclosed informant’s information must demonstrate both the informant’s reliability and the basis of the informant’s knowledge. The court found that neither Investigator Galligan’s affidavit nor the informant’s affidavits established the informant’s reliability. The court emphasized that the issuing judge, not the police, must be satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for issuing the warrant. The judge must inquire into the facts supporting the application. The court noted that the police officer’s affidavit did not articulate any prior success with this informant, and the informant’s affidavits were merely signed “Confidential Informant.” The court stated: “It is the issuing Judge, not the police or applicant for the search warrant, who must be satisfied that there is a reasonable basis for the issuance of the warrant.” This case highlights the importance of judicial oversight in the warrant process and the need for concrete evidence of an informant’s reliability to protect against unreasonable searches.

  • People v. Carpenito, 80 N.Y.2d 65 (1992): Establishing Informant Existence When Informant is Unavailable Due to Fear

    People v. Carpenito, 80 N.Y.2d 65 (1992)

    When a confidential informant is legitimately unavailable due to fear, the prosecution may establish the informant’s existence through extrinsic evidence; however, the trial court retains discretion to require production of the informant if the prosecution fails to adequately demonstrate unavailability.

    Summary

    Defendant was indicted on drug and weapons charges after a search warrant was executed based on information from confidential informants. The trial court ordered an in camera hearing to examine the existence of one informant (a *Darden* hearing). The prosecution failed to produce the informant, claiming fear for the informant’s safety, and offered alternative evidence to establish the informant’s existence. The trial court suppressed the evidence, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that the prosecution could use extrinsic evidence to prove the informant’s existence if the informant was genuinely unavailable due to fear, but the trial court had discretion on whether to accept that evidence.

    Facts

    Detective Burns investigated cocaine trafficking based on information from a confidential informant starting in January 1988.

    A second informant and police surveillance linked the defendant to the alleged drug network.

    On July 26, 1988, a search warrant was issued for the defendant, his wife, their residence, and vehicles.

    On July 27, 1988, the warrant was executed, and drugs, weapons, and drug paraphernalia were seized.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was indicted on multiple charges, including drug and weapon possession.

    Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, challenging the statements of the second informant.

    The trial court ordered a *Darden* hearing to examine the informant’s existence.

    The prosecution failed to produce the informant, claiming the informant feared for their safety, and offered alternative evidence.

    The trial court granted the motion to suppress.

    The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the trial court should have considered alternative evidence of the informant’s existence.

    The Court of Appeals granted defendant’s motion for leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether suppression is the appropriate remedy when the prosecution cannot produce a confidential informant for a *Darden* hearing because the informant allegedly fears personal injury?

    Holding

    No, because it is consistent with *Darden* to permit the People to establish the existence of confidential informants through extrinsic evidence once the People have demonstrated that the informant is legitimately unavailable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a blanket exception for informants unavailable due to fear would incentivize defendants to intimidate suspected informants. The Court emphasized that the trial judge has discretion to determine if the informant’s unavailability is genuine and due to fear. If satisfied, the court can allow the prosecution to prove the informant’s existence through alternative means. However, if the prosecution fails to meet this initial threshold, the court retains the discretion to require the informant’s production.

    The Court stated, “Where, as here, the Court is convinced that the informant’s unavailability is, in fact, the result of actual fear of death or injury to the informant or his family, there is no practical reason for the exception.”

    The Court further explained the policy consideration: “Moreover, adoption of defendant’s argument would provide criminal defendants with an incentive to intimidate suspected informants in an effort to secure suppression of damaging physical evidence.”

    The Court explicitly overruled *People v. Johnson* (39 NY2d 364) to the extent that it suggested the Court of Appeals had the power to grant affirmative relief to a non-appealing party.