New York Law Review

Tag: concurrent sentence

  • People v. Fuggazzatto, 9 N.Y.3d 349 (2007): Withdrawing Guilty Plea After Prior Conviction Vacated

    People v. Fuggazzatto, 9 N.Y.3d 349 (2007)

    When a defendant pleads guilty to a crime in exchange for a sentence that runs concurrently with a sentence for a prior conviction, and the prior conviction is later vacated, the defendant is entitled to withdraw the guilty plea if it was induced by the expectation of concurrent sentencing.

    Summary

    Fuggazzatto pleaded guilty to criminally negligent homicide and criminal possession of a weapon in exchange for a sentence to run concurrently with a sentence he was already serving for a prior conviction of criminal possession of stolen property. After the prior conviction was vacated, Fuggazzatto moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that it had been induced by the now-defunct concurrent sentence agreement. The Court of Appeals held that he was entitled to withdraw his plea, reasoning that the plea agreement was predicated on the concurrent sentence and that vacating the prior conviction undermined the basis for the plea.

    Facts

    Defendant was on trial for murder and other related charges. After four days of trial and the testimony of sixteen witnesses, the People offered defendant a plea bargain. The offer was to plead guilty to criminally negligent homicide and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. This plea would result in a concurrent sentence with a term of imprisonment of 4 to 8 years. At the time of the plea, defendant was already serving a sentence for a prior conviction of criminal possession of stolen property. Subsequently, the prior conviction was vacated.

    Procedural History

    After his prior conviction was vacated, Fuggazzatto moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The County Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted Fuggazzatto’s motion to vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant who pleads guilty in exchange for a concurrent sentence with a prior conviction is entitled to withdraw the guilty plea when the prior conviction is vacated.

    Holding

    Yes, because the guilty plea was induced by the expectation of a concurrent sentence, and vacating the prior conviction undermines the basis for the plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plea agreement was premised on the understanding that the defendant would serve a concurrent sentence. The court stated, “Here, defendant pleaded guilty to avoid the risk of a greater sentence, but he also knew that whatever sentence he received would run concurrently with the sentence he was already serving. The vacatur of the earlier conviction removed an important building block upon which the plea rested.” The court distinguished this case from situations where a defendant receives the benefit of the plea bargain (i.e., a reduced sentence) regardless of the prior conviction. The court stated that, in those cases, the defendant might not be entitled to withdraw the plea. However, in this case, the concurrent sentence was a significant factor in the defendant’s decision to plead guilty, and the vacatur of the prior conviction eliminated that benefit. The court noted the importance of fairness and ensuring that plea agreements are based on accurate information. It suggested that prosecutors could include waivers in plea agreements to address the possibility of a prior conviction being vacated. Judge Graffeo dissented, arguing that the defendant would have accepted the plea offer regardless of the prior conviction, given the serious charges he was facing and the fact that the plea avoided a potentially much longer sentence. Graffeo also expressed concern about the application of the majority’s rule in future cases, questioning how much additional time would be considered a significant factor in inducing a plea.

  • People v. Pichardo, 1 N.Y.3d 126 (2003): Vacating Guilty Pleas After Original Concurrent Sentence is Overturned

    1 N.Y.3d 126 (2003)

    When a guilty plea is induced by the court’s explicit promise of a lesser sentence to run concurrently with a sentence in another case, and that original conviction is overturned, the defendant may withdraw their plea.

    Summary

    Juan Carlos Pichardo pleaded guilty to a drug charge in Bronx County in exchange for a 1-to-3-year sentence to run concurrently with a 20-years-to-life murder sentence in New York County. Subsequently, his murder conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel, and he was acquitted on retrial. Pichardo then moved to vacate the drug conviction, arguing the plea was induced by the concurrent sentence promise, which could no longer be fulfilled. The Supreme Court granted his motion, but the Appellate Division reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that Pichardo was entitled to withdraw his plea because the fundamental basis for it—the concurrent sentence—had disappeared.

    Facts

    Pichardo was convicted of murder in New York County and sentenced to 20 years to life. One week later, he pleaded guilty in Bronx County to criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, in exchange for a 1-to-3-year sentence to run concurrently with the murder sentence. The guilty plea was based on selling one bag of cocaine for $20 to an undercover officer. Years later, Pichardo’s murder conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel. He was retried and acquitted of murder. Pichardo had already served his 1-to-3-year drug sentence by this time.

    Procedural History

    After being acquitted of murder, Pichardo moved in Bronx County Supreme Court to vacate his drug conviction under CPL 440.10, arguing his plea was induced by the now-vacated murder sentence. The Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the drug conviction. Pichardo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant is entitled to withdraw a guilty plea entered in exchange for a sentence to run concurrently with another sentence when the initial conviction is overturned.

    Holding

    Yes, because the condition that induced the admission of guilt—the concurrent sentence promise—fundamentally changed when the murder conviction was vacated. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s order vacating the plea.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings, including People v. Taylor, People v. Boston, People v. Fuggazzatto, People v. Rogers, and People v. Clark, stating that it had consistently concluded that when a guilty plea is induced by the court’s explicit promise that the defendant will receive a lesser sentence to run concurrently with a sentence in another case, and that conviction is overturned, the defendant may withdraw his plea since the promise cannot be kept. The Court distinguished People v. Lowrance, where there was no clear promise of a concurrent sentence. The Court dismissed the argument that Pichardo had already received the benefit of his bargain because he served the drug sentence concurrently with the murder sentence, noting that the timing was not determinative. “What changed essentially here were the facts that induced defendant’s plea. In effect, when the murder conviction was vacated, defendant’s ‘concurrent’ time became a nullity—in the eyes of the law, it is as if he served no time at all on the murder, and his sentence on the drug charge stood alone, based on an unfulfilled and unfulfillable promise.” The Court concluded that Pichardo would not have pleaded guilty to the drug charge—based on selling a $20 bag of cocaine—had it not been for the murder conviction, of which he now stands acquitted. The court suggested that a better practice might be for the parties to spell out the consequences that will follow upon vacatur of the conviction. The dissent argued that vacatur was unwarranted because the lesser sentence was completed while the defendant was serving a concurrent sentence and it is not manifestly unjust to hold defendant to his negotiated plea since the drug and murder charges did not share any common defenses.