New York Law Review

Tag: compulsory process

  • People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327 (1990): Scope of Compulsory Process at Pretrial Wade Hearings

    People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327 (1990)

    A defendant does not have an unqualified right to call an identifying witness at a pretrial Wade hearing to challenge the suggestiveness of a lineup; the decision to allow such testimony rests within the sound discretion of the hearing court.

    Summary

    Chipp was convicted of sexual abuse and related crimes. At a combined Huntley-Wade hearing, the trial court denied Chipp’s request to call the 10-year-old complaining witness to testify about the suggestiveness of the pre-trial lineup. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while defendants have the right to call witnesses at criminal proceedings, this right is not absolute at a Wade hearing, which is meant only to determine the suggestiveness of a pretrial identification, and is subject to the discretion of the hearing judge.

    Facts

    Shanica F., a 10-year-old girl, was sexually abused and nearly sodomized by a man she later identified as Chipp. The incident occurred on April 7, 1986, in a building on West 131st Street in Manhattan. Shanica described her attacker to the police. Shermain Thompson, a tenant in the building, recognized the description as matching “Apache,” a friend of her brother, whom she had seen in the building earlier that day. Two days later, police found civilians holding Chipp at the same building. They were told that Chipp was the man who had “raped” the girl. Detective Francisci, who was assigned to the case, arranged a lineup where Shanica identified Chipp within 10 seconds.

    Procedural History

    Chipp was convicted in the trial court. Prior to trial, a combined Huntley-Wade hearing was held regarding the admissibility of Chipp’s statements and Shanica’s lineup identification. The hearing court denied Chipp’s request to call Shanica as a witness at the hearing. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the hearing court’s refusal to allow the defendant to call the complaining witness to testify at a combined Huntley and Wade hearing denied him a constitutional or statutory right to present relevant evidence on the issue of the suggestiveness of a pretrial lineup identification procedure.

    Holding

    No, because any right of compulsory process at a Wade hearing may be outweighed by countervailing policy concerns, properly within the discretion and control of the hearing judge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that while CPL 60.15(1) affords a defendant the right to call witnesses at a criminal proceeding, that right is not absolute. The Court emphasized that a Wade hearing, unlike a trial, does not involve a determination of guilt or innocence but rather determines whether a pretrial identification procedure was unduly suggestive. The Court reasoned that according an absolute right to call an identifying witness at a Wade hearing would enable defendants to harass identifying witnesses and transform the hearing into a discovery proceeding. The court noted that no indicia of suggestiveness was presented to the hearing court. The court reasoned that the complainant’s testimony on the varied complexions of the subjects of the lineup would only have been cumulative, as the court already had a photograph of the lineup before it. The court held that the hearing judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the defendant’s request to call the complainant at the Wade hearing. The Court stated, “Indeed we have held in respect to pretrial hearings more directly addressing the guilt or innocence of an accused that a defendant’s right to require the production of a witness with relevant testimony could be outweighed by countervailing policy considerations (People v Petralia, 62 NY2d 47, 52-53).”

  • People v. McCartney, 38 N.Y.2d 618 (1976): Securing Out-of-State Witnesses Under the Uniform Act

    38 N.Y.2d 618 (1976)

    Under the Uniform Act to Secure Attendance of Witnesses from Without the State in Criminal Cases (CPL 640.10), a trial court’s decision to compel the attendance of an out-of-state witness is discretionary and requires the requesting party to demonstrate the materiality and necessity of the witness’s testimony.

    Summary

    McCartney pleaded guilty to robbery after his confession was deemed admissible. He appealed, arguing that he was denied his right to compulsory process when the trial court refused to compel a Maryland State trooper’s attendance at his suppression hearing. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the decision to compel an out-of-state witness under the Uniform Act is discretionary and requires a showing of materiality, which McCartney failed to demonstrate. The Court emphasized the need to balance the defendant’s right to witnesses with the potential burden on the out-of-state witness.

    Facts

    McCartney was interrogated by New York State Police in a Maryland jail. He later sought to suppress statements he made during the interrogation, claiming they were involuntary. He requested the court to compel the attendance of a Maryland State trooper, Officer Miles, who was allegedly present during the interrogation. The prosecution presented testimony from Investigator Anderson of the New York State Police who conducted the interrogation. Another New York State Police officer who was also present during defendant’s interrogation, Senior Investigator Capozzi, although available to the defendant, was not called upon to testify.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied McCartney’s request to compel the Maryland trooper’s attendance. McCartney pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to issue a certificate under CPL 640.10(3) to compel the attendance of an out-of-state witness at a pretrial suppression hearing.

    Holding

    No, because the decision to compel the attendance of an out-of-state witness is discretionary, and the defendant failed to demonstrate that the witness’s testimony was material and necessary to his case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Sixth Amendment guarantees compulsory process, it does not constitutionally require a state to compel the attendance of witnesses beyond its jurisdiction. The Uniform Act, while valid, is not constitutionally mandated. The Court emphasized that the Act should be applied uniformly across states that have adopted it, and that a key requirement for compelling an out-of-state witness is a showing of materiality. The burden of demonstrating materiality rests on the party seeking to compel attendance. The Court stated that unsupported statements of materiality are insufficient. The court stated, “Unsupported statements that the witness is material or necessary are not sufficient to require the Trial Judge to grant an application under CPL 640.10 (subd 3).”

    The court found that McCartney failed to meet this burden. He argued that discrepancies existed between the testimony of Investigator Anderson and Senior Investigator Capozzi (who testified at his brother’s hearing), but he did not point out any specific discrepancies or call Investigator Capozzi to testify at his own hearing. Moreover, the trial court found that Officer Miles was only “in and out” of the room and did not observe any significant portion of the questioning. The Court highlighted that the process of securing an out-of-state witness is “drastic” and represents an incursion on the witness’s liberty. Therefore, a trial court’s decision to deny a request under CPL 640.10(3) is discretionary and should not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. The Court concluded no abuse of discretion occurred in this case.