New York Law Review

Tag: Composite Sketch

  • People v. Maldonado, 97 N.Y.2d 522 (2002): Admissibility of Composite Sketches as Evidence

    97 N.Y.2d 522 (2002)

    Composite sketches are generally inadmissible as evidence to prove guilt, as they constitute hearsay and may unduly prejudice the jury, except when offered to rebut a claim of recent fabrication by the identifying witness.

    Summary

    Maldonado was convicted of attempted murder and robbery based on a composite sketch and the victim’s identification. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the composite sketch was improperly admitted into evidence because it constituted inadmissible hearsay and served to bolster the victim’s identification. The defense’s cross-examination did not assert recent fabrication, which is required to admit a sketch as a prior consistent statement. The Court emphasized the risk of prejudice when jurors compare a defendant to a sketch, potentially leading to a guilty verdict based on resemblance rather than independent evidence.

    Facts

    Younis Duopo, a livery cab driver, was shot during an attempted robbery. The gunman, Poventud, was apprehended separately. Duopo later worked with a police artist to create a composite sketch of the non-shooting accomplice. A detective showed the sketch to Poventud’s associates, who identified Maldonado. Based on the sketch, the detective brought Maldonado in, and Duopo identified him in a photo array and lineup. At trial, the defense showed Duopo a photo of Maldonado’s brother, whom Duopo mistakenly identified as the assailant.

    Procedural History

    The trial court initially disallowed the composite sketch but later admitted it after the defense cross-examined the detective, arguing that the defense had opened the door by questioning the investigation’s integrity. The jury convicted Maldonado. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting a composite sketch of the defendant into evidence, where the defense did not allege recent fabrication by the identifying witness.

    Holding

    No, because the composite sketch constituted inadmissible hearsay and served to improperly bolster the victim’s identification, and the defense never claimed the witness recently fabricated his testimony. The cross-examination of the detective also did not create an opening to admit the sketch.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held that composite sketches are generally inadmissible as evidence of guilt because they are considered hearsay. A sketch is the artist’s interpretation of a witness’s description, not a direct record of events. Admission carries a risk of prejudice, as jurors may focus on the defendant’s resemblance to the sketch, rather than independent evidence. The Court acknowledged an exception: a sketch may be admissible as a prior consistent statement to rebut a claim of recent fabrication, meaning “charging the witness not with mistake or confusion, but with making up a false story well after the event.” Here, the defense only challenged the accuracy of Duopo’s identification, not its veracity. Questioning the detective’s investigative thoroughness also did not open the door to admit the sketch. The Court emphasized the lack of other evidence against Maldonado, making the erroneous admission prejudicial. As the court noted, “When a jury examines a composite sketch, the temptation to inculpate or exonerate the defendant on the basis of the sketch is all but irresistible… the prejudice of that circular logic is manifest and inescapable.”

  • People v. Caserta, 19 N.Y.2d 18 (1966): Admissibility of Composite Sketches in Criminal Trials

    People v. Caserta, 19 N.Y.2d 18 (1966)

    A witness may not testify to an extrajudicial identification of a composite sketch of the defendant; however, the sketch can be used in suppression hearings regarding probable cause or during cross-examination to highlight inconsistencies in identification.

    Summary

    Caserta was convicted of robbery, and the prosecution presented testimony from an identifying witness who had worked with a police artist to create a composite sketch of the suspect four days after the crime. The admission of the composite sketch and testimony about its creation was challenged on appeal. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the introduction of the composite sketch through the identifying witness was prejudicial error. The court reasoned that it violated the established rule against bolstering a witness’s identification with prior consistent statements or extrajudicial identifications of photographs. The court also found that the prosecutor’s prejudicial misstatements during summation warranted a new trial.

    Facts

    The defendant, Caserta, was accused of robbery.
    An identifying witness testified at trial.
    Four days after the robbery, the witness collaborated with a police artist to create a composite sketch of the suspect.
    Over the defense’s objection, the trial court admitted the composite sketch into evidence, and the witness testified about creating it.
    During summation, the prosecutor made statements implying the defendant altered his appearance after the robbery.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of robbery in the trial court.
    The defendant appealed the conviction, arguing that the admission of the composite sketch and the prosecutor’s statements were errors.
    The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the admission of the composite sketch and testimony regarding its creation constituted reversible error.
    Whether the prosecutor’s prejudicial misstatements during summation warranted a new trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because a witness cannot testify about an extrajudicial identification of a composite sketch, similar to the rule against extrajudicial photo identifications, and the sketch’s admission was prejudicial, given that identification was key to the case.
    Yes, because the prosecutor’s statements were not supported by evidence and demonstrably influenced the jury, and the court failed to cure the prejudice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that allowing the identifying witness to testify about the composite sketch and admitting the sketch itself was similar to allowing testimony about extrajudicial photo identifications, which is prohibited under New York law because it improperly bolsters the witness’s testimony. The court stated, “The rule is settled in this State that a witness may not testify to an extrajudicial identification of a photograph of the defendant.” The court extended this rule to composite sketches, stating, “The reason for that rule applies with greater force in the case of a composite sketch.” The court acknowledged that other jurisdictions have varying rules on the admissibility of composite sketches but adhered to the established New York precedent. The court clarified that composite sketches could be used in suppression hearings to establish probable cause or during cross-examination to highlight inconsistencies.

    The court also addressed the prosecutor’s statements during summation, finding them to be prejudicial because they implied that the defendant had altered his appearance to avoid identification and that the statements were unsupported by evidence. The court noted the jury’s interest in the alleged alteration, demonstrated by their request for a magnifying glass, indicating the prosecutor’s statements influenced their deliberations. The court stated that the trial court erred by not allowing the defendant to rebut the prosecutor’s statements or instructing the jury to disregard them, citing precedent such as People v. Fleischman, 10 N.Y.2d 1025 (1961).