New York Law Review

Tag: comparative negligence

  • Trupia v. Lake George Central School District, 14 N.Y.3d 392 (2010): Limits on Assumption of Risk Defense

    Trupia v. Lake George Central School District, 14 N.Y.3d 392 (2010)

    The assumption of risk doctrine, which can negate a defendant’s duty of care, is primarily limited to athletic and recreational activities where the plaintiff has freely assumed a known risk, and should not be broadly applied to ordinary negligence claims, especially those involving the supervision of children.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of the assumption of risk doctrine in New York negligence law. An infant plaintiff was injured while riding a bannister during a summer program. The defendant school district sought to amend its answer to include assumption of risk as a defense, arguing the plaintiff consented to the risks involved. The Court of Appeals held that the assumption of risk doctrine is primarily applicable to athletic and recreational activities, not to the general supervision of children. Extending the doctrine beyond these activities would undermine comparative negligence principles and an educational institution’s duty of care.

    Facts

    Luke Anthony Trupia, an infant plaintiff, attended a summer program administered by the Lake George Central School District. While at the program, Luke rode a bannister and fell, sustaining serious injuries. The plaintiff’s complaint alleged negligent supervision, claiming Luke was left unsupervised at the time of the accident. The defendants sought to amend their answer to assert the affirmative defense of assumption of risk, arguing that Luke had previously fallen from a bannister and thus knew the risks.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the defendant’s motion to amend their answer. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court’s order, denying the motion for leave to amend. The Appellate Division granted the defendant leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division erred in denying the defendant’s motion to amend their answer.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in denying the defendant’s motion for leave to amend their answer to include the affirmative defense of primary assumption of risk in a negligence action based on a lack of supervision of a child.

    Holding

    No, because the assumption of risk doctrine is generally limited to athletic and recreational activities, and applying it to the general supervision of children would undermine the principles of comparative negligence and a school’s duty of care.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the interplay between assumption of risk and comparative negligence, noting that CPLR 1411 abolished assumption of risk as an absolute defense, replacing it with a system of comparative fault. However, assumption of risk has persisted as a means of limiting a defendant’s duty, based on the idea that a plaintiff who freely assumes a known risk negates the defendant’s duty to protect them from that risk. The court emphasized that the doctrine is most persuasively justified by its utility in facilitating free and vigorous participation in athletic activities, as stated in Benitez v New York City Bd. of Educ., 73 NY2d 650, 657 (1989). The Court was concerned that extending the doctrine beyond these circumstances would undermine the legislative intent of comparative negligence under CPLR 1411 which applies to “any action to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property, or wrongful death.” The Court also reasoned that applying assumption of risk in cases involving children would severely diminish an educational institution’s duty to supervise children adequately, because “Children often act impulsively or without good judgment—that is part of being a child; they do not thereby consent to assume the consequently arising dangers, and it would not be a prudent rule of law that would broadly permit the conclusion that they had done so.” The Court explicitly stated that the inference of assumption of risk “may not be made in their case, or for that matter where adults are concerned, except in the context of pursuits both unusually risky and beneficial that the defendant has in some nonculpable way enabled.”

  • Ayers v. O’Brien, 14 N.Y.3d 452 (2010): Emergency Vehicle Standard of Care When the Operator is the Plaintiff

    14 N.Y.3d 452 (2010)

    Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104, which provides a reckless disregard standard of care for drivers of emergency vehicles, cannot be used offensively by the emergency vehicle operator to prevent a comparative fault defense when the operator is the plaintiff.

    Summary

    A Deputy Sheriff, Ayers, was injured when his patrol car was struck by O’Brien while making a U-turn to pursue a speeding vehicle. Ayers sued O’Brien for negligence. O’Brien asserted a comparative fault defense. Ayers moved to dismiss the defense, arguing that as an emergency vehicle operator, he was only liable for reckless disregard under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e), and he had not acted recklessly. The New York Court of Appeals held that the reckless disregard standard only applies when the emergency vehicle operator is a defendant, not when they are the plaintiff. The comparative fault defense was reinstated.

    Facts

    On July 31, 2005, Deputy Sheriff Ayers was on patrol. Ayers made a U-turn to pursue a speeding vehicle. While executing the U-turn, Ayers’ patrol car was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by O’Brien.

    Procedural History

    Ayers sued O’Brien for common-law negligence in New York State Supreme Court. O’Brien asserted a comparative fault defense. The Supreme Court granted Ayers’ motion to dismiss the comparative fault defense. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the defense. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and certified the question of whether the Appellate Division erred in reinstating the defense.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the reckless disregard standard of liability under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) applies in determining the culpable conduct of the operator of an emergency vehicle when the operator is the plaintiff.

    Holding

    No, because Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) is intended to protect emergency vehicle operators from liability, not to provide them with an advantage when they are the ones bringing the lawsuit.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104(e) was designed to give emergency vehicle operators the freedom to perform their duties without being unduly hampered by the normal rules of the road. Citing Saarinen v. Kerr, 84 N.Y.2d 494 (1994), the court reiterated that the purpose of the statute is to prevent emergency personnel from being deterred from taking calculated risks to save lives or property due to the fear of civil liability for “a mere failure of judgment.” The court emphasized that the statute “precludes the imposition of liability for otherwise privileged conduct except where the conduct rises to the level of recklessness.”

    However, the court found that allowing Ayers to use the statute to shield himself from a comparative fault defense would be an inappropriate extension of the statute’s purpose. The court stated that Ayers’ interpretation of the statute would “shift the responsibility for any contributory negligence on the part of an emergency vehicle operator to the driver of another vehicle whom the emergency vehicle operator sues.” This would lead to unfair results, such as an emergency vehicle operator recovering full damages from a minimally negligent defendant even if the operator’s own negligence contributed to the injuries. The court concluded that there was no evidence that the legislature intended such a “financial windfall” when it enacted the statute. The Court stated that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1104 (e) “cannot be used as a sword to ward off a comparative fault defense” and should only apply when the emergency vehicle operator is sued or countersued.

  • Soto v. New York City Transit Authority, 6 N.Y.3d 487 (2006): Comparative Negligence vs. Sole Proximate Cause

    6 N.Y.3d 487 (2006)

    A plaintiff’s reckless conduct, even when contributing substantially to their injuries, does not automatically absolve a defendant of liability if the defendant also acted negligently and the plaintiff’s conduct was not a superseding cause.

    Summary

    Juan Soto, after consuming alcohol, walked along a subway catwalk with friends. Attempting to catch a train, he was struck and severely injured. At trial, Soto testified about his estimated running speed, which an expert used to argue the train could have stopped in time. The jury found the NYCTA negligent, assigning 25% fault to them and 75% to Soto. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while Soto’s conduct was reckless, it wasn’t a superseding cause that relieved the NYCTA of its duty of care, and that Soto’s speed estimate was properly admitted as evidence.

    Facts

    Plaintiff, 18 years old, spent an evening drinking alcohol with friends. In the early morning, the group walked along a subway catwalk after determining the train was not running. As a train approached, they ran to catch it, and plaintiff was struck, resulting in the amputation of both legs below the knee. Plaintiff testified he was running about 7-8 miles per hour. The train operator gave inconsistent accounts of the incident.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued the NYCTA. The jury found the NYCTA negligent and apportioned fault. The trial court denied the NYCTA’s motion to set aside the verdict. The Appellate Division affirmed the jury verdict, with two justices dissenting. The NYCTA appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the plaintiff’s reckless conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries, thus relieving the defendant of liability.

    2. Whether the plaintiff’s estimate of his running speed was admissible as evidence.

    Holding

    1. No, because the jury could reasonably find that the train operator was also negligent and the plaintiff’s conduct was not a superseding cause.

    2. Yes, because the plaintiff established a sufficient foundation demonstrating the basis of his knowledge about running speed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the jury’s verdict should stand if there was a valid line of reasoning and permissible inferences that could lead rational people to the conclusion reached by the jury. The court found that the jury appropriately considered the plaintiff’s actions and applied the doctrine of comparative negligence. The court distinguished this case from situations involving dangerous, illegal conduct, emphasizing that while the plaintiff contributed to his injury, he did not engage in conduct that automatically barred recovery. The court cited Coleman v. New York City Tr. Auth., stating a train operator may be found negligent if they see a person on the tracks from a distance that would allow them to stop the train. The court found no error in admitting the plaintiff’s testimony regarding his running speed because he had a basis for estimating his speed from running on a treadmill. The court stated: “The reliability of plaintiff’s testimony and the weight it should have been accorded were issues for the finders of fact.” The dissenting judge argued that the plaintiff’s recklessness was so egregious that it superseded the defendant’s conduct and became the sole proximate cause of his injuries, citing cases where plaintiffs who put themselves in the path of trains were denied recovery. The dissent emphasized the extraordinary degree of the plaintiff’s fault, arguing that people whose failure to take care of themselves is extreme should not shift consequences to others.

  • Bruni v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d 319 (2004): City’s Internal Documents as Acknowledgement of Defective Conditions

    Bruni v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d 319 (2004)

    A city agency’s internal documents can constitute a “written acknowledgement from the city” under the Pothole Law if they demonstrate the agency responsible for repairing a dangerous condition had first-hand knowledge of its existence and nature.

    Summary

    Plaintiff Bruni sued the City of New York for negligence after he was injured by a hole in the street near a catch basin. The New York City Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) had prior internal documentation acknowledging the dangerous condition. The issue was whether these documents satisfied the “written acknowledgement” requirement of the Pothole Law, and whether the trial court erred in not submitting the issue of comparative negligence to the jury. The Court of Appeals held that the DEP documents did constitute sufficient acknowledgement, and that the trial court erred by not allowing the jury to consider Bruni’s comparative negligence. The case emphasizes that internal documents can satisfy the Pothole Law’s acknowledgement requirement and underscores the importance of allowing the jury to consider comparative negligence when there is a valid basis for it.

    Facts

    On July 10, 1997, a complaint was filed with the DEP regarding a damaged catch basin at 11th Avenue and 62nd Street in Brooklyn. Samuel Gomez, a DEP supervisor, inspected the site on July 18, 1997, and noted “caving” (a hole in the street) and missing bricks in a Foreman’s Report. Gomez placed a sawhorse and traffic cones around the area. He filled out a “Request for Repairs Work Order,” which was approved on July 23, 1997. On August 26, 1997, Bruni was injured when he stepped into the hole. The sawhorse and cones were no longer present. Bruni sued the City for negligence.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the City’s motion for a directed verdict and request for a jury charge on comparative negligence. The jury found for Bruni, awarding him $1.6 million. The Appellate Division reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that the DEP work order was not a “written acknowledgement from the city” under the Pothole Law. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether internal documents prepared by the DEP can constitute a “written acknowledgement from the city” within the meaning of the City’s Pothole Law (Administrative Code § 7-201[c]).

    2. Whether the Supreme Court erred in failing to submit the issue of Bruni’s comparative negligence to the jury.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a written statement showing that the city agency responsible for repairing a condition had first-hand knowledge of both the existence and the dangerous nature of the condition is an “acknowledgement” sufficient to satisfy the Pothole Law.

    2. Yes, because there were permissible inferences from which rational people could conclude negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the DEP documents demonstrated the City’s awareness of the dangerous condition. The court found the City’s argument that the documents did not evince awareness of a hole in the street to be “frivolous,” pointing to Gomez’s report specifically referring to “caving” and the sketch showing the problem area in the street. The court distinguished this case from Laing v. City of New York, where the Parks Department’s report was not made in connection with the sidewalk condition that caused the plaintiff’s injury. Here, DEP was responsible for fixing the hole and ultimately did so. The Court emphasized that the language of the Pothole Law does not explicitly require the acknowledgement to come from the Department of Transportation (DOT) in all cases. The Court stated that the “acknowledgement alternative in paragraph (2) of the Pothole Law appears to be designed to make written notice to DOT unnecessary where there is documentary evidence that serves the same function—to demonstrate that the responsible city agency knew of the hazard and had an opportunity to remedy it.” Regarding comparative negligence, the Court held that the jury should have been allowed to consider whether Bruni exercised due care, given he walked in darkness on an unfamiliar route and may not have been attentive to the ground in front of him. The Court emphasized that “[t]he issue of negligence, whether of the plaintiff or defendant, is usually a question of fact.”

  • Bauer v. Female Academy of the Sacred Heart, 97 N.Y.2d 447 (2002): Coexistence of Labor Law § 202 and § 240(1) Claims

    97 N.Y.2d 447 (2002)

    An injured window cleaner can assert claims under both Labor Law § 202 and Labor Law § 240(1); however, Labor Law § 202 requires the application of comparative negligence principles, while Labor Law § 240(1) imposes strict liability.

    Summary

    Keith Bauer, a window washer, was injured while cleaning windows at Female Academy of the Sacred Heart. He sued, alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 202, and 240(1), and common-law negligence. The defendant argued that § 202 was the exclusive remedy. The Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff can assert claims under both Labor Law § 202 and § 240(1). It also determined that § 202 incorporates comparative negligence principles because it relies on Industrial Code regulations, while § 240(1) imposes strict liability.

    Facts

    Bauer, employed by Environmental Service Systems (ESS), was assigned to clean third-floor exterior windows at the Academy using the belt-and-anchor method. The building’s anchors were square, while the hooks on Bauer’s lanyard were round, violating Industrial Code requirements. While detaching a hook, Bauer lost his balance and fell, sustaining severe injuries.

    Procedural History

    Bauer sued the Academy. The Academy initiated a third-party action against ESS. The Supreme Court denied motions to dismiss all claims except the Labor Law § 202 claim, and also denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the Labor Law § 240(1) claim. The Appellate Division modified, dismissing the Labor Law § 240(1) claim, reasoning that the Legislature did not intend both sections to apply simultaneously. At trial on the § 202 claim, the Supreme Court directed a verdict for Bauer, finding a § 202 violation resulted in strict liability. The jury found in favor of Bauer. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that § 202 was a comparative negligence statute due to a 1970 amendment. At the second trial, the jury found the Academy negligent, but its negligence was not a substantial factor in causing Bauer’s injuries. Bauer appealed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an injured window cleaner’s claims under Labor Law § 202 and Labor Law § 240(1) can coexist.

    2. Whether a violation of Labor Law § 202 results in strict liability or comparative negligence.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Legislature did not express an intention that these statutes be mutually exclusive; the inclusion of “cleaning” in Labor Law § 240(1) supports this.

    2. Comparative Negligence, because a 1970 amendment made it a comparative negligence statute by deferring to the safety standards for window cleaners set forth in regulations of the Industrial Board.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the statutes serve different goals, apply to different defendants, and have been interpreted differently. Labor Law § 202 protects window cleaners and exterior surface cleaners, and applies to owners, lessees, agents, and managers. Labor Law § 240(1) applies to workers engaged in “cleaning” a building, and strict liability flows to owners and contractors only.

    The Court stated, “We would be ill-advised to hold that— simply because an injured window cleaner’s claim appears cognizable under both Labor Law § 202 and Labor Law § 240 (1)— one cause of action must be chosen to the exclusion of the other.”

    Regarding Labor Law § 202, the Court found that the 1970 amendment, which replaced specific safety requirements with references to the Board of Standards and Appeals, transformed the statute from a strict liability statute to one based on comparative negligence. A violation of a regulation or ordinance is only some evidence of negligence. The Court cited Schumer v. Caplin, 241 N.Y. 346 (1925) and Teller v. Prospect Heights Hospital, 280 N.Y. 456 (1939). The Court noted, “Violation of a rule of the Industrial Board, however, constitutes merely some evidence which the jury may consider on the question of defendant’s negligence, along with other evidence in the case which bears on that subject”. Because the current version of Labor Law § 202 relies on the Industrial Code for specific safety standards, violations of those standards are evidence of negligence, not strict liability.

  • Thoma v. Ronai, 82 N.Y.2d 736 (1993): Summary Judgment and Comparative Negligence

    Thoma v. Ronai, 82 N.Y.2d 736 (1993)

    A plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability in a negligence action where there is a factual question as to whether the plaintiff exercised reasonable care.

    Summary

    In this New York Court of Appeals case, the plaintiff, a pedestrian, sought summary judgment on the issue of liability after being struck by the defendant’s car. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ denial of summary judgment, holding that a factual question existed regarding the plaintiff’s comparative negligence. Specifically, the plaintiff’s own admission that she did not observe the oncoming vehicle raised a question as to whether she exercised reasonable care while crossing the intersection. This case underscores the principle that even in negligence actions, a plaintiff must demonstrate the absence of any material issue of fact regarding their own negligence to be granted summary judgment.

    Facts

    The plaintiff, Marna Thoma, was injured when she was struck by a car driven by the defendant, Sandor Ronai, while she was crossing an intersection as a pedestrian. The plaintiff commenced a negligence action seeking damages for her personal injuries. The defendant asserted the defense of comparative negligence, alleging that the plaintiff’s own negligence contributed to the accident.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability in the Supreme Court (the trial court). The Supreme Court denied the motion. The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The plaintiff then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reviewed the submissions and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability in a negligence action, given the defendant’s assertion of comparative negligence and the plaintiff’s own admission that she did not see the defendant’s vehicle before being struck.

    Holding

    No, because the plaintiff’s concession that she did not observe the vehicle that struck her raised a factual question as to whether she exercised reasonable care. This unresolved question of fact precluded the granting of summary judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that summary judgment is only appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact. In this case, the plaintiff’s own submissions, including her affidavit and the police accident report, suggested that she may have been negligent in failing to look to her left while crossing the intersection. The Court highlighted the plaintiff’s admission that she did not observe the vehicle that struck her as a crucial piece of evidence raising a factual question about her reasonable care. Since the defendant had raised the issue of comparative negligence, it was essential to determine whether the plaintiff had taken reasonable steps for her own safety. The court essentially determined that a reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff was comparatively negligent. Because the plaintiff had not demonstrated the absence of any material issue of fact, her motion for summary judgment was properly denied. The court did not offer extensive reasoning; it simply stated the well-established rule that summary judgment is inappropriate when there is a genuine issue of material fact. This case is significant because it reinforces the principle that a plaintiff seeking summary judgment in a negligence action must demonstrate the absence of any factual question regarding their own potential negligence. It serves as a practical reminder to attorneys that a plaintiff’s failure to exercise reasonable care can bar summary judgment, even if the defendant’s negligence is apparent.

  • Bottalico v. State, 59 N.Y.2d 305 (1983): Duty to Maintain Highway Shoulders for Negligent Drivers

    Bottalico v. State, 59 N.Y.2d 305 (1983)

    When the State provides a paved strip or shoulder alongside a roadway, it must maintain the shoulder in a reasonably safe condition for foreseeable uses, even those resulting from a driver’s negligence.

    Summary

    This case addresses the State’s duty to maintain highway shoulders. The claimants sought damages for injuries sustained when their vehicles veered onto negligently maintained shoulders, causing accidents. The Court of Claims found the State negligent but also attributed fault to the drivers. The central issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the State could be liable for injuries sustained when a driver negligently leaves the roadway and encounters a dangerous shoulder. The Court of Appeals held that the State does have a duty to maintain shoulders in a reasonably safe condition, even for drivers who negligently leave the road, with liability apportioned based on comparative negligence. The court reasoned that shoulders, once provided, are foreseeably used, and drivers may not expect them to pose a grave risk.

    Facts

    The claimants were injured when the vehicles they were in went out of control after encountering substantial drop-offs from the paved roadway onto the shoulder.

    The State had provided paved shoulders adjacent to the roadways in question.

    The shoulders were not maintained in a reasonably safe condition, presenting a hazard to drivers who might inadvertently veer onto them.

    Procedural History

    The claimants filed actions in the Court of Claims seeking damages for their injuries.

    The Court of Claims found the State negligent in maintaining the shoulders and that this negligence was a proximate cause of the injuries.

    The Court of Claims also found the plaintiffs negligent in driving off the roadway and apportioned liability according to fault.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Court of Claims decision in Bottalico, but the case of Minckler was appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the State may be held liable for injuries caused when a driver negligently leaves the paved portion of the roadway and is injured due to a negligently maintained shoulder.

    Holding

    Yes, because when the State undertakes to provide a shoulder, it must maintain it in a reasonably safe condition for foreseeable uses, including those resulting from a driver’s negligence. The comparative fault of the driver is relevant to apportioning liability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the State has a duty to maintain roadways in a reasonably safe condition, and this duty extends to shoulders when the State undertakes to provide them. The court distinguished this situation from cases where a municipality has no duty to improve land abutting the roadway that is not intended for automobile use, referencing Tomassi v. Town of Union. The court stated, “It is, however, both foreseeable and contemplated that, once provided, an improved shoulder at times will be driven upon.”

    The Court emphasized that drivers may have no reason to expect that moving from the roadway to the shoulder might expose them to a grave risk of danger. The court cited Taylor v. State of New York in support of this proposition. The Court found that “No meaningful legal distinction can be made between a traveler who uses a shoulder with justification and one who uses it negligently insofar as how such conduct relates to whom a duty is owed to maintain the shoulder.”

    The Court clarified that its prior decision in McCauley v. State of New York, where the complaint was dismissed, was based on a finding of no proximate cause, not on the absence of a duty. It further stated that decisions exonerating the State under similar circumstances but decided under the doctrine of contributory negligence (now replaced by comparative negligence) are not relevant to determining the State’s duty.

  • D’Ambrosio v. City of New York, 55 N.Y.2d 454 (1982): Apportioning Liability Between Municipality and Abutting Landowner for Sidewalk Defects

    D’Ambrosio v. City of New York, 55 N.Y.2d 454 (1982)

    The “special benefit” rule, which previously allowed municipalities to shift sidewalk liability entirely to abutting landowners for defects related to the landowner’s special use, is replaced by a comparative fault system, apportioning liability between the municipality and landowner based on their respective degrees of negligence.

    Summary

    Plaintiff was injured after tripping on a raised metal disk in a sidewalk covering a water shut-off valve for the abutting property. She sued the City, who then brought a third-party claim against the landowner. The jury found both the City and landowner negligent, assigning 65% responsibility to the City. The Appellate Division awarded the City full indemnification against the landowner based on the “special benefit” rule. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Dole v. Dow Chem. Co. requires apportionment of liability based on comparative fault, eliminating the “special benefit” rule’s complete liability shift. This ruling ensures both the municipality’s and the landowner’s negligence are considered in determining liability for sidewalk defects.

    Facts

    Plaintiff tripped over a metal disk, raised about one inch above the sidewalk, covering a water shut-off valve connected to the abutting property.
    The valve was installed by a previous owner for the property’s benefit.
    Plaintiff testified she was avoiding sidewalk cracks when she tripped.
    Expert testimony indicated the disk’s elevation was improper and curb valves should be flush with the sidewalk.
    Evidence showed the City had prior notice of the dangerous condition, as another person had fallen in the same location about a year prior.

    Procedural History

    Plaintiff sued the City, alleging negligence in maintaining the sidewalk.
    Plaintiff settled with the landowner before trial for $22,500.
    The City filed a third-party complaint against the landowner for indemnification.
    The jury found both the City and landowner negligent, awarding plaintiff $100,000 in damages and assigning 65% responsibility to the City.
    The City’s motion for judgment over against the landowner was denied.
    The Appellate Term modified the judgment, awarding the City full indemnification against the landowner based on the “special benefit” rule.
    The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the rule in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., allowing joint tortfeasors to seek contribution based on their degree of fault, impacts the “special benefit” rule, which allows a municipality to shift liability for sidewalk defects to the abutting landowner.

    Holding

    No, because the “special benefit” rule is no longer applicable to impose an obligation of indemnification on the landowner; liability is to be apportioned on the basis of the respective violations of duty owed by the alleged joint tort-feasors to the plaintiff.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reviewed the historical shift from no contribution among joint tortfeasors to the allowance of contribution based on comparative fault as established in Dole v. Dow Chem. Co.
    The Court distinguished between indemnification, where one party is held liable solely due to the negligence of another, and contribution, where parties share responsibility for the harm.
    The Court determined that the “special benefit” rule, allowing municipalities to seek indemnity from landowners for sidewalk defects related to the landowner’s special use, was not a case of pure indemnification. Rather, it was a recognition that the municipality’s culpability was only secondary where the precise instrumentality causing the injury was installed for the landowner’s special benefit.
    The Court reasoned that both the municipality and the landowner have duties to the public to maintain sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition.
    When a sidewalk appurtenance negligently falls into disrepair, both parties have breached their duties and may be liable.
    Referring to plaintiff’s injury, the court argued that “If the municipality pays the damages, it is not being compelled to pay for the wrong of another; it is simply being held liable for its own failure to exercise reasonable care.”
    Since Dole eliminated the need for distinguishing between active and passive negligence for contribution purposes, the Court held that liability should be apportioned based on the respective degrees of fault of the municipality and the landowner.
    The Court emphasized that the primary inquiry should be the extent to which each party contributed to the defective condition. The evidence showed that “plaintiff was attempting to avoid cracks in the sidewalk a few feet ahead of her (a condition for which the City is concededly responsible) or to evidence regarding the City’s actual notice of the defect in the sidewalk appurtenance.”

  • Long v. Forest-Fehlhaber, 55 N.Y.2d 154 (1982): Contributory Negligence as Defense to Labor Law §241(6) Violations

    Long v. Forest-Fehlhaber, 55 N.Y.2d 154 (1982)

    Violation of a rule promulgated by the State Board of Standards and Appeals pursuant to Labor Law §241(6) is merely some evidence of negligence, and therefore contributory negligence (for pre-September 1975 accidents) or comparative negligence (for post-September 1975 accidents) is a defense.

    Summary

    Ernest Long, a concrete finisher, was injured at a construction site when he tripped over an exposed electrical conduit in a dark passageway. He sued the electrical contractor, Forest-Fehlhaber, alleging a violation of Labor Law §241(6) and related safety regulations. The initial trial allowed contributory negligence as a complete defense, resulting in a verdict for the defendant. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that contributory negligence was not a defense. The second trial, without considering Long’s negligence, resulted in a verdict apportioning liability between Forest-Fehlhaber and Long’s employer. The Court of Appeals reversed, clarifying that violating administrative rules under §241(6) is evidence of negligence, not negligence per se, and therefore, contributory or comparative negligence is a valid defense.

    Facts

    On February 3, 1975, Ernest Long, an experienced concrete finisher, was injured at the South Mall construction site in Albany. While walking in a “pitch black” temporary passageway leading to his work area, he tripped over an exposed electrical conduit. The accident occurred approximately 45 minutes before the scheduled start time. Forest-Fehlhaber, the electrical contractor, was responsible for maintaining adequate illumination in the passageway, as per Board of Standards and Appeals rule 23-1.30.

    Procedural History

    Long sued Forest-Fehlhaber. The first trial resulted in a jury verdict for Forest-Fehlhaber, as the judge allowed contributory negligence as a complete defense. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial on the grounds that contributory negligence was not a defense to a §241(6) claim. The second trial, under the Appellate Division’s instruction, found Forest-Fehlhaber liable, apportioning damages. Forest-Fehlhaber appealed to the Court of Appeals from the final judgment after the second trial, bringing up the non-final order from the first appeal for review.

    Issue(s)

    Whether contributory negligence (for pre-September 1975 accidents) or comparative negligence (for post-September 1975 accidents) is a defense to an action premised on the violation of rules promulgated by the State Board of Standards and Appeals pursuant to subdivision 6 of section 241 of the Labor Law.

    Holding

    No, because the violation of administrative rules adopted pursuant to Labor Law §241(6) does not constitute negligence as a matter of law. Therefore, contributory negligence (or comparative negligence, depending on the accident date) is a defense to actions based on such violations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Appellate Division’s interpretation of Allen v. Cloutier Constr. Corp., clarifying that the term “absolute liability” in that case referred to the nondelegable nature of the duty imposed on owners and contractors, not the elimination of all defenses. The court emphasized that Allen recognized that a violation of an administrative regulation is merely “some evidence of negligence” (Allen v. Cloutier Constr. Corp., 44 N.Y.2d 290, 298). The court distinguished between violations of explicit statutory provisions and breaches of administrative rules. A breach of an administrative rule does not establish negligence as a matter of law and, therefore, does not preclude the defense of contributory negligence (or comparative negligence). The court noted that Labor Law §241(6) itself provides only a broad standard, leaving the specifics to the Board of Standards and Appeals. "[V]iolation of the administrative rules adopted pursuant to the authorization of subdivision 6 of section 241 of the Labor Law cannot rise to the level of negligence as a matter of law, contributory negligence was, and comparative negligence now is, a defense to an action based on such a dereliction."

  • Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25 (1972): Apportioning Damages Among Joint Tortfeasors

    Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 31 N.Y.2d 25 (1972)

    Under Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., damages among joint or concurrent tortfeasors should be apportioned based on their relative degrees of fault, regardless of whether their negligence is characterized as “active” or “passive.”

    Summary

    Willis Kelly, a laborer, was injured when a crane on a construction site contacted high-tension wires owned by Long Island Lighting Co. (LILCO). Kelly sued LILCO and Herrick Manor, Inc. (Herrick), the general contractor. Both defendants cross-claimed against each other. The jury found both defendants negligent, and the trial court dismissed the cross-claims, finding both actively negligent. The Court of Appeals modified the order, holding that damages should be apportioned based on relative fault, and remanding the case for the trial court to determine the percentage of fault attributable to each defendant. The court emphasized this new rule does not affect a plaintiff’s right to recover the full amount of damages from any joint tortfeasor.

    Facts

    LILCO owned and maintained high-tension wires along Clinton Avenue. Herrick was the general contractor for an apartment building being constructed near these wires. Kelly, a laborer, was injured when a crane contacted the wires, causing him to be electrocuted. LILCO knew about the construction but took no protective measures regarding the wires. Herrick’s president knew of the danger posed by the wires and requested LILCO to insulate them but did not warn the workers, including Kelly, of the danger, even when he saw the crane moving towards the wires.

    Procedural History

    Kelly and his wife sued LILCO and Herrick. Both defendants filed cross-claims against each other. The jury found both LILCO and Herrick negligent and awarded damages to the plaintiffs. The trial court dismissed both cross-claims, finding each party actively negligent. Herrick appealed the dismissal of its cross-claim. The Appellate Division affirmed. Herrick appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether damages among joint or concurrent tortfeasors should be apportioned based on their relative degrees of fault, regardless of whether their negligence is characterized as “active” or “passive”.

    Holding

    Yes, damages should be apportioned based on the relative fault of each tortfeasor because to require a tortfeasor who is only slightly negligent to pay the same amount as a more negligent co-tortfeasor is inequitable and unjust.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the rule established in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., which permits the apportionment of damages among joint tortfeasors based on their relative degrees of fault, regardless of the nature of their concurring fault. The court found that the previous rule, which prevented a defendant found guilty of “active” negligence from recovering from another negligent party, was inequitable. The court stated, “To require a joint tort-feasor who is, for instance, 10% causally negligent to pay the same amount as a co-tort-feasor who is 90% causally negligent seems inequitable and unjust. The fairer rule, we believe, is to distribute the loss in proportion to the allocable concurring fault.” This refinement of the contribution rule does not affect the plaintiff’s right to recover the total amount of damages from any joint tortfeasor. The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine the relative degrees of negligence or fault and the percentage of fault attributable to each defendant. The court clarified that this case addresses contribution between joint tortfeasors and does not concern issues like vicarious liability where the active-passive dichotomy would still apply.