New York Law Review

Tag: Comparative Fault

  • Sammis v. Nassau/Suffolk Football League, 95 N.Y.2d 809 (2000): Impact of Comparative Fault on Duty of Care

    Sammis v. Nassau/Suffolk Football League, 95 N.Y.2d 809 (2000)

    The doctrine of assumption of risk does not automatically relieve a defendant of their duty of care; comparative fault principles may apply, requiring a fact-finder to assess the relative culpability of all parties involved.

    Summary

    Edwin Sammis sustained injuries while assisting Alex Caruana in removing a box from an elevated shelf. Sammis sued the Nassau/Suffolk Football League and others, alleging negligence. The lower courts granted summary judgment to the defendants, reasoning that Sammis had assumed the risk of injury by helping Caruana. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the lower courts erred in concluding that Sammis’s actions relieved the defendants of their duty of care. The Court of Appeals found that there were issues of fact as to comparative fault, and the case should be decided by a fact finder.

    Facts

    Edwin Sammis assisted Alex Caruana in removing a box from an elevated shelf in an equipment shed at the North Babylon Athletic Club.

    During the process, Sammis sustained injuries.

    Sammis and his wife sued the Nassau/Suffolk Football League and other related parties (excluding the Town of Babylon), alleging negligence.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability.

    Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs’ motion and, *sua sponte*, granted summary judgment to the defendants, dismissing the complaint based on the doctrine of assumption of risk.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed, modifying the Appellate Division’s order by denying summary judgment to defendants.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a plaintiff’s act of helping another person remove an object from an elevated shelf automatically relieves the defendants of their duty of care, thereby entitling them to summary judgment.

    Holding

    No, because comparative fault principles apply, requiring a fact-finder to assess the relative culpability of all parties involved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the lower courts erred in concluding that Sammis’s act of helping Caruana remove the box relieved the defendants of any duty of care or otherwise established the defendants’ entitlement to summary judgment. The Court clarified that assumption of risk does not automatically negate a defendant’s duty.

    The Court reasoned that issues of fact existed regarding comparative fault. CPLR 1411 dictates consideration of comparative fault.

    The Court emphasized that the record did not provide a basis for granting the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on the question of the defendants’ liability, either. It was a matter for the jury.

  • Whalen v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 294 (1998): Determining Set-Offs in Cases with Comparative Fault and Settlement

    Whalen v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 92 N.Y.2d 294 (1998)

    In cases involving both comparative fault and settlement with some defendants, the settlement amount should be deducted from the gross verdict before applying the plaintiff’s percentage of fault.

    Summary

    Robert Whalen was injured while driving an ATV manufactured by Kawasaki and sold by Robinson Cycle Sales. Whalen settled with Kawasaki before trial. At trial against Robinson, the jury found Whalen 92% at fault and Robinson 8% at fault, awarding $2,415,000 in damages. Robinson sought a set-off for the Kawasaki settlement under General Obligations Law § 15-108(a). The court addressed whether the set-off should be applied before or after reducing the verdict by Whalen’s comparative fault. The Court of Appeals held that the settlement amount should be deducted first, before calculating the reduction for comparative fault to align with statutory goals of encouraging settlements and equitable apportionment.

    Facts

    Robert Whalen suffered injuries when the Kawasaki ATV he was driving crashed. The ATV was designed and manufactured by Kawasaki and sold by Robinson Cycle Sales to Whalen’s friend. Whalen sued both Kawasaki and Robinson, alleging negligence, strict products liability, and breach of warranty.

    Procedural History

    Whalen settled with Kawasaki for $1,600,000 during jury selection, withdrawing all claims against Robinson derivative of Kawasaki’s liability. The trial proceeded against Robinson alone. The jury found Whalen 92% negligent and Robinson 8% negligent, awarding $2,415,000. Robinson then moved to amend its answer to assert General Obligations Law § 15-108 set-off, which the trial court initially denied. The Appellate Division reversed, allowing the amendment and applying the set-off *after* reducing the verdict by Whalen’s fault, resulting in no monetary responsibility for Robinson. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Robinson waived the benefits of General Obligations Law § 15-108(a) by failing to seek apportionment of liability against Kawasaki before the verdict.

    2. Whether, in cases involving both comparative fault and settlement, the settlement amount should be deducted from the gross verdict before or after applying the plaintiff’s percentage of fault.

    Holding

    1. No, because Robinson did not waive all benefits of General Obligations Law § 15-108(a) as the statute provides three modes of setoff, and failing to seek apportionment against Kawasaki only foreclosed one of them.

    2. Yes, the settlement amount should be deducted from the gross verdict first, because this approach best promotes the statutory goals of encouraging settlements and ensuring equitable apportionment of responsibility.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Robinson’s failure to seek apportionment against Kawasaki only foreclosed the possibility of using Kawasaki’s equitable share of fault as a setoff; the other two setoff options (amount stipulated or paid) remained available. Regarding the timing of the setoff, the Court adopted the “settlement-first” approach. This method aligns with the statutory purpose of encouraging settlements. The court noted, “the Kawasaki settlement in turn may be said to approximate the parties’ intuitive assessment of Kawasaki’s fault and damages.” Deducting the settlement first provides a more precise allocation of loss, as it accounts for the settling defendant’s share before determining the remaining liability based on comparative fault. The Court also emphasized that settlement-first provides an incentive for defendants to settle, because nonsettling defendants risk increasing their liability as others settle. The Court explicitly rejected the “fault-first” approach, noting that it could allow a nonsettling defendant to escape responsibility altogether, undermining the goals of General Obligations Law § 15-108. The court found that the settlement-first approach, “results in defendant Robinson being liable to plaintiff in an amount reached after deducting the settlement amount from the gross jury verdict and then discounting the remainder by plaintiffs comparative fault”.