New York Law Review

Tag: Common-law marriage

  • Matter of Mott v. Duncan Petroleum Trans., 390 N.E.2d 290 (N.Y. 1979): Recognition of Out-of-State Common Law Marriage

    Matter of Mott v. Duncan Petroleum Trans., 390 N.E.2d 290 (N.Y. 1979)

    A common-law marriage validly contracted in another state will be recognized in New York, even if New York does not itself recognize common-law marriages; the validity of the marriage is determined by the law of the state where the marriage purportedly occurred.

    Summary

    Mary Mott sought worker’s compensation death benefits as the common-law widow of John Mott. The Workers’ Compensation Board denied the claim, finding no legal marriage. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Board applied an incorrect legal standard. Although New York does not recognize common-law marriage, it recognizes such marriages validly contracted in other states. The Board erred by assuming New York only recognizes marriages previously declared valid in another state, and by assuming a mere visit to Georgia could not establish a valid marriage there. The case was remanded for the Board to determine if a common-law marriage was established under Georgia law, considering the couple’s intent and conduct in both Georgia and New York.

    Facts

    Mary and John Mott lived together in New York from 1964 until John’s death in 1973. They presented themselves as husband and wife and jointly conducted legal and financial matters. They were never formally married. Mary claimed a common-law marriage based on visits to Georgia, where she alleged they lived as husband and wife, intending to establish a permanent residence and business. These plans never materialized.

    Procedural History

    The Workers’ Compensation Board denied Mary Mott’s claim for death benefits, concluding no valid marriage existed. The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s decision, finding substantial evidence to support it. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter back to the Appellate Division with directions to remand for further proceedings before the Worker’s Compensation Board.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Workers’ Compensation Board erred in determining Mary and John Mott’s marital status by failing to properly apply Georgia law regarding common-law marriage.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Workers’ Compensation Board applied an incorrect legal standard in determining whether a valid common-law marriage existed under Georgia law, including an overly restrictive view of when an out-of-state marriage is recognized in New York and the circumstances under which a common-law marriage can be formed in Georgia.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that while the Workers’ Compensation Board determines factual matters, it must apply the correct legal standard. New York recognizes common-law marriages validly contracted in other states, even though it does not permit them within the state. The validity of an out-of-state marriage is determined by the law of the state where the marriage occurred. The court stated, “It has long been settled law that although New York does not itself recognize common-law marriages… a common-law marriage contracted in a sister State will be recognized as valid here if it is valid where contracted.”

    Under Georgia law, a common-law marriage requires that the parties are able to contract, a contract of marriage was made, and the marriage was consummated according to law. Intent to marry in Georgia can be shown through circumstantial evidence, such as living together as husband and wife and representing themselves as married. The court found the Board’s determination was based on an erroneous view of the law. The Board incorrectly assumed New York only recognizes marriages previously declared valid in another state. It also erred in assuming a mere visit to Georgia could not result in a valid marriage. “Given the apparent liberality of the Georgia rule with respect to common-law marriages, this too was error.” Finally, the Board failed to consider the parties’ behavior in New York as evidence of their intent to marry, which is relevant even if secondary to conduct in Georgia. The case was remanded to the Board to redetermine the factual question of whether the Motts effected a common-law marriage in Georgia based on the correct legal standards.

  • In re Estate of Benjamin, 34 N.Y.2d 27 (1974): Establishing a Common-Law Marriage Before Abolishment

    34 N.Y.2d 27 (1974)

    The agreement essential to a common-law marriage need not be proved in any particular way, and documentary evidence, cohabitation, reputation, acknowledgment, declarations, and conduct are all probative.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between two women both claiming to be the widow of Jacob Benjamin, who died intestate. Olga Benjamin claimed a common-law marriage predating 1933, while Lucille Benjamin based her claim on a 1956 ceremonial marriage. The Surrogate’s Court initially ruled against Olga, requiring direct proof of an agreement per verba de praesenti. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that direct proof isn’t necessary; circumstantial evidence can establish a common-law marriage. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the principle that the agreement to live as man and wife can be shown through various forms of evidence, including documentary evidence, cohabitation, and reputation.

    Facts

    Jacob Benjamin died intestate in 1971. Olga Benjamin claimed she had entered a common-law marriage with Jacob in 1927 and lived as husband and wife. A daughter, Elouise, was born to them in 1929 and acknowledged by both parents. Olga purportedly returned to Trinidad around 1938/1939 and had no further contact with Jacob. Lucille Benjamin claimed to be Jacob’s widow through a ceremonial marriage in 1956 in New York; Jacob had stated in his marriage license application that he had never been married. Evidence was presented that Olga and Jacob lived together and were regarded by neighbors as husband and wife.

    Procedural History

    Lucille and Olga both sought letters of administration for Jacob’s estate. The Surrogate’s Court ruled that Lucille was the lawful widow and that Olga had not established a valid common-law marriage. The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s decision. Olga appealed to the New York Court of Appeals as a matter of right. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ ruling and remanded the case to the Surrogate Court for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Surrogate Court erred in requiring direct proof of an agreement per verba de praesenti to establish a common-law marriage in order to overcome the presumption of validity attaching to a subsequent ceremonial marriage.

    Holding

    No, because the agreement essential to a common-law marriage need not be proven in any particular way; direct or circumstantial evidence may suffice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that while common-law marriages were abolished in New York in 1933, those validly contracted before that date are still recognized. The court acknowledged that the party seeking to establish a common-law marriage bears the burden of proof. However, the court clarified that the agreement essential to a common-law marriage does not require direct proof. Circumstantial evidence, such as documentary evidence, cohabitation, reputation as husband and wife, acknowledgment, declarations, and conduct, can suffice. The court noted that cohabitation and reputation raise a presumption of common-law marriage, though this presumption can be rebutted. The court found that the Surrogate’s Court placed undue emphasis on direct proof of the marital agreement, overlooking documentary evidence such as Jacob’s acknowledgment of Elouise as his daughter in birth and baptismal records, and his 1944 army discharge certificate indicating he was married. The court stated that while the army discharge certificate was not admissible to prove the common-law marriage, it did demonstrate Jacob’s continuing attitude about his relationship with Olga. Taken together, the court found that the evidence of cohabitation, reputation, and documentary evidence suggested an agreement to live as man and wife in 1927. The court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this understanding.

  • Matter of Watts, 31 N.Y.2d 491 (1973): Establishing a Common-Law Marriage

    Matter of Watts, 31 N.Y.2d 491 (1973)

    The party asserting the existence of a common-law marriage bears the burden of proof, and when the relationship’s inception is meretricious, they must overcome the presumption that the relationship’s character has continued.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether Louise Lieber and Amandus Watts entered into a valid common-law marriage in Florida, which would then be recognized in New York. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Surrogate Court’s decree that no marriage existed. The court emphasized that Lieber failed to establish a prima facie case for common-law marriage under Florida law and did not overcome the presumption that the relationship was meretricious from the beginning, based on documentary evidence and Lieber’s own admissions.

    Facts

    Amandus Watts died in 1966. Louise Lieber claimed to be Watts’ common-law wife and sought letters of administration for his estate. She presented evidence that they lived together, she wore a wedding ring, cared for him, and were occasionally introduced as husband and wife. However, during 1955-1958, Lieber filed tax returns under her own name. Watts filed tax returns from 1960-1965 without claiming Lieber as his wife and in 1959, reported her as his employee. Lieber voted under her own name and was admitted to a hospital as “housekeeper”. A 1964 letter from Lieber stated, “If I were a wife I couldn’t do more for you.” She later admitted that, but for the executor, they would have married. She was listed as Watts’ housekeeper on funeral forms and filed a claim for services rendered as his housekeeper from 1955 to 1966.

    Procedural History

    Lieber petitioned for letters of administration in Surrogate’s Court, Hamilton County, claiming to be Watts’ common-law wife. Watts’ distributees and executor contested. The Surrogate’s Court ruled against Lieber, dismissing her petition and objections to Watts’ will. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Surrogate’s Court’s original decree.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Lieber and Watts entered into a valid common-law marriage under Florida law, such that it should be recognized in New York.

    Holding

    No, because Lieber failed to establish a prima facie case for a common-law marriage under Florida law, and she failed to overcome the presumption that their relationship was meretricious in its inception.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied Florida law, which places the burden of proof on the party asserting the common-law marriage. Florida law requires either direct testimony of an agreement to marry or, absent that, proof of general repute and cohabitation as man and wife to support a presumption of marriage. The court found that Lieber’s evidence fell short of establishing a prima facie case. Citing *Matter of Alcala* and *Matter of Beacher*, the court distinguished the present case by noting the lack of documentary evidence, such as tax returns, deeds, or insurance policies, supporting a matrimonial relationship. Instead, the documentary evidence refuted the claim. Furthermore, the court reasoned that even if a prima facie case had been established, Lieber failed to overcome the presumption of a continuing meretricious relationship. The 1964 letter suggesting Watts “didn’t want to live in sin” implied the relationship was initially meretricious. The court stated, “A fair inference is that the relationship was meretricious in its inception and such inference is bolstered by the record developed in the Surrogate’s Court. Against this, respondent presented little cogent evidence to overcome the presumption of a continuing meretricious relationship.” The court emphasized that acts inconsistent with marriage, like filing taxes separately and Lieber’s admission of a housekeeper relationship, weighed against her claim. The court referenced *Barretti v. Twomey* a Florida case, to highlight how documentary evidence can refute claims of common-law marriage.

  • People v. Allen, 27 N.Y.2d 108 (1970): Determining ‘Family’ or ‘Household’ Status for Family Court Jurisdiction

    People v. Allen, 27 N.Y.2d 108 (1970)

    The terms “family” and “household” in Section 812 of the Family Court Act, which defines the court’s jurisdiction over certain disputes, apply only to relationships with legal interdependence, established through a solemnized marriage or a recognized common-law union.

    Summary

    Three defendants, Allen, Echols, and Christmas, were convicted of assault-related crimes in Supreme Court. They argued their cases should have been transferred to Family Court under Section 812 of the Family Court Act, claiming the victims were members of their “family” or “household.” Allen lived with his victim for three years. Echols lived with his victim for eleven years, fathering two children, while being married to another woman. Christmas claimed to have lived with his victim, a claim she denied. The New York Court of Appeals held that Family Court jurisdiction under Section 812 only extends to legally recognized relationships like marriage or common-law unions, not informal or illicit arrangements.

    Facts

    Defendant Allen pleaded guilty to assault after being charged with sodomy on a woman he had lived with for three years. Allen conceded he wasn’t married to the victim, nor was their relationship a common-law marriage.
    Defendant Echols pleaded guilty to attempted assault after stabbing his former girlfriend, with whom he had lived for eleven years and had two children. Echols was married to another woman at the time.
    Defendant Christmas was convicted of assault and weapons possession. He testified he had lived with the female victim for 1.5 years, but she denied this claim.

    Procedural History

    Allen and Echols pleaded guilty in the Supreme Court, Kings County and Bronx County, respectively.
    Christmas was convicted by a jury in Nassau County Court.
    All three defendants appealed, arguing that the assault charges should have been transferred to Family Court under Section 812 of the Family Court Act.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Section 812 of the Family Court Act grants the Family Court jurisdiction over assault cases involving parties in unceremonialized, informal, or illicit relationships, specifically those not recognized as common-law marriages?

    Holding

    No, because the “family” and “household” categories in Section 812 of the Family Court Act are limited to relationships with legal interdependence established through a solemnized marriage or recognized common-law union. The legislature aimed to preserve family units consistent with public policy and state laws, and extending Family Court services to informal relationships would contradict this policy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the legislative intent behind Article 8 of the Family Court Act was to preserve the family unit by providing conciliation and assistance rather than penal sanctions in intra-family disputes. However, the family unit to be preserved must be consistent with public policy and state law. The court stated: “Implicit in the legislation is the proposition that the family or household unit which is sought to be preserved must be one whose continued existence is consistent with both public policy and the laws of this State.”
    New York State does not recognize common-law marriages (Domestic Relations Law, § 11), and the court held it should not contradict this policy by extending Family Court jurisdiction to such relationships. It emphasized the State’s power to regulate marriage: “in its broad powers to regulate society, the State has the power to set standards and procedures to control such a basic institution as marriage.” The court further reasoned that extending jurisdiction would place a tremendous burden on the Family Court, requiring pretrial hearings to determine the “unity of living arrangement, and of social [and] economic * * * interdependence”.
    The court noted that other legal avenues exist to address issues arising from such relationships, such as support proceedings for children and restraining orders for physical protection. Therefore, transferring these cases to Family Court would not offer significant benefits. “Support proceedings for the benefit of the children may be instituted regardless of the marital status of the parties. (Domestic Relations Law, § 33.) Restraining orders or jail, if necessary, can fulfill the parties’ need for physical protection. Thus, there appears that little can be gained by transferring such cases to the Family Court.”