New York Law Review

Tag: Common Carrier

  • Gallagher v. New York City Transit Authority, 2001 N.Y. Slip Op. 08247: Duty of Care on Subway Access Stairways

    Gallagher v. New York City Transit Authority, 2001 N.Y. Slip Op. 08247

    A transit authority has a duty to maintain stairways providing sole access to its subway station, regardless of ownership, ensuring passenger safety.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sued the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) for injuries sustained from a fall on a stairway leading to a subway station. The NYCTA moved for summary judgment, arguing they didn’t own the stairway and were merely a common user. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that a factual issue existed regarding the stairway’s use. The court declined to address NYCTA’s new argument to abandon the established rule on appeal because it was not raised previously in lower courts.

    Facts

    The plaintiff fell on a stairway leading to the subway station at Columbus Circle. She alleged the fall was due to a defect in the stairway’s metal strip. She sued the NYCTA, claiming inadequate maintenance. The NYCTA presented evidence, including a 1971 easement agreement and an affidavit from their trial counsel, suggesting the stairway served other businesses in addition to the subway.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the NYCTA’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding the NYCTA didn’t own the stairway and had no duty to maintain it. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, denying summary judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the NYCTA, as a common carrier, owes a duty of care to maintain a stairway providing access to its subway station, even if it does not own the stairway, if the stairway is constantly and notoriously used by passengers as a means of access.

    2. Whether the Court of Appeals can consider a new legal argument raised for the first time on appeal.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because an issue of fact existed as to whether the stairway was used solely to access the subway station. Summary judgment was improper.

    2. No, because this Court does not review questions raised for the first time on appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on the established rule from Schlessinger v. Manhattan Ry. Co., which states that a railway company’s duty to provide safe approaches extends to approaches owned by others if constantly used by passengers to access the train. The Court highlighted conflicting evidence regarding the stairway’s use, as the plaintiff’s daughter contradicted the defense counsel’s affidavit. Because there was conflicting evidence summary judgement was inappropriate. The court declined to address the NYCTA’s argument to abandon the Schlessinger rule, as it was raised for the first time on appeal. The court emphasized that it generally does not review issues not raised in lower courts, especially when the issue involves changing a long-established common-law rule. The Court stated that it is inappropriate to consider new arguments on appeal because “this Court best serves the litigants and the law by limiting its review to issues that have first been presented to and carefully considered by the trial and intermediate appellate courts.” The court reasoned the plaintiff would have had the opportunity to counter the new argument with facts or legal arguments had it been raised in the trial court.

  • Bethel v. New York City Transit Authority, 92 N.Y.2d 348 (1998): Standard of Care for Common Carriers

    Bethel v. New York City Transit Authority, 92 N.Y.2d 348 (1998)

    New York common carriers are held to the same standard of reasonable care under the circumstances as any other potential tortfeasor, abandoning the prior requirement of the “highest degree of care”.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sued the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA) for injuries sustained when a bus seat collapsed. The trial court instructed the jury that the NYCTA, as a common carrier, owed a “highest degree of care.” The jury found for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the “highest degree of care” standard for common carriers is no longer applicable. Instead, common carriers are held to the same standard of reasonable care under the circumstances as any other potential tortfeasor. This decision aligns the duty of care for common carriers with general negligence principles, eliminating a previously heightened standard based on outdated policy considerations. The case was remitted for a new trial under the correct standard of care.

    Facts

    Plaintiff boarded a NYCTA bus and sat in a seat designed to fold up for wheelchair access. The seat collapsed, and Plaintiff sustained injuries. A post-accident inspection revealed the seat was damaged and could not be restored to its normal position. Plaintiff argued the NYCTA had constructive notice of the defect based on a computer record showing repairs to the “Lift Wheelchair” 11 days prior. Plaintiff contended a proper inspection during those repairs would have revealed the defect.

    Procedural History

    The trial court instructed the jury that the NYCTA owed a duty to use the highest degree of care. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff based on constructive notice. The Appellate Division affirmed. The NYCTA appealed, challenging the jury instruction on the elevated duty of care for common carriers. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to address the propriety of the “highest degree of care” instruction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a common carrier in New York should be held to a higher standard of care (i.e., “highest degree of care”) than that of ordinary reasonable care under the circumstances.

    Holding

    No, because a common carrier is subject to the same duty of reasonable care under the circumstances as any other potential tortfeasor.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the historical basis for the “highest degree of care” standard for common carriers stemmed from the hazardous nature of early rail travel and the passenger’s complete dependency on the carrier. However, technological advancements and government regulation have made public transit as safe as private travel. Moreover, the “highest degree of care” standard is inconsistent with the fundamental concept of negligence, which presupposes a uniform standard of behavior based on a reasonable person under the circumstances. The Court emphasized the flexibility of the reasonable person standard, stating that it allows juries to consider the specific circumstances of the case, including the potential hazards of public transportation. The court overruled the prior precedent imposing a special duty on common carriers, stating: “For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the rule of a common carrier’s duty of extraordinary care is no longer viable. Rather, a common carrier is subject to the same duty of care as any other potential tortfeasor — reasonable care under all of the circumstances of the particular case.” The Court also noted the anomalous results that could occur under the old rule, such as applying different standards of care to a passenger injured by negligent operation versus defective equipment. The instruction to the jury, therefore, was not harmless error, as it may have skewed their deliberations by inviting them to scrutinize the carrier’s conduct more stringently. The court cited McLean v. Triboro Coach Corp., noting the question of “whether it is ever practicable for one to use more care than one reasonably can”.

  • People v. Trainor, 86 N.Y.2d 544 (1995): Venue in Criminal Cases on Common Carriers

    People v. Trainor, 86 N.Y.2d 544 (1995)

    New York’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 20.40(4)(f) allows prosecution of an offense committed on a common carrier in any county the carrier passes through, regardless of whether the location of the crime is ascertainable.

    Summary

    Defendant was prosecuted in New York County for offenses committed on a commuter train from Westchester to New York City. The Court of Appeals addressed whether CPL 20.40(4)(f) authorized prosecution in New York County, given the offenses occurred wholly in Westchester County. The Court held that New York County was a proper venue, interpreting the common carrier exception to venue broadly. It distinguished the private vehicle exception, emphasizing the historical application and plain language of the common carrier rule, which allows for prosecution in any county the common carrier passes through, regardless of where the crime occurred.

    Facts

    In March 1993, the defendant boarded a Metro-North commuter train from Westchester County to New York City. He presented a suspicious weekly pass to the conductor, who later determined it was a forgery after further inspection. The conductor seized the forged pass while the train was still in Westchester County. The defendant was subsequently arrested upon arrival in New York City.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was tried and convicted in New York County for criminal possession of a forged instrument and theft of services. At the close of the prosecution’s case, the defendant moved for dismissal, arguing improper venue. The trial court initially granted the motion, but the Appellate Term reversed, reinstating the verdict. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether CPL 20.40(4)(f) permits prosecution in New York County for offenses committed on a commuter train when the offenses occurred entirely in Westchester County?
    2. Does the ruling in People v. Moore, which limits the private vehicle exception to situations where the crime’s location is indeterminable, also apply to the common carrier exception under CPL 20.40(4)(f)?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the plain language of CPL 20.40(4)(f) allows prosecution in any county through which the common carrier passes during the trip.
    2. No, because the common carrier exception has a distinct historical basis and the statute’s plain language does not support such a limitation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that CPL 20.40(4)(f) authorized prosecution in New York County based on the statute’s plain language. The Court distinguished its prior holding in People v. Moore, which restricted the “private vehicle exception” to situations where the location of the crime could not be determined. The Court emphasized the historical context of the common carrier exception, noting its existence since 1877 and its consistent application to all offenses committed on common carriers, regardless of whether the crime’s location was ascertainable. The Court noted that the 1877 law specified that indictment, trial, conviction and sentencing could take place “in any such county, in the same manner and with the like effect as in the county where the offense or crime was committed”. The Court reasoned that there was no basis to conclude that the drafters of CPL 20.40(4)(f) intended to depart from the historical meaning and application of the common carrier exception.

    The Court explained: “Our unwillingness to expand the scope of Moore is largely due to the absence of any support for such a limitation in the plain, unambiguous language of section 20.40 (4) (f) itself.” The Court also pointed out that the private vehicle exception, unlike the common carrier exception, had no counterpart in prior law, further justifying a narrower interpretation.

  • Urquhart v. New York City Transit Authority, 85 N.Y.2d 828 (1995): Establishing Negligence in Sudden Stop Cases

    Urquhart v. New York City Transit Authority, 85 N.Y.2d 828 (1995)

    To establish a prima facie case of negligence against a common carrier for injuries sustained when a vehicle suddenly stops, a plaintiff must present objective evidence demonstrating that the stop was ‘unusual and violent,’ exceeding the ordinary jerks and jolts of travel.

    Summary

    Urquhart sued the New York City Transit Authority for injuries sustained when he fell on a bus. He claimed the bus stopped suddenly and violently, throwing him down the length of the bus. The jury found the Transit Authority 90% at fault. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Urquhart failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Urquhart’s testimony provided sufficient objective evidence of an extraordinary and violent stop beyond mere characterization, warranting a retrial on the weight of the evidence and damages.

    Facts

    Plaintiff Urquhart boarded a bus in downtown Brooklyn. After paying his fare, he walked toward the rear of the bus. He testified that the bus began moving quickly and that the driver was arguing loudly with another passenger. The bus stopped suddenly and violently. The force of the stop caused Urquhart to fall and slide the entire length of the bus to the front, resulting in injuries to his shoulder, elbow, and knee. The bus driver’s testimony contradicted Urquhart’s account.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the Transit Authority’s motion to dismiss after the jury found the Authority 90% at fault. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint, finding that Urquhart failed to establish a prima facie case of negligence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision and remitted the case for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of negligence against the New York City Transit Authority based on an unusually violent and sudden stop of a bus.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plaintiff’s testimony provided objective evidence that the bus stopped so suddenly and violently as to propel his body down its entire length, causing injuries to his shoulder, elbow, and knee, which is more than a mere characterization of the stop.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that to establish negligence against a common carrier in a sudden stop case, the plaintiff must show that the stop was “unusual and violent” (Trudell v New York R. T. Corp., 281 NY 82, 85). However, merely characterizing the stop as such is insufficient. The Court distinguished Urquhart’s testimony from a mere characterization, noting that he provided objective evidence of the force of the stop. Specifically, Urquhart testified that the bus stopped so suddenly and violently that he was propelled down the entire length of the bus, resulting in specific injuries. This provided sufficient evidence to infer that the stop was extraordinary and violent, differing from the normal jerks and jolts of city bus travel, attributable to the Transit Authority’s negligence. The court emphasized that such testimony “provided more than a mere characterization of the stop. It also provided objective evidence of the force of the stop sufficient to establish an inference that the stop was extraordinary and violent, of a different class than the jerks and jolts commonly experienced in city bus travel and, therefore, attributable to the negligence of defendant.” Since the Appellate Division dismissed the complaint based solely on the legal insufficiency of the evidence, the Court of Appeals remitted the case to the Appellate Division to consider the Transit Authority’s arguments regarding the weight of the evidence and the excessiveness of damages.

  • Breen v. New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co., 109 N.Y. 297 (1888): Res Ipsa Loquitur in Common Carrier Cases

    109 N.Y. 297 (1888)

    In cases involving common carriers, an accident that injures a passenger raises a presumption of negligence on the part of the carrier, shifting the burden to the carrier to prove it was not negligent.

    Summary

    The plaintiff was injured while exiting a train when it suddenly started. She sued the railroad company, alleging negligence. The court addressed whether the mere occurrence of the accident created a presumption of negligence against the railroad. The Court of Appeals held that because the train’s operation was under the railroad’s control and the accident was one that ordinarily would not occur if the carrier used proper care, a presumption of negligence arose. This shifted the burden to the railroad to prove it was not negligent.

    Facts

    The plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant’s elevated train. As she was stepping off the train at a station, the train suddenly started with a jerk. The sudden movement threw her down, causing severe injuries. She claimed the railroad’s negligence caused her injuries.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiff sued the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. in a New York state court. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, arguing errors in the judge’s instructions to the jury. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the occurrence of an accident on a common carrier, resulting in passenger injury, raises a presumption of negligence against the carrier, thereby shifting the burden to the carrier to prove its lack of negligence.

    Holding

    Yes, because when a passenger is injured due to an accident involving a common carrier, and that accident is one that would not ordinarily occur if the carrier exercised due care, a presumption of negligence arises against the carrier.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that common carriers have a duty to provide passengers a reasonable opportunity to safely exit their trains. The court noted the plaintiff’s evidence warranted a conclusion that she was not at fault for her injuries. Because the train and its movements were controlled by the defendant’s employees, the court held that the accident raised a presumption that the railroad was negligent. The court cited precedents establishing this principle, stating the burden was then on the defendant to “repel such presumption.” The defendant attempted to prove the accident was not due to a flaw in its system by presenting evidence about how its trains were operated. The defendant argued that a passenger pulling the emergency cord caused the train to start prematurely, but the jury did not find this argument persuasive, and the Court of Appeals found no error in the lower court’s instructions regarding this issue. The court emphasized that if the jury believed the passenger’s actions caused the train to start, the defendant would not be negligent, but because the jury evidently rejected that explanation, the presumption of negligence stood.