New York Law Review

Tag: Commissioner of Social Services v. Philip De G.

  • Commissioner of Social Services v. Philip De G., 59 N.Y.2d 137 (1983): Credibility and Paternity Inferences

    59 N.Y.2d 137 (1983)

    In paternity proceedings, the trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility is given great weight, and a respondent’s refusal to testify allows the strongest inferences against him, provided those inferences are supported by the opposing evidence.

    Summary

    This case concerns a paternity dispute. The Commissioner of Social Services, on behalf of the petitioner, initiated proceedings to establish the respondent as the father of her child. Conflicting evidence existed regarding the date of conception. The petitioner had intercourse with the respondent on November 14, 1981, but also admitted to intercourse with another man on October 9, 1981. She testified to a normal menstrual period between November 1-5, 1981. Medical testimony indicated the child was born prematurely, approximately four weeks early. The respondent did not testify. The Family Court found the respondent to be the father. The Appellate Division reversed, but the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, reinstating the Family Court order. The Court emphasized the trial judge’s role in assessing credibility and the negative inference drawn from the respondent’s silence in the face of opposing evidence.

    Facts

    On July 9, 1982, the petitioner gave birth to a child out of wedlock. The attending physician testified the child was born approximately four weeks prematurely, setting the expected birth date around August 4, 1982. Hospital records supported the premature birth. The petitioner testified she first had intercourse with the respondent on November 14, 1981. She also admitted to having intercourse with another individual on October 9, 1981. She testified that her last normal menstrual period occurred between November 1 and November 5, 1981. The respondent chose not to testify at trial.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Social Services initiated the paternity proceeding in Family Court. The Family Court adjudicated the respondent as the father. The Appellate Division reversed the Family Court’s decision. The Commissioner of Social Services appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, reinstating the Family Court’s original determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Family Court’s determination that the respondent was the father of the child was supported by clear and convincing evidence, considering the conflicting dates of possible conception and the respondent’s refusal to testify.

    Holding

    Yes, because the trial judge’s assessment of the petitioner’s credibility, along with the medical testimony regarding prematurity and the negative inference drawn from the respondent’s refusal to testify, provided clear and convincing evidence to support the Family Court’s finding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the significant weight given to the trial judge’s assessment of witness credibility. The Court noted the rule that a respondent’s refusal to testify in a paternity proceeding allows the strongest inferences against him, provided that the opposing evidence permits such inferences. The court cited Noce v. Kaufman, 2 N.Y.2d 347 and Matter of Commissioner of Social Servs. [Patricia A.] v. Philip De G., 59 NY2d 137 in support. The court reasoned that the combination of the petitioner’s testimony regarding her menstrual cycle, the medical testimony confirming the child’s premature birth, and the respondent’s silence, supported the Family Court’s conclusion. The court highlighted that the medical testimony placed the date of intercourse with the respondent within an accepted gestational period. Because the respondent did not testify to offer an alternative explanation or to contradict the petitioner’s testimony, the court found that the Family Court’s conclusion was supported by the evidence. The court implicitly applied a ‘totality of the circumstances’ test to determine whether clear and convincing evidence existed, giving substantial deference to the lower court’s findings. The Court’s reasoning underscores the importance of a party’s decision to testify or remain silent, particularly when faced with adverse evidence. It also clarifies that while negative inferences are permissible, they must be grounded in and supported by the other evidence presented.

  • Commissioner of Social Services v. Philip De G., 44 N.Y.2d 166 (1978): Parental Support Obligations and Emancipation

    Commissioner of Social Services v. Philip De G., 44 N.Y.2d 166 (1978)

    A parent is not automatically obligated to support a child over 18 who voluntarily leaves home against the parent’s wishes to live with a paramour, even if the child receives public assistance; the court retains discretion based on family dynamics and potential injustice.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a father can be compelled by the Department of Social Services to support his 18-year-old daughter who voluntarily left home against his wishes to live with her boyfriend and have a child, subsequently receiving public assistance. The court held that the father was not obligated to provide support under these circumstances. The decision emphasizes the importance of considering the family relationship and potential injustice when determining parental support obligations, even when public assistance is involved, recognizing the daughter’s voluntary abandonment of parental control.

    Facts

    The respondent’s daughter, born in 1956, lived with her father after her parents’ divorce. In early 1974, she told her cousin she planned to leave home, live with her boyfriend, and have a child, intending to support herself through public assistance. She left home shortly after turning 18 in October 1974. After a brief return home, she eventually moved in permanently with her unemployed boyfriend in the spring of 1975. She gave birth to a child out of wedlock in the fall of 1975 and subsequently applied for and received public assistance for herself and her child.

    Procedural History

    In February 1976, the Commissioner of Social Services of Orange County initiated a proceeding in Family Court to compel the respondent to contribute to his daughter’s support, pursuant to Social Services Law § 101-a(3). The Family Court dismissed the petition, finding the daughter had emancipated herself. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, citing Matter of Roe v Doe. The Commissioner of Social Services then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Department of Social Services can compel a father to support his daughter, who is over 18 and receiving public assistance, after she voluntarily left home against his wishes to live with her paramour and have a child.

    Holding

    No, because the court retains discretion in determining support obligations, considering the impact on the family relationship and potential for injustice, and because the daughter voluntarily abandoned the parent’s home against the father’s reasonable wishes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while Social Services Law generally obligates parents to support children until age 21, this obligation is not absolute when the child is receiving public assistance. Citing Family Court Act § 415, the court emphasized its discretionary power to determine a fair and reasonable contribution for support, considering the needs of the petitioner and the circumstances of the case. The court distinguished this case from situations involving abandoned or abused children, highlighting that the father had consistently supported his daughter, encouraged her education, and accepted her back after absences. The court noted that the daughter’s choice to leave home against her father’s wishes to pursue a particular lifestyle did not automatically obligate him to financially support that choice. The court stated, “We simply hold that under these circumstances the courts below could properly refuse to compel him to pay for her support when she chose to leave home to live with her paramour.” The decision also referenced the state’s policy of fostering family integrity, which would be undermined by forcing the father to underwrite a lifestyle his daughter chose against his reasonable wishes.