Matter of Legal Aid Soc. v. Scheinman, 53 N.Y.2d 12 (1981)

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and is inappropriate to compel the performance of acts involving the exercise of discretion, even where an entity makes recommendations; the ultimate decision rests with the officer with the authority to make it.

Summary

This case addresses the availability of mandamus relief to compel the Commissioner of Correction to reinstate passes for individuals providing legal services to inmates. The New York Court of Appeals held that mandamus was inappropriate because the Commissioner’s decision to grant or revoke passes involved discretionary authority, not purely ministerial acts. The Board of Correction’s recommendations were not binding. The court emphasized that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy reserved for situations where there is a clear legal right to the relief sought and the duty to be compelled is ministerial. Because the Commissioner had discretion, the lower courts erred in considering the merits of the case.

Facts

Thomas McCreary’s pass, granting access to correctional facilities in New York City, was revoked. Naomi Burns had her institutional pass initially revoked, but the Commissioner later withdrew his objections and reinstated it. Both McCreary and Burns sought reinstatement of their passes, apparently arguing that the Commissioner was improperly applying standards promulgated by the Board of Correction.

Procedural History

The petitioners sought mandamus relief in lower courts to compel the Commissioner of Correction to reinstate the passes. The lower courts granted relief. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that mandamus was not the appropriate remedy.

Issue(s)

Whether mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel the Commissioner of Correction to reinstate passes to correctional facilities when the decision to grant or revoke such passes involves discretionary authority?

Holding

No, because the decision to grant or revoke passes involves the exercise of discretion by the Commissioner of Correction, and mandamus is only appropriate to compel the performance of purely ministerial acts.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Board of Correction has the authority to make recommendations, the Commissioner of Correction retains the discretion to apply the board’s standards in individual cases. The court cited prior cases, including Matter of Legal Aid Soc. v Scheinman, 53 NY2d 12; Matter of Association of Surrogates & Supreme Ct. Reporters v Bartlett, 40 NY2d 571,574; and Matter of Gimprich v Board of Educ., 306 NY 401, 406, to support the principle that mandamus is appropriate only when a petitioner has a clear legal right to the relief sought and the duty sought to be compelled is ministerial, not discretionary. The court stated that “[a]uthority to revoke the pass of Thomas McCreary granting access to the correctional facilities in the City of New York lay within the discretion of the commissioner in conformity with the standards promulgated by the board pursuant to subdivision e of section 626 of the New York City Charter, and the reinstatement of his pass cannot be classified as a purely ministerial act.” Because the Commissioner’s decision involved discretion, mandamus was not an appropriate remedy. The Court also noted that, in the case of Naomi Burns, the Commissioner had already withdrawn his objections and reinstated her pass, rendering the issue moot. Finally, because the petitioners were not entitled to relief, they were also not entitled to attorney’s fees under section 1988 of title 42 of the United States Code.