New York Law Review

Tag: Commercial Use

  • Stout v. Mechaniceville Block Co., 93 N.Y.2d 613 (1999): Scope of Liability Under NY Labor Law § 240(1)

    93 N.Y.2d 613 (1999)

    New York Labor Law § 240(1), which imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors for failing to provide adequate safety devices, can extend to tree removal when the removal is integral to a construction or renovation project affecting a building or structure, but the exception for owners of one- and two-family dwellings does not apply when the dwelling is used for commercial purposes.

    Summary

    Plaintiff, injured while removing a tree, sued the property owner (Stout) under Labor Law § 240(1). The New York Court of Appeals considered whether tree removal qualified as work on a “building or structure” under the statute and whether Stout, as a homeowner, was exempt from liability. The Court held that § 240(1) could apply if the tree removal was part of a larger renovation project. However, the homeowner exception did not apply where the renovations were intended to prepare the house for commercial rental. The court reinstated the cause of action for the plaintiff.

    Facts

    Stout contracted to buy property and hired Facchin, Inc. to remove a tree located 10-15 feet from the house. The tree’s branches touched the house and garage roofs. The tree removal was allegedly part of a plan to remodel the house into a two-family dwelling and facilitate paving the driveway and constructing a parking lot for Stout’s nearby funeral home. Plaintiff, an employee of Facchin, was injured when he fell from a ladder while cutting down the tree because a co-worker failed to secure the rope.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court dismissed the action against the Estate of Von Sothen but denied summary judgment motions by Stout and Facchin. The Appellate Division modified the Supreme Court decision by dismissing the complaints against Stout and Facchin, concluding that Labor Law § 240(1) did not apply because a tree is not a building or structure. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the tree removal constituted “erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure” within the meaning of Labor Law § 240(1)?

    2. Whether Stout qualified for the homeowner exception under Labor Law § 240(1) as an owner of a one- or two-family dwelling who did not direct or control the work?

    Holding

    1. No, not inherently, but Yes because the tree removal was part of a larger renovation project affecting the house and intended for commercial rental purposes.

    2. No, because the renovations were intended to prepare the house for commercial rental, negating the protection of the homeowner exception.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that while a tree is not inherently a building or structure, § 240(1) should be liberally construed to protect workers in construction-related activities. The tree removal was intertwined with the house renovations and paving, thus falling within the statute’s scope. The Court quoted Lewis-Moors v Contel of N. Y., 78 NY2d 942, 943 defining a building or structure as ” ‘any production or piece of work artificially built up or composed of parts joined together in some definite manner’ ” quoting Caddy v Interborough R. T. Co., 195 NY 415, 420. Regarding the homeowner exception, the Court emphasized it was designed to protect unsophisticated homeowners, not those using their properties for commercial gain. Since Stout intended to rent the renovated house, he could not claim the exception. The Court stated, “It was not intended to insulate from liability owners who use their one- or two-family houses purely for commercial purposes.” The burden of proving the applicability of the homeowner exception falls on the defendant, as stated in Massie v Crawford, 78 NY2d 516, 519. This case is significant because it clarifies the boundaries of § 240(1) and the homeowner exception, emphasizing the importance of considering the context and purpose of the work being performed, informing legal reasoning in similar situations.

  • Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982): Limits on Right to Privacy for Matters of Public Interest

    Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982)

    New York’s statutory right to privacy under Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 does not extend to the publication of a person’s photograph in connection with a matter of public interest unless the photograph has no real relationship to the article or the article is an advertisement in disguise.

    Summary

    Clarence Arrington sued The New York Times Company and others after his photograph was used on the cover of the New York Times Magazine to illustrate an article about the Black middle class. Arrington claimed the article presented views he did not share and subjected him to public scorn. The Court of Appeals held that the use of Arrington’s photograph was not a violation of New York’s Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 because the article concerned a matter of public interest, and the photograph bore a reasonable relationship to the article. However, the Court found that the photographer and photo agency could be liable for commercializing Arrington’s photograph without his consent.

    Facts

    The New York Times Magazine published an article entitled “The Black Middle Class: Making It,” featuring a photograph of Clarence Arrington on its cover. Arrington had no knowledge that the photograph had been taken or that it would be used in connection with the article. The article discussed the role and perceptions of the Black middle class, including the idea that this group was becoming removed from less fortunate members of their race. Arrington, a financial analyst, felt the article’s views were insulting and subjected him to ridicule, either because people thought he shared those views or because they assumed he had become a professional model.

    Procedural History

    Arrington sued the New York Times Company, the photographer Gianfranco Gorgoni, Contact Press Images, Inc. (the photographic agency), and Robert Pledge (Contact’s president). The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Special Term dismissed the complaint against all defendants, but granted Arrington leave to amend the complaint against the Times based on a constitutional right to privacy. The Appellate Division modified the Special Term’s order by deleting the leave to amend, finding no common-law or constitutional right to privacy applied. Arrington appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the publication of Arrington’s photograph in connection with an article of public interest violates New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51.

    2. Whether the photographer and photographic agency could be held liable for violating New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51 by selling Arrington’s photograph to the New York Times.

    3. Whether Arrington’s constitutional right to privacy was violated.

    Holding

    1. No, because a picture illustrating an article on a matter of public interest is not considered used for the purposes of trade or advertising within the prohibition of the statute unless it has no real relationship to the article or unless the article is an advertisement in disguise.

    2. Yes, because the photographer and photographic agency may have commercialized the photograph independently from the publisher’s immunity for publishing matters of public interest.

    3. No, because there was no state action involved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reviewed the history and scope of New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50 and 51, noting that these statutes were enacted in response to Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., which denied the existence of a common-law right to privacy in New York. The statutes were narrowly drafted to encompass only the commercial use of an individual’s name or likeness. The Court emphasized that it has consistently adhered to the position that “there exists no so-called common-law right to privacy” in New York (Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 493, 497, n. 2). The Court balanced the protection against invasion of privacy for purposes of “advertising” or “trade” with the constitutional values of free speech and free press. The Court cited Murray v. New York Mag. Co., stating that “ ‘[a] picture illustrating an article on a matter of public interest is not considered used for the purposes of trade or advertising within the prohibition of the statute * * * unless it has no real relationship to the article * * * or unless the article is an advertisement in disguise.’ ” The court found that the article concerned a matter of public interest, and the photograph bore a reasonable relationship to the article. However, the Court found that the photographer and photo agency could be liable for commercializing Arrington’s photograph without his consent. The Court rejected Arrington’s “false light” claim, expressing concern that it could compromise the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. Finally, the Court rejected Arrington’s claim based on an alleged constitutional right to privacy, because no state action was involved.

  • Town of Huntington v. Park Shore Country Day Camp, 47 N.Y.2d 61 (1979): Upholding Zoning Ordinance Distinguishing Between Commercial and Non-Profit Uses

    Town of Huntington v. Park Shore Country Day Camp, 47 N.Y.2d 61 (1979)

    A zoning ordinance may permissibly distinguish between commercial and non-profit uses of property, even if the activities appear similar, because the potential impacts on a residential neighborhood differ significantly.

    Summary

    The Town of Huntington sought to enjoin Park Shore from commercially operating tennis courts in a residential district, arguing it violated the zoning ordinance. Park Shore counterclaimed, alleging unconstitutional discrimination because the ordinance permitted non-profit clubs to operate similar courts. The court upheld the ordinance, finding a rational basis for distinguishing between commercial and non-profit entities. Commercial ventures, driven by profit, are more likely to cause increased traffic, noise, and disruption to the neighborhood compared to non-profit clubs. This distinction aligns with the town’s authority to regulate property for the general welfare.

    Facts

    Park Shore operated a day camp and nursery school on 15 acres in a residential zone under a special exception permit granted in 1959. In 1968, it built two tennis courts for camp use. By 1974, it expanded to 14 courts and opened them for commercial use to the general public, promoting the facilities through advertising. The town then initiated an action to enjoin Park Shore from operating the tennis courts commercially.

    Procedural History

    The Town of Huntington brought an action in Special Term to enjoin Park Shore’s commercial use of the tennis courts. Special Term ruled the zoning provision unconstitutional and denied the injunction. The Appellate Division unanimously reversed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a zoning ordinance that permits private, non-profit clubs but not commercial enterprises to operate tennis courts in a residential district is unconstitutionally discriminatory.

    Holding

    No, because the distinction between commercial and non-profit entities is rationally related to the legitimate government interest of preserving the character of residential neighborhoods.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized the strong presumption of constitutionality afforded to zoning ordinances. It reasoned that separating business from non-business uses is an appropriate zoning practice, as residential districts aim to foster family life rather than commercial pursuits. While some commercial enterprises might complement residential living, those motivated by profit tend to generate more traffic, noise, and overall disruption. The court stated, “[i]t is beyond dispute, for instance, that, even if all incidents of the use at this time are the same, there are characteristics of defendant’s venture that may render it, at least potentially, more burdensome to the residential neighborhood in which it is carried on than the same activity conducted by a nonprofit club.” The court noted that a commercial venture’s pursuit of profit might lead to aggressive advertising and peak utilization, increasing the likelihood of disturbances. In contrast, non-profit clubs are more likely to consider long-term community benefits. The court concluded it is a legislature’s right to anticipate future problems and enact measures to guard against them, even if the anticipated events never occur. The court cited numerous cases upholding zoning practices that permit special exception uses in residential zones conditioned on the activity not being conducted as a commercial or profit-making venture. Because Huntington’s ordinance was rationally related to preserving residential values, the court upheld it, reversing the Special Term’s decision.

  • Arrington v. New York Times Co., 55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982): Limits of Privacy Claims Absent Statutory Violation

    55 N.Y.2d 433 (1982)

    In New York, a cause of action for invasion of privacy is strictly limited to the statutory provisions outlined in Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, precluding common-law claims for invasion of privacy based on unreasonable publicity.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs sued over portrayals in books and a movie, claiming invasion of privacy and defamation. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim, holding that New York does not recognize a common-law right to privacy beyond the statutory protections in Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, which prohibit the use of a person’s name, portrait, or picture for commercial purposes without consent. Since the plaintiffs’ names, portraits, or pictures were not used, no cause of action existed under the statute. The defamation claims were not addressed in this motion to dismiss and remained for later consideration.

    Facts

    The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants, for commercial gain, portrayed them with detailed accuracy in books and a movie represented as true stories. They asserted that the portrayals were so accurate regarding their physical characteristics and activities that they were effectively identified, leading to an invasion of their privacy.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs brought suit alleging invasion of privacy and defamation. The defendant moved to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion regarding the invasion of privacy claim, but the appellate division reversed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the appellate division’s order dismissing the invasion of privacy claim, while the defamation claims were not part of this appeal and remained for future proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York State recognizes a common-law right to judicial relief for invasion of privacy based on unreasonable publicity, beyond the protections afforded by Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law.

    Holding

    No, because in New York, the right to judicial relief for invasion of privacy is limited to the statutory provisions outlined in Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, and does not extend to common-law claims based on unreasonable publicity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plaintiffs’ claim for invasion of privacy failed because Sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law exclusively govern such claims in New York. These sections prohibit using a person’s “name, portrait or picture” for commercial purposes without consent. Since the defendants did not use the plaintiffs’ names, portraits, or pictures in the books or movie, there was no violation of the statute. The court explicitly stated, “whatever may be the law in other jurisdictions with respect to the right to judicial relief for invasion of privacy in consequence of unreasonable publicity, in our State thus far there has been no recognition of such right other than under sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law.” The court reinforced the idea that any expansion of privacy rights in New York must come from the legislature, not the courts. The court distinguished this case from defamation claims, which were not addressed by the motion to dismiss and remained open for future litigation. This underscores the court’s strict interpretation of the statutory limits on privacy claims, leaving potential plaintiffs with limited recourse in situations where their likeness or identity is not directly exploited.