New York Law Review

Tag: commencement of action

  • Jones v. Bill, 10 N.Y.3d 550 (2008): Determining When an Action is “Commenced” Under the Graves Amendment

    10 N.Y.3d 550 (2008)

    Under New York law, for the purposes of the federal Graves Amendment (49 U.S.C. § 30106), an action is “commenced” on the date of the initial filing of the summons and complaint, not the date of joinder of the vehicle lessor.

    Summary

    This case addresses the interpretation of the word “commenced” in the context of the federal Graves Amendment, which shields vehicle lessors from vicarious liability. Jones was injured in an accident with Bill. Jones sued Bill, who claimed he leased the vehicle from DCFS Trust. Jones then amended the complaint to add DCFS as a defendant. The issue was whether the action against DCFS was “commenced” when the initial suit was filed against Bill (before the Graves Amendment took effect) or when DCFS was added as a defendant (after the Amendment’s effective date). The Court of Appeals held that the action was commenced upon the initial filing, thus the Graves Amendment did not protect DCFS.

    Facts

    1. On July 7, 2005, Jones was injured in a car accident with Bill.
    2. On August 8, 2005, Jones filed a lawsuit against Bill, identifying him as the “owner and operator” of the vehicle.
    3. Bill’s answer denied ownership, stating he leased the vehicle from DCFS Trust.
    4. On November 1, 2005, Jones filed an amended summons and complaint, adding DCFS as a defendant.
    5. The Graves Amendment, which preempts state laws imposing vicarious liability on vehicle lessors, took effect on August 10, 2005.

    Procedural History

    1. Supreme Court granted DCFS’s motion to dismiss, holding the action against DCFS was commenced after the Graves Amendment’s effective date.
    2. Plaintiff’s motion for reargument or leave to serve an amended complaint was denied.
    3. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.
    4. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, for purposes of the federal Graves Amendment (49 U.S.C. § 30106), an action is “commenced” on the date of the initial filing of the summons and complaint, or on the date of joinder of the vehicle lessor.

    Holding

    1. No, because under New York law, an action is “commenced” by filing a summons and complaint or summons with notice (CPLR 304 [a]), and the federal statute does not specify a different meaning or require the vehicle lessor to be named as a party before its effective date.

    Court’s Reasoning

    1. The Court relied on the plain language of CPLR 304(a), which states that an action is commenced by filing a summons and complaint.
    2. The Court distinguished between when a claim is “interposed” and when an “action is commenced,” noting CPLR 203(c) uses this distinction.
    3. The Court reasoned that related provisions of the CPLR, such as CPLR 305(a) and CPLR 1003, support the view that the “action” is already commenced when a new party is joined.
    4. The Court noted that Congress’s understanding of “commencement” aligns with New York’s commencement-by-filing system, which is modeled on the federal counterpart (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 3).
    5. The Court found no indication in the Graves Amendment that it bars vicarious claims asserted in an amended pleading in an action commenced before its effective date.
    6. The Court stated: “Nothing in the language of the Graves Amendment suggests that it bars vicarious claims asserted in an amended pleading in an action commenced prior to its effective date.”
    7. The court also found that the rule is “clear and easy-to-follow”.

  • Valladares v. Valladares, 55 N.Y.2d 383 (1982): Determining Applicability of Equitable Distribution Law Based on Action Commencement Date

    Valladares v. Valladares, 55 N.Y.2d 383 (1982)

    The applicability of New York’s Equitable Distribution Law is determined by the date the divorce action was commenced, not when a counterclaim for divorce requesting equitable distribution is filed.

    Summary

    In a divorce action commenced before the effective date of New York’s Equitable Distribution Law, the wife sought to amend her answer after the law’s effective date to include a counterclaim for divorce and a demand for equitable distribution of marital property. The Court of Appeals held that the Equitable Distribution Law did not apply because the original divorce action was commenced before the law’s effective date. The Court emphasized the legislature’s clear intent to apply the new law only to actions commenced on or after the specified date. This decision underscores the importance of the commencement date of an action in determining the applicable law regarding property distribution in divorce cases.

    Facts

    The husband initiated a divorce action against the wife on April 2, 1980, based on cruel and inhuman treatment. The wife’s initial answer included denials and an affirmative defense of the husband’s adultery. The Equitable Distribution Law came into effect on July 19, 1980. Subsequently, the husband amended his complaint to include a cause of action for the wife’s alleged adultery. The wife then sought to amend her answer to include a counterclaim for divorce based on the husband’s adultery and to request equitable distribution of the marital property under the new law.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted the wife permission to amend her answer to include the counterclaim for divorce but denied her request to add a demand for equitable distribution. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision. The wife then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Equitable Distribution Law applies to a divorce action commenced before its effective date when a counterclaim requesting equitable distribution is filed after the effective date.

    Holding

    No, because the controlling factor for determining the applicability of the Equitable Distribution Law is the commencement date of the original action, not the date when a counterclaim is filed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the legislature explicitly stated that Part B of the amended Section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law (the Equitable Distribution Law) “shall be controlling with respect to any action or proceeding commenced on or after such effective date.” The court reasoned that the legislature made a clear distinction based on the commencement date of the action. The Court rejected the wife’s argument that her claim for equitable distribution should be considered as interposed when her amended answer was served, relying on CPLR 203 (c) and (e), which pertain to statutes of limitations. The court stated, “Acceptance of the proposition behind CPLR 203 (subds [c], [e]) does not assist defendant wife in the present case, however, for the determinative time for applicability of part B of section 236 of the Domestic Relations Law is not when her claim was interposed but when the action in which it was interposed was commenced.” The Court highlighted that the extensive study and discussion surrounding the amendment indicated that the legislature’s choice of words was deliberate and intended to have its plain meaning. The court stated that it’s not its role to discard the clear language adopted by the Legislature and substitute other words for it. The Court deferred to the legislature’s determination on when the new law should apply, stating that arguments for applying the law to pending litigation should be addressed to the legislature, not the court.