New York Law Review

Tag: comity

  • Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 127 (1970): Comity and Collateral Attack on Foreign Divorce Decrees Based on Fraud

    Gleason v. Gleason, 26 N.Y.2d 127 (1970)

    A New York court’s ability to entertain a collateral attack on a foreign divorce decree based on fraud depends on whether such an attack would be permitted in the rendering jurisdiction, considered under principles of comity.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a New York court can hear a collateral attack on a Dominican Republic divorce decree and separation agreement based on the husband’s alleged fraud. The wife claimed the husband failed to disclose ongoing negotiations to sell his family business, which would have significantly impacted her decision to sign the agreement. The Court of Appeals held that the initial determination must be whether Dominican Republic courts would allow a similar collateral attack. If so, New York courts, under principles of comity, should also consider the merits of the fraud claim. If not, the New York court should then consider whether exceptional circumstances warrant allowing the attack despite Dominican law.

    Facts

    The wife and husband, married for 20 years, separated and began negotiating a separation agreement and divorce in 1971. On March 20, 1972, they signed a separation agreement, and the wife authorized an appearance on her behalf in a Dominican Republic divorce proceeding. Four days later, the husband obtained a divorce decree in the Dominican Republic. Less than three weeks after the divorce, the wife learned the husband’s family business had been sold for $28.5 million. Less than three months after the divorce, the wife sued to set aside the divorce decree and separation agreement, alleging fraud.

    Procedural History

    The wife sued to set aside the Dominican Republic divorce decree and the separation agreement. Special Term concluded the husband committed fraud but dismissed the action, holding that the divorce decree could not be collaterally attacked in New York. The Appellate Division affirmed, disagreeing with the finding of fraud. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment and remitted the case for trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a New York court may entertain a collateral attack for fraud on a divorce decree rendered in the Dominican Republic.

    Holding

    No, not without first determining whether the divorce decree and separation agreement may be collaterally attacked in the courts of the Dominican Republic for the alleged fraud, because New York courts normally accord comity to foreign judgments, giving them the same recognition as judgments from sister states, but the extent of that recognition depends on the law of the rendering jurisdiction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that New York courts typically grant comity to foreign judgments, giving them the same effect as judgments from sister states under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. However, this principle is not absolute. The initial step is to determine whether the Dominican Republic would allow a collateral attack on the divorce decree and separation agreement based on the alleged fraud. If the Dominican Republic permits such an attack, New York courts should also consider the merits of the fraud claim. As the court stated, “where collateral attack on the ground of fraud would be permitted in the courts of the foreign State in which the judgment had been rendered, our courts will entertain a similar challenge.”

    If the Dominican Republic bars collateral attacks, the New York court should then consider whether there are sufficient circumstances to warrant allowing a collateral attack despite Dominican law. The court noted that “if proof with respect to the laws of the Dominican Republic demonstrates that collateral attack would be barred in the courts of that Country or that there were doubts as to whether it would be permitted, the trial court in this case should nonetheless then consider, under principles of comity, whether there are here sufficient circumstances to warrant allowing collateral attack notwithstanding that such an attack would not be permitted in the courts of the Dominican Republic.” The court emphasized the need to determine whether the husband’s conduct vitiated the separation agreement and power of attorney before granting any summary judgment.

  • Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64 (1965): Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees Based on Comity

    16 N.Y.2d 64 (1965)

    A state court may recognize a divorce decree from another jurisdiction, even if not entitled to full faith and credit, based on principles of comity and estoppel, especially when a party has participated in obtaining the decree and a significant amount of time has passed.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a Surrogate was correct in recognizing an Alabama divorce decree, even if the decree was potentially subject to attack in Alabama for lack of actual residence. The Court held that the Surrogate was entitled to recognize the Alabama decree based on factors like the wife’s initial consent, the extended period since the divorce was granted, and the lack of demonstrable benefit to the wife from the divorce. The Court emphasized that while full faith and credit might not mandate recognition, comity and estoppel principles allowed the New York court to acknowledge the decree’s validity.

    Facts

    The decedent and his wife married in New York in 1948 and remained residents of New York. In 1959, the decedent obtained an Alabama divorce, allegedly without establishing bona fide residence. The wife signed an appearance and power of attorney for the Alabama proceedings. She claimed she didn’t understand the documents and only learned of the divorce after her husband’s death. The couple continued to file joint tax returns as husband and wife and the decedent provided partial support to the wife.

    Procedural History

    The Surrogate Court recognized the Alabama divorce decree and denied the wife’s application for letters of administration after the husband died intestate. The Appellate Division affirmed the Surrogate’s decision. Justice Munder dissented, arguing that the Alabama decree was void and not entitled to full faith and credit.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Surrogate Court was required to give full faith and credit to the Alabama divorce decree, potentially invalid under Alabama law, thus precluding the wife from receiving letters of administration as the surviving spouse.

    Holding

    No, because even if the Alabama divorce decree wasn’t entitled to full faith and credit, the Surrogate court could recognize it based on comity and estoppel principles, considering the wife’s participation in the divorce proceedings, the significant delay before challenging it, and the absence of demonstrable benefit to the wife from the divorce.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court considered Alabama law regarding collusive “quickie” divorces, noting that such decrees could be vacated in Alabama, even on the court’s own motion. However, the Court also acknowledged that Alabama courts might not automatically set aside void decrees, especially if there was a significant delay or if the party seeking vacatur had obtained benefits from the divorce. Referencing Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, the court noted that void decrees are vacatable by the court in which they were rendered, if void on their face. The Court distinguished cases where parties were estopped from challenging divorces due to having received benefits. The Court reasoned that, despite the potential invalidity of the Alabama divorce under Alabama law, the nine-year lapse between the divorce and the challenge raised a strong likelihood of laches. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the Hartigan case focused on the *power* of the court to vacate, not an *obligation* to do so. More importantly, the court noted that the doctrine of comity allowed New York courts to recognize judgments from sister states even when full faith and credit did not apply. As the court stated, “Full faith and credit may compel New York to recognize a judgment of a sister State. The absence of full faith and credit does not mandate ignoring the judgment of a sister State”. The court concluded that preventing someone who participated in a fraud on another state’s court from benefiting by changing their position in New York was a valid basis for estoppel. The Court highlighted that it was not dealing with issues of personal jurisdiction or due process violations as in Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220. Therefore, the Surrogate was correct in recognizing the Alabama divorce decree.

  • Matter of Heller-Baghero, 26 N.Y.2d 337 (1970): Surrogate Court’s Discretion in Original Probate for Non-Domiciliaries

    Matter of Heller-Baghero, 26 N.Y.2d 337 (1970)

    A Surrogate Court possesses discretion to entertain original probate of a non-domiciliary’s will when the bulk of the estate’s assets are in New York and prior proceedings in the domiciliary jurisdiction have not conclusively determined the validity of a later will.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a Surrogate Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the original probate of a 1964 will of a non-domiciliary (Austrian resident) when an estate proceeding based on a prior 1962 will was pending in Austria. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to strike objections to the New York probate, holding that the Surrogate Court had discretion to assert jurisdiction. Key factors influencing the decision included the fact that 90% of the estate’s assets were in New York, the Austrian proceedings had not conclusively determined the validity of the 1964 will, and requiring probate in Austria would be unduly burdensome.

    Facts

    Eudolph Heller-Baghero, an American citizen, executed a will in New York City in 1964, revoking all prior wills and leaving his estate to his divorced wife and another woman. A prior will from 1962 existed, which was the subject of estate proceedings in Austria. The 1962 will left the bulk of his property to his divorced wife, or his daughters if she predeceased him. Approximately 90% of the testator’s assets were located in New York. The Austrian court was aware of the 1964 will, but no certified copy was ever formally presented to them. The daughters were granted administration of the Austrian estate, but the Austrian court indicated that the 1964 will, if valid, would invalidate the prior will, potentially leading to a legacy suit.

    Procedural History

    The 1964 will was presented for probate in the Surrogate’s Court, New York County. The testator’s daughters filed objections, arguing that the testator was domiciled in Austria and a prior will was the subject of proceedings there. The Surrogate struck the objections. The Appellate Division affirmed, granting leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals on a certified question, indicating the determination was a matter of law, not discretion.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Surrogate Court had discretion to entertain jurisdiction for original probate of the 1964 will, and if so, whether the exercise of that discretion was exceeded as a matter of law.

    Holding

    Yes, the Surrogate Court had discretion to entertain jurisdiction because the statute authorizes probate, the 1964 will had not been probated or denied in the domiciliary jurisdiction, and the bulk of the assets were in New York.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on Section 1605 of the Surrogate’s Court Procedure Act, which allows original probate of a non-domiciliary’s will if it affects property in New York and is validly executed under New York law. The statute restricts original probate only when the will has already been probated or denied probate in the testator’s domicile. Since the 1964 will was not considered in the Austrian proceeding, the statute permitted the Surrogate Court to exercise discretion. The Court reviewed prior cases, including Matter of Leonori, Matter of Wolf, and Matter of McCullough, which established that the Surrogate Court’s decision is discretionary, based on factors like comity and the location of assets. The Court found the Surrogate Court’s decision justified by the substantial assets in New York, the executor and a legatee being New York residents, and the potential for extensive litigation in Austria. The court noted, “the facts of the particular case justify the entertainment of original jurisdiction, although they certainly would not compel it.” The court emphasized that the law of Austria would govern the intrinsic validity of the will and devolution of property not disposed of by will, stating, “the only issue is of the validity of the 1962 and 1964 wills, and not whether the law of New York or Austria governs the intrinsic validity, or effect, of the will or devolution of the property when not disposed by will.”

  • In re Estate of Bachman, 1 N.Y.2d 581 (1956): Comity and Enforcement of Foreign Custody Orders

    In re Estate of Bachman, 1 N.Y.2d 581 (1956)

    Principles of comity may warrant the enforcement of foreign custody decrees, even if full faith and credit does not compel it, particularly when the foreign court had jurisdiction and the decree was entered with the consent of the parties.

    Summary

    This case concerns the enforceability in New York of a Puerto Rican court order regarding child custody. The mother initially sought custody in Puerto Rico but then left with the child before a final decision, violating a court order. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that comity did not require recognizing the Puerto Rican order under the specific circumstances where the mother was no longer domiciled in Puerto Rico. The dissent argued that principles of comity should have been applied to respect the Puerto Rican court’s decision, especially since the mother initially invoked its jurisdiction.

    Facts

    The parents were in a dispute over the custody of their child. The mother initiated custody proceedings in Puerto Rico. During the proceedings, and prior to a final custody determination, the mother left Puerto Rico with the child, in violation of a court order prohibiting her from doing so. She then established residence in New York. The father sought to enforce the Puerto Rican custody order in New York.

    Procedural History

    The lower court in New York refused to enforce the Puerto Rican custody order. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals initially affirmed the Appellate Division order, but upon reargument, reversed, holding that the Puerto Rican decree was not enforceable in New York based on the lack of continuing jurisdiction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether principles of comity require New York courts to recognize and enforce a child custody order issued by a court in Puerto Rico, where the mother, who initially sought the Puerto Rican court’s jurisdiction, subsequently left Puerto Rico with the child in violation of a court order and established residence in New York.

    Holding

    No, because under the specific facts, especially considering the mother’s change of domicile, comity did not require enforcement where the Puerto Rican court seemingly lacked a basis for continuing jurisdiction over the child’s custody.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while full faith and credit might not apply to custody decrees, principles of comity could still warrant their enforcement. However, in this instance, the court found that the mother’s departure from Puerto Rico with the child, in violation of the court order, and her subsequent establishment of a new domicile in New York, altered the circumstances. The court implied that it appeared the Puerto Rican court lacked continuing jurisdiction when it issued a final order after the mother had left the jurisdiction. The decision suggests a reluctance to reward the mother’s actions in defying the Puerto Rican court. The dissent, however, strongly argued that the mother’s initial decision to invoke the jurisdiction of the Puerto Rican court should estop her from later challenging its authority, and that comity should have been extended as a matter of respect for the Puerto Rican judicial system. Judge Fuld, in dissent, stated, “To sanction appellant’s course in this case — first invoking the jurisdiction of the courts of Puerto Rico in order to have determined the very question of custody here involved and then, when the case seemed to be going against her, leaving Puerto Rico and flouting the order of its court — must inevitably lead to disrespect for courts in general and disruption of the orderly administration of justice. Our courts of New York should do to other courts and their judgments what we would have them do to us and our decisions.”