New York Law Review

Tag: comity

  • Debra H. v. Janice R., 14 N.Y.3d 576 (2010): Parental Rights of Same-Sex Civil Union Partners

    Debra H. v. Janice R., 14 N.Y.3d 576 (2010)

    New York will recognize parentage created by a civil union in Vermont, allowing a partner in the civil union to seek visitation and custody of a child born to the other partner during the civil union.

    Summary

    Debra H. sought visitation and custody of M.R., a child born to her civil union partner, Janice R., through artificial insemination. The New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed its prior holding in Alison D., stating that, generally, only biological or adoptive parents have standing to seek visitation. However, the Court recognized Debra H. as M.R.’s parent based on comity, as Vermont law considers both partners in a civil union to be parents of a child born to either partner during the union. The case was remitted for a best-interest hearing to determine visitation and custody.

    Facts

    Janice R. is the biological mother of M.R., conceived through artificial insemination. Janice R. and Debra H. entered into a civil union in Vermont before M.R.’s birth. Janice R. repeatedly refused Debra H.’s requests to adopt M.R. After their separation, Janice R. initially allowed Debra H. supervised visits but later cut off all communication. Debra H. then sought joint legal and physical custody of M.R.

    Procedural History

    Debra H. filed a proceeding in Supreme Court seeking custody and visitation. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Debra H., invoking equitable estoppel. Janice R. appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, citing Alison D., stating that only biological or adoptive parents have standing. Debra H. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether New York should recognize a non-biological, non-adoptive individual as a parent based on equitable estoppel, thus allowing them to seek visitation and custody.
    2. Whether, under the principles of comity, New York should recognize Debra H. as M.R.’s parent because of her status as a civil union partner under Vermont law, thereby granting her standing to seek visitation and custody.

    Holding

    1. No, because parentage under New York law derives from biology or adoption, as affirmed in Alison D.
    2. Yes, because comity should be extended to recognize parentage created by a civil union in Vermont, allowing Debra H. to seek visitation and custody in a best-interest hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reaffirmed its holding in Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991), which established that only biological or adoptive parents have standing to seek visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 70. The Court rejected the argument that equitable estoppel could be invoked to grant standing to a non-biological, non-adoptive individual, finding that parentage under New York law derives from biology or adoption. The Court distinguished Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D., 7 N.Y.3d 320 (2006), which addressed paternity by estoppel for child support purposes, stating it did not overrule or erode Alison D. The Court emphasized the importance of a bright-line rule to provide certainty for parents and children. The Court stated that any change in the meaning of “parent” under the law should come from legislative enactment. As the Court stated, “Alison D., in conjunction with second-parent adoption, creates a bright-line rule that promotes certainty in the wake of domestic breakups otherwise fraught with the risk of disruptive . . . battle[s] over parentage.“

    However, the Court addressed the unique circumstance of the Vermont civil union. Under Vermont law, partners in a civil union have the same rights and responsibilities as spouses in a marriage, including those related to children born during the union. Citing Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006), the Court recognized that Vermont law would consider Debra H. a parent of M.R. because the child was born during the civil union. The Court then invoked the doctrine of comity, which allows one state to defer to the laws and policies of another. The Court reasoned that recognizing Debra H. as M.R.’s parent due to the Vermont civil union would not conflict with New York’s public policy, given that New York allows second-parent adoption for same-sex couples. The Court stated, “New York will accord comity to recognize parentage created by an adoption in a foreign nation… We see no reason to withhold equivalent recognition where someone is a parent under a sister state’s law.” Accordingly, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to Supreme Court for a best-interest hearing to determine visitation and custody, with Debra H. recognized as M.R.’s parent under New York law for the purpose of standing.

  • Matter of Doe, 13 N.Y.3d 101 (2009): Enforceability of Foreign Adoption Decrees and Parental Rights in New York

    Matter of Doe, 13 N.Y.3d 101 (2009)

    Once parental rights have been validly established under New York law, between an adoptive parent and child who continue to live in New York, the choice of law governing the parental relationship is New York law, ensuring stability and certainty for families.

    Summary

    This case involves a dispute between two former lovers, LMB and ERJ, over the adoption of a Cambodian child, John Doe, whom they jointly brought to the United States. After their relationship ended, ERJ sought to adopt John Doe without notice to LMB, who had previously obtained an adoption certificate from Cambodian authorities. The New York Court of Appeals addressed the validity of the Cambodian adoption, the enforceability of a relinquishment letter signed by LMB, and the application of the Act of State Doctrine. The Court affirmed the lower courts’ decision to vacate ERJ’s adoption decree, emphasizing the importance of adhering to New York law in matters concerning parental rights of New York residents.

    Facts

    LMB and ERJ, while romantically involved, brought John Doe, a Cambodian child with a heart ailment, to New York for medical treatment with the intention of jointly adopting him. To circumvent perceived restrictions on adoptions from Cambodia, LMB, a U.S. citizen born in Trinidad and Tobago, reclaimed his Trinidadian citizenship to adopt John Doe in Trinidad, followed by ERJ adopting him in New York. LMB obtained an adoption certificate from Cambodian authorities in June 2004. The couple’s relationship ended in August 2004. ERJ, after being advised she could adopt John Doe in New York, obtained a similar certificate in October 2005. LMB signed a letter in March 2005 relinquishing his adoption permission. ERJ filed for adoption in New York in January 2006 without notifying LMB, leading to the ensuing legal battle.

    Procedural History

    ERJ was granted an adoption decree by the New York County Surrogate on April 12, 2006. Upon learning of the adoption, LMB initiated proceedings to vacate it. The Surrogate Court granted LMB’s petition, a decision affirmed by the Appellate Division. ERJ appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Cambodian adoption certificate issued to LMB in June 2004 should be given comity under New York law, thereby establishing LMB as John Doe’s legal parent.

    2. Whether LMB’s March 2005 letter relinquishing his permission to adopt John Doe effectively constituted a valid consent to ERJ’s adoption under New York law.

    3. Whether the Cambodian government’s documents issued in 2006 constituted “acts of state” that nullified LMB’s parental rights.

    4. Whether the lower courts erred in failing to consider the best interests of the child in deciding whether to vacate ERJ’s adoption.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Court determined that ERJ should not have been allowed to adopt John Doe without notice to the person who was John Doe’s father under Cambodian law.

    2. No, because the relinquishment letter did not comply with the requirements of Domestic Relations Law § 115-b.

    3. No, because the Act of State Doctrine does not apply to acts affecting individuals residing outside the acting state’s territory.

    4. No, because the best interests of a child do not automatically validate an otherwise illegal adoption.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that LMB became John Doe’s father under Cambodian law in June 2004, and the June 2004 adoption was entitled to more respect than ERJ afforded it. The court emphasized that once parental rights are validly established under New York law, the law of New York governs the parental relationship, ensuring certainty for New York residents raising adopted children. The court rejected ERJ’s argument that Cambodian law should govern the validity of the relinquishment letter, holding that New York law applied because the child and adoptive parent resided in New York. The Court found that the letter failed to comply with Domestic Relations Law § 115-b. Regarding the Act of State Doctrine, the Court held that it did not apply because the Cambodian documents were issued while LMB, ERJ, and John Doe resided in New York. The Court emphasized that New York parents should not be at risk of having adoptions nullified by foreign decrees. Finally, the Court stated that while the child’s best interests are important, they do not validate an otherwise illegal adoption. The Court stated that the parental rights of a child’s father cannot simply be ignored because a court thinks it would be in the child’s best interests to be adopted by someone else. The court noted LMB’s assurance that he would not remove the child from ERJ’s home, expressing hope the issue of his parental rights would remain academic. “Under established conflict of laws principles, the applicable law should be that of ‘the jurisdiction which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation’ (Babcock v Jackson, 12 NY2d 473, 481 [1963]).”

  • Boudreaux v. State of Louisiana, 14 N.Y.3d 321 (2010): Enforcing Judgments Against States Across State Lines

    14 N.Y.3d 321 (2010)

    The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require a state to enforce a judgment against another state if that judgment is unenforceable in the rendering state due to constitutional or statutory limitations on the payment of judgments against the state.

    Summary

    Plaintiffs, victims of a flood in Louisiana, obtained a substantial judgment against the State of Louisiana. However, Louisiana law stipulates that judgments against the state are only payable from funds appropriated by the legislature, which had not occurred. Plaintiffs sought to enforce the judgment in New York, hoping to seize Louisiana’s assets located there. The New York Court of Appeals held that neither the Full Faith and Credit Clause nor comity required New York to enforce a judgment that Louisiana itself could not enforce due to its own constitutional and statutory limitations. This case highlights the limitations on enforcing judgments against states when the rendering state has specific protections in place.

    Facts

    In 1983, a flood caused damage to homes and businesses in Louisiana. The plaintiffs, as a class, sued the State of Louisiana, Department of Transportation (DOT), alleging negligence in the construction of an Interstate 12 bridge that disrupted the river’s natural floodplain, leading to the flooding. The plaintiffs won and were awarded a significant sum in damages, plus interest. Despite docketing the judgment in numerous Louisiana parishes, the plaintiffs could not recover any funds because the Louisiana legislature had not appropriated the necessary funds to pay the judgment.

    Procedural History

    The plaintiffs initially prevailed in their suit against the State of Louisiana in Louisiana courts. After exhausting appeals, they were awarded damages. Unable to collect in Louisiana due to lack of legislative appropriation, they attempted to docket the judgment in New York County. The Supreme Court clerk initially declined the filing due to technical defects. The plaintiffs then sought leave to correct these deficiencies, but the Supreme Court denied their motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, citing comity, stating that New York courts should defer to Louisiana law, which made the judgment unenforceable until the legislature appropriated funds. The dissent argued for enforcement based on public policy. The plaintiffs then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution or the doctrine of comity requires New York courts to enforce a money judgment against the State of Louisiana when that judgment is unenforceable in Louisiana due to constitutional and statutory limitations.

    Holding

    No, because the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires that a foreign judgment be given the same credit, validity, and effect as it would have in the state that rendered it; since the judgment is unenforceable in Louisiana without legislative appropriation, New York is not required to enforce it.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel New York to treat the Louisiana judgment as a New York judgment. Instead, it requires New York to give the judgment the same effect it would have in Louisiana. The court noted that Louisiana law, specifically its constitution and statutes, mandates that judgments against the state are only payable from legislatively appropriated funds. As such, the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized that a plaintiff may have a right (a judgment) without a remedy if the legislature fails to appropriate funds. The New York court stated, “what plaintiffs seek is for the courts of New York to enforce a judgment that cannot be enforced in Louisiana.”

    The court also addressed the doctrine of comity, stating it is a voluntary decision by one state to defer to the policy of another. The court deferred to Louisiana’s constitution and public policy embodied in its statutes, noting that Louisiana courts had already recognized the validity of these limitations. The court emphasized that the underlying cause of action occurred in Louisiana, involved only Louisiana residents, and therefore New York had no compelling interest to provide a forum for redress. Quoting Nevada v. Hall, the court concluded it was wise policy to respect Louisiana’s established limits on liability.

  • Byblos Bank Europe, S.A. v. Sekerbank Turk Anonym Syrketi, 10 N.Y.3d 243 (2008): Discretion to Deny Recognition of Conflicting Foreign Judgments

    Byblos Bank Europe, S.A. v. Sekerbank Turk Anonym Syrketi, 10 N.Y.3d 243 (2008)

    New York courts have the discretion under CPLR 5304(b)(5) to deny recognition to a foreign judgment that conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment, even if the conflicting judgment is the later in time, particularly when the later court departed from normal res judicata principles.

    Summary

    Byblos Bank, a Belgian bank, sought to enforce a Belgian judgment in New York against Sekerbank, a Turkish bank. The Belgian judgment was obtained after the Belgian court refused to recognize a prior Turkish judgment dismissing Byblos’s claims on the merits. Sekerbank argued that the New York court should deny recognition to the Belgian judgment because it conflicted with the earlier Turkish judgment. The New York Court of Appeals held that New York courts have discretion under CPLR 5304(b)(5) to deny recognition to a foreign judgment that conflicts with another final judgment, and that the “last-in-time” rule does not require automatic recognition of the later judgment, especially when the later court disregarded principles of res judicata.

    Facts

    Byblos Bank issued two loans to Sekerbank based on a fraudulent loan guaranty by a Sekerbank employee who embezzled the funds.

    Byblos initiated legal proceedings in Belgium, Turkey, and Germany after Sekerbank ceased payments.

    The Turkish court ruled against Byblos, a decision upheld on appeal.

    A German court recognized the Turkish judgment.

    Initially, a Belgian court dismissed Byblos’s claim based on res judicata. However, on appeal, the Belgian appellate court reversed, declining to recognize the Turkish judgment due to a now-repealed Belgian law requiring merits review of foreign judgments, and ultimately ruled in favor of Byblos.

    Byblos then sought to enforce the Belgian judgment in New York, believing Sekerbank had assets there.

    Procedural History

    Byblos obtained an ex parte order of attachment in New York Supreme Court.

    Byblos moved to confirm the attachment and for summary judgment in lieu of complaint.

    Sekerbank cross-moved to vacate the attachment, arguing that the Belgian judgment conflicted with the prior Turkish judgment and should not be recognized under CPLR 5304(b)(5).

    Supreme Court denied Byblos’s motion and granted Sekerbank’s cross-motion, declining to apply the last-in-time rule and refusing to recognize the Belgian judgment.

    The Appellate Division modified, dismissing the complaint but otherwise affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted Byblos leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a New York court is required to apply the “last-in-time” rule when faced with conflicting foreign country judgments, compelling recognition of the most recent judgment.

    2. Whether the Supreme Court properly exercised its discretion under CPLR 5304(b)(5) in declining to recognize the Belgian judgment because it conflicted with an earlier Turkish judgment.

    Holding

    1. No, because rigid application of the last-in-time rule would conflict with the discretionary language of CPLR 5304(b)(5) that vests New York courts with the authority to decide whether a foreign judgment that conflicts with another judgment is entitled to recognition.

    2. Yes, because the Belgian court departed from normal res judicata principles when it declined to give effect to the Turkish judgment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, emphasizing the discretion afforded to New York courts under CPLR 5304(b)(5) when dealing with conflicting foreign judgments. The court stated that “New York has traditionally been a generous forum in which to enforce judgments for money damages rendered by foreign courts” but this is subject to statutory and common law limitations. The court noted that CPLR article 53, the Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgments Recognition Act, codified existing case law and promotes efficient enforcement of New York judgments abroad. However, CPLR 5304(b)(5) allows a court to refuse recognition if the judgment conflicts with another final judgment.

    The court rejected the argument that the “last-in-time” rule, applicable to conflicting sister-state judgments under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, should be mechanically applied to conflicting foreign judgments. The court reasoned that such rigid application would undermine the discretionary power granted by CPLR 5304(b)(5).

    The court emphasized that the Belgian court’s decision to disregard the Turkish judgment, which had been previously recognized by a German court, was a departure from generally accepted principles of res judicata and comity. The Court wrote, “Specifically, the last-in-time rule should not be applied where, as here, the last-in-time court departed from normal res judicata principles by permitting a party to relitigate the merits of an earlier judgment.”

    Therefore, the Supreme Court appropriately exercised its discretion in declining to recognize the Belgian judgment, which conflicted with the previously rendered Turkish judgment. This decision underscores the importance of comity and the principle that courts should generally respect final judgments from other jurisdictions, unless there are compelling reasons to do otherwise.

  • Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. v. Montana Board of Investments, 7 N.Y.3d 65 (2006): Exercising Long-Arm Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Institutional Traders

    7 N.Y.3d 65 (2006)

    A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary who transacts business within the state, even through electronic means, if the defendant’s activities are purposeful and there is a substantial relationship between the transaction and the claim asserted.

    Summary

    Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc. (DBSI) sued the Montana Board of Investments (MBOI) for breach of contract after MBOI refused to honor a bond transaction. The transaction was negotiated electronically between DBSI in New York and MBOI in Montana. The New York Court of Appeals held that New York courts had personal jurisdiction over MBOI because MBOI purposefully transacted business in New York, and comity did not require deference to Montana’s laws limiting venue in contract disputes. The Court also upheld summary judgment for DBSI, finding no evidence to support MBOI’s claim of insider trading.

    Facts

    DBSI, a New York-based securities firm, and MBOI, a Montana state agency, engaged in a bond transaction on March 25, 2002. Negotiations occurred via Bloomberg Messaging System between DBSI’s employee in New York and MBOI’s employee in Montana. After initial reluctance, MBOI agreed to sell $15 million in Pennzoil-Quaker State Company bonds to DBSI at a quoted price. Later that day, Shell Oil announced it would acquire Pennzoil-Quaker State Company. MBOI then refused to honor the deal, claiming DBSI had inside information. DBSI bought the bonds elsewhere for $1.6 million more.

    Procedural History

    DBSI sued MBOI in New York Supreme Court for breach of contract. MBOI moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, and comity. The Supreme Court granted MBOI’s motion. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing MBOI’s defenses and granting DBSI summary judgment on liability. MBOI appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether New York courts have personal jurisdiction over MBOI, a Montana state agency, based on a single bond transaction negotiated electronically between the parties.

    2. Whether principles of comity require New York courts to defer to Montana law, which limits venue for contract claims against the state to Montana courts.

    3. Whether summary judgment was proper where MBOI claimed DBSI had inside information justifying its breach of contract.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because MBOI purposefully transacted business in New York by initiating and pursuing negotiations with DBSI, availing itself of the benefits of conducting business there.

    2. No, because New York has a strong policy of providing a forum for redress of injuries arising out of transactions within the state, and the Montana statute limits venue rather than liability.

    3. Yes, because MBOI offered no evidence to support its claim of insider trading beyond the timing of the transaction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that New York’s long-arm statute, CPLR 302(a)(1), allows jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who transact business in the state. The Court cited Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., stating that proof of one transaction is sufficient if the defendant’s activities were purposeful and related to the claim. The Court emphasized that MBOI was a sophisticated institutional trader who knowingly entered New York to negotiate a substantial transaction. The Court stated: “[S]o long as a party avails itself of the benefits of the forum, has sufficient minimum contacts with it, and should reasonably expect to defend its actions there, due process is not offended if that party is subjected to jurisdiction even if not ‘present’ in that State.” Because MBOI had also engaged in other bond transactions with DBSI’s New York employee in the past, it had sufficient contacts with New York. Regarding comity, the Court followed Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Houston, holding that New York’s interest in providing a forum for commercial transactions outweighed Montana’s interest in limiting venue. The Montana statute was viewed as an administrative convenience rather than a limitation on liability. The Court stated New York has “a very strong policy of assuring ready access to a forum for redress of injuries arising out of transactions spawned here.” As to summary judgment, the court found MBOI’s claim of insider trading was based solely on the timing of the transaction, which was insufficient to create a triable issue of fact. The Court noted that “[t]he timing of the trade as ‘evidence’ of impropriety does not of itself create a triable issue of fact regarding illegal conduct by DBSI.”

  • Sung Hwan Co. v. Rite Aid Corp., 7 N.Y.3d 78 (2006): Enforcing Foreign Judgments Based on Tortious Acts Causing Economic Injury

    7 N.Y.3d 78 (2006)

    New York courts will generally enforce foreign judgments under the principles of comity, even if the foreign court’s substantive law differs from New York’s, provided the foreign court had jurisdiction and the judgment doesn’t violate New York’s public policy.

    Summary

    Sung Hwan Co., a Korean company, sought to enforce a Korean court judgment against Rite Aid Corporation in New York. The Korean judgment was based on a tort claim alleging that Rite Aid’s defective ice cream caused economic injury to Sung Hwan in Korea. Rite Aid argued that the Korean court lacked jurisdiction because the claim was essentially a breach of contract, and New York law doesn’t allow economic damages for negligence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts, holding that the Korean court’s exercise of jurisdiction was proper under New York’s long-arm statute (CPLR 302) and that the difference in substantive tort law between Korea and New York was not a sufficient basis to deny comity.

    Facts

    Sangshin Trading Co., a Korean company, contracted with Thrifty Payless, Inc. (later acquired by Rite Aid) to purchase ice cream for resale in Korea.

    Sung Hwan Co. contracted with Sangshin to buy Thrifty ice cream for its stores in Korea.

    Sales of Thrifty ice cream grew rapidly, but declined sharply after the Korean government found listeria in the ice cream.

    Sung Hwan sought compensation from Thrifty (later Rite Aid) for losses but received no offer of settlement.

    Sung Hwan sued Rite Aid in Korea, alleging a tort claim based on Rite Aid’s negligence in failing to properly test the ice cream.

    Rite Aid failed to respond to the Korean lawsuit, and a default judgment was entered against them.

    Procedural History

    Sung Hwan sought to enforce the Korean judgment in New York.

    The Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, finding no basis for personal jurisdiction over Rite Aid.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal.

    The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Korean court’s exercise of jurisdiction over Rite Aid was consistent with New York’s concept of personal jurisdiction, specifically under CPLR 302(a)(3), which allows jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who commit tortious acts outside the state causing injury within the state.

    2. Whether the difference in substantive tort law between Korea and New York, specifically regarding the recovery of economic damages for negligence, is a sufficient basis to deny comity to the Korean judgment.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because for purposes of establishing long-arm jurisdiction, a tort should be broadly defined to encompass one that causes economic injury.

    2. No, because differing remedies do not violate the principles of comity between the two jurisdictions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that New York has a history of generously enforcing foreign judgments under the doctrine of comity. CPLR Article 53 codifies this principle, allowing enforcement of foreign judgments unless the foreign court lacked jurisdiction or the judgment violates New York’s public policy.

    The court focused on whether the Korean court’s exercise of jurisdiction was consistent with CPLR 302(a)(3), New York’s long-arm statute, which allows jurisdiction over non-domiciliaries who commit tortious acts outside the state causing injury within the state. The court determined that the key question was whether Rite Aid committed a “tortious act” outside of Korea causing injury within Korea.

    Rite Aid argued that Sung Hwan’s claim was essentially a breach of contract claim disguised as a tort, and that New York law doesn’t allow recovery for economic loss based on negligence. The Court rejected this argument, stating that the focus should be on whether a tortious act occurred, not on the remedy sought. The court cited Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel, stating that CPLR 302 does not limit the kinds of tortious acts covered to personal injury and property damage.

    The Court emphasized that interfering with another jurisdiction’s legislative and judicial actions undermined the principles of comity. The Court concluded that although Korean law may be more expansive than New York law in imposing liability for economic loss under a tort theory, this difference alone is not enough to deny comity to the Korean judgment, citing Loucks v Standard Oil Co. of N.Y.

    “If a foreign statute gives the right, the mere fact that we do not give a like right is no reason for refusing to help the plaintiff in getting what belongs to him. We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home.”

  • Crair v. University of Maryland, 97 N.Y.2d 524 (2002): Comity and Application of Foreign Notice of Claim Statutes

    97 N.Y.2d 524 (2002)

    New York courts will generally apply the laws of other states under the principle of comity unless those laws conflict with New York’s public policy.

    Summary

    Lisa Crair sued the University of Maryland and the University of Virginia on behalf of her deceased sister, Stacey Crair, alleging that Stacey contracted Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease from contaminated Human Growth Hormone (HGH) provided by the universities. The universities moved to dismiss based on Lisa’s failure to comply with Maryland and Virginia’s notice-of-claim statutes, which require claimants to file a notice of claim before filing suit against the state. The New York Court of Appeals held that comity required the application of the Maryland and Virginia statutes, as those statutes did not violate New York public policy, and dismissed the case against the universities.

    Facts

    Stacey Crair received HGH injections from 1966 to 1978 to treat short stature. The HGH was provided by a program at Johns Hopkins University, later operated by the University of Maryland, and then by her treating physician after he moved to the University of Virginia. Some of the HGH was contaminated with a virus that causes Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, which Stacey was diagnosed with in 1993. She died from the disease in 1997. Lisa Crair, Stacey’s sister, sued the universities, alleging negligence and strict products liability.

    Procedural History

    Lisa Crair initially filed suit in 1995, but it was dismissed against the University of Virginia for improper service of process. After being appointed Stacey’s guardian ad litem, Lisa filed a second action in 1996, joining the University of Maryland. The university defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Lisa failed to file notices of claim as required by Virginia and Maryland law. Supreme Court granted the motions, dismissing the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether New York should apply the notice of claim provisions of Virginia and Maryland law to actions against the Universities of Virginia and Maryland, instrumentalities of those states, under principles of comity.

    Holding

    Yes, because applying the notice of claim provisions of Virginia and Maryland law does not conflict with New York’s public policy, and therefore comity requires their application in this case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not require New York to apply the laws of another state if those laws are “obnoxious” to New York’s public policy. The Court cited Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Houston, where it held that New York would apply the laws of other states where application does not conflict with New York’s public policy.

    The Court distinguished this case from Ehrlich-Bober and Morrison v. Budget Rent A Car Sys., which involved restrictive venue provisions. In those cases, the Court declined to apply the other states’ laws because they conflicted with New York’s interest in providing a forum for redress of injuries arising out of transactions within the state. Here, the issue was failure to file a notice of claim, a requirement that does not offend New York public policy. The Court emphasized that New York statutes are “replete with such provisions to restrict suits against public authorities and various kinds of municipal entities.” The Court noted that even if the defendant had actual knowledge of the claim, New York still requires strict compliance with notice of claim provisions, citing Thomann v. City of Rochester.

    The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that she substantially complied with the Virginia statute by commencing the previous suit and corresponding with the Virginia Attorney General’s office. The Court cited Halberstam v. Commonwealth of Virginia, which held that “actual notice does not obviate [the] duty to strictly comply with the [Virginia Tort Claims] Act’s notice provisions.” Because the Virginia Tort Claims Act is a statute in derogation of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, it must be strictly construed.

  • Ratsutsky v. Gotlib, 643 N.E.2d 696 (N.Y. 1994): Enforceability of Foreign Divorces Under Comity Principles

    Ratsutsky v. Gotlib, 643 N.E.2d 696 (N.Y. 1994)

    New York courts will recognize foreign divorce decrees under the principle of comity unless the decree was obtained through fraud, coercion, or oppression, or if the underlying policies are fundamentally offensive to New York law.

    Summary

    Lia Ratsutsky sought a divorce in New York from Ilya Gotlib, despite a prior divorce decree obtained in the Ukraine (then part of the USSR) in 1976. Ratsutsky claimed the Soviet divorce was a sham, intended to facilitate emigration. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Soviet divorce was valid and enforceable under comity principles. The Court found insufficient evidence to prove that the Soviet divorce was the product of fraud, coercion, or oppression, or that it violated New York public policy. The Court emphasized the importance of respecting foreign adjudications and the need for particularized evidence to overcome the presumption of validity.

    Facts

    The parties married in the USSR in 1976 and divorced within a year, with Ratsutsky initiating the divorce and appearing in court with Gotlib. Both parties later emigrated to the United States separately. They lived together in Brooklyn for a period in the 1980s and had a daughter in 1980, filing joint tax returns. Subsequently, they separated, leading to Ratsutsky filing a divorce action in New York, contesting the validity of the Soviet divorce. Ratsutsky argued the Soviet divorce was obtained to ease emigration as Jewish-Soviet citizens, claiming married Jews faced emigration barriers.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially found questions of fact regarding coercive circumstances surrounding the Soviet divorce. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to Gotlib, dismissing Ratsutsky’s divorce action, finding the Soviet divorce valid. The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the 1976 Soviet divorce decree between Ratsutsky and Gotlib should be recognized and enforced in New York under the principles of comity, despite Ratsutsky’s claim that it was a sham obtained to facilitate emigration from the USSR.

    Holding

    Yes, because Ratsutsky failed to provide sufficient evidence that the Soviet divorce was the product of fraud, coercion, or oppression, or that it violated New York public policy. The Court requires particularization in claims emanating out of public policy assertions.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that New York courts generally recognize foreign judgments under the doctrine of comity, a principle rooted in respect for foreign adjudications and pragmatic necessity in a world of diverse legal systems. To disregard a facially valid foreign divorce decree, a party must demonstrate that it was the product of individualized fraud, coercion, or oppression, or that it rested on public policies fundamentally offensive to those of New York. The Court found Ratsutsky’s claims of coercion insufficient, as she failed to provide specific evidence that the Soviet policy against married Jews emigrating directly affected her and Gotlib’s divorce. The Court noted that even if such a policy existed, there was no demonstrated cause-and-effect correlation between the policy and the divorce decree. The Court also pointed out that Ratsutsky swore in her U.S. naturalization papers that she was divorced, further undermining her claim that the Soviet divorce was invalid. The Court stated, “This Court requires particularization in claims emanating out of public policy assertions, a term ‘frequently used in a very vague, loose or inaccurate sense’.” It further reasoned, “New York cannot breezily disregard documented facts and facially regular records based on generalized and significantly belated claims… Such a course of action would seriously undermine the ‘rare’ public policy exception to the appropriate application of the doctrine of comity.”

  • Stoffel v. Stoffel, 78 N.Y.2d 599 (1991): Enforceability of Separation Agreements Incorporated into Foreign Divorce Judgments

    Stoffel v. Stoffel, 78 N.Y.2d 599 (1991)

    New York courts will generally accord comity to foreign judgments of divorce, including separation agreements incorporated therein, unless the allegations of fraud and duress rise to the level of gross inequity that would violate a strong public policy of the state.

    Summary

    Plaintiff sought to invalidate a separation agreement incorporated, but not merged, into a Dominican Republic divorce judgment, alleging fraud and duress by her former husband concerning the valuation of his business interests. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of her complaint, reaffirming the principle of comity towards foreign judgments. The Court found that the plaintiff’s allegations, even if true, did not demonstrate a level of gross inequity sufficient to violate New York’s public policy, especially considering she was represented by independent counsel and the agreement was not facially irregular or unconscionable.

    Facts

    Plaintiff and her former husband entered into a separation agreement that was subsequently incorporated into a Dominican Republic divorce judgment. The plaintiff later sought to invalidate the separation agreement, alleging that her former husband: understated the value of his partnership interest in an investment firm; failed to disclose an impending firm restructuring that would increase his interest’s value; and threatened a custody fight if she did not agree to his financial terms. Plaintiff did not challenge the jurisdiction of the Dominican Republic court or the validity of the divorce itself. She claimed fraud and duress in the formation of the separation agreement.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint, holding that the Dominican Republic divorce judgment precluded further litigation regarding the validity of the incorporated separation agreement, citing Greschler v. Greschler. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether allegations of fraud and duress in the negotiation of a separation agreement, which has been incorporated but not merged into a foreign divorce judgment, are sufficient to invalidate the agreement in New York, based on public policy grounds.

    Holding

    No, because the allegations did not rise to the level of gross inequity that might implicate New York’s public policy, especially where the plaintiff had independent counsel and the agreement was not facially irregular or unconscionable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized New York’s general policy of according comity to foreign judgments. It reasoned that even if the plaintiff’s allegations of fraud and duress were sufficient to state a claim for rescission, they did not demonstrate a level of gross inequity that would violate New York’s strong public policy. The Court considered the fact that the plaintiff was represented by independent counsel when she signed the separation agreement. It also noted that the agreement, while favorable to the husband, was not facially irregular or unconscionable. The Court cited Levine v. Levine and Christian v. Christian to define “unconscionable” in this context. The Court stated that there was no basis to conclude that recognizing the Dominican Republic divorce judgment, or the incorporated separation agreement, would “do violence to some strong public policy of this State.” The court implied that only the most egregious cases of overreach would justify setting aside a foreign judgment: the allegations must be beyond mere unfairness and strike at the core values of equity and fairness.

  • Ehrlich-Bober & Co. v. University of Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574 (1980): Comity and Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Governmental Entities in Commercial Transactions

    49 N.Y.2d 574 (1980)

    When a commercial transaction is centered in New York, New York courts are not precluded by comity from exercising jurisdiction over an out-of-state governmental entity, despite the entity’s state law limiting suits to specific venues, especially when New York has a strong interest in providing a forum for such transactions.

    Summary

    Ehrlich-Bober & Co., a New York securities dealer, sued the University of Houston, a Texas state agency, in New York for breach of contract related to reverse repurchase agreements. The University argued it was immune from suit in New York due to a Texas law restricting suits against it to specific Texas counties. The New York Court of Appeals held that New York courts could exercise jurisdiction. It reasoned that the transactions were centered in New York, and New York has a strong interest in providing a forum for commercial transactions within the state. Comity did not require deference to the Texas venue restriction.

    Facts

    Ehrlich-Bober, a New York-based securities dealer, engaged in multiple reverse repurchase agreements with the University of Houston. These transactions, totaling approximately $44 million, involved the sale and repurchase of securities. Many transactions were initiated by phone calls to Ehrlich-Bober’s New York office. On several occasions, a University employee visited Ehrlich-Bober’s office in New York. Two specific agreements were at issue, involving Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) securities. Ehrlich-Bober delivered the purchase price to Manufacturer’s Hanover in New York, and the securities were delivered to Ehrlich-Bober. The University refused to repurchase the securities as agreed, causing Ehrlich-Bober a loss.

    Procedural History

    Ehrlich-Bober sued the University of Houston in New York. The University moved to dismiss, arguing sovereign immunity, lack of long-arm jurisdiction, and forum non conveniens. Special Term granted the motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal based on sovereign immunity, but found long-arm jurisdiction existed and forum non conveniens did not apply. Ehrlich-Bober appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether New York courts should, as a matter of comity, recognize and enforce a Texas statute that limits suits against the University of Houston to specific counties in Texas.

    Holding

    1. No, because New York’s interest in providing a forum for commercial transactions centered in New York outweighs Texas’s interest in limiting the venue for suits against its agencies, especially when the transaction has only an indirect relation to the governmental function of the University.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals recognized that while New York could choose to defer to the Texas law as a matter of comity, it was not compelled to do so. The court emphasized that comity is a matter of practice, convenience, and expediency, not a binding rule of law. The court stated, “Whatever the New York rule may once have been…it is abundantly clear that the rule has undergone a substantial evolution over six decades…Today in New York the determination of whether effect is to be given foreign legislation is made by comparing it to our own public policy; and our policy prevails in case of conflict”.

    The court identified New York’s strong public policy in maintaining its status as a major commercial and financial center, which includes providing ready access to its courts for redress of injuries arising from transactions within the state. The court distinguished this case from situations where the foreign law goes to the heart of a governmental function. The Texas statute, as interpreted by Texas courts, was deemed a restrictive venue provision for administrative convenience, not a limitation on liability essential to the governmental function.

    The court emphasized that the transactions were centered in New York: initiated by a call to New York, accepted in New York, with money paid and securities delivered in New York, and repurchases to occur in New York. The court reasoned that requiring New York financial institutions to review the laws of every jurisdiction before doing business with its agencies would be an intolerable burden.

    The dissenting opinion argued that the court was confusing the requirements for obtaining long-arm jurisdiction with considerations of comity. It contended that New York should respect Texas’s decision to limit suits against its state entities, similar to New York’s own restrictions on suits against the State University of New York. The dissent warned that the majority’s decision could allow suits against New York state entities in other states, despite New York’s intent to limit such suits to the New York Court of Claims.