Collins v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 N.Y.2d 692 (1978)

In cases of occupational silicosis, the 90-day period for filing a workers’ compensation claim under Section 44-a of the Workmen’s Compensation Law begins when the employee knows they are totally disabled due to silicosis and that the disease is related to their employment.

Summary

The New York Court of Appeals affirmed an order of the Appellate Division that upheld the Workmen’s Compensation Board’s decision regarding the timeliness of a silicosis claim. The court found that the claim was filed within 90 days of the employee’s knowledge that he was totally disabled due to silicosis and that the condition was caused by his employment. The court reasoned that the 90-day limitation period under Section 44-a of the Workmen’s Compensation Law commences when an employee knows they are totally disabled as a result of silicosis, or that the silicosis contributed to another condition resulting in total disability, and that the silicosis is work-related. The court emphasized the presumption that required notice was given, absent substantial evidence to the contrary.

Facts

Employee Collins worked at an aluminum factory from 1950 to August 28, 1957, and was exposed to silica dust. He underwent surgery in 1954 and was diagnosed with tuberculoma with antraco-silicosis but was told he had nothing to worry about. The employer’s medical director did not believe Collins had silicosis based on X-rays taken from 1954 to 1957. In 1958, Collins learned he had silicosis. He later developed other conditions. Collins filed his compensation claim on July 7, 1969, after a hospital entry suggested he apply for compensation. He died on May 16, 1973.

Procedural History

The Workmen’s Compensation Board found the claim was timely filed, that silicosis contributed to Collins’ death, and that the claim was the liability of the Special Disability Fund. The Appellate Division affirmed. One justice dissented regarding the disability compensation award. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the employee’s claim for compensation was timely filed within ninety days after he first had knowledge that the disease was totally disabling and was due to the nature of the employment, in accordance with Section 44-a of the Workmen’s Compensation Law.
2. Whether the Board properly determined, based on medical evidence, that the claimant’s occupational silicosis contributed to and caused the decedent’s death.
3. Whether the claim is the liability of the Special Disability Fund under section 15(8)(ee) of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, rather than the Fund for Reopened Cases under section 25-a of the law.

Holding

1. Yes, because the Workmen’s Compensation Board had a right to find, based on a lack of substantial evidence to the contrary, that Collins’ notice was filed within 90 days after he acquired knowledge that his silicosis was totally disabling and was due to the nature of his employment.
2. Yes, because the testimony and report of an expert consultant on dust diseases furnished substantial evidence in support of the board’s determination as to the cause of death.
3. Yes, because the employee’s claim was filed in compliance with section 44-a and thus was not “stale”, and it being conceded that there was no advance payment of compensation, there is no predicate to shift liability to the Fund for Reopened Cases under section 25-a.

Court’s Reasoning

The court applied Section 44-a of the Workmen’s Compensation Law, which provides an exception to the two-year filing deadline for silicosis claims, requiring the claim to be filed within 90 days after disablement and knowledge that the disease is due to the nature of the employment. The court emphasized that the 90-day limitation begins when the employee knows they are totally disabled due to silicosis or that silicosis contributed to another condition resulting in total disability and that the silicosis is work-related.

The court noted the presumption under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, § 21(2), that the required notice was given unless substantial evidence shows otherwise. The court found that the Workmen’s Compensation Board had the right to determine that Collins’ notice was timely because there wasn’t substantial evidence to the contrary. It distinguished the employer’s evidence, an entry in a hospital record, because the entry did not reveal the source of information or that knowledge was imparted to Collins.

Regarding the cause of death, the court cited Matter of Ernest v. Boggs Lake Estates, 12 N.Y.2d 414, 416, noting that the testimony and report of an expert consultant on dust diseases constituted substantial evidence supporting the Board’s determination.

Finally, because the claim was filed in compliance with Section 44-a and there was no advance payment of compensation, the court concluded that liability could not be shifted to the Fund for Reopened Cases under Section 25-a, citing Matter of Riley v. Aircraft Prods. Mfg. Corp., 40 N.Y.2d 366, 369-370 and Matter of Casey v. Hinkle Iron Works, 299 N.Y. 382.