New York Law Review

Tag: collective bargaining agreement

  • Matter of Lantry v. State of New York, 6 N.Y.3d 49 (2005): Prevailing Wage Rate Classification & Local Contractor Practices

    Matter of Lantry v. State of New York, 6 N.Y.3d 49 (2005)

    The Department of Labor is not required to conduct surveys of local contractor practices to determine the appropriate trade classification for prevailing wage rate purposes and may rely on factors such as collective bargaining agreements, jurisdictional agreements, and the nature of the work itself.

    Summary

    Lantry, a contractor, challenged the Department of Labor’s (DOL) methodology for classifying work to determine prevailing wage rates, arguing the DOL should consider survey evidence of local contractor practices. The DOL determined Lantry underpaid employees by classifying window installation work as glazier work instead of the higher-paid ironworker classification. The Court of Appeals held that the DOL need not conduct local contractor surveys and that the Commissioner’s determination was not arbitrary or capricious, emphasizing the DOL’s discretion in considering collective bargaining agreements and the nature of the work.

    Facts

    Lantry, a subcontractor, installed preglazed windows for a school district, paying his non-union employees the glazier’s wage rate. The Department of Labor (DOL) audited the project and determined the employees should have been paid the higher ironworker rate, resulting in an underpayment assessment. Lantry requested a hearing, anticipating the DOL would use a “prevailing practice in the locality” approach, relying on surveys of local contractors. Lantry presented evidence that local contractors predominantly paid glaziers’ rates for preglazed window installation.

    Procedural History

    The administrative hearing officer accepted the DOL’s ironwork classification. The Commissioner adopted the hearing officer’s findings. Lantry then commenced an Article 78 proceeding to vacate the Commissioner’s order. The Appellate Division confirmed the determination. The Court of Appeals granted Lantry leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Commissioner of Labor is required to consider survey evidence of local contractor practices when classifying work for the purpose of determining the appropriate prevailing wage rate under Labor Law § 220.

    Holding

    No, because nothing in Labor Law § 220 mandates that the Commissioner consider actual contractor practices in a locality when classifying work, and the Commissioner’s methodology is upheld as long as it is not unreasonable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that Labor Law § 220 does not mandate the Commissioner to consider actual contractor practices when classifying work. The Court emphasized that trade classifications are within the Department’s expertise and should not be disturbed unless clearly inconsistent with the work performed. The Commissioner generally analyzes the specific nature of the work, collective bargaining agreements, jurisdictional agreements, and past Bureau recognition. The Court acknowledged that collective bargaining agreements could be relied upon. In instances where multiple unions claim jurisdiction, the Department expands its review to encompass factors such as jurisdictional agreements and the nature of the work. The court found the Department’s mission is to ensure workers are paid the correct wage initially, necessitating trade classification before project commencement. The court quoted Matter of Kelly v Beame, 15 NY2d 103, 109 (1965), stating that “[t]he pivotal question” is the nature of the work performed in reviewing the Department’s trade classifications.

    The Court distinguished the case from Matter of Cortland Glass Co., where a contrary determination was reached, noting that the Commissioner explicitly overruled Cortland Glass to the extent it held that actual practice evidence is relevant to classifying work. The Court of Appeals deferred to the Commissioner’s expertise, finding the classification of the task as ironwork neither arbitrary nor capricious.

  • In Re City of Johnstown, 99 N.Y.2d 273 (2002): Arbitrability of Disputes Under Collective Bargaining Agreements

    99 N.Y.2d 273 (2002)

    A dispute is arbitrable if there is no statutory, constitutional, or public policy prohibition against arbitrating the grievance, and the parties agreed to arbitrate the specific issue in their collective bargaining agreement.

    Summary

    The Cities of Johnstown and Schenectady appealed a decision to compel arbitration of grievances filed by their respective Police Benevolent Associations (PBAs). The PBAs sought arbitration regarding the calculation of retirement benefits for Tier II employees under Retirement and Social Security Law § 302(9)(d). The New York Court of Appeals held that the grievances were arbitrable because no law or public policy prohibited arbitration, and the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) contained broad arbitration clauses encompassing the dispute. The court emphasized the distinction between the merits of the grievance and the threshold question of arbitrability, stating that the arbitrator, not the court, weighs the merits.

    Facts

    The Cities of Johnstown and Schenectady entered into CBAs with their respective PBAs. The CBAs stipulated that retirement benefits would be calculated using the definition of “Final Average Salary” in Retirement and Social Security Law § 302(9)(d). At the time the CBAs were signed, this section applied only to Tier I employees. Subsequently, the statute was amended to extend the 12-month calculation formula to non-Tier I employees (Tier II). The PBAs then argued that all members, including Tier II employees, were eligible for these benefits under the existing CBAs. The cities disagreed, leading to the PBAs demanding arbitration based on the broad arbitration clauses in the CBAs.

    Procedural History

    The Cities filed petitions in Supreme Court to stay the arbitrations. The Supreme Court granted the stays, reasoning that the parties did not intend to provide retirement benefits to Tier II employees. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the petitions and finding a “reasonable relationship” between the CBAs and the grievances. The Cities then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a grievance concerning the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement’s retirement benefits provision to include Tier II employees is arbitrable, despite the fact that at the time the agreement was signed, it would have been illegal to provide those benefits to Tier II employees?

    Holding

    Yes, because there is no statutory, constitutional, or public policy bar preventing the parties from agreeing that an arbitrator will decide whether they intended in these clauses to extend benefits to Tier II employees if and when it became lawful for municipalities to do so.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the two-part test from Matter of Acting Supt. of Schools of Liverpool Cent. School Dist. (United Liverpool Faculty Assn.) to determine arbitrability. The first question is whether any law or public policy prohibits arbitration of the grievance. The Court found that Retirement and Social Security Law § 443(f-1), which prohibits compulsory interest arbitration for these benefits, does not apply to grievance arbitration, which involves interpreting an existing CBA, not negotiating a new one. The second question is whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute. The Court found a “reasonable relationship” between the subject matter of the dispute (retirement benefits) and the general subject matter of the CBA (terms and conditions of employment). The court emphasized that CPLR 7501 directs that when deciding whether a dispute is arbitrable, “the court shall not consider whether the claim with respect to which arbitration is sought is tenable, or otherwise pass upon the merits of the dispute.”

    The dissenting judge argued that Civil Service Law § 201(4) expressly excludes retirement benefits from the definition of terms and conditions of employment subject to collective bargaining, meaning the dispute was not arbitrable. The dissent also noted the legislature specifically precluded interest arbitration for these benefits. The dissent asserted the majority’s focus ignored the right of a municipality to determine if it is able to bear the cost of extending the benefit, because there is no legal authority for an arbitrator to extend such retirement benefits in the absence of municipal authorization.

  • City of New York v. Uniformed Fire Officers Association, 95 N.Y.2d 278 (2000): Arbitrability of Employee Rights in Criminal Investigations

    City of New York v. Uniformed Fire Officers Association, 95 N.Y.2d 278 (2000)

    Public policy bars arbitration of disputes concerning the procedures used by the New York City Department of Investigation (DOI) in conducting criminal investigations, as allowing arbitration would impermissibly delegate the City’s broad authority to investigate its internal affairs.

    Summary

    The City of New York sought to prevent arbitration of a dispute with the Uniformed Fire Officers Association (UFOA) regarding whether the employee rights provisions of their collective bargaining agreement (CBA) applied to criminal investigations conducted by the DOI. The DOI had excluded a union representative from interviews with firefighters during a criminal investigation. The Court of Appeals held that public policy, as reflected in the New York City Charter and decisional law, prohibits arbitration that would interfere with the DOI’s authority to conduct criminal investigations, affirming the lower courts’ decisions to enjoin arbitration.

    Facts

    In February 1996, the DOI subpoenaed several firefighters, including members of the UFOA, as part of criminal investigations. One investigation involved a firefighter fraudulently claiming a disabling injury to obtain higher pension benefits. During DOI interviews, a fire officer’s union representative was excluded, and the union counsel questioned the adequacy of the notice given to the firefighters under Article XVII of the CBA, which contains provisions for employee rights during interrogations, interviews, trials, and hearings.

    Procedural History

    The UFOA filed a request for arbitration, claiming the City violated Article XVII of the CBA. The City challenged the arbitrability of the request before the New York City Board of Collective Bargaining (BCB), which determined the dispute was arbitrable. The City then commenced a special proceeding in Supreme Court to annul the BCB’s determination and enjoin arbitration. The Supreme Court set aside the BCB’s determination and enjoined arbitration. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether public policy bars arbitration of a dispute over whether the employee rights provisions of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) can be invoked to limit or restrict the procedures of criminal investigations commenced by the New York City Department of Investigation (DOI).

    Holding

    No, because allowing an arbitrator to restrict the DOI’s investigatory procedures by invoking the employee rights provisions of a CBA would be an impermissible delegation of the City’s broad authority to investigate its internal affairs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals determined that a two-pronged inquiry is required to assess arbitrability: (1) whether arbitration claims are authorized for the subject matter of the dispute, and (2) whether the parties consented to refer disputes in this specific area to arbitration. Applying the first prong, the Court found that public policy prohibits arbitration of the DOI’s criminal investigation procedures. The Court emphasized the importance of the DOI’s role in investigating corruption and criminal activity within the City, as outlined in the New York City Charter and relevant case law. According to the court, allowing an arbitrator to dictate investigation procedures would hinder the DOI’s role and contravene the City Charter’s prohibition against interference with investigations. The Court further reasoned that judicial intervention to stay arbitration is warranted when granting any relief would violate public policy. The procedural protections afforded to a City employee under the CBA cannot be separated from their impact on a DOI criminal investigation. The Court also stated that the BCB’s determination that the dispute is arbitrable is not entitled to due deference, as arbitration is prohibited by public policy here. Chief Judge Kaye dissented, arguing that the stay of arbitration was premature because the arbitrator could fashion a remedy consistent with public policy and because factual questions remained about the nature of the DOI investigation.

  • In re Arbitration Between Monroe and Schenectady County Sheriff’s Department, 96 N.Y.2d 477 (2001): Enforceability of Contractual Arbitration Clauses

    In re Arbitration Between Monroe and Schenectady County Sheriff’s Department, 96 N.Y.2d 477 (2001)

    A party cannot compel arbitration if they have failed to satisfy conditions precedent to arbitration as set forth in the collective bargaining agreement.

    Summary

    Schenectady County ordered Correction Officer Monroe, who was receiving disability benefits under General Municipal Law § 207-c, to report for light duty. Monroe filed for arbitration, arguing he was unfit for light duty. The County sought to stay arbitration, citing its 207-c Procedure, which mandates a grievance process before arbitration. The Court of Appeals held that Monroe could not compel arbitration because he failed to follow the required grievance procedure outlined in the 207-c Procedure, a condition precedent to arbitration.

    Facts

    Correction Officer David Monroe received disability payments under General Municipal Law § 207-c for a stress-related condition. The County ordered him to undergo psychiatric evaluations, after which the psychiatrist recommended light duty. The County then ordered Monroe to report for light duty, consisting mostly of desk work, at the Schenectady County Jail. Monroe protested, providing letters from his own medical professionals asserting his inability to return to work. The County informed Monroe that he must file a step 3 grievance under Article XI of the County’s 207-c Procedure within ten days of receiving the light duty order.

    Procedural History

    Monroe filed a notice of arbitration instead of the step 3 grievance. The County petitioned for a permanent stay of arbitration. Monroe cross-petitioned to compel arbitration. Supreme Court granted the County’s petition and stayed arbitration. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the dispute was not arbitrable and the power to issue a light duty order lies exclusively with the governmental authority. The Court of Appeals affirmed, but solely on the basis that Monroe did not satisfy the conditions precedent for arbitration.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an employee can compel arbitration regarding a light duty order when they have failed to follow the grievance procedure outlined in the applicable collective bargaining agreement or procedural framework.

    Holding

    No, because Monroe failed to satisfy the condition precedent of filing a step 3 grievance as required by the County’s 207-c Procedure before seeking arbitration.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that for a matter to be arbitrable, the claim must be lawfully fit for arbitration and the parties must have agreed to refer the particular matter to arbitration. The court focused on whether there was an agreement to arbitrate in this specific case. The court interpreted Article XI of the County’s 207-c Procedure as setting forth a process for reviewing a light duty order, requiring a claimant to first file a step 3 grievance. Only after this step, and a subsequent review by a Medical Officer, could arbitration be sought under Article 16.3 of the collective bargaining agreement. The court rejected Monroe’s argument that Article VI allowed for immediate arbitration, finding that Article VI contemplated disputes over specific light duty assignments *after* an employee had returned to light duty. By not following the step 3 grievance procedure, Monroe failed to satisfy a condition precedent for arbitration. The Court stated, “Because Monroe did not follow the step 3 grievance procedure, he did not satisfy a condition precedent for any arbitration under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.”

  • Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562 v. City of Cohoes, 94 N.Y.2d 686 (2000): Due Process Requirements Before Ordering Light Duty

    Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562 v. City of Cohoes, 94 N.Y.2d 686 (2000)

    A firefighter receiving General Municipal Law § 207-a disability payments is not entitled to a due process hearing before being ordered to report for light duty, unless the firefighter submits a conflicting medical report from their own physician.

    Summary

    The City of Cohoes ordered six firefighters receiving disability payments to return to light or full duty after a city physician’s evaluation. The firefighters, through their union, objected and demanded a due process hearing before returning to work, arguing they were still disabled. The Union also filed grievances and sought arbitration. The Court of Appeals held that a hearing is not required before a return-to-duty order unless the firefighter provides a conflicting medical report. The court also found that the collective bargaining agreement did not mandate arbitration of the dispute.

    Facts

    Six members of the City of Cohoes Fire Department were receiving disability payments under General Municipal Law § 207-a.
    The City’s physician examined them and determined that five could perform light duty and one could return to full duty.
    On October 31, 1997, the City ordered them to report for duty on November 10. The Union objected, requesting a due process hearing before the members were required to return. The reporting date was extended, and each firefighter received a copy of his evaluation, a description of assignment duties, and a work schedule. Only two firefighters provided medical documentation from their personal physicians supporting their claim of continued disability.

    Procedural History

    The firefighters and the Union initiated a CPLR article 78 proceeding to prevent enforcement of the orders. Supreme Court dismissed the petition for all six firefighters.
    The Appellate Division modified, holding that a hearing was required before withholding benefits for the two firefighters who submitted medical documentation of continued disability.
    Separately, the Union demanded arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The City sought a stay of arbitration. Supreme Court granted the stay.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the stay of arbitration. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and consolidated the appeals, ultimately affirming the Appellate Division’s order to stay arbitration.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a firefighter receiving General Municipal Law § 207-a disability payments is entitled to an evidentiary hearing before being ordered to report for light duty based on a medical determination of capability.

    2. Whether the City was compelled to submit the disputed orders to report for light duty assignments to arbitration on the Union’s demand.

    Holding

    1. No, because a firefighter on § 207-a status is not entitled to a hearing prior to the issuance of a report for light duty order unless they submit a report by their personal physician expressing a contrary opinion.

    2. No, because the CBA did not expressly provide for arbitration regarding the applicability of the contractual rights to disabled firefighters on General Municipal Law § 207-a status in the instant dispute.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the due process claim, the Court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, considering the private interests affected, the risk of error, and the governmental interest. The Court reasoned that while firefighters have a property interest in their disability payments, they are protected by the requirement of a medical determination of capability before being ordered back to duty. Requiring the firefighter to submit a conflicting medical report before triggering a hearing is not unduly burdensome. The Court highlighted the financial implications of § 207-a payments for municipalities and the lack of a mechanism for recoupment of erroneously paid benefits. The Court cited Codd v. Velger and similar cases to support the principle that a hearing is not required until the employee raises a genuine dispute on operative facts.

    Regarding arbitration, the Court acknowledged the broad arbitration clause in the CBA but emphasized its silence regarding the applicability of contractual rights to firefighters on § 207-a status. The Court relied on Matter of Chalachan v. City of Binghamton, stating, “[t]he collective bargaining agreement should not therefore be construed to implicitly expand whatever compensation rights are provided petitioners under the statute. Any additional benefits must be expressly provided for in the agreement.” Since the CBA did not expressly extend the cited benefits to § 207-a recipients, the Court held that the arbitration clause could not be construed to cover the grievances.

  • Matter of Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers’ Ass’n, 90 N.Y.2d 793 (1997): Enforceability of CBA Terms vs. PERB Jurisdiction

    Matter of Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers’ Ass’n, 90 N.Y.2d 793 (1997)

    When a public employer unilaterally changes a term of employment expressly covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), the dispute is resolved through the CBA’s grievance procedures, not the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB).

    Summary

    The Susquehanna Valley Central School District reduced the work hours of its matrons, violating a CBA provision specifying an eight-hour workday. The matrons filed a grievance, which was denied. They then initiated an Article 78 proceeding, arguing the reduction was arbitrary. The School Board, for the first time on appeal, claimed the court lacked jurisdiction because the issue fell under PERB’s exclusive jurisdiction as a failure to negotiate in good faith under the Taylor Law. The Court of Appeals held that because the CBA expressly covered the working hours, the dispute was a breach of contract, not a failure to negotiate, and thus was properly resolved through the CBA’s grievance process, not PERB.

    Facts

    The Susquehanna Valley Central School District employed petitioners as school matrons. The school district reduced the matrons’ daily work schedule from eight to six hours. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) specified that changes in working conditions must be negotiated and agreed upon in writing and that matrons would normally work an eight-hour day. The matrons filed a grievance claiming a breach of the CBA.

    Procedural History

    The matrons’ grievance was denied at all stages, including a hearing before the Board of Education. The matrons then filed a CPLR Article 78 proceeding challenging the Board of Education’s determination. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the matrons, ordering restoration of their full-time hours. The school board appealed, arguing that Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, asserting the issue was within PERB’s exclusive jurisdiction. The Appellate Division agreed with the school board. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a public employer’s unilateral change in a term of employment expressly covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), or whether it may be resolved through the grievance procedures of the CBA.

    Holding

    No, because when a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) already covers a specific term of employment, a dispute over that term is a breach of contract issue to be resolved through the CBA’s grievance procedures, not a failure to negotiate issue falling under the Public Employment Relations Board’s (PERB) jurisdiction.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Taylor Law does not override basic contract law. Once a CBA is in place, the statutory duty to bargain is exhausted for the terms expressly covered in the agreement. Citing Matter of City of Newburgh v Newman, the court distinguished between disputes arising from terms already agreed upon in the CBA (resolvable through grievance/arbitration) and disputes concerning new matters (requiring bargaining). The court also noted Civil Service Law § 205 (5) (d), which restricts PERB’s jurisdiction, stating that “the board shall not have authority to enforce an agreement between an employer and an employee organization and shall not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged violation of such an agreement that would not otherwise constitute an improper employer or employee organization practice.” The court emphasized that PERB itself has recognized that disputes over subjects settled by the CBA are outside its jurisdiction. The court reasoned that because the matrons’ work hours were covered by the CBA, the school district’s unilateral change was a breach of the CBA, not an improper practice of failure to bargain in good faith. The court concluded that the dispute centered on interpreting the CBA, specifically whether the eight-hour workday provision was an enforceable job security clause and whether management rights provisions justified the reduction in hours. These were contractual issues beyond PERB’s jurisdiction. The court stated, “In all respects, the rights asserted by the parties to this controversy are derived from exchanges of promises in the CBA.”

  • Blamowski v. Munson Transp., Inc., 91 N.Y.2d 193 (1997): Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements and Proper Notice

    Blamowski v. Munson Transp., Inc., 91 N.Y.2d 193 (1997)

    An arbitration award may be vacated if proper notice of intention to arbitrate was not served, the objecting party did not participate in the arbitration, and the agreement to arbitrate was not complied with.

    Summary

    Blamowski, a truck driver, was terminated after a drug test. His union filed for arbitration nine months after the denial of his grievance. Munson refused to participate, arguing the collective bargaining agreement was no longer binding because Blamowski was the only union member. The arbitrator ruled in Blamowski’s favor. The New York Court of Appeals held the arbitration award was properly vacated because Munson wasn’t properly served with a notice of intention to arbitrate under CPLR 7503(c), Munson didn’t participate in the arbitration, and Blamowski failed to comply with the agreement’s timeline for submitting to arbitration.

    Facts

    Blamowski, a truck driver for Munson Transportation, was part of a small bargaining unit represented by Local 375. By April 1992, he was the only member. After a positive drug test, Munson terminated Blamowski. He filed a grievance, which was denied. The NLRB dismissed an unfair labor practice charge, stating that an employer is not required to bargain with a unit permanently consisting of only one employee.

    Procedural History

    Blamowski and Local 375 demanded arbitration nine months after the grievance denial. Munson refused to participate. The arbitrator ruled in favor of Blamowski. The Supreme Court confirmed the arbitration award. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Munson was not bound to arbitrate. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the arbitration award should be vacated because (1) proper notice of intention to arbitrate was not served on Munson, (2) Munson did not participate in the arbitration proceeding, and (3) Blamowski did not comply with the agreement to arbitrate.

    Holding

    Yes, because (1) the notice of arbitration did not contain the requisite language of CPLR 7503(c); (2) Munson’s actions demonstrated nonparticipation in the arbitration; and (3) Blamowski failed to submit the grievance to arbitration within the time frame specified in the collective bargaining agreement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on three main reasons for vacating the arbitration award. First, the Court found that the notice of intention to arbitrate was deficient because it did not include the specific language required by CPLR 7503(c), which states that the served party has 20 days to apply for a stay of arbitration, or they will be precluded from objecting to the validity of the agreement or asserting a time bar. The court noted, “A party may serve upon another party a demand for arbitration or a notice of intention to arbitrate, specifying the agreement pursuant to which arbitration is sought and the name and address of the party serving the notice * * * and stating that unless the party served applies to stay the arbitration within twenty days after such service he shall thereafter be precluded from objecting that a valid agreement was not made or has not been complied with and from asserting in court the bar of a limitation of time” (CPLR 7503 [c]). Because this language was missing, Munson wasn’t properly served.

    Second, the Court determined that Munson did not participate in the arbitration. Munson did not attend hearings, select an arbitrator, or pay fees. The Court distinguished between communicating objections to the arbitration and actually participating in it, finding the former insufficient for participation.

    Third, the Court held that Blamowski did not comply with the arbitration agreement because he submitted the grievance nine months after the employer’s denial, far exceeding the five-day limit specified in the agreement. The Court emphasized strict compliance with the procedural requirements of the arbitration agreement. Because all three conditions were met, the arbitration award was properly vacated under CPLR 7511(b)(2).

  • Board of Education v. Buffalo Teachers Federation, 86 N.Y.2d 370 (1995): Legislative Approval Requirements for Collective Bargaining Agreements

    Board of Education v. Buffalo Teachers Federation, 86 N.Y.2d 370 (1995)

    Under New York’s Taylor Law, a board of education cannot avoid its obligations under a collective bargaining agreement by claiming a need for additional legislative approval when it has already directed the execution of the agreement and the statute does not explicitly require further legislative action.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute between the Board of Education for the City of Buffalo (Board) and the Buffalo Teachers Federation, Inc. (Union) over a collective bargaining agreement. After the Union ratified the agreement, the Board refused to approve or fund it, claiming that further legislative approval was required. The Court of Appeals held that the Board was obligated to implement the agreement. The Court reasoned that the Board, having directed the execution of the agreement, could not then claim a residual statutory power to frustrate the fulfillment of the validly adopted agreement, absent a specific statutory requirement for further legislative action. This decision clarifies the scope of the Taylor Law regarding legislative approval of public sector collective bargaining agreements.

    Facts

    The Union and the Buffalo School District reached a four-year collective bargaining agreement in September 1990, which the Union membership ratified. The Board initially refused to approve the agreement. The Union filed an improper practice charge with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB). PERB sustained the charge and ordered the District to execute the agreement but declined to order the Board to implement it. The Board then directed its Superintendent to execute the agreement but simultaneously resolved that it would not provide the funds necessary for implementation. The agreement contained a clause stating that any provision requiring legislative action to permit its implementation by amendment of law or by providing additional funds therefor, would not become effective until the appropriate legislative body had given approval.

    Procedural History

    The Board initiated a proceeding to nullify PERB’s determination, but the Appellate Division confirmed PERB’s order. Subsequently, the Board sought a declaratory judgment that it was not obligated to approve or fund the agreement. The Union counterclaimed for a declaration that the Board was obligated to implement the agreement. Supreme Court granted the Board’s motion, declaring it had no obligation to approve or fund the agreement, and denied the Union’s cross-motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Board of Education could refuse to implement a collective bargaining agreement, duly executed by the Superintendent, on the grounds that the agreement required further legislative approval for the allocation of funds for increased salaries under Civil Service Law § 201(12) and § 204-a(1)?

    Holding

    No, because the Buffalo Board directed the execution of the 1990 agreement (after it litigated the PERB phase of the matter) and has not shown that it is required to perform any further legislative action. Thus, it possesses no residual statutory power to frustrate the fulfillment of the otherwise validly adopted agreement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on interpreting Civil Service Law § 201(12) and § 204-a(1), noting that an agreement becomes binding when the legislative body gives its approval only as to provisions that require such approval. The court emphasized that the legislative history of the 1969 amendments to the Taylor Law indicated that the approval mechanism was added to clarify that legislative action is needed before an agreement becomes effective as to provisions requiring legislative approval, such as appropriation of funds for salaries. However, the Court reasoned that the Board’s argument that the allocation of teacher salaries is inherently legislative could not override the fact that the Board authorized the Superintendent to execute the agreement. The Court stated that the Board’s theory, taken to its logical extreme, would encumber all contracts with budgetary impacts with specific, formal, follow-up steps, even when the Board has generally accepted the agreement by operation of law. The court found that the Taylor Law does not require or contemplate such superfluity. The Court also noted the importance of preventing public employers from imposing unilateral conditions upon public employees, as this would undermine the policy of securing amicable, negotiated agreements. The Court highlighted the Board’s past practice of formally adopting labor contracts in a unitary action. “Because the Board has not identified any further legislative action that it must perform under the pertinent statutes with respect to the salary provisions of the agreement… further approval by it is not needed for implementation of this agreement.”

  • Matter of Committee of Interns v. NYC, 87 N.Y.2d 419 (1995): Arbitrability of Indemnification for Public Employees

    Matter of Committee of Interns and Residents v. New York City, 87 N.Y.2d 419 (1995)

    A contractual agreement to arbitrate disputes between a municipality and its employees is enforceable unless a statute, decisional law, or public policy precludes arbitration of the specific subject matter.

    Summary

    This case concerns whether the City of New York must arbitrate a dispute over its duty to defend a resident physician, Anyakora, in a malpractice suit. Anyakora allegedly refused to treat a woman in labor, leading to disciplinary action, criminal charges, and a civil suit. The union, Committee of Interns and Residents, sought arbitration based on a collective bargaining agreement requiring the City to provide malpractice insurance. The City argued that General Municipal Law § 50-k and public policy prohibit representing or indemnifying an employee facing criminal charges for the same conduct. The Court of Appeals held that arbitration was permissible because no statute or public policy explicitly prohibits arbitrating the City’s obligation to provide insurance coverage under the collective bargaining agreement. The court emphasized that any potential conflict with public policy could be addressed by the arbitrator when fashioning a remedy.

    Facts

    Peter Anyakora, a resident physician at Harlem Hospital, allegedly refused to admit, examine, or treat a woman brought in by ambulance in active labor.
    Despite a direct order from the hospital administrator, Anyakora did not provide treatment, and the patient gave birth in the admitting room attended only by EMS personnel.
    Anyakora faced disciplinary charges from the hospital and criminal prosecution under Public Health Law § 2805-b (2) (b).
    The patient, Charlesetta Brown, sued Anyakora for medical malpractice, breach of statutory duty, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
    Anyakora requested the City to represent and indemnify him in the civil suit, citing the collective bargaining agreement between his union and the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation.
    The City denied the request, citing General Municipal Law § 50-k, which limits the obligation to defend and indemnify when the employee’s conduct violates disciplinary rules.

    Procedural History

    The union filed a grievance alleging the City’s refusal violated the malpractice insurance provision of the collective bargaining agreement.
    After the grievance was denied, the union filed a notice of arbitration and commenced a CPLR article 75 proceeding to compel arbitration and stay the civil action.
    The City moved to dismiss and for a permanent stay of arbitration, arguing public policy and General Municipal Law § 50-k prohibit representation/indemnification when an employee faces criminal charges for the same conduct.
    Supreme Court rejected the City’s motions and directed immediate arbitration.
    The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a dispute over a municipality’s duty to defend and indemnify a public employee in a civil action is arbitrable when the employee faces criminal charges for the same underlying conduct, given a collective bargaining agreement requiring such indemnification.

    Holding

    Yes, because no statute, decisional law, or public policy prohibits arbitration of the dispute over the City’s obligation to provide malpractice insurance coverage to its employee under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court outlined a two-part inquiry to determine arbitrability: (1) whether arbitration is authorized under the Taylor Law for the subject matter; (2) whether the arbitration clause includes the subject area. (Matter of Acting Supt. of Schools [United Liverpool Faculty Assn.] 42 NY2d 509, 513).
    The court emphasized that arbitration is permissible unless a statute, decisional law, or public policy prohibits it. The court distinguished between situations where granting any relief would violate public policy and where only the requested remedy would do so. In the latter, courts should not preemptively intervene (Matter of Port Wash. Union Free School Dist. v Port Wash. Teachers Assn., 45 NY2d 411, 417).
    The Court rejected the City’s argument that General Municipal Law § 50-k sets the outer limits of its duty to defend, noting that the statute explicitly states it should not impair other rights to defense or indemnification (General Municipal Law § 50-k [7], [9]).
    The court noted that the City’s policy arguments were directed at the specific relief sought (representation) and not the underlying arbitrability of the insurance coverage issue. Any policy concerns can be addressed by the arbitrator when fashioning a remedy. The court stated, “[S]hould the arbitrator’s exercise of remedial discretion end in perceived policy conflicts, review by the courts will not have to rest on speculation or assumption” (id., at 419).
    Since the collective bargaining agreement provided for malpractice insurance and no statute prohibits such coverage as a condition of employment, and the arbitration clause broadly covered disputes over contract interpretation, the Court concluded that the dispute was arbitrable.

  • Matter of Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free School Dist. v. Greenburgh No. 11 Fedn. of Teachers, 82 N.Y.2d 770 (1993): Applying Current Public Policy to Arbitration Awards

    Matter of Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free School Dist. v. Greenburgh No. 11 Fedn. of Teachers, 82 N.Y.2d 770 (1993)

    Controversies regarding arbitration awards should be decided based on the public policy in effect at the time of the decision, not at the time the collective bargaining agreement was created or the dispute arose.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a 1986 amendment to Education Law § 1711, allowing negotiated agreements to modify superintendents’ power to transfer teachers, applies to a 1988 arbitration award resolving a dispute under a 1985 collective bargaining agreement. The school board challenged the award, arguing it violated public policy at the time of the agreement. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, holding that the public policy in effect at the time of the decision (1993), not the policy at the time of the agreement (1985), should govern. The court confirmed the arbitration award, finding it consistent with the amended Education Law § 1711 and current public policy.

    Facts

    A teacher was transferred to a different grade level by the Greenburgh Board of Education without considering seniority, as stipulated in the 1985 collective bargaining agreement. At the time of the agreement, public policy (as reflected in Matter of Sweet Home Cent. School Dist. v Sweet Home Educ. Assn.) forbade delegating teacher transfer decisions to negotiation. An arbitrator’s award in 1988 ordered the teacher’s return to her original kindergarten class. By 1988, however, the Legislature had amended Education Law § 1711, nullifying the public policy reflected in the Sweet Home case. The school board challenged the arbitrator’s award.

    Procedural History

    The case began as an arbitration proceeding under the 1985 collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the teachers’ federation. The School District then sought to vacate the arbitration award. The Appellate Division ruled in favor of the School District. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the CPLR article 75 petition and confirming the arbitration award.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the public policy reflected in a 1986 amendment to Education Law § 1711 should apply to the 1988 arbitral resolution of a dispute under a 1985 collective bargaining agreement.

    Holding

    Yes, because controversies of this kind should be decided on the basis of public policy operative at the time of decision, not at the time the agreement was made or the dispute arose.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the relevant public policy is that which exists at the time of the decision, citing Matter of Board of Trustees [Maplewood Teachers’ Assn.] and Matter of Hodes v Axelrod. The court emphasized that the issue was not about retroactive application of the amended statute, but rather the application of current public policy. The amended Education Law § 1711 explicitly allows for negotiated agreements to modify the power and duties of superintendents regarding teacher transfers. The court stated, “the power and duties of superintendents of schools with regard to the transfer of teachers may be modified by an agreement negotiated pursuant to the provisions of the civil service law” (L 1986, ch 843, § 1 [legislative intent]). The court also rejected the School Board’s argument that the arbitrator’s award was irrational, without providing specific details.