New York Law Review

Tag: collective bargaining

  • Matter of Dourdounas v. City of New York, 2025 NY Slip Op 01671: Exhaustion of CBA Grievance Procedures and Article 78 Proceedings

    2025 NY Slip Op 01671

    When a claim arises exclusively from a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a mandatory grievance process, an employee must pursue the grievance procedure, and may not bring an Article 78 proceeding to challenge the employer’s actions, unless a breach of the duty of fair representation by the union is alleged.

    Summary

    In Matter of Dourdounas v. City of New York, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the proper method for a unionized public employee to seek judicial review of a claim arising under a collective bargaining agreement. The court held that because the employee’s claim concerned a breach of contract under the CBA, and the CBA contained a mandatory grievance process, an Article 78 proceeding was improper. The employee could not bypass the CBA’s dispute resolution mechanism and bring the action directly, especially since the employee did not allege that the union breached its duty of fair representation. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Article 78 petition, clarifying the distinction between statutory claims, which can proceed under Article 78, and contract claims governed by a CBA, which require a different procedure and cause of action.

    Facts

    George Dourdounas, a high school math teacher, was assigned to the Absent Teacher Reserve (ATR) pool as per the CBA between the NYC Department of Education (DOE) and the United Federation of Teachers (UFT). The CBA allowed for a severance package for ATR teachers who retired by a certain date. Dourdounas was temporarily assigned to Bronx International High School. He requested the severance incentive, but was denied because he was considered permanently assigned to Bronx International. Dourdounas initiated a grievance process through the CBA. The grievance was denied at the school and Chancellor levels, and the UFT denied arbitration. Dourdounas then brought an Article 78 proceeding against the City.

    Procedural History

    Dourdounas initiated the grievance process under the CBA, which was denied at each step including a denial of arbitration by the UFT. Dourdounas then commenced an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, which was dismissed as time-barred. The Appellate Division affirmed, also holding the claim was time-barred. The Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an Article 78 proceeding is the proper mechanism for judicial review of a claim arising exclusively under a collective bargaining agreement, which has a mandatory grievance process, when the employee has exhausted the grievance procedure.
    2. Whether the statute of limitations for a claim arising under a collective bargaining agreement, and subject to a mandatory grievance process, begins to run when the employee is informed of the action, or when the grievance process is exhausted.

    Holding

    1. No, because the claim arose solely under the CBA, and the CBA included a mandatory grievance process, an Article 78 proceeding was not proper.
    2. The statute of limitations begins to run when the employee has exhausted the mandatory grievance process and is aware of the final decision.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on Ambach v. Board of Education, which established that when a claim arises under a CBA with a mandatory grievance process, an employee may not sue the employer directly for breach of that agreement but must proceed through the union in accordance with the contract. Only if the union fails in its duty of fair representation can the employee go beyond the agreed procedure and litigate a contract issue directly against the employer. The court emphasized that claims arising exclusively from an alleged breach of a term in a CBA must be brought through a civil action for breach of contract. The court distinguished this case from claims based on statutory or constitutional violations, which are properly brought in an Article 78 proceeding.

    The court explained that disrupting the contract’s settlement procedures threatens the union’s authority as representative and weakens the individual employee’s protection. Therefore, since Dourdounas’s claim was based solely on a contract right, and he did not allege a breach of the duty of fair representation by the UFT, the Article 78 proceeding was improper, and his claim should be dismissed.

    The court clarified that even if the claim could have been properly brought under Article 78, the Appellate Division’s application of the exhaustion rules would have been incorrect because the statute of limitations would not have begun to run until the grievance process was exhausted.

    Practical Implications

    This decision highlights several key considerations for attorneys dealing with public sector employees in New York. First, it underscores the importance of identifying the source of the legal claim. If the claim is solely based on the CBA, the employee must exhaust the CBA’s grievance process before any judicial review can be sought. Second, it clarifies that an Article 78 proceeding is not the proper mechanism for a breach of contract claim arising from a CBA with a mandatory grievance process; a breach of contract action is required. Third, to bring a claim against the employer, the employee must allege both breach of contract by the employer and breach of the duty of fair representation by the union. Fourth, the statute of limitations for a claim arising under a CBA with a mandatory grievance process starts to run once the grievance process is exhausted. This case should inform how attorneys analyze cases involving public employees and their rights under a collective bargaining agreement, as the decision makes clear the path that must be taken to pursue a legal action. Finally, it underscores that the failure to allege a breach of the duty of fair representation will result in the dismissal of the claim.

    This case, especially concerning the analysis of when the statute of limitations begins to run, distinguishes claims involving mandatory versus optional grievance processes, and its emphasis on the Ambach rule, are crucial for attorneys practicing in employment law in New York.

    The decision reinforces the importance of adhering to established procedures and the limits on individual employees’ rights when collective bargaining agreements are in place. The ruling is consistent with prior cases concerning the need for exhaustion of remedies and the scope of Article 78 proceedings.

  • Matter of City of New York v. New York State Nurses Association, 29 N.Y.3d 486 (2017): Information Rights in Collective Bargaining and Grievance Procedures

    29 N.Y.3d 486 (2017)

    A public employer must provide a union with data normally maintained in the regular course of business, reasonably available and necessary for the administration of the parties’ agreements, including the processing of grievances, which encompasses disciplinary actions when the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) defines grievances to include disciplinary actions.

    Summary

    The New York State Nurses Association (NYSNA) sought information from the City of New York’s Human Resources Administration (HRA) to represent two nurses in disciplinary proceedings. The City refused, leading NYSNA to file an improper practice petition. The Board of Collective Bargaining (Board) found the City’s refusal improper, citing NYCCBL § 12-306(c)(4). The City challenged this decision, but the Appellate Division affirmed, finding the Board’s decision rational. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division, holding that because the CBA defined “grievance” to include disciplinary actions, the City was obligated to provide the requested information, which included data normally maintained in the regular course of business. The dissent argued that the statute, focused on good faith bargaining, did not extend to information requests for disciplinary proceedings and that the information requests were not necessary for the collective bargaining process.

    Facts

    Two nurses, members of NYSNA, employed by the City’s Human Resources Administration (HRA), faced disciplinary charges for falsifying time records. HRA sent notices outlining the disciplinary process, including a Step 1 conference and a Step 2 Grievance Hearing. NYSNA requested information from HRA, including policies, records, and witness statements, to represent the nurses. The City refused. NYSNA filed an improper practice petition with the Board of Collective Bargaining, alleging a violation of NYCCBL § 12-306(a)(1) and (4). The Board ruled in favor of NYSNA, which the City then challenged in court.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Collective Bargaining found that the City’s refusal to provide information was an improper practice. The City initiated a CPLR Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, which granted the City’s petition and annulled the Board’s determination. The Appellate Division reversed the Supreme Court, holding that the Board’s decision was rational and granting the City leave to appeal on a certified question. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether NYCCBL § 12-306(c)(4) requires the City to provide information to NYSNA for disciplinary proceedings against its members.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the CBA defined grievance to include disciplinary action, and the information requested was data normally maintained in the regular course of business, necessary for grievance processing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court considered the language of NYCCBL § 12-306, which requires employers to provide data reasonably necessary for full and proper discussion, understanding, and negotiation. The court noted that the CBA defined “grievance” to include disciplinary actions, incorporating the information requirements applicable to grievances. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Pfau v. Public Employment Relations Board, which did not have the same contractual framework. The court held that the City’s arguments regarding the expedited timeline of disciplinary proceedings were unpersuasive, especially since other agencies followed the same process.

    Practical Implications

    This ruling clarifies that the duty to provide information in collective bargaining extends to disciplinary proceedings when the CBA defines disciplinary actions as grievances. Legal practitioners representing unions should review CBAs to identify the scope of “grievance” definitions. This decision reinforces the importance of clear contract language in defining the scope of information rights. Public employers must be prepared to provide relevant information during disciplinary proceedings. This case underscores that access to information is a crucial aspect of union representation and contract administration. Subsequent cases involving information requests related to disciplinary actions will likely cite this case as precedent.

  • New York State Public Employees Federation, AFL-CIO v. New York State Racing and Wagering Board, 27 N.Y.3d 502 (2016): Satisfying Duty to Negotiate Through a Side Letter Agreement

    <strong><em>27 N.Y.3d 502 (2016)</em></strong></p>

    A public employer satisfies its duty to negotiate in good faith under the Taylor Law when it has negotiated terms in an agreement that are reasonably clear on the specific subject at issue.

    <p><strong>Summary</strong></p>

    The New York State Racing and Wagering Board reduced per diem wages for seasonal employees. The New York State Public Employees Federation (PEF) filed an improper practice charge, alleging a violation of the Civil Service Law. The issue was whether a side letter agreement between the Racing Board and PEF satisfied the duty to negotiate. The Court of Appeals held that the side letter agreement, which addressed wage limitations, demonstrated that the parties had reached accord, thereby satisfying the duty to negotiate. The court emphasized deference to the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) and reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating PERB’s dismissal of the improper practice charge.

    <p><strong>Facts</strong></p>

    PEF represented seasonal track personnel employed by the Racing Board. The Racing Board chair sets the compensation for these employees, subject to the Director of the Budget’s approval. In 1995, PEF and the state entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with a side letter agreement addressing terms of employment for seasonal employees. The side letter agreement incorporated articles from the CBA and covered compensation, including lump-sum payments and salary increases. In January 1996, the Racing Board reduced per diem pay. PEF filed an improper practice charge with PERB, alleging a violation of the duty to negotiate. PERB dismissed the charge, finding the side letter agreement satisfied the duty to negotiate. The Appellate Division reversed PERB’s decision, but the Court of Appeals ultimately reversed the Appellate Division.

    <p><strong>Procedural History</strong></p>

    PEF filed an improper practice charge with PERB. The Assistant Director of PERB found a violation of the Civil Service Law, but PERB dismissed the charge, finding the duty to negotiate satisfied. The Supreme Court upheld PERB’s decision. The Appellate Division reversed, finding PERB’s determination arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and reinstated the Supreme Court’s judgment.

    <p><strong>Issue(s)</strong></p>

    1. Whether PERB’s decision dismissing the improper practice charge was arbitrary and capricious or affected by an error of law.

    <p><strong>Holding</strong></p>

    1. No, because the side letter agreement demonstrated that the parties had reached accord, satisfying the duty to negotiate.

    <p><strong>Court's Reasoning</strong></p>

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that, under Civil Service Law § 209-a (1) (d), the Racing Board has a duty to negotiate in good faith. However, this duty is satisfied when an agreement demonstrates that the parties had reached accord. The court deferred to PERB’s expertise in interpreting collective bargaining agreements. The court found that the side letter agreement addressed limitations on the Director of the Budget’s discretion to set wages. The agreement included specific pay increases and did not rule out pay reductions. The side letter agreement was comprehensive, covering conditions of employment for seasonal employees for 1995 to 1999. The court concluded that PERB’s finding that the parties intended the side letter agreement to act as a negotiated limitation upon the State Budget Director’s discretion was not arbitrary and capricious. The court stated, “Duty satisfaction occurs when a specific subject has been negotiated to fruition and may be established by contractual terms that either expressly or implicitly demonstrate that the parties had reached accord on that specific subject.”

    <p><strong>Practical Implications</strong></p>

    This case emphasizes that public employers can satisfy their duty to negotiate by negotiating comprehensive agreements that address the specific subjects at issue, even if the agreement does not explicitly address every possible scenario. It underscores the importance of drafting collective bargaining agreements with clear language and detailed provisions. The case highlights the deference given to PERB’s interpretation of such agreements. Legal practitioners should be mindful of the potential for duty satisfaction defenses when advising public employers on labor relations. This case confirms the importance of carefully examining all terms in a collective bargaining agreement and any side letters, to assess how the parties intended to limit the budget director’s discretion in determining wages. The decision reinforces the principle that the courts will generally uphold the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements made by the agency with expertise in this area.

  • Matter of Town of Islip v. PERB, 25 N.Y.3d 491 (2015): Unilateral Discontinuation of Illegal Past Practice

    Matter of Town of Islip v. PERB, 25 N.Y.3d 491 (2015)

    A public employer is not required to collectively bargain to discontinue a past practice that is in direct violation of a duly enacted local law.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether a town was required to collectively bargain before discontinuing a practice that violated a local ethics law. Town employees had been permitted to use town vehicles for personal use, a practice inconsistent with the town’s Code of Ethics. The Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) found that discontinuing this practice without bargaining violated the Taylor Law. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a public employer is not obligated to bargain over the cessation of an illegal practice established in violation of local law.

    Facts

    The Town of Islip had a practice of allowing town employees to use town-owned vehicles for personal use, including commuting to and from home. This practice was in place despite the existence of Chapter 14 of the Town Code, specifically Section 14-12, which prohibited the use of town-owned vehicles for personal convenience except when such services are available to the public or are provided as municipal policy for official business. The Town unilaterally discontinued the practice, leading to a complaint filed by the union representing the employees.

    Procedural History

    The union filed an improper practice charge with PERB, alleging the Town violated the Taylor Law by unilaterally discontinuing a past practice. PERB sustained the charge, finding the Town failed to bargain over a mandatory subject of negotiation. The Appellate Division confirmed PERB’s determination. The Court of Appeals reversed, modifying the order and remitting to the Appellate Division with directions to remand to PERB for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a public employer must collectively bargain before discontinuing a past practice that is in violation of a duly-enacted local law.

    Holding

    1. No, because requiring an employer to bargain over the discontinuance of an illegal practice would undermine the local law and public policy.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that PERB’s decision effectively required the Town to bargain its way out of an illegal activity. The Court found this contrary to law and public policy, stating that illegal past conduct should not evolve into binding terms and conditions of employment. The Court emphasized that allowing such a practice would permit PERB to overrule a duly-enacted local law, which is impermissible. The Court stated, “The issue distills to whether a public employer must collectively bargain its way out of a previous policy that is plainly in violation of a duly-enacted local law.” The Court further explained that where a past practice violates a local law, the employer has no duty to bargain its cessation. Requiring bargaining in such a scenario would place an undue burden on the employer and allow illegal practices to persist.

  • City of New York v. Detectives’ Endowment Association, 14 N.Y.3d 41 (2009): Police Commissioner’s Authority over Drug Testing Methodology

    14 N.Y.3d 41 (2009)

    A New York City Police Commissioner’s disciplinary authority extends to the selection of drug testing methodologies and triggers, exempting these decisions from mandatory collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the NYPD must collectively bargain with police unions over the methodology used for drug testing (hair analysis vs. urine analysis) and the triggers for such testing. The Court of Appeals held that the Police Commissioner’s disciplinary authority, granted by the New York City Charter and Administrative Code, encompasses the discretion to choose drug testing methods and triggers. Requiring collective bargaining on these issues would unduly limit the Commissioner’s ability to maintain discipline within the force. Therefore, these decisions are not subject to mandatory negotiation under the Taylor Law.

    Facts

    The NYPD informed police unions of its intent to use radioimmunoassay (RIAH), a hair analysis method, for all drug screening of uniformed members. Previously, urine analysis was primarily used for random and promotional drug screenings, while hair analysis was used for reasonable suspicion, end-of-probation, and voluntary testing. The unions protested, arguing that the change in methodology was subject to collective bargaining. The City maintained that the change was within the Police Commissioner’s authority.

    Procedural History

    The Detectives’ Endowment Association (DEA) and other unions filed improper practice petitions with the Board of Collective Bargaining (Board), alleging that the NYPD unilaterally changed its drug testing policy in violation of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law. The Board granted the petitions, finding that expanding the categories of employees subject to hair testing and changing the testing methodology constituted a unilateral change subject to collective bargaining. The City then filed an Article 78 proceeding to annul the Board’s decisions. The Supreme Court granted the City’s petition, but the Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Police Commissioner’s disciplinary authority under the New York City Charter and Administrative Code includes the discretion to choose the scientific methodology for drug testing of uniformed officers and the triggers for such testing, thereby exempting these decisions from mandatory collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the Police Commissioner’s disciplinary authority extends to the selection of drug testing methodologies and triggers, making these decisions management prerogatives not subject to mandatory collective bargaining.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court recognized the strong state policy supporting collective bargaining under the Taylor Law. However, it also acknowledged that some subjects are excluded from collective bargaining as a matter of policy. The Court relied on its previous decision in Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. of City of N.Y., Inc. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., (6 NY3d 563 [2006]), which held that New York City Charter § 434 (a) and Administrative Code § 14-115 (a) express a policy favoring management authority over police disciplinary matters, overriding the policy favoring collective bargaining.

    The Court reasoned that the detection and deterrence of wrongdoing, including illegal drug use, is a crucial aspect of the Police Commissioner’s responsibility to maintain discipline. Allowing the Commissioner to unilaterally institute drug testing is insufficient if his discretion to select effective investigatory measures is constrained. Requiring collective bargaining over testing methodology and triggers would unduly limit the Commissioner’s ability to enforce discipline effectively. As the Supreme Court stated, “if the Commissioner is not at liberty to use a particular drug test even after determining that [it] would be more effective at exposing drug use among police officers, then his ability to carry out his disciplinary ‘authority’ has been significantly limited.”

    The Court clarified that its holding was limited to the specific issues presented: drug testing methodology and triggers. It did not address whether every step taken to implement drug testing is excluded from bargaining. The Court emphasized the need to balance collective bargaining rights with the Police Commissioner’s authority to maintain discipline within the NYPD.

  • County of Erie v. Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 11 N.Y.3d 76 (2008): Bargaining Duty Regarding Inmate Classification Systems

    11 N.Y.3d 76 (2008)

    A public employer’s decision regarding its primary mission, such as implementing an inmate classification system mandated by statute, is not subject to mandatory collective bargaining, although the impact of such a decision on employees’ terms and conditions of employment may be.

    Summary

    Erie County and its Sheriff were accused of improperly transferring exclusive bargaining unit work by assigning correction officers and deputy sheriffs to guard both sentenced and unsentenced inmates after implementing a unified classification system. The New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) found the County committed an improper employment practice. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Sheriff’s implementation of a classification system, as required by Correction Law § 500-b, was a policy decision related to the primary mission of ensuring inmate safety and security, and thus not subject to mandatory bargaining, although the impact of that decision may be.

    Facts

    The Civil Service Employees Association (CSEA) represented correction officers who guarded sentenced inmates at the Erie County Correctional Facility. The Teamsters Local 264 represented deputy sheriffs who guarded unsentenced inmates at the Erie County Holding Center and an adjacent “Annex.” In 2000, control of the Correctional Facility was transferred to the Erie County Sheriff. Due to overcrowding at the Holding Center and vacancies at the Correctional Facility, the State Commission of Correction directed the Sheriff to utilize a unified classification system per Correction Law § 500-b. The Sheriff implemented a single classification system, resulting in the commingling of sentenced and unsentenced inmates, and the assignment of both correction officers and deputy sheriffs to guard both types of inmates.

    Procedural History

    The unions filed improper practice charges, and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in their favor. PERB affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The County commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging PERB’s determination. Supreme Court transferred the matter to the Appellate Division, which confirmed PERB’s determination. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s judgment, granting the petition and annulling PERB’s determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Sheriff was required to collectively bargain with the unions before implementing a classification policy that was satisfactory to the State Commission of Correction and that resulted in the assignment of unit work to non-unit employees.

    Holding

    No, because the Sheriff’s implementation of a formal and objective inmate classification system, as mandated by Correction Law § 500-b and related regulations, constitutes a non-bargainable policy decision relating to the primary mission of ensuring inmate safety and security. The impact of that decision, if any, on the contracts between the parties, however, is subject to bargaining.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a public employer’s decisions are not bargainable if they are inherently and fundamentally policy decisions relating to the primary mission of the employer, citing Matter of Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 75 NY2d 660, 669 (1990). While policy decisions themselves are exempt from bargaining, their impact is not, citing West Irondequoit Teachers Assn. v Helsby, 35 NY2d 46 (1974). The Court emphasized that Correction Law § 500-b directs the Sheriff to exercise good judgment and discretion to ensure the safety, security, and good order of the jail. The Sheriff is charged with implementing and maintaining a formal and objective system for the consistent classification of all inmates, considering factors like criminal history, prior escapes, and mental/medical illness, without regard to adjudication status or collective bargaining units.

    The court found PERB’s determination that petitioners committed an improper practice was not entitled to deference, citing Matter of Newark Val. Cent. School Dist. v Public Empl. Relations Bd., 83 NY2d 315, 320 (1994). Once the Sheriff implemented such a system, the impact of that decision, if any, upon the contracts between the parties is subject to bargaining. The Court stated, “Given the statutory requirement that the Sheriff implement and maintain a formal and objective classification system, we conclude that PERB’s determination that petitioners committed an improper practice by unilaterally transferring unit work to nonunit employees is not entitled to deference.”

  • Police Benevolent Assn. of N.Y. State Troopers, Inc. v. Division of N.Y. State Police, 13 N.Y.3d 93 (2009): Right to Counsel During Critical Incident Reviews

    Police Benevolent Assn. of N.Y. State Troopers, Inc. v. Division of N.Y. State Police, 13 N.Y.3d 93 (2009)

    A union’s failure to explicitly negotiate for representation rights during critical incident reviews in a collective bargaining agreement constitutes a waiver of any such right, even if the union previously assumed the right existed.

    Summary

    The Police Benevolent Association (PBA) sought a judgment declaring that state troopers have a right to counsel or union representation during “critical incident reviews.” These reviews are conducted after incidents involving death, serious injury, or firearm discharge by a trooper. While the PBA assumed this right existed under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), the Division of State Police later changed its policy. The Court of Appeals held that because the CBA only explicitly provided for representation during administrative interrogations, the PBA had waived any right to representation during critical incident reviews. The court emphasized the importance of explicit negotiation for specific rights within collective bargaining.

    Facts

    The Division of State Police conducts critical incident reviews after incidents where a trooper’s actions result in death or serious injury, or the discharge of a firearm. Until 2001, both the PBA and the Division assumed that troopers had a collectively bargained right to representation during these reviews, similar to administrative interrogations. In May 2001, Trooper Taney was involved in a fatal accident and was denied union representation during the critical incident review. Subsequently, in a separate incident, troopers involved in a shooting were also denied representation. The Division then restated its policy, allowing counsel but restricting private conversations before the interview. Later, the Division further modified its policy to offer use immunity for compelled statements and to separate critical incident review personnel from administrative investigation personnel.

    Procedural History

    The PBA and several troopers filed an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the Division’s critical incident review policies violated Civil Service Law § 75 (2) and their constitutional right to counsel. Supreme Court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. The Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal as of right, then granted their motion for leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals assumed standing for the purposes of the appeal, but affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal of the complaint.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the collective bargaining agreement between the PBA and the Division of State Police provided troopers with a right to counsel or union representation during critical incident reviews.

    Holding

    No, because the collective bargaining agreement only explicitly provided for representation during administrative interrogations that could lead to discipline, the PBA effectively waived any right to representation during critical incident reviews.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while the Taylor Law requires public employers to bargain in good faith, statutory and due process rights can be surrendered during collective bargaining. In this case, the CBA explicitly provided for representation during administrative interrogations (CBA § 16.2 [A] [8]), but was conspicuously silent on the right to counsel during critical incident reviews as described under CBA § 16.1 (D), which states that “members may be requested and are expected to properly respond and if requested, submit written memoranda detailing all necessary facts.” Because the PBA only agreed to a right to counsel during administrative interrogations, it necessarily waived any representation right troopers may have had during critical incident reviews. The court noted that if the PBA disagreed with the Division’s application of CBA § 16.1 (D) to critical incident reviews, it was obligated to submit that grievance to binding arbitration, as provided in CBA § 15.4. The court emphasized that “statutory and due process rights may even be surrendered during collective bargaining.” The absence of an explicit provision for representation during critical incident reviews indicated a waiver of that right, regardless of prior assumptions. The court implicitly endorsed the Division’s argument that critical incident reviews do not relate to discipline, making them subject to collective bargaining, and that the troopers failed to secure this right through bargaining.

  • Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, 9 N.Y.3d 23 (2007): Legislative Power vs. Executive Authority in Public Sector Bargaining

    9 N.Y.3d 23 (2007)

    A local law altering the scope of collective bargaining does not necessarily curtail the power of an elected officer (the Mayor) requiring a mandatory referendum, as long as it doesn’t impair the officer’s fundamental role in the structure of local government.

    Summary

    The Mayor of New York City challenged two local laws passed by the City Council over his veto, which conferred “uniformed” status on fire alarm dispatchers and EMTs, thus changing their collective bargaining arrangements. The Mayor argued these laws were preempted by the Taylor Law and violated mandatory referendum requirements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that the local laws were not preempted and did not require a referendum, as they did not impair the Mayor’s fundamental powers within the city’s governmental structure, but merely regulated city government operations.

    Facts

    Local Laws 18 and 19 (2001) granted “uniformed” status to fire alarm dispatchers and EMTs within the New York City Fire Department. This status change mandated that the Mayor negotiate with unions specifically representing these employees, rather than a citywide union, regarding issues like overtime and time-off policies. This action was based on an interpretation of New York City Administrative Code § 12-307 (a) (4), which dictates bargaining procedures for uniformed services. The Mayor vetoed the laws, arguing they infringed on his executive power.

    Procedural History

    The Mayor filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the validity of the local laws. Supreme Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City Council, declaring the laws valid. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Mayor appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Local Laws 18 and 19 of 2001 are preempted by the Taylor Law (Civil Service Law § 200 et seq.)?

    2. Whether the enactment of Local Laws 18 and 19 violated the mandatory referendum provisions of the Municipal Home Rule Law § 23 (2) (f) and the New York City Charter § 38 (5)?

    Holding

    1. No, because the local laws prescribe bargaining procedures, not substantive terms, and the regulation of bargaining procedures is within the scope of local legislation.

    2. No, because the local laws do not curtail any power of the Mayor within the meaning of Municipal Home Rule Law § 23 (2) (f) or New York City Charter § 38 (5). The Court held that the requirement of a referendum only applies to legislation that impairs a power conferred on the officer as part of the framework of local government.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the Taylor Law permits local governments to supersede certain provisions as long as they are “substantially equivalent.” The Mayor’s argument centered on an alleged inconsistency with the Taylor Law’s definition of “agreement” (Civil Service Law § 201 [12]). The Court dismissed this, stating the laws didn’t dictate agreement terms but rather bargaining procedures, a proper subject for local legislation. The Court emphasized that the regulation of bargaining procedures, specifically the determination of bargaining units, falls within the domain of local legislative authority.

    The Court highlighted that Municipal Home Rule Law § 23 (2) (f) and New York City Charter § 38 (5) require a referendum only when a local law “abolishes, transfers or curtails any power of an elective officer.” The Court interpreted this as applying only when a law impairs a power conferred on the officer as part of the structure of local government itself (e.g., power to appoint commissioners or prepare a budget). Limitations on an officer’s freedom to act as a consequence of legislative policymaking do not trigger a mandatory referendum.

    The dissent argued that the local laws were preempted by the Taylor Law, as the amended provisions of the Collective Bargaining Law were initially negotiated by the Mayor and municipal unions, and the City Council overstepped its authority by unilaterally expanding the scope of collective bargaining. The dissent viewed the local laws as an intrusion into the Mayor’s exclusive authority to negotiate with unions.

    The court directly addressed and rejected this line of reasoning from the dissent: “But we see nothing in the Taylor Law, and nothing in any decision interpreting it, to suggest the existence of any such limitation on legislative authority; and we reject as unsound the principle that a legislative body’s power to pass laws can be conferred or withheld by the executive’s agreement, or failure to agree, with labor representatives on proposed legislation.”

  • City of Poughkeepsie v. Poughkeepsie Professional Firefighters’ Assn., 6 N.Y.3d 514 (2006): Negotiability of Procedures for Reviewing Firefighter Benefit Eligibility

    City of Poughkeepsie v. Poughkeepsie Professional Firefighters’ Assn., 6 N.Y.3d 514 (2006)

    A demand for a review procedure to contest a municipality’s initial determination of a firefighter’s eligibility for General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits is mandatorily negotiable, but a demand that effectively seeks a de novo determination of eligibility by an arbitrator infringes upon the municipality’s exclusive statutory authority and is not mandatorily negotiable.

    Summary

    This case addresses the scope of collective bargaining for firefighter benefits under General Municipal Law § 207-a. The City of Poughkeepsie and the Poughkeepsie Professional Firefighters’ Association were in dispute over the negotiability of procedures for determining a firefighter’s eligibility for benefits. The City argued that the Association’s proposals infringed on its exclusive statutory authority to make initial eligibility determinations. The New York State Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) agreed with the City. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while a review procedure is negotiable, a demand for a de novo determination by an arbitrator is not.

    Facts

    The City of Poughkeepsie and the Poughkeepsie Professional Firefighters’ Association engaged in collective bargaining. A key point of contention was the procedure for implementing General Municipal Law § 207-a, which provides benefits to firefighters injured in the line of duty. The Association proposed a procedure where an arbitrator would review a firefighter’s eligibility for benefits, the termination of benefits, and assignment to light duty. The City maintained that the proposals effectively wrested from the City the authority to make initial eligibility determinations, violating General Municipal Law § 207-a.

    Procedural History

    After failed negotiations, the Association petitioned PERB for compulsory interest arbitration. The City filed an improper practice charge, alleging the Association’s demands were not mandatory subjects of bargaining. PERB agreed with the City. The Association commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding seeking annulment of PERB’s determination. Supreme Court granted the petition. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the petition. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether PERB rationally determined that the Association’s proposed contract language sought a de novo review of a firefighter’s eligibility for General Municipal Law § 207-a benefits, rather than a review procedure of the City’s initial determination, thereby rendering it a nonmandatory subject of collective bargaining.

    Holding

    Yes, because PERB reasonably concluded that the Association’s demands sought a redetermination of eligibility by an arbitrator, rather than a review of the City’s initial determination, infringing upon the City’s nondelegable statutory right to make initial eligibility determinations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed PERB’s determination, emphasizing that General Municipal Law § 207-a authorizes municipalities to make initial determinations about a firefighter’s eligibility for benefits, and this authority is not a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, citing Matter of Schenectady Police Benevolent Assn. v New York State Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 85 NY2d 480 (1995). While a demand for a review procedure to contest a municipality’s initial determination is mandatorily negotiable, citing Matter of City of Watertown v State of N.Y. Pub. Empl. Relations Bd., 95 NY2d 73 (2000), the Court found that PERB reasonably concluded that the Association’s proposal went beyond a review procedure and sought a de novo determination by an arbitrator.

    The Court deferred to PERB’s expertise in interpreting the Civil Service Law and resolving improper practice charges, stating, “Because these matters are consigned to PERB’s discretion, we may not disturb its determination unless irrational.” The Court noted that the proposed language called for the arbitrator to resolve the firefighter’s claim, conduct evidentiary hearings, and assign burdens of proof, indicating a redetermination procedure rather than a review of the City’s initial decision.

    The Court emphasized that the key distinction is between a process that reviews the municipality’s determination versus one that substitutes the arbitrator’s judgment for the municipality’s initial determination. The latter impermissibly infringes on the municipality’s statutory authority. In essence, the Court found “no irrationality in PERB’s conclusion that the disputed demands set forth not a review procedure, but a redetermination procedure in derogation of the City’s nondelegable statutory right to make initial determinations.”

  • Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n v. NYS PERB, 6 N.Y.3d 563 (2006): Collective Bargaining Limits in Police Discipline

    6 N.Y.3d 563 (2006)

    When the legislature expressly commits disciplinary authority over a police department to local officials, police discipline may not be a subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Summary

    This case addresses the conflict between the Taylor Law’s support for collective bargaining and the policy favoring strong disciplinary control over police forces. The Court of Appeals held that the Taylor Law does not mandate collective bargaining when legislation specifically grants disciplinary authority to local officials, like the NYC Police Commissioner or a Town Board. The Court reasoned that while collective bargaining is generally favored, statutes explicitly assigning police discipline to local authorities outweigh this policy. This decision affirmed Appellate Division rulings prioritizing local control over police discipline when specific legislation exists.

    Facts

    Two separate cases were consolidated. The first involved the NYC PBA challenging PERB’s decision that the City wasn’t obligated to bargain over certain disciplinary procedures from an expired agreement. The second involved the Town of Orangetown seeking to stay arbitration of a police disciplinary dispute, arguing a collective bargaining agreement provision on discipline was invalid.

    Procedural History

    In the NYC PBA case, the Supreme Court upheld PERB’s decision, and the Appellate Division affirmed. In the Orangetown case, the Supreme Court granted the stay of arbitration, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether police discipline is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law when other legislation expressly commits disciplinary authority over a police department to local officials.

    Holding

    No, because where the legislature has expressly committed disciplinary authority over a police department to local officials, police discipline may not be a subject of collective bargaining under the Taylor Law.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court acknowledged the tension between the Taylor Law’s support for collective bargaining and the public policy favoring local control over police discipline. Generally, Civil Service Law §§ 75 and 76 govern public employee discipline, allowing for collective bargaining agreements that supplement or modify their provisions, as established in Auburn Police Local 195. However, § 76(4) preserves pre-existing laws granting specific disciplinary control to local officials. Citing New York City Charter § 434(a) and Administrative Code § 14-115(a), the Court noted the NYC Police Commissioner’s explicit authority over department discipline. Similarly, the Rockland County Police Act § 7 grants town boards the power to regulate police discipline. The Court gave weight to a line of Appellate Division cases holding that such legislation overrides the presumption in favor of collective bargaining. While acknowledging PERB’s expertise in Taylor Law application, the Court determined that the case hinged on weighing competing policy considerations reflected in the local laws, an area outside PERB’s purview. Quoting People ex rel. Masterson v. French, 110 NY 494, 499 (1888), the Court emphasized the quasi-military nature of police forces and the need for discretionary authority over discipline. The Court concluded that the legislative commands in the NYC Charter, Administrative Code, and Rockland County Police Act express a policy favoring management authority over police discipline that outweighs the policy favoring collective bargaining, even if those enactments predate the Taylor Law and did not intend to create an exception to it. As the Court noted: “The issue is whether these enactments express a policy so important that the policy favoring collective bargaining should give way, and we conclude that they do.”