New York Law Review

Tag: Collateral Review

  • Matter of Fappiano v. New York City Police Dept., 95 N.Y.2d 744 (2000): FOIL and Civil Rights Law § 50-b

    Matter of Fappiano v. New York City Police Dept., 95 N.Y.2d 744 (2000)

    Civil Rights Law § 50-b(2)(a), which allows disclosure of sex crime victim information to a person “charged” with a sex offense, does not apply to individuals already convicted of such offenses seeking documents for collateral review.

    Summary

    Three petitioners, each convicted of sex crimes, sought to compel police departments to disclose records related to their cases via Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) requests. The police departments denied the requests, citing Civil Rights Law § 50-b(1), which protects the identity of sex crime victims. The petitioners argued that § 50-b(2)(a), allowing disclosure to persons “charged” with a sex offense, applied to them. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts’ decisions, holding that “charged” does not include convicted individuals, and the police departments must still demonstrate that each document sought contains identifying information before denying disclosure.

    Facts

    Scott Fappiano was convicted of rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and burglary in 1985 and sought 25 categories of police reports for a federal habeas corpus petition.
    Ceasar Stapleton was convicted of rape, sodomy, and assault in 1988 and sought nine categories of reports for CPL article 440 and federal habeas corpus proceedings, even though he received similar material from the District Attorney’s Office.
    Charles Doyen was convicted of sodomy and kidnapping in 1987 and requested 13 categories of documents from the New York State Police for collateral review.

    Procedural History

    Fappiano’s conviction and denial of his CPL article 440 motion were affirmed on appeal.
    Stapleton’s conviction was affirmed, and his applications for a writ of error coram nobis and CPL article 440 motions were denied. His federal habeas corpus petition was largely denied.
    Doyen’s sodomy conviction was affirmed, and kidnapping conviction was reversed on appeal.
    In all three cases, the police departments denied the FOIL requests under Civil Rights Law § 50-b(1). The Supreme Court initially ordered disclosure or reinstatement of the petition in each case, and the Appellate Division affirmed, equating the petitioners to persons “charged” with a crime. The Court of Appeals then reviewed these decisions.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Civil Rights Law § 50-b(2)(a), which allows disclosure of sex crime victim information to a person “charged” with an offense, applies to individuals already convicted of such offenses seeking documents for collateral review.
    Whether a blanket denial of a FOIL request for documents relating to a sex crime is justified under Civil Rights Law § 50-b, even if some documents do not contain information that tends to identify the victim.

    Holding

    No, because a person “charged” with a crime is distinctly different from someone already convicted, possessing rights such as the presumption of innocence and the right to confront accusers.
    No, because Civil Rights Law § 50-b shields documents containing information that tends to identify the victim, the police departments must still show that each requested document contains such identifying information.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that statutory interpretation requires giving words their natural meaning. The term “charged” cannot be equated with “convicted,” as a person charged has different legal rights. The legislative history supports this interpretation, as the sponsor’s memorandum refers to the individual as involved at the “investigation and prosecution” stage. The Court emphasized that the constitutional right of confrontation, the sole justification for the exception in § 50-b(2)(a), does not extend to CPL article 440 motions and federal habeas corpus review.

    Regarding the blanket denial, the Court stated that while Civil Rights Law § 50-b protects the privacy of sex crime victims, this does not justify denying access to documents that do not contain identifying information. The police departments must make a particularized showing as to why each document should not be disclosed. Citing Matter of John P. v Whalen, the Court noted, “the standing of one who seeks access to records under the Freedom of Information Law is as a member of the public.” Therefore, even if the petitioners knew the victim’s identity, they are treated as any other member of the public seeking access to these records.

    The Court also noted that Stapleton’s petition should be dismissed because he conceded receiving most of the requested documents from the District Attorney’s Office and because he sought “serial numbers” or “lot numbers” in his Article 78 proceeding that were not originally requested in the FOIL request to the NYPD, holding that the relief sought here is academic, citing Matter of Moore v Santucci.

  • People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638 (1991): Prejudice Requirement for Rosario Violations in Collateral Review

    People v. Jackson, 78 N.Y.2d 638 (1991)

    A defendant seeking to vacate a conviction via a CPL 440.10 motion based on a Rosario violation (failure to disclose a witness’s prior statement) after exhausting direct appeals must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the failure to disclose the Rosario material contributed to the verdict.

    Summary

    Erick Jackson was convicted of felony murder and arson. After his direct appeal failed, he moved to vacate his conviction under CPL 440.10, alleging a Rosario violation. The prosecution had failed to disclose a memorandum containing a synopsis of an interview with a prosecution witness. The Court of Appeals addressed whether the per se error rule for Rosario violations, typically applied on direct appeal, extends to collateral review via CPL 440.10 motions. The Court held that it does not; a defendant must demonstrate prejudice resulting from the Rosario violation when seeking relief under CPL 440.10 after exhausting direct appeals, requiring a showing that the non-disclosure reasonably could have contributed to the verdict.

    Facts

    Erick Jackson was convicted of felony murder and arson in connection with a fire at a supermarket that killed six firefighters.

    After his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, Jackson filed a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate his conviction.

    The motion alleged ineffective assistance of counsel and a Brady violation. The trial court also considered a Rosario claim.

    The People conceded that a memorandum summarizing an interview with a fire marshal, who later testified, was not provided to the defense, and that it was not a duplicative equivalent of other disclosed materials.

    Procedural History

    Jackson was convicted of felony murder and arson; his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.

    Jackson then filed a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate his conviction, which was granted by the trial court based on a Rosario violation, applying the per se error rule.

    The Appellate Division affirmed, also applying the per se error rule.

    The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the per se error rule applicable to Rosario violations on direct appeal extends to motions to vacate a conviction under CPL 440.10 after direct appeal has been exhausted, or whether the defendant must demonstrate prejudice.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant who has exhausted direct appeal and seeks to raise a Rosario claim via a CPL 440.10 motion must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the failure to disclose the Rosario material contributed to the verdict.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished between direct appeals and collateral attacks via CPL 440.10 motions.

    CPL 440.10(1)(f), relating to “improper and prejudicial conduct,” is the appropriate avenue for Rosario claims raised in a CPL 440.10 motion.

    CPL 440.10(1)(f) requires a showing of prejudice; the improper conduct must have affected the trial and prejudiced the defendant. “To prevail under CPL 440.10 (1) (f), however, a defendant must do more than demonstrate that the conduct at issue was improper. The statute by its very terms affords a remedy only if the defendant’s trial was affected by conduct that was both improper and prejudicial.”

    The per se error rule developed in Rosario cases on direct appeal was a policy decision, balancing defendant’s rights against society’s. However, CPL 440.10 requires a showing of prejudice, reflecting society’s interest in the finality of judgments.

    The Court adopted a “reasonable possibility” standard for prejudice, requiring the defendant to show that the failure to disclose the Rosario material “contributed to the verdict.” This aligns with the standard in Rosario itself and with Brady claims where a specific request was made.

    The Court emphasized that the per se error rule continues to apply to Rosario claims on direct appeal and when a Rosario claim is raised concurrently on direct appeal and in a CPL 440.10 motion (per People v. Novoa).

    The Court rejected the dissent’s view that the procedural distinction was arbitrary, emphasizing that it was an effort to balance the rights of the defendant against the interests of society, particularly the interest in the finality of judgments, given the lack of a time limit on CPL 440.10 motions.

  • People v. Angelakos, 70 N.Y.2d 670 (1987): Collateral Review of Plea Allocutions

    People v. Angelakos, 70 N.Y.2d 670 (1987)

    When the record of a plea proceeding contains sufficient facts to permit review of the plea allocution on direct appeal, the sufficiency of that allocution cannot be collaterally reviewed in a CPL 440.10 proceeding.

    Summary

    Angelakos pleaded guilty to robbery. Subsequently, he sought to withdraw the plea, arguing coercion and lack of understanding. Later, through counsel, he moved to vacate the conviction via CPL 440.10, alleging he didn’t admit to the elements of robbery during the plea. The County Court vacated the conviction, but the Appellate Division reversed, holding CPL 440.10 was inapplicable and that direct appeal was the proper method. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the record contained sufficient facts for review on direct appeal, collateral review via CPL 440.10 was barred, especially since Angelakos failed to perfect his initial direct appeal. This case clarifies the interplay between direct appeals and collateral attacks on plea allocutions.

    Facts

    On March 31, 1983, Angelakos pleaded guilty to second-degree robbery.
    He then sought to withdraw the plea, claiming coercion and lack of understanding regarding his rights.
    Later, represented by assigned counsel, he moved to vacate the conviction under CPL 440.10, arguing he never admitted to the elements of the crime during the plea allocution.
    He maintained he was unaware his companion intended to rob the business.

    Procedural History

    Angelakos pleaded guilty in County Court.
    The County Court initially set a hearing for the CPL 440.10 motion but later granted the motion to vacate the conviction based on the plea minutes.
    The Appellate Division reversed, denying the motion to vacate and reinstating the conviction, stating direct appeal was the correct method.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the sufficiency of a plea allocution, where sufficient facts appear on the record to permit review on direct appeal, can be challenged via a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate the conviction.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 440.10 is not a substitute for direct appeal when the defendant was in a position to raise an issue on appeal, or readily could have but failed to do so.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on CPL 440.10(2)(b) and (c), which mandate dismissal of a 440.10 motion if the judgment is appealable or pending appeal, and sufficient facts exist on the record for adequate review, or if such review was possible but didn’t occur due to the defendant’s failure to perfect an appeal. The purpose of these provisions is to prevent CPL 440.10 from being employed as a substitute for direct appeal. The court noted that Angelakos conceded that no hearing was required because sufficient facts appeared on the record to establish the insufficiency of the plea allocution. Because sufficient facts existed in the record to review the allocution, the proper avenue for review was a direct appeal, which Angelakos failed to perfect. The court emphasized that “[o]nly in the unusual situation that sufficient facts with respect to the issue do not appear on the record is a CPL 440.10 motion to vacate available as a means of review.” The court implied a strategic approach for defendants: “A defendant who is not sure that the record will ultimately be found to contain sufficient facts may protect himself against a holding that direct review is not warranted on the record presented by making a CPL 440.10 motion, but even if he wins that motion must preserve his direct appeal so that it can be consolidated with the People’s appeal from the nisi prius ruling on the motion.”

  • Matter of State of New York v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59 (1974): Limits on the Use of Prohibition

    Matter of State of New York v. King, 36 N.Y.2d 59 (1974)

    The extraordinary remedy of prohibition is available only when a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its authorized powers, and is not a means to seek collateral review of an error of law in a pending criminal action.

    Summary

    This case addresses the appropriate use of a writ of prohibition to challenge a lower court’s decision. The Court of Appeals held that prohibition is not available to correct mere errors of law within a court’s jurisdiction; it is reserved for instances where a court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter or acts in excess of its authorized powers. The court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, finding that the petition alleged only an error of law, not a jurisdictional defect, and therefore should have been dismissed. The decision emphasizes the limited scope of prohibition as a remedy.

    Facts

    The defendant in a criminal case was ordered by the Supreme Court to provide the prosecution with a written report of an examination conducted by a court-appointed psychiatrist. The defendant then sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Supreme Court from enforcing that order.

    Procedural History

    The defendant filed a petition for article 78 relief, in the nature of prohibition, in the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division ruled in favor of the defendant, preventing the Supreme Court from requiring the report. The State of New York appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Appellate Division erred in granting a petition for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Supreme Court from requiring a defendant to provide the prosecution with a written report of his examination by a court-appointed psychiatrist.

    Holding

    Yes, because the extraordinary remedy of prohibition lies only where a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its authorized powers, and is not available as a means of seeking collateral review of an error of law in a pending criminal action.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that prohibition is an extraordinary remedy that is only available in limited circumstances. Citing Matter of State of New York v King, 36 NY2d 59, 62, the court reiterated that prohibition lies only where a court “acts or threatens to act without jurisdiction in a matter over which it has no power over the subject matter or where it exceeds its authorized powers in a proceeding over which it has jurisdiction.” The court emphasized that prohibition is not a substitute for appeal and cannot be used to correct errors of law. The court found that the defendant’s petition alleged no more than an error of law, and therefore the remedy of prohibition was not appropriate. The court did not address the merits of the underlying claim regarding the report from the psychiatrist, as the procedural issue was dispositive. The court emphasized the importance of maintaining the separation of powers and preventing unwarranted interference with ongoing judicial proceedings through the misuse of extraordinary remedies.