New York Law Review

Tag: Codefendant

  • People v. Vasquez, 70 N.Y.2d 84 (1987): Attorney-Client Privilege and Third-Party Presence

    People v. Vasquez, 70 N.Y.2d 84 (1987)

    The attorney-client privilege does not apply when communications are made in the presence of a third party, particularly a codefendant with potentially adverse interests, unless a common defense is being mounted, and the client has a reasonable expectation of confidentiality under the circumstances.

    Summary

    Vasquez was convicted of criminal possession of a weapon based on the statutory presumption of possession arising from his presence in a car where a gun was found. He argued that he should have been allowed to present evidence of a conversation between his codefendant Pena and Pena’s attorney, which Vasquez translated, to rebut the presumption. The trial court excluded the evidence based on attorney-client privilege. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Pena had no reasonable expectation of confidentiality because Vasquez, a codefendant with potentially adverse interests, was present, and there was no common defense being mounted. Therefore, the exclusion of the evidence was prejudicial error.

    Facts

    Vasquez and two codefendants, Pena and Mejia, were accused of robbing stereo equipment. The theft occurred when the Ridleys offered to sell equipment to the defendants, who were in a parked car. An argument arose, and Pena drove off with the equipment. The Ridleys pursued them to a gas station. John Ridley approached the car, and Pena allegedly pressed a gun to his ribs. There was conflicting testimony about whether Vasquez also got out of the car with the gun. Police apprehended the three defendants; Pena was driving, Mejia in the front passenger seat, and Vasquez in the back. The stereo equipment was in the front, and a handgun was found under papers on the floor of the rear seat.

    Procedural History

    Vasquez, Pena, and Mejia were charged with robbery and criminal possession of a weapon. Mejia’s charges were dismissed during trial. The jury found Pena guilty of robbery, petit larceny, and criminal possession of a weapon. Vasquez was convicted only of criminal possession of a weapon, third degree, and acquitted of the other charges. Vasquez appealed, arguing the trial court erred in preventing him from presenting evidence to rebut the statutory presumption of possession based on attorney-client privilege. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the attorney-client privilege protects statements made by a client to their attorney in the presence of a codefendant who is acting as an interpreter.

    Holding

    1. No, because Pena had no reasonable expectation of confidentiality in the presence of Vasquez, a codefendant with potentially adverse interests, given that they were not mounting a common defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that the attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between a client and their attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. However, communications made in the presence of a third party are generally not privileged, unless an exception applies. One exception is for statements made to the attorney’s employees or agents. The scope of the privilege depends on whether the client had a reasonable expectation of confidentiality under the circumstances. The Court noted that a defendant does not generally enjoy a confidential privilege when communicating with counsel in the presence of another codefendant unless they are mounting a common defense. In this case, the court found that Vasquez was merely providing an accommodation as an interpreter, and the codefendants’ interests were potentially adverse. Thus, Pena had no reasonable expectation of confidentiality. The court stated, “It was Pena’s responsibility to establish facts sufficient to support the privilege and he failed to do so.” The court also found that the exclusion of this evidence was not harmless error because the jury’s verdict likely rested on the statutory presumption of possession, which Vasquez was entitled to rebut. The excluded testimony may have created enough doubt to rebut the presumption. The court emphasized, “Manifestly, the jury rejected the People’s claim, based on Ridley’s testimony, that defendant actually possessed the weapon because it acquitted him of the counts charging robbery, larceny and criminal possession, second degree. His conviction of simple possession must have rested on the presumption therefore and defendant Vas entitled to rebut it by introducing evidence tending to prove that Pena possessed the gun.”

  • People v. Diaz, 19 N.Y.2d 547 (1967): Accomplice Testimony and the Requirement of Corroboration

    People v. Diaz, 19 N.Y.2d 547 (1967)

    A conviction cannot stand solely on the testimony of an accomplice, including a codefendant testifying in their own defense, unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence connecting the defendant to the crime.

    Summary

    Diaz and Green were charged with grand larceny and related crimes. At trial, Green, a codefendant, testified against Diaz, implicating him in the crime. The trial court refused to instruct the jury that Green’s testimony required corroboration, believing it unnecessary when the accomplice is a codefendant. The Appellate Division agreed this was error, but deemed it harmless. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the jury should have been instructed on the need for corroboration of accomplice testimony, regardless of whether the accomplice is a codefendant, and that the error was not harmless because the jury’s verdict may have relied heavily on Green’s uncorroborated testimony.

    Facts

    Police officers observed Diaz driving a car pushing another car, which was later identified as stolen, with Green behind the wheel of the stolen vehicle. As the officers approached, Green fled. Diaz drove off. Green testified against Diaz at trial, detailing Diaz’s involvement in the crime and identifying a transmission in Diaz’s car as belonging to the stolen vehicle.

    Procedural History

    Diaz was convicted of concealing and withholding stolen property. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, acknowledging that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury about the need for corroboration of accomplice testimony, but held the error harmless. Diaz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a conviction can be upheld when based on the uncorroborated testimony of a codefendant implicating the defendant in the commission of a crime, where the trial court failed to instruct the jury that accomplice testimony requires corroboration under Section 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    Holding

    No, because Section 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure mandates corroboration of accomplice testimony, and this requirement applies regardless of whether the accomplice is a codefendant testifying in their own defense; therefore, the failure to so instruct the jury was prejudicial error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the plain language of Section 399, which states, “A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless he be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.” The court found no basis in the statute to distinguish between an accomplice who is merely a witness and one who is a codefendant testifying in their own behalf. The court noted that the jury might have relied heavily on Green’s testimony, particularly regarding the transmission, which was a key piece of evidence. The court reasoned that, despite the existence of other evidence, the jury could have discredited that evidence, leaving Green’s uncorroborated testimony as the primary basis for the conviction. Quoting People v. Wallin, 32 Cal. 2d 803, 809, the court stated: “‘Although there was evidence which, if believed, was corroborative of the testimony of [the accomplice], defendant was clearly prejudiced by the refusal to give the requested instructions, since the jury in considering the credibility of witnesses may have rejected the corrobative evidence leaving the testimony of the accomplice to stand alone.’” The court also addressed the argument that a codefendant might be less likely to seek leniency by implicating another, stating that the District Attorney’s office could still have offered a lighter sentence to Green in exchange for his testimony against Diaz. Therefore, the court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, emphasizing the importance of instructing the jury on the need for corroboration of accomplice testimony to ensure a fair trial.