New York Law Review

Tag: Co-defendant Confession

  • People v. Watkins, 55 N.Y.2d 890 (1981): Co-defendant’s Confession and Right to Confrontation

    People v. Watkins, 55 N.Y.2d 890 (1981)

    A defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation is not satisfied by the opportunity to cross-examine a co-defendant at a pre-trial suppression hearing, especially when the co-defendant denies making the incriminating statement.

    Summary

    Watkins was convicted in a joint trial with a co-defendant, Cruz, after Cruz’s confession implicating Watkins was admitted into evidence. Cruz had denied making the statement at a pre-trial suppression hearing, where Watkins’ attorney declined to cross-examine him. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal of Watkins’ conviction, holding that the admission of Cruz’s statement violated Watkins’ right to confrontation under Bruton v. United States. The court reasoned that the opportunity to cross-examine Cruz at the suppression hearing did not substitute for the right to confrontation at trial, particularly since Cruz denied making the statement, removing any reason for cross-examination at that stage.

    Facts

    Rafael Cruz and Watkins were co-defendants in a criminal case. At a pre-trial suppression hearing concerning a statement Cruz allegedly made, Cruz testified and denied making an inculpatory statement that implicated Watkins. Watkins’ attorney did not cross-examine Cruz during the suppression hearing. Cruz’s statement implicating Watkins was later admitted into evidence at their joint trial, despite Watkins’ objection. Neither Cruz nor Watkins testified at trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Cruz’s motion to suppress his statement, as well as Watkins’ motion for a severance. Watkins was convicted based on the jury’s verdict. The Appellate Division reversed Watkins’ conviction and granted a new trial, finding that admitting Cruz’s statement violated the principles established in Bruton v. United States. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant at a joint trial, where the co-defendant denied making the statement at a pre-trial suppression hearing where the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine, violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.

    Holding

    No, because the opportunity for cross-examination at a pre-trial suppression hearing does not satisfy a defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation, particularly when the co-defendant denies making the alleged statement.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Bruton v. United States, which held that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when a facially incriminating confession of a non-testifying co-defendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the co-defendant. The court distinguished the pre-trial suppression hearing from a trial, emphasizing that the opportunity for cross-examination at the suppression hearing does not fulfill the constitutional requirement of confrontation. The court stated, “The opportunity for cross-examination at a pretrial suppression hearing does not satisfy a defendant’s constitutional right of confrontation.” Furthermore, because Cruz denied making the statement at the suppression hearing, there was no reason for Watkins’ attorney to cross-examine him at that stage. The key principle is that the defendant must have a meaningful opportunity to confront and cross-examine the witness at trial to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. The court reasoned that because Cruz did not testify at trial, Watkins was denied his right to confront and cross-examine him regarding the incriminating statement. The decision underscores the importance of the right to confrontation at trial and highlights the limitations of pre-trial proceedings in satisfying that right. This case is significant because it clarifies that a pre-trial opportunity for cross-examination does not cure a Bruton violation when the co-defendant’s confession is admitted at trial and the co-defendant does not testify.

  • People v. Safian, 46 N.Y.2d 181 (1978): Co-Defendant Confessions and the Bruton Rule Exception

    People v. Safian, 46 N.Y.2d 181 (1978)

    When codefendants have made full and voluntary confessions that are substantially identical, the admission of one codefendant’s confession at a joint trial does not violate the other codefendant’s right to confrontation under the Bruton rule, provided proper limiting instructions are given.

    Summary

    David Safian and Robert Miner were convicted of murder for the killing of Safian’s wife, with Miner confessing to being hired by Safian. At their joint trial, each defendant’s confession was admitted with limiting instructions. Safian argued that the admission of Miner’s confession violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under Bruton v. United States. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that because the confessions were substantially identical, there was no significant risk of prejudice to Safian, and therefore, no Bruton violation.

    Facts

    David Safian, separated from his wife, unsuccessfully tried to reconcile in April 1975. He then told his wife that their daughter would eventually live with him. On March 5, 1975, Safian met Robert Miner. Safian confessed to telling Miner he was “looking for some crazy guy to take care of this girl I know.” Miner asked for $1,500, and they agreed on $1,000. Safian showed Miner his wife’s home, workplace, and car. On May 2, 1975, Deborah Safian was stabbed to death. A neighbor saw a man on a motorcycle leaving the scene. Miner owned a similar motorcycle, and his jacket had blood matching the victim’s type.

    Procedural History

    Safian and Miner were jointly tried and convicted of murder. Safian appealed, arguing that the admission of Miner’s confession violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, as established in Bruton v. United States. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Safian appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the admission of a codefendant’s confession at a joint trial violates a defendant’s right to confrontation when the defendant has also made a full and voluntary confession substantially identical to the codefendant’s.

    Holding

    1. No, because where each defendant has made a full and voluntary confession which is almost identical, the Bruton rule does not require reversal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the exception to the Bruton rule established in People v. McNeil, which holds that when codefendants have made “full and voluntary confession which is almost identical to the confessions of his codefendants,” there is no Bruton violation. The court found that Safian’s confession was “susceptible of only one interpretation: Safian hired Miner to kill his wife.” While Safian used the euphemism of the street, “take care of,” instead of “kill,” the court found no ambiguity. The court reasoned that the proximity in time between Safian’s admitted meetings with Miner and the homicide, coupled with Safian pointing out the victim’s residence and automobile to Miner, further supported the conclusion that Safian hired Miner to kill his wife. The court emphasized that the jury had Safian’s own detailed confession, which diminished any risk of undue prejudice from Miner’s confession. The right to confrontation is of diminished usefulness when the co-defendant’s confession tracks almost exactly the defendant’s own story. The court noted the purpose of Bruton is to prevent conviction based on a codefendant’s confession, but in this case, Safian’s own confession was overwhelming evidence of his guilt. The court also addressed the prosecutor’s improper summation, deeming it harmless error due to the trial justice’s careful instructions and the overwhelming evidence against Safian. The court also held that because the only crime of which Safian could be guilty, on any view of the evidence, was that of intentional murder, the defendant was not entitled to a charge of lesser included crimes.

  • People v. Streiff, 41 A.D.2d 259 (1973): When a Joint Trial Unduly Prejudices a Defendant

    People v. Streiff, 41 A.D.2d 259 (1973)

    A defendant is entitled to a separate trial when a co-defendant’s statement, inadmissible against the defendant, is so incriminating that it substantially prejudices the defendant’s right to a fair trial, especially when the evidence against the defendant, standing alone, is weak.

    Summary

    Charles Streiff was convicted of felony murder along with co-defendants Davis and Payne. Streiff appealed, arguing he was prejudiced by the joint trial because Payne’s statement, which implicated all three men in an attempted rape that led to the victim’s death, was admitted into evidence. The New York Court of Appeals reversed Streiff’s conviction, holding that the joint trial prejudiced Streiff because Payne’s statement filled critical gaps in the prosecution’s case against Streiff, and without it, a conviction for felony murder would have been unlikely. The court affirmed the convictions of Davis and Payne.

    Facts

    Martha Kirk went missing, and her car was found at Merrill’s restaurant. Her body was later discovered, and an autopsy revealed she had been strangled. Streiff, Davis, and Payne were identified as patrons of Merrill’s on the night Kirk disappeared. Initially, they denied involvement, but later signed statements admitting some degree of involvement and implicating each other. The statements generally agreed that they found Kirk drunk and unconscious in her car, moved her to their vehicle, and drove to a secluded area. However, their accounts of what happened in the secluded area differed significantly, particularly between Streiff and Payne. Payne’s statement included graphic details implying an attempted rape, which was the predicate felony for the felony murder charge.

    Procedural History

    Streiff moved for a severance and separate trial, which was denied. All three defendants were tried together and convicted of felony murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. Streiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the denial of his motion for a separate trial was prejudicial error.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Streiff’s motion for a separate trial, thereby prejudicing his right to a fair trial due to the admission of a co-defendant’s (Payne’s) statement that was highly incriminating but inadmissible against Streiff.

    Holding

    Yes, because without Payne’s statement, the possibility of Streiff’s conviction for felony murder was remote, and Payne’s statement so clearly and ineradicably charted the course to guilt. “In a case where, without the existence of a confession by one defendant, the evidence against another would be too weak to justify a conviction or even where a conviction would be doubtful, our review of the judgment would compel us to conclude that an abuse of discretion had been committed.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while the decision to grant a separate trial is discretionary, appellate courts can review whether that discretion was abused and resulted in injustice. The court acknowledged that the introduction of a co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant could violate the defendant’s right to confront witnesses, but this right was not violated here because the co-defendants testified. However, the court emphasized that the right to a separate trial is broader than the right to confrontation. The court recognized the risk that a jury might consider evidence against all defendants collectively, despite instructions to consider each defendant separately. While the possibility of prejudice is discounted when the defendant’s own statement is nearly identical to the co-defendant’s or when independent proof of guilt is substantial, neither condition was met in Streiff’s case.

    The court found that Streiff’s own statement, even if it established criminal conduct, did not definitively establish the attempted rape necessary for a felony murder conviction. Payne’s statement, however, filled this gap. The court stated, “From a purely legal standpoint, Payne’s admission that he lay next to the naked girl with his erect penis exposed, shows that he at least ‘carr[ied] the project forward within dangerous proximity to the criminal end to be attained.’” The court concluded that it could not confidently say the jury disregarded Payne’s statement when convicting Streiff, particularly because Payne implicated Streiff by claiming Streiff was present during the attempted rape. Therefore, the joint trial substantially prejudiced Streiff’s rights, necessitating a separate trial. As the court put it, “Cast out the [codefendant’s] confessions and the result would need to be the same” and this was not the case here.

  • People v. Zavarro, 32 N.Y.2d 6 (1973): Admissibility of Co-Defendant’s Confession in Joint Trial

    People v. Zavarro, 32 N.Y.2d 6 (1973)

    In a joint trial, the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession that implicates the other defendant violates the implicated defendant’s right to confrontation, even if the jury is instructed that the confession is only admissible against the confessing defendant.

    Summary

    Isaac and Mark Zavarro were jointly tried for arson. Isaac made an admission to a private party that implicated Mark in the crime. Neither defendant testified, nor did either confess to the police. The trial judge instructed the jury that Isaac’s admission was only admissible against Isaac. The New York Court of Appeals held that admitting Isaac’s confession in the joint trial was reversible error as to Mark, violating his right to confrontation. The court reasoned that the instruction was insufficient to cure the prejudice, and Mark should have been granted a separate trial. Isaac’s conviction was affirmed, while Mark’s was reversed.

    Facts

    Two brothers, Isaac and Mark Zavarro, were jointly charged and tried for arson.
    Neither brother testified at trial.
    Neither brother gave a confession to the police.
    Isaac made an admission to a private party that implicated Mark in the arson.
    This admission was the only evidence connecting Mark to the crime.

    Procedural History

    Isaac and Mark Zavarro were jointly tried and convicted of arson in a lower court.
    Mark appealed his conviction, arguing that the admission of Isaac’s statement violated his right to confrontation.
    The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant in a joint trial violates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, even when the jury is instructed that the confession is only admissible against the co-defendant.

    Holding

    No, because under the rule established in Bruton v. United States, introducing a co-defendant’s confession that implicates another defendant is prejudicial and violates the defendant’s right to cross-examination, and this prejudice is not cured by jury instructions that the confession should only be considered against the confessing co-defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the principles established in Bruton v. United States, holding that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession implicating the defendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to only consider the confession against the co-defendant.
    The court found that the trial judge’s instruction was insufficient to eradicate the error, especially since the confession was the only evidence connecting Mark to the crime.
    The court reasoned that because effective redaction of Isaac’s statement was impossible, Mark should have been granted a separate trial. The court emphasized that the admission was made after the fire and was not in furtherance of any conspiracy.
    The court stated that the trial judge’s instruction effectively precluded the jury from considering the conspiracy argument.

  • People v. Anthony, 24 N.Y.2d 696 (1969): Co-Defendant Confessions and the Right to Confrontation

    People v. Anthony, 24 N.Y.2d 696 (1969)

    The admission of a co-defendant’s confession that implicates another defendant at a joint trial violates the implicated defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation if the co-defendant does not testify and is not subject to cross-examination.

    Summary

    Defendants Anthony and Batten were convicted of murder. Anthony confessed to the crime, implicating Batten. Batten also gave a statement. At their joint trial, Anthony did not testify. The court instructed the jury that Anthony’s confession was only admissible against Anthony. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed Anthony’s conviction but reversed Batten’s conviction, holding that the admission of Anthony’s confession violated Batten’s Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him, as Anthony did not testify and was not subject to cross-examination. The court emphasized that the prosecutor’s summation exacerbated the prejudice.

    Facts

    Three butchers were murdered at the Spring Valley Meat Market. Carl Gilbert, an employee, told police that Anthony, a co-employee, had fired a gun in the market’s rear yard a month prior. Anthony initially admitted owning a .32 caliber gun and firing it but later claimed he sold it. Ballistics tests linked bullets from the victims and a shell casing from the yard to Anthony’s gun. Anthony confessed to the murders, later implicating Batten in the planning and execution. Batten initially denied involvement but later admitted Anthony told him about a planned robbery at the market and showed him money afterwards.

    Procedural History

    Both defendants challenged the voluntariness of their statements at a Huntley hearing. The trial court found the statements voluntary. They were tried jointly. The jury found both guilty of first-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. Anthony and Batten appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Anthony’s confession was admissible given his claim that it was involuntary.
    2. Whether Anthony was prejudiced by being tried jointly with Batten due to Batten’s statements implicating Anthony.
    3. Whether Batten’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated by the admission of Anthony’s confession implicating him, when Anthony did not testify.

    Holding

    1. No, because there was sufficient evidence to support the finding that Anthony’s statements were voluntarily made.
    2. No, because Batten testified and was subject to cross-examination, providing Anthony with the opportunity to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
    3. Yes, because Anthony’s confession, which implicated Batten, was admitted at their joint trial, and Anthony did not testify, depriving Batten of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witness against him.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding Anthony’s confession, the Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence to support the lower courts’ findings that the confession was voluntary. The court stated that the findings of the trial court and jury, affirmed by the Appellate Division, cannot be disturbed unless they are “incredible as a matter of law or unless the inferences drawn from conflicting testimony are not supported by sufficient evidence in the record.” The court also rejected Anthony’s Bruton claim, noting that because Batten testified and was subject to cross-examination, Anthony had the opportunity to confront him.

    However, regarding Batten, the court held that the admission of Anthony’s confession, which singled out Batten as the instigator and active participant, violated Batten’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under Bruton v. United States. The court quoted the prosecutor’s summation, which stated that Anthony’s confession was so intertwined that Batten could not be removed from it, highlighting the prejudice. The court stated: “Bruton v. United States (supra) mandates a reversal as to him since he was deprived of the precise Sixth Amendment right to confrontation which Bruton was deprived of when his codefendant Evans’ statement was admitted at their joint trial and Evans did not take the stand.” This prejudice, intensified by the prosecutor’s summation, required reversal of Batten’s conviction and a new trial.

  • People v. Pohl, 23 N.Y.2d 290 (1968): Use of Coram Nobis for Bruton Violations After Exhausting Appeals

    People v. Pohl, 23 N.Y.2d 290 (1968)

    When a defendant’s normal appellate process has been exhausted, relief from a joint trial conviction, based on the prejudicial impact of a co-defendant’s out-of-court statements violating Bruton v. United States, must be sought through a writ of error coram nobis.

    Summary

    Pohl was convicted of murder in 1950 after a joint trial with a co-defendant where both had made confessions implicating each other. The trial judge instructed the jury to only consider each confession against its maker. Years later, the Supreme Court decided Bruton v. United States, holding that such joint trials could be prejudicial. Pohl sought reargument of his appeal based on Bruton. The New York Court of Appeals denied reargument, holding that Pohl must seek relief via a writ of error coram nobis in the original trial court since his normal appellate process had been exhausted. This case establishes the procedure for seeking relief under Bruton in New York after direct appeals have concluded.

    Facts

    In 1950, Pohl and a co-defendant, Ploss, were jointly indicted and tried for first-degree murder. Both defendants had made oral and written confessions implicating each other in the crime. Prior to trial, Pohl’s motion for a separate trial was denied. During the trial, the judge instructed the jury that each defendant’s confession was admissible only against that defendant, not against the other.

    Procedural History

    The Erie County Court found Pohl and Ploss guilty, and both were sentenced to life imprisonment. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The New York Court of Appeals upheld that determination. Years later, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruton v. United States, Pohl sought reargument of his appeal in the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, whose normal appellate process has been exhausted, can seek relief from a conviction obtained in a joint trial where a co-defendant’s confession, implicating the defendant, was admitted into evidence, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruton v. United States, via a motion for reargument or whether the defendant must seek relief via writ of error coram nobis?

    Holding

    No, because in cases where the normal appellate process has been exhausted, relief must be sought by resort to a writ of error coram nobis.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Bruton v. United States and Roberts v. Russell established that a defendant tried jointly with a co-defendant may be prejudiced by the latter’s extra-judicial statements which implicate him, even with jury instructions to disregard them. Bruton was made retroactive and applicable to the states. However, because Pohl had already exhausted his normal appellate process, the Court of Appeals determined that the appropriate avenue for seeking relief was a writ of error coram nobis in the original trial court. The court emphasized judicial economy, stating that using coram nobis “will avoid burdening this court and the Appellate Division, as well as other appellate courts.” The court explicitly stated that “in all cases in which the normal appellate process has been exhausted or is no longer available… a defendant complaining of the prejudicial impact upon him of a codefendant’s out-of-court statements at a joint trial must seek relief by resort to a writ of error coram nobis.” This decision provides a procedural mechanism for defendants in New York to raise Bruton claims after their direct appeals have concluded.