New York Law Review

Tag: Claim of Right Defense

  • People v. Pagan, 19 N.Y.3d 91 (2012): Claim of Right and Mistake of Fact Defenses in Robbery

    People v. Pagan, 19 N.Y.3d 91 (2012)

    In a robbery case, a defendant’s claim that they mistakenly believed the property they were taking was theirs is equivalent to a claim of right defense, and neither defense is permissible where the defendant used force to take fungible currency.

    Summary

    Debra Pagan was convicted of attempted robbery in the second degree after an altercation with a cab driver over change. Pagan argued that she mistakenly believed the money she was trying to take from the cab driver was rightfully hers. The New York Court of Appeals held that, in this context, Pagan’s “mistake of fact” defense was indistinguishable from a “claim of right” defense, which is not a valid defense when force is used to take money, especially fungible currency, even if the defendant honestly believes they are entitled to it. The court emphasized the risk of violence inherent in such situations.

    Facts

    Debra Pagan hailed a cab, stating she only had $4, though the minimum fare was $6. The driver agreed to the lower amount. Upon arrival, Pagan gave the driver a $1 bill and a $20 bill, later claiming she was owed $17 in change, despite the driver returning the $1 bill. Pagan then demanded the $20 back and offered $4 from the $16 in change to the driver, who refused, stating she was paying him with his own money. The cab’s security locks were activated, preventing Pagan from leaving. When the driver said he would take her to the police, she put the $16 on the console. As the driver headed to the police precinct, Pagan tried to grab the $16, scratching and biting his hand. She then brandished a knife and demanded the money. Police officers intervened, arresting Pagan.

    Procedural History

    Pagan was indicted on charges including attempted robbery. At trial, she requested a jury instruction on mistake of fact, arguing she believed the money was hers. The trial court denied this, giving instead a negative claim of right instruction. Pagan was convicted of attempted robbery in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for a mistake of fact jury instruction.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in giving a negative claim of right instruction to the jury.
    3. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support the conviction.

    Holding

    1. No, because under these facts, the mistake of fact defense is equivalent to a claim of right defense, which is not permitted in robbery cases involving the use of force.
    2. No, because the negative claim of right instruction was proper under the circumstances, as the money at issue was fungible currency.
    3. Yes, because the jury could have rationally concluded that the defendant did not have a good faith belief that the bills she tried to take were hers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that robbery involves “forcible stealing,” and while a claim of right is a defense to larceny, it is limited in robbery cases due to the risk of injury. The court stated, “Forcibly taking the property of another, even when one honestly believes it to be one’s own property ‘entails the risk of physical or mental injury to individuals’”. In Pagan’s case, her claim that she mistakenly believed the money was hers was equivalent to a claim of right. The court emphasized that a mistake of fact defense, like a claim of right defense, does not apply when force is used to take money to satisfy a preexisting debt. Regarding the negative claim of right instruction, the court noted that currency is generally considered fungible, and therefore, a defendant cannot have a true claim to specific bills unless they have unique characteristics. The court distinguished this from taking a specific chattel, like a painting, where a good faith belief of ownership might negate larcenous intent. The Court found that the evidence supported the jury’s conclusion that Pagan knew the money was not hers and was attempting to take it by force. The court reasoned that the People disproved the defense by presenting evidence that Pagan negotiated a $4 fare, tried to pay with the driver’s change, scratched and bit the driver, and produced a knife.

  • People v. Zona, 14 N.Y.3d 486 (2010): Good Faith Claim of Right Defense in Larceny

    People v. Zona, 14 N.Y.3d 486 (2010)

    A defendant in a larceny case is entitled to a jury instruction on the good faith claim of right defense if there is any reasonable view of the evidence, viewed most favorably to the defendant, that he honestly believed he had a right to the property, regardless of whether that belief was reasonable.

    Summary

    Defendant, a deputy sheriff, was convicted of petit larceny for taking tires and other items from a Sheriff’s Department surplus warehouse after being told by a superior officer that he could take what he wanted. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the good faith claim of right defense. The Court reasoned that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that the defendant honestly believed he had permission to take the property, regardless of whether that belief was reasonable. This case clarifies that subjective good faith, not objective reasonableness, is the critical inquiry for the claim of right defense.

    Facts

    Defendant, a deputy sheriff, was instructed by Undersheriff Larson to move property from a surplus warehouse. Larson told defendant and other deputies that they could take what they wanted from the warehouse. Defendant took five new tires, a boat, and a filing cabinet. He traded the tires for credit towards new tires for his own vehicle. Later, after learning Larson may not have had authority to give the items away, defendant returned the boat and filing cabinet and attempted to repurchase the tires.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was indicted for petit larceny. The trial court denied defendant’s request to instruct the jury on the good faith claim of right defense. The jury convicted defendant. The Appellate Division reversed, ordering a new trial, finding a reasonable view of the evidence supported the defense. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the good faith claim of right defense, where the defendant claimed he took the property based on a superior officer’s permission.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was a reasonable view of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, that the defendant had a good faith belief that he had the right to take the property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated the applicable rule: “In determining whether to instruct a jury on a claimed defense, the court must view the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to the defendant.” The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support the defendant’s claim that he honestly believed his superior officer had the authority to give him the property. The court emphasized that subjective good faith, not reasonableness, is the test. The court also rejected the argument that a defendant must prove prior ownership or possession to assert the claim of right defense, stating that the defense requires only a good faith belief “that the property was appropriated under a claim of right” (Penal Law § 155.15 [1]). The court noted that inconsistencies in the evidence are for the jury to resolve and do not relieve the trial court of its obligation to instruct the jury on a defense if supported by the evidence. Quoting People v. Butts, 72 N.Y.2d 746, 750 (1988), the court stated that even “inconsistency in claimed defenses or even between a defendant’s testimony and a defense ‘should not deprive [the] defendant of the requested charge’ if the charge would otherwise be warranted by the evidence”. The dissent argued that the defendant’s actions, such as lying about how he obtained the tires and attempting to conceal his actions, demonstrated that he knew his actions were illegal and therefore could not have had a good faith belief in his right to take the property.

  • People v. Green, 5 N.Y.3d 540 (2005): Claim of Right Defense Not Applicable in Robbery Cases

    5 N.Y.3d 540 (2005)

    A defendant in a robbery prosecution is not entitled to a claim-of-right jury instruction, even if they believed in good faith that the property taken was theirs, because the statutory claim-of-right defense is limited to larceny by trespass or embezzlement, and public policy discourages forcible self-help.

    Summary

    Green was convicted of robbery for forcibly taking a disc player from Pabon, believing it was his stolen property. At trial, Green requested a jury instruction on the claim-of-right defense, arguing he lacked the intent to steal. The trial court denied the request, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the claim-of-right defense is unavailable in robbery prosecutions. The Court reasoned that the Legislature limited the defense to larceny by trespass or embezzlement, and allowing it in robbery cases would encourage the use of force to recover property. While a defendant can argue lack of intent, they are not entitled to a specific claim-of-right jury instruction.

    Facts

    Defendant Green forcibly took a disc player from Pabon, believing Pabon was among a group who had previously stolen Green’s own disc player. Green approached Pabon, snatched the disc player, and walked away. Pabon followed, asking for it back, at which point one of Green’s associates punched Pabon. Green testified that he believed Pabon was one of the individuals who had stolen his disc player because Pabon resembled one of them and was holding a similar disc player.

    Procedural History

    Green and an associate were charged with second-degree robbery and criminal possession of stolen property. The trial court denied Green’s request for a jury instruction on the claim-of-right defense. Green was convicted on all counts. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a defendant, prosecuted for robbery of a specific chattel, who in good faith believed that the property was his, is entitled to a “claim-of-right” jury instruction?

    Holding

    1. No, because the Legislature has limited the availability of the statutory claim-of-right defense to prosecutions for larceny by trespass or embezzlement, and public policy considerations militate against encouraging the use of forcible self-help to recover property.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Penal Law § 155.15(1) provides a claim-of-right defense only for larceny committed by trespassory taking or embezzlement. While a good-faith claim of right negates larcenous intent, this does not automatically extend the defense to robbery cases. The Court acknowledged that robbery is essentially larceny accomplished through force, but the Legislature’s explicit limitation of the claim-of-right defense to specific larceny offenses indicates a deliberate choice not to extend it to crimes involving force. Citing People v. Reid, 69 N.Y.2d 469 (1987), the Court emphasized that if the Legislature intended to excuse forcible taking, it would have explicitly stated so. The court highlighted the policy concerns associated with encouraging self-help through force. A specific jury instruction on claim-of-right defense would give the defendant an unfair advantage by emphasizing one aspect of the proof. The court noted that a defendant can still argue lack of intent based on a claim of right, but is not entitled to a special jury instruction on the defense: “However, simply because a jury might be convinced by a claim-of-right argument, it does not follow that a claim-of-right charge, derived from a statutory defense limited to certain types of larceny, is also available to defendants in robbery prosecutions.”