Tag: Civil Union

  • Debra H. v. Janice R., 14 N.Y.3d 576 (2010): Parental Rights of Same-Sex Civil Union Partners

    Debra H. v. Janice R., 14 N.Y.3d 576 (2010)

    New York will recognize parentage created by a civil union in Vermont, allowing a partner in the civil union to seek visitation and custody of a child born to the other partner during the civil union.

    Summary

    Debra H. sought visitation and custody of M.R., a child born to her civil union partner, Janice R., through artificial insemination. The New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed its prior holding in Alison D., stating that, generally, only biological or adoptive parents have standing to seek visitation. However, the Court recognized Debra H. as M.R.’s parent based on comity, as Vermont law considers both partners in a civil union to be parents of a child born to either partner during the union. The case was remitted for a best-interest hearing to determine visitation and custody.

    Facts

    Janice R. is the biological mother of M.R., conceived through artificial insemination. Janice R. and Debra H. entered into a civil union in Vermont before M.R.’s birth. Janice R. repeatedly refused Debra H.’s requests to adopt M.R. After their separation, Janice R. initially allowed Debra H. supervised visits but later cut off all communication. Debra H. then sought joint legal and physical custody of M.R.

    Procedural History

    Debra H. filed a proceeding in Supreme Court seeking custody and visitation. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Debra H., invoking equitable estoppel. Janice R. appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, citing Alison D., stating that only biological or adoptive parents have standing. Debra H. appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether New York should recognize a non-biological, non-adoptive individual as a parent based on equitable estoppel, thus allowing them to seek visitation and custody.
    2. Whether, under the principles of comity, New York should recognize Debra H. as M.R.’s parent because of her status as a civil union partner under Vermont law, thereby granting her standing to seek visitation and custody.

    Holding

    1. No, because parentage under New York law derives from biology or adoption, as affirmed in Alison D.
    2. Yes, because comity should be extended to recognize parentage created by a civil union in Vermont, allowing Debra H. to seek visitation and custody in a best-interest hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reaffirmed its holding in Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651 (1991), which established that only biological or adoptive parents have standing to seek visitation under Domestic Relations Law § 70. The Court rejected the argument that equitable estoppel could be invoked to grant standing to a non-biological, non-adoptive individual, finding that parentage under New York law derives from biology or adoption. The Court distinguished Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D., 7 N.Y.3d 320 (2006), which addressed paternity by estoppel for child support purposes, stating it did not overrule or erode Alison D. The Court emphasized the importance of a bright-line rule to provide certainty for parents and children. The Court stated that any change in the meaning of “parent” under the law should come from legislative enactment. As the Court stated, “Alison D., in conjunction with second-parent adoption, creates a bright-line rule that promotes certainty in the wake of domestic breakups otherwise fraught with the risk of disruptive . . . battle[s] over parentage.

    However, the Court addressed the unique circumstance of the Vermont civil union. Under Vermont law, partners in a civil union have the same rights and responsibilities as spouses in a marriage, including those related to children born during the union. Citing Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912 A.2d 951 (Vt. 2006), the Court recognized that Vermont law would consider Debra H. a parent of M.R. because the child was born during the civil union. The Court then invoked the doctrine of comity, which allows one state to defer to the laws and policies of another. The Court reasoned that recognizing Debra H. as M.R.’s parent due to the Vermont civil union would not conflict with New York’s public policy, given that New York allows second-parent adoption for same-sex couples. The Court stated, “New York will accord comity to recognize parentage created by an adoption in a foreign nation… We see no reason to withhold equivalent recognition where someone is a parent under a sister state’s law.” Accordingly, the Court reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the case to Supreme Court for a best-interest hearing to determine visitation and custody, with Debra H. recognized as M.R.’s parent under New York law for the purpose of standing.