New York Law Review

Tag: Civil Service Law § 73

  • Matter of Hurwitz v. Perales, 81 N.Y.2d 123 (1993): Minimum Due Process Requirements Before Termination of Employment

    Matter of Hurwitz v. Perales, 81 N.Y.2d 123 (1993)

    Before terminating a public employee under Civil Service Law § 73, due process requires only that the employee receive an explanation of the grounds for discharge and an opportunity to respond; a formal hearing is not required at the pre-termination stage.

    Summary

    This case addresses the extent of due process required before terminating a public employee for continuous absence due to disability under Civil Service Law § 73. Nadine Hurwitz, a long-term employee of the Department of Social Services (DSS), was terminated after being on sick leave for a year. The Court of Appeals held that DSS provided Hurwitz with adequate pre-termination due process. Hurwitz was informed of the reasons for her potential termination and given opportunities to submit medical documentation and discuss her condition with DSS and its medical personnel. The court emphasized that a full hearing is not required pre-termination, only an opportunity to respond.

    Facts

    Nadine Hurwitz, a DSS employee, went on sick leave due to labyrinthitis. DSS informed her that her leave would extend to February 1988 and she needed medical documentation to return. Hurwitz submitted a letter from her physician requesting part-time work. DSS required an examination by Dr. Ambewadikar, who concluded Hurwitz couldn’t perform her duties. Hurwitz protested, requesting an appeal, but was told there was no formal appeal. She discussed the report with Dr. Ambewadikar and her supervisor, but withdrew her challenge before a second examination could occur. DSS then terminated her employment.

    Procedural History

    Hurwitz filed an Article 78 proceeding, claiming she was denied due process. The Supreme Court initially granted the petition, but on remand, DSS held a hearing limited to her absence and ability to perform duties, and again decided to terminate her. Hurwitz commenced another Article 78 proceeding, challenging the sufficiency of the pre-termination hearing. The Appellate Division remanded for a hearing on her present ability to perform the duties. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the pre-termination procedures afforded to the petitioner, specifically the notice and opportunity to respond to the medical evaluation, satisfied the requirements of due process before termination under Civil Service Law § 73?

    Holding

    Yes, because the petitioner was given adequate notice of the grounds for her potential termination and a meaningful opportunity to respond to the findings of the DSS’s medical evaluation prior to her discharge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court relied on Matter of Prue v Hunt, which adopted the principles of Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v Loudermill, holding that due process requires pre-termination notice and some opportunity to be heard, but not a formal hearing. The court emphasized that due process at the pre-termination stage need only serve as “an initial check against mistaken decisions” and need not definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge (quoting Loudermill). In this case, Hurwitz received notice and had several opportunities to challenge the medical evaluation, submit medical documentation, and discuss her condition with DSS personnel. The court noted that the ultimate validity of the medical evaluation is a matter for the post-termination hearing. The court stated that “the procedure must only be sufficient to serve as ‘an initial check against mistaken decisions’ and it ‘need not definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge’ (Loudermill, supra, at 545-546).” The court concluded that the pre-termination process was sufficient to meet the minimal requirements of due process.

  • Prue v. Hunt, 78 N.Y.2d 364 (1991): Pre-Termination Hearings Required for Civil Service Terminations

    Prue v. Hunt, 78 N.Y.2d 364 (1991)

    Due process requires that a civil servant facing termination under Civil Service Law § 73 for disability-related absence receive pre-termination notice and an opportunity to be heard, even if a post-termination hearing is also provided.

    Summary

    Prue, a police officer, was terminated under Civil Service Law § 73 after being absent for over a year due to an injury. He was offered a post-termination hearing but argued he was entitled to a pre-termination hearing. The court held that under Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, due process requires pre-termination notice and an opportunity to respond before a civil servant is terminated for disability-related absence under § 73. This requirement stems from the potential for erroneous discharge and the need for discretion in determining an employee’s ability to perform their duties. The pre-termination hearing need only provide the employee with an explanation of the charges and a chance to present their side of the story, balancing the employee’s interests with the employer’s administrative burden.

    Facts

    Prue, a 19-year veteran police officer, was injured in a non-work-related accident and was unable to perform his duties. After exhausting his paid leave, Prue requested reinstatement, submitting a doctor’s note stating he could perform a desk job (which he had previously held as PBA President). His request was denied, and he was terminated under Civil Service Law § 73 due to his continuous absence.

    Procedural History

    Prue commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding contesting his termination. The Supreme Court upheld the termination, finding the offered post-termination hearing sufficient. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that Loudermill requires a pre-termination hearing, superseding the prior holding in Matter of Economico v. Village of Pelham. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to address the impact of Loudermill on the pre-termination hearing requirement.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Federal Due Process Clause requires a pre-termination hearing for civil servants terminated under Civil Service Law § 73 due to disability-related absence.
    2. If a pre-termination hearing is required, what procedural formalities are mandated by Federal due process?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the potential for erroneous discharge and the discretionary nature of § 73 terminations necessitate a pre-termination opportunity for the employee to respond.
    2. Due process requires only pre-termination notice and an opportunity to respond, either in writing or in person, because post-termination review is available, and the issues are not overly complex.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied heavily on Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, which established that public employees with a property interest in their employment are entitled to a pre-termination hearing. The court reasoned that Prue’s termination implicated contested questions regarding his physical condition and ability to perform a desk job, which could have influenced the discretionary decision to terminate him under § 73. Citing Loudermill, the court stated that “the only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker is likely to be before the termination takes effect.”

    The court emphasized that the pre-termination hearing need not be a full evidentiary hearing but should provide the employee with an explanation of the grounds for discharge and an opportunity to present their side of the story. This balances the employee’s due process rights with the employer’s administrative burden. The court found no need for greater procedural formality than required in Loudermill, given the availability of post-termination review and the relative simplicity of the issues involved. The court concluded that Section 73, as interpreted to require pre-termination notice and opportunity to be heard, is not facially unconstitutional.

  • Economico v. Village of Pelham, 50 N.Y.2d 120 (1980): Due Process and Termination of Disabled Public Employees

    Economico v. Village of Pelham, 50 N.Y.2d 120 (1980)

    A tenured public employee can be terminated without a pre-termination hearing under Civil Service Law § 73 when the operative facts triggering the statute (continuous absence for one year or more due to non-service-related disability) are undisputed.

    Summary

    Economico, a tenured police officer, was terminated after being absent for over 18 months due to a non-service-related injury. He claimed a violation of due process because he wasn’t given a hearing before termination and that the collective bargaining agreement granted him unlimited sick leave. The court held that a pre-termination hearing wasn’t required because the operative facts of his prolonged absence and the nature of his disability were undisputed. The court also found that the collective bargaining agreement did not prevent the village from terminating employment under Civil Service Law § 73.

    Facts

    Economico, a police officer for the Village of Pelham since 1971, was injured in a non-work-related car accident in January 1976. He was initially placed on paid sick leave. In October 1976, he was ordered to return to work but refused, claiming he was unfit. The village then stopped his sick leave pay, but an arbitrator ordered the village to resume payments. After 18 months of absence, the village terminated Economico’s employment in August 1977 under Civil Service Law § 73.

    Procedural History

    Economico filed an Article 78 proceeding, arguing his termination violated due process and the collective bargaining agreement. Special Term granted him relief, but the Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the proceeding. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a tenured public employee is entitled to a pre-termination hearing under the Due Process Clause before being terminated under Civil Service Law § 73 for a continuous absence of one year or more due to a non-service-related disability.

    2. Whether a collective bargaining agreement provision granting “unlimited sick leave with pay” prohibits a municipality from terminating an employee under Civil Service Law § 73.

    Holding

    1. No, because when the operative facts triggering the statute (continuous absence for one year or more due to non-service-related disability) are undisputed, a pre-termination hearing is not required to satisfy due process.

    2. No, because the collective bargaining agreement provision, even if construed as a perpetual job security clause, cannot prevent an employer from exercising its right to terminate employees under the clear statutory requisites of Civil Service Law § 73.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Economico, as a tenured civil servant, had a property interest in his position, which is protected by due process. However, this interest is not absolute and can be limited by statute. The court emphasized the state’s interest in maintaining an efficient civil service. Section 73 of the Civil Service Law allows for termination after a year’s absence due to disability. The court reasoned that “[o]nce it was demonstrated that petitioner’s condition satisfied the objective criteria triggering application of section 73, his property interest in the position could be extinguished in the sound discretion of the appointing authority.”

    The court stated that a hearing is required when the operative facts are in dispute. Quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, the court noted that “where the facts underlying operation of the statute are in dispute the affected employee must be afforded an opportunity to be heard before that interest is finally extinguished.” However, in Economico’s case, the operative facts—his prolonged absence and the non-service-related nature of his disability—were undisputed. Economico even maintained he was still disabled.

    Regarding the collective bargaining agreement, the court found it did not explicitly prohibit termination under § 73. Moreover, even if it did, the court stated that “public policy prohibits an employer from bargaining away its right to remove those employees satisfying the plain and clear statutory requisites for termination.” The court cited Matter of Cohoes City School Dist. v Cohoes Teachers Assn., 40 NY2d 774, 778 for the principle that a municipality may not surrender its ultimate appointing authority.

  • Matter of Smith v. O’Shea, 55 N.Y.2d 774 (1981): Termination of Disabled Employee Under Civil Service Law

    Matter of Smith v. O’Shea, 55 N.Y.2d 774 (1981)

    An employee continuously absent from and unable to perform their duties for one year or more due to a disability may be terminated under Civil Service Law § 73 without a pre-termination hearing unless there is a factual dispute impacting the employer’s right to discharge.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the petitioner’s termination under Civil Service Law § 73 was valid. The petitioner, an employee continuously disabled for over a year, was terminated without a hearing. The Court found that the petitioner failed to raise the veteran status argument in lower courts and that § 73 is constitutional. The Court reasoned that a hearing is only required when there is a factual dispute impacting the employer’s right to discharge, and the petitioner’s own statements and those of his physicians obviated any such dispute. The Court also held that the petitioner’s application for reinstatement was insufficient to mandate reinstatement on his preferred date.

    Facts

    The petitioner was an employee who was continuously absent from his position for more than one year due to a disability. The Department terminated his employment pursuant to Civil Service Law § 73. The Department called to his attention in its termination letter of his right to reinstatement depended on making application for a medical examination by a doctor selected by the department. The petitioner sent letters to the department on January 28, 1978 and May 22, 1978.

    Procedural History

    The petitioner challenged his termination, arguing that he was entitled to a hearing before termination and that he was entitled to be reinstated on June 6, 1978 rather than August 1, 1978. The lower courts rejected his arguments. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order upholding the termination.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the petitioner, as a veteran, was protected by Civil Service Law § 75 from termination without a hearing.

    2. Whether Civil Service Law § 73 is unconstitutional because it permits termination without a hearing of an employee continuously absent from and unable to perform the duties of his position for one year or more by reason of a disability.

    3. Whether the petitioner was entitled to be reinstated on June 6, 1978, rather than August 1, 1978.

    Holding

    1. No, because the argument regarding veteran status was not raised in the lower courts and the record lacked evidence to support it.

    2. No, because a hearing is only required under § 73 when there is a factual dispute impacting the employer’s right to discharge, and in this case, the petitioner’s own statements and those of his physicians obviated any such dispute.

    3. No, because the petitioner’s application for a medical examination was insufficient to require reinstatement on June 6, 1978; the statute did not give the petitioner the right to fix the date of the examination.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court found that the petitioner’s argument regarding veteran status was not properly before the court because it was not raised in the lower courts. Regarding the constitutionality of § 73, the Court relied on its prior decision in Matter of Economico v. Village of Pelham, stating that “only when there is ‘some factual dispute impacting upon the employer’s right to discharge’ is a hearing required by that section and that hearing may, in the absence of demonstrated serious hardship, be held posttermination.” The Court determined that no such factual dispute existed in this case, as the petitioner’s own statements and those of his physicians established his continuous disability. The court also found that “by the many written statements by petitioner and his physicians filed with the department petitioner has obviated any question that he was continuously disabled for the requisite period.”

    Regarding the reinstatement date, the Court found that the petitioner’s letters were insufficient to constitute a proper application for a medical examination, as required by § 73. The first letter assumed the right to continued sick leave and the second simply stated his availability for an examination on a specific date. The Court emphasized that “[t]he statute did not give petitioner the right to fix the date of the examination.” Because of this, the petitioner failed to show what caused the department’s failure to reinstate him prior to August 1, 1978, or whether or when he was in fact examined by a department doctor.