Sanders v. Winship, 57 N.Y.2d 391 (1982)

In the context of housing discrimination law, a ‘cooperative tenant’ under New York Civil Rights Law § 19-a can include the spouse of a cooperative shareholder, even if that spouse is not a shareholder themselves, if they exert influence on cooperative housing decisions.

Summary

Martin and Erika Sanders, a Jewish couple, sued a cooperative corporation, its directors, and Joanne Winship, the wife of a director, alleging discrimination based on their religion and Israeli background. The Sanderses claimed that Mrs. Winship, though not a shareholder, influenced the corporation’s decision to deny their application to purchase an apartment. The issue before the New York Court of Appeals was whether Mrs. Winship, as the spouse of a shareholder residing in the apartment, qualified as a ‘cooperative tenant’ under Civil Rights Law § 19-a, making her liable for discriminatory actions. The Court held that she could be considered a ‘cooperative tenant’ because of her potential influence on cooperative decisions.

Facts

Martin and Erika Sanders contracted to purchase an apartment in a cooperative building in Manhattan. As required, they submitted to an interview at the apartment of Joanne and Frederick Winship. Mr. Winship was the president and a director of the cooperative corporation, and the ‘cooperative shareholder’ of the apartment. The Sanderses alleged that during the interview, the Winships made derogatory remarks about their religion and Israeli background. Subsequently, their application was denied without reason, despite providing all necessary financial and character information. The Sanderses claimed the rejection was based on their creed and influenced by Mrs. Winship.

Procedural History

The Sanderses sued the corporation, the directors, and Mrs. Winship. Mrs. Winship moved to dismiss the complaint against her, arguing she was not a ‘cooperative tenant’ under the statute. Special Term denied her motion. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the complaint against her. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, reinstating the complaint against Mrs. Winship.

Issue(s)

Whether, under New York Civil Rights Law § 19-a, the spouse of a cooperative shareholder, who resides in the apartment but is not a shareholder themselves, can be considered a ‘cooperative tenant’ and thus be held liable for discriminatory actions in denying a prospective purchaser’s application.

Holding

Yes, because the statute is remedial and should be liberally construed to prevent discrimination, and because the spouse of a shareholder often exerts significant influence on household decisions, including those related to the cooperative.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court emphasized that Civil Rights Law § 19-a is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed to combat discrimination. The statute prohibits a cooperative corporation from withholding consent to a sale based on race, creed, national origin, or sex. The definition of ‘corporation’ includes ‘cooperative tenants’ and ‘cooperative shareholders.’ The court reasoned that the inclusion of “cooperative tenants” as a category distinct from “cooperative stockholders” in such a particularized statute was not a mere redundancy. The court acknowledged that a tenant, in the vernacular, has long and universally included “occupant”, “inhabitant” and “dweller”. The Court found that in a marital situation, both spouses have a legitimate interest in influencing the actions of the cooperative. The court stated, “In the marital situation, it needs no great sociological insight to know that, as a practical matter, the home is a common vital concern, in the management of which quite often a significant influence is exerted by one other than its titular owner.” The Court concluded that Mrs. Winship, as the spouse of a shareholder, could be considered a ‘cooperative tenant’ if she actively participated in or contributed to the discriminatory withholding of consent. The Court reasoned that influence, representative of the opinions of those who ultimately will be affected by the decisions, as the plaintiff alleges, was manifested by Mrs. Winship, when she not only actively displayed her displeasure but seized the opportunity to do so either by invitation or acquiescence of her husband and other directors. The court noted that a statute is to be viewed as a whole and that “In the exposition of a statute, the intention of the lawmaker will prevail over the literal sense of the terms; and its reason and intention will prevail over the strict letter.”