New York Law Review

Tag: City of Geneva

  • Colleges of the Seneca v. City of Geneva, 94 N.Y.2d 713 (2000): Determining Real Property Ownership for Tax Exemption Purposes

    Colleges of the Seneca v. City of Geneva, 94 N.Y.2d 713 (2000)

    For purposes of RPTL 420-a, a college owns a dormitory building constructed by a developer on land owned by the college and financed through leasing agreements between the parties when the college retains significant incidents of ownership.

    Summary

    The Colleges of the Seneca sought a real property tax exemption under RPTL 420-a for a dormitory built on its land by a developer, GCS, through a lease agreement. The City of Geneva denied the exemption for the dormitory itself, arguing GCS owned it until the College fully paid for it. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the College retained sufficient incidents of ownership under the Ground Lease and Master Lease to qualify for the tax exemption, as the College owned the land and improvements, controlled design and occupancy, and bore the risk of loss. The matter was remitted to determine if a refund was due.

    Facts

    The Colleges of the Seneca owns land in Geneva, NY, previously tax-exempt. To construct a dormitory, the College entered into a Ground Lease with GCS Growth, L.L.C., leasing the land to GCS for 40 years. Simultaneously, a Master Lease was created where GCS would build the dormitory at its expense, subject to College approval, and lease it back to the College for 40 years. The College secured the construction loan by pledging part of its endowment. The Ground Lease was amended to explicitly state the College owned the land and all leasehold improvements constructed by GCS. The College had exclusive rights to approve the dormitory’s design, select residents, and set rental rates and could terminate the Master Lease at any time.

    Procedural History

    After the dormitory’s construction in 1996, the College applied for a real property tax exemption under RPTL 420-a. The City Assessor continued the exemption for the land but denied it for the dormitory, claiming GCS owned the dormitory until the College fully paid for it. The College then initiated a combined CPLR article 78 and RPTL article 7 proceeding challenging the City’s determination. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, agreeing with the City. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and granted the petition.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, for purposes of RPTL 420-a, the Colleges of the Seneca owns a dormitory building constructed by a developer on real property owned by the College and financed through leasing agreements between the parties such that the dormitory is exempt from real property taxation.

    Holding

    Yes, because the College retained significant incidents of ownership over the dormitory under the terms of the Ground Lease and Master Lease, demonstrating that the College, and not GCS, was the true owner for the purpose of the tax exemption under RPTL 420-a.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that ownership of the dormitory hinged on the interpretation of the Ground Lease and Master Lease between the College and GCS. The Court distinguished the case from situations where a tenant erects a structure for their own use, noting here that the “owner/landlord of the land is also the occupier/tenant of the building erected on the land.” The Court highlighted key provisions in the leases that indicated College ownership. The Ground Lease stated the College owned the land and all improvements. The Master Lease gave the College the right to approve the dormitory’s design, select residents, set rental levels, and decide whether to rebuild after substantial damage. The Court emphasized that GCS’s financial stake was limited to construction costs plus a guaranteed return, not the dormitory’s actual value, meaning GCS’s equity did not fluctuate with the building’s value. Therefore, the Court concluded the College bore the risks and enjoyed the benefits of ownership. Referencing Matter of National Cold Stor. v Boyland, the Court stated, “It is not true, as a matter of law, in order to sustain a separate property interest in a building that the tenant must have a right of removal. The principle is that a landlord and tenant may separate the ownership of land and building by agreement.” Because the College had “all the incidents of ownership of the dormitory,” the Court held the dormitory exempt from real property taxation pursuant to RPTL 420-a.

  • Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent Association, Inc. v. City of Geneva, 92 N.Y.2d 326 (1998): Enforceability of Past Practices for Retired Employees’ Benefits

    Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent Association, Inc. v. City of Geneva, 92 N.Y.2d 326 (1998)

    A municipality is not legally bound to continue a past practice of providing a certain level of health benefits to retired employees if that practice is not explicitly guaranteed by a collective bargaining agreement or other enforceable contract.

    Summary

    The Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent Association sued the City of Geneva, challenging the city’s decision to reduce health insurance benefits for retired police officers. The Association argued that the City’s long-standing practice of providing a certain level of benefits, established by a 1972 resolution, created an enforceable right. The New York Court of Appeals held that absent an explicit contractual obligation (such as a collective bargaining agreement), the City was not obligated to maintain the prior level of benefits for retirees. The statutory duty to bargain in good faith under the Taylor Law does not extend to retirees.

    Facts

    In 1972, the City of Geneva passed Resolution No. 33, promising health benefits to retired city employees through a specific plan. For 24 years, the City provided these benefits, using different providers but maintaining a consistent level of coverage. In 1996, the City announced that, starting January 1, 1997, retirees’ health insurance would be changed to a plan with inferior coverage.

    Procedural History

    The Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent Association filed a CPLR article 78 proceeding challenging the City’s right to reduce the retirees’ health benefits. The Supreme Court granted the petition, ordering the City to continue the more generous health plan. The Appellate Division reversed, dismissing the petition. The Court of Appeals then affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the petitioner, Aeneas McDonald Police Benevolent Association, Inc., has standing to bring the proceeding.
    2. Whether a municipality’s past practice of providing a certain level of health benefits to retired employees creates an enforceable right to compel the continuation of those benefits in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement or other contract.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the petitioner’s membership includes retirees who would have individual standing, its mission aligns with its members’ interests, and individual member participation is unnecessary for complete relief.
    2. No, because the statutory duty to bargain under the Taylor Law does not extend to retirees, and a past practice, independent of a contract term, does not create a contractual right.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that while a past practice involving a mandatory subject of negotiation (like health benefits for current employees) creates a statutory bargaining right for current employees, this right does not extend to retirees. The Court emphasized that a public employer’s statutory duty to bargain does not include retirees, citing Civil Service Law § 201 (4), (7) (a); § 204 (2). The court distinguished the role of past practices in arbitration, where arbitrators have broad discretion to consider such evidence, from court proceedings, which are bound by substantive rules of law. The Court stated that “past practice, like any other form of parol evidence, is merely an interpretive tool and cannot be used to create a contractual right independent of some express source in the underlying agreement.” The Court also noted that a municipal resolution is a unilateral action that is temporary and does not create vested contractual rights, citing Matter of Jewett v Luau-Nyack Corp., 31 NY2d 298, 306. The Court concluded that because no collective bargaining agreement or other contract addressed retiree health benefits, the City was free to alter them unilaterally.