New York Law Review

Tag: City of Buffalo

  • Charter Development Company, L.L.C. v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.3d 580 (2005): Tax Exemption for Charter School Leased Property

    4 N.Y.3d 580 (2005)

    A privately owned property leased to a charter school is not automatically exempt from real property taxes under Education Law § 2853(1)(d); the charter school’s tax exemption extends only to the same extent as other public schools, which generally applies to property owned, not leased, by the school.

    Summary

    Charter Development Company (CDC) sought a real property tax exemption for a property it owned and leased to a charter school, arguing that Education Law § 2853(1)(d) granted such an exemption. The City of Buffalo denied the exemption, asserting that the statute only provides charter schools with the same tax exemptions as public schools, which typically apply to owned, not leased, property. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statute does not create a separate exemption for privately owned property leased to charter schools. The Court emphasized that tax exemptions are narrowly construed and that the statute’s language must be interpreted to provide charter schools with the same, but not greater, exemptions as public schools.

    Facts

    Charter Development Company (CDC), a for-profit company, acquired property in Buffalo, developed it, and leased it to Buffalo United Charter School. The sublease required the charter school to pay rent and all property taxes. CDC applied for a real property tax exemption based on Education Law § 2853(1)(d), arguing that its lease to the charter school rendered the property tax-exempt.

    Procedural History

    The City Assessor denied CDC’s application. The Board of Assessment Review upheld the denial. CDC then commenced an Article 78 proceeding and Real Property Tax Law Article 7 proceeding to annul the Assessor’s decision and declare the property tax-exempt. Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and the Appellate Division affirmed. CDC appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether Education Law § 2853(1)(d) exempts from real property taxes a property owned by a private entity and leased to a charter school.

    Holding

    No, because Education Law § 2853(1)(d) provides charter schools with the same tax exemptions as public schools, and this exemption generally applies to property owned, not leased, by the school; the statute does not create a separate exemption for privately owned property leased to charter schools.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that statutes must be interpreted according to their plain meaning, and all parts of the act must be read together. Tax exemption statutes are narrowly construed, and any ambiguity is resolved against the exemption. The burden is on the taxpayer to prove entitlement to the exemption.

    The Court found that Education Law § 2853(1)(d) clearly intends to grant charter schools the same tax exemptions as public schools. The phrase “including property leased by the charter school” merely clarifies the type of property that is exempt, not to create a separate exemption for property owned by a private entity. The Court reasoned that interpreting the statute as CDC suggested would not give effect to the other words in the statute and would grant charter schools a greater exemption than public schools, which was not the legislature’s intent.

    The Court distinguished the situation from RPTL 408, which provides an exemption for property owned by a school district and improvements thereon leased by the district, noting this applied to structures erected on property owned by the districts. The Court concluded that CDC failed to demonstrate that the Charter Schools Act plainly created an exemption for private property leased to a charter school. As the court noted, “[t]ax exclusions are never presumed or preferred and before [a] petitioner may have the benefit of them, the burden rests on it to establish that the item comes within the language of the exclusion.” (quoting Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Finance Adm’r of City of N.Y., 58 NY2d 95, 99 [1983])

  • Buffalo Police Benevolent Assn. v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.3d 660 (2005): Public Policy Limits on Collective Bargaining for Police Promotions

    Buffalo Police Benevolent Assn. v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.3d 660 (2005)

    Public policy requires that police departments retain the statutory authority under Civil Service Law § 61 (1) to select one of three candidates for promotions, and a collective bargaining agreement cannot eliminate that discretion absent compelling evidence of a conscious waiver.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a city can bargain away its right to choose one of the top three candidates for police detective promotions based on a collective bargaining agreement. The Buffalo Police Benevolent Association (PBA) argued that a “Maintenance of Benefits” clause obligated the city to promote the highest-ranked candidate. The Court of Appeals held that public policy prevents a police commissioner from surrendering the statutory power to choose the best-qualified candidate for such positions through a collective bargaining agreement, absent clear evidence of a knowing waiver. This decision limits the scope of collective bargaining in areas critical to public safety.

    Facts

    Following a competitive examination for detective positions in the Buffalo Police Department, Officer Raymond Wrafter ranked first on the eligibility list. However, the Police Commissioner promoted another candidate from the top three. The PBA filed a grievance, asserting that this violated the collective bargaining agreement’s “Maintenance of Benefits” clause, which the PBA claimed preserved a past practice of promoting the top-ranked candidate.

    Procedural History

    The arbitrator sided with the PBA, finding the city violated the collective bargaining agreement and awarded damages to Officer Wrafter. The Supreme Court confirmed the arbitrator’s award, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, vacating the arbitrator’s award.

    Issue(s)

    Whether public policy permits a police commissioner to relinquish the discretion granted by Civil Service Law § 61(1) to select any one of the top three candidates for promotion to detective, through a collective bargaining agreement.

    Holding

    No, because public policy considerations related to the effective functioning of a police department and the safety of the community outweigh the general deference given to arbitration awards and collective bargaining agreements.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court distinguished this case from Matter of Professional, Clerical, Tech. Empls. Assn. (Buffalo Bd. of Educ.) (PCTEA), where it allowed a public employer to bargain away its discretion in promoting clerical staff. The Court emphasized that police promotions involve positions critical to public safety, requiring the Police Commissioner to retain the authority to choose the most qualified candidate. The Court found no “compelling evidence” that the Commissioner knowingly surrendered this power. While arbitrators generally have broad discretion, awards violating public policy are invalid. Here, the arbitrator’s ruling improperly bound the Commissioner to appoint the top-scoring candidate, infringing on the Commissioner’s statutory authority and potentially compromising public safety. The Court quoted Matter of Sprinzen [Nomberg], stating that “an award which is violative of public policy will not be permitted to stand.” The Court reasoned that the commissioner’s discretion in selecting police officers is essential for maintaining an effective police force. Permitting a collective bargaining agreement to override this discretion would unduly restrict the commissioner’s ability to choose the most suitable individuals for critical law enforcement roles.