New York Law Review

Tag: city charter

  • Matter of Comptroller of the City of New York v. Bloomberg, 6 N.Y.3d 254 (2006): Interpreting ‘Property’ in City Charter Concession Contracts

    Matter of Comptroller of the City of New York v. Bloomberg, 6 N.Y.3d 254 (2006)

    The term “property” in New York City Charter § 362(a), defining “concession,” is not limited to real property but includes intangible property, and the City Comptroller’s power to review contracts under § 328(b)(ii) is limited to ensuring proper certification, not to conducting a substantive investigation of the contract’s underlying process.

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute over a concession contract between New York City and Snapple, where Snapple would sell beverages in vending machines on City property and market the City’s brand. The City Comptroller challenged the contract’s validity, arguing that the City failed to obtain proper approval for the marketing portion of the agreement and that the term “property” in the City Charter should include intangible assets like intellectual property. The Court of Appeals held that “property” includes intangible assets but limited the Comptroller’s review power to ensuring proper certification, preventing him from delving into the contract’s substantive aspects. This decision clarifies the scope of the Comptroller’s authority and the definition of “property” in the context of City concession contracts.

    Facts

    In 2003, New York City created the Marketing Development Corporation (MDC) to develop public-private partnerships. The City, MDC, and the Department of Citywide Administrative Services entered into a concession contract with Snapple Beverage Corporation. The contract involved Snapple selling beverages in vending machines on City property and marketing the City’s brand. The City presented only the vending portion of the contract to the New York City Franchise and Concession Review Committee (FCRC) for approval. The Comptroller objected, arguing that the entire contract should have been submitted to the FCRC.

    Procedural History

    The Comptroller brought a combined special proceeding (Article 78) and declaratory judgment action, seeking to annul the contract. Supreme Court rejected the Comptroller’s challenge. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the Comptroller could only object to the certifications’ existence, not the underlying process, and that “property” included intangible assets. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the statute of limitations bars the Comptroller’s claim that the contract is invalid because it could not be registered properly under Charter § 328.

    2. Whether the term “property” in Charter § 362(a) is limited to real property.

    3. Whether the Comptroller, under Charter § 328(b)(ii), can transform a procedure for registering a contract into a substantive investigation of a contract.

    Holding

    1. No, because the agency determination became “final and binding” no earlier than February 20, 2004, the date the City filed the contract with the Comptroller for registration.

    2. No, because under settled statutory interpretation principles, the term “property” in Charter § 362 (a) is not limited to “real property.”

    3. No, because the Comptroller may not, under Charter § 328 (b) (ii), transform a procedure for registering a contract into a substantive investigation of a contract.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations began to run when the City filed the contract with the Comptroller for registration. As to the definition of “property,” the Court relied on the plain language of Charter § 362(a), which defines “concession” as a grant for the private use of city-owned “property.” The Court noted that the term “property” is not qualified by “real,” “personal,” “tangible,” or “intangible.” The Court emphasized that when the drafters of the Charter intended to refer to “real property,” they explicitly used those words. For example, § 362(d) uses the term “real property” in contrast to “inalienable property.” The Court reasoned that the drafters’ decision not to use “real property” in § 362(a) indicated that they did not intend such a narrow construction.

    Regarding the Comptroller’s authority, the Court held that under § 328(b)(ii), the Comptroller may deny registration only if “a certification required by [section 327] has not been made.” The Court stated that § 328(b)(ii) does not empower the Comptroller to second-guess facially sufficient certifications provided by the Mayor and the Corporation Counsel. The Court reasoned that the Charter’s delegation of duties plainly establishes that the Mayor and Corporation Counsel bear the responsibility for determining that procedural requirements have been met and that legal authority exists to award a concession contract. The Court directly quoted Hudson Riv. Tel. Co. v Watervliet Turnpike & Ry. Co., 135 NY 393, 403-404 (1892), stating “[t]he words of the statute are to be interpreted according to their natural and obvious meaning, and, as the terms employed are not ambiguous, extrinsic facts are not available to restrict the authority which it plainly confers.” The Court concluded that allowing the Comptroller to conduct a substantive investigation would undermine the Charter’s intended allocation of responsibilities.

  • Brooklyn Heights Ass’n v. Macchiarola, 82 N.Y.2d 100 (1993): Upholding Districting Commission’s Discretion in Balancing Charter Requirements

    Brooklyn Heights Ass’n v. Macchiarola, 82 N.Y.2d 100 (1993)

    A City Districting Commission’s decision, based on a reasonable policy of adhering to census block boundaries, will be upheld when balancing competing districting criteria, even if it arguably impacts neighborhood integrity.

    Summary

    Following the abolition of the New York City Board of Estimate, a City Districting Commission was formed to redraw City Council districts. The Commission, tasked with creating a Latino-majority district, included a waterfront tabulation block in that district despite objections from Brooklyn Heights residents who claimed the area was historically part of their neighborhood. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts, holding that the Commission’s decision to avoid splitting tabulation blocks was a reasonable policy choice to effectuate the Charter’s requirement that census data be used and the decision was not arbitrary or capricious.

    Facts

    After the New York City Board of Estimate was declared unconstitutional, a City Districting Commission was appointed to redraw City Council districts. To create a Latino-majority district (District 38), the Commission created a “land bridge” using 11 tabulation blocks, including block 105, a long waterfront area. Brooklyn Heights residents (in District 33) objected, claiming the northern part of block 105 and adjacent piers were historically part of their neighborhood and should be included in their district.

    Procedural History

    Brooklyn Heights residents and civic groups filed an Article 78 proceeding challenging the districting plan. The Supreme Court granted the petition, ordering the district lines redrawn. The Appellate Division affirmed. The City appealed to the Court of Appeals as of right.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the City Districting Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in declining to split a census tabulation block to preserve a neighborhood’s integrity when balancing competing districting criteria mandated by the City Charter?

    Holding

    No, because the Commission’s decision to avoid splitting tabulation blocks was a reasonable policy choice, and the Charter only requires that districting criteria be applied “to the maximum extent practicable,” allowing for flexibility and compromise.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that the Commission was mandated to use the “final count results” of the 1990 census and adopted a policy of not splitting tabulation blocks, the smallest geographical units for which census data was available, to implement this mandate. The Court deferred to the Commission’s reasonable policy choice related to implementing the technical requirements of districting. The Court noted the Charter only required criteria to be applied “to the maximum extent practicable,” indicating a need for flexibility. The Court stated: “It is not our role to second-guess the Commission’s reasonable policy choice related to implementing the technical requirements of districting.” The Court found that the Commission’s policy was directly and reasonably related to implementing the census requirement and was not arbitrary or capricious. Because the land-based portion of block 105 was dispositive, the court declined to address the issue of the piers, stating, “In view of our conclusion with regard to block 105, it is unnecessary to consider the disposition of the five disputed piers, because they would not be contiguous to District 33 in any event”.

  • Beame v. Council of City of New York, 43 N.Y.2d 690 (1977): Interpreting Publicly Approved Laws with Traditional Statutory Construction

    Beame v. Council of City of New York, 43 N.Y.2d 690 (1977)

    Publicly approved provisions of law, such as city charters, should be interpreted using traditional standards of statutory construction rather than attempting to discern the intent of the “intelligent, careful voter.”

    Summary

    This case concerns a dispute over whether the Mayor of New York City could vote on budget modifications before the Board of Estimate. The plaintiffs argued that the City Charter prevented the Mayor from voting on any matter related to the budget. The defendant, the Mayor, argued that the restriction only applied to the original budget approval, not to subsequent modifications. The Court of Appeals held that the Mayor was not restricted from voting on budget modifications, and abandoned the standard of interpreting publicly approved laws by seeking the intent of the “intelligent, careful voter,” in favor of traditional statutory construction.

    Facts

    The president of the New York City Council and the borough presidents, all members of the Board of Estimate, sued the Mayor of New York City, who was also a member of the Board. The dispute centered on whether the Mayor could vote on budget modifications proposed by the Mayor himself. The plaintiffs argued that the City Charter prohibited the Mayor from participating in any Board of Estimate vote on the budget. The Mayor conceded he couldn’t vote on the original budget, but argued that this restriction didn’t extend to modifications under section 124(b) of the charter.

    Procedural History

    The Special Term ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring that the Mayor could not vote on budget modifications. The court reasoned that an “intelligent, careful voter” would believe the Charter excluded the Mayor from any Board of Estimate vote on the budget. The Appellate Division reversed, granting summary judgment to the Mayor, holding the voting restriction applied only to initial budget approval. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, but on different reasoning.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Mayor of New York City is permitted to vote as a member of the Board of Estimate on budget modifications made pursuant to section 124(b) of the New York City Charter, given the restrictions on mayoral voting power in section 120(d) of the charter.

    Holding

    No, because the restriction on the Mayor’s voting power in section 120(d) of the City Charter applies only to the approval of the original budget, and the specific incorporation of section 120 in only some modification provisions of section 124 implies that it does not apply to modifications under section 124(b).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals abandoned the “intelligent, careful voter” standard for interpreting publicly approved laws, calling it an “empty legal fiction.” The court reasoned that so few voters actually review and digest the complex materials related to charter amendments that the standard is unrealistic. Instead, the court adopted traditional standards of statutory construction. Applying these standards, the court held that the City Charter should be read as a whole, considering each word to arrive at its meaning. The court determined that section 120(d)’s restriction on the Mayor’s voting power applied only to the approval of the original budget. The court found that to extend the restriction to subsequent budget modifications under section 124(b) would render the specific incorporation of section 120 in a few of the modification provisions in section 124 meaningless. The court applied the principle that “an irrefutable inference must be drawn that what is omitted or not included was intended to be omitted or excluded.” Therefore, the Mayor’s power to vote on budget modifications is limited only in the instances specified in section 124(f). The court effectively applied the statutory interpretation canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

  • Matter of চাপEmerson v. Buck, 230 N.Y. 380 (1920): Limitations on Common Council Power Over Budget Items

    230 N.Y. 380 (1920)

    A city’s Common Council lacks the authority to diminish or reject budget items that relate to salaries when the Board of Estimate and Contract has the exclusive power to fix those salaries and determine positions.

    Summary

    This case addresses the division of power between a city’s Board of Estimate and Contract and its Common Council concerning budget appropriations, specifically regarding salaries. The Board of Estimate and Contract created several new positions with fixed salaries in its budget estimate. The Common Council then reduced the salary amount for the police department, eliminated the newly created positions, and replaced them with old positions at the same salary. The Court of Appeals determined that the Common Council overstepped its authority because the Board had the exclusive power to create the positions and fix the salaries. The Common Council’s power was limited to either accepting or rejecting the budget as a whole.

    Facts

    The Board of Estimate and Contract of Mount Vernon prepared its budget estimate for the upcoming fiscal year, including specific salaries for city officials and employees. The estimate included new positions like claims clerk, clerk to deputy comptroller, and indexing and vault clerk, each at $1,800. The police department salaries were estimated at $295,893. For the building department, new positions for construction inspectors at $2,500 each were included. The Common Council then diminished the police department salaries to $262,693, struck out the new positions, and inserted old positions in their place.

    Procedural History

    The Board of Estimate and Contract sought a court order compelling the Common Council to adopt the original budget estimate. The lower court ordered the Common Council to adopt the estimate as submitted by the Board. The Common Council appealed that decision, and the Court of Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Common Council had the power to strike out or diminish items in the budget estimate that related to salaries fixed by the Board of Estimate and Contract.

    2. Whether the Common Council had the power to substitute different positions for those included in the budget estimate by the Board of Estimate and Contract.

    Holding

    1. No, because the city charter explicitly states that “the common council shall not have power to diminish or reject any item which relates to salaries.”

    2. No, because the power to determine the positions and numbers of city officers and employees resided exclusively with the Board of Estimate and Contract.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the Board of Estimate and Contract had been granted the power to create subordinate positions and fix salaries. This power was explicitly stated in the city charter. Section 81, when read alongside section 71, indicated a legislative intent to vest this authority in the Board. The Common Council’s authority was limited to diminishing or rejecting items in the budget that were *not* related to salaries, indebtedness, estimated revenues, state and county taxes, or judgments. Regarding the police department salaries, the court emphasized that the Board had the power *at all times* to determine the number of officers and men in the police department. Diminishing this item would therefore improperly limit the Board’s power to determine the number of officers and men. Regarding the building department, the Court found the action of the Council essentially rejected the Board’s salary and position determinations, which the Council was not empowered to do.