Tag: Child’s Preference

  • Dintruff v. McGreevy, 35 N.Y.2d 768 (1974): Child’s Preference in Custody Disputes

    Dintruff v. McGreevy, 35 N.Y.2d 768 (1974)

    In custody disputes between divorced parents, the paramount concern is the welfare and interests of the child, and while a child’s preference should be considered, it is not determinative, and custody should be established on a long-term basis, avoiding frequent changes absent unfitness of the custodial parent.

    Summary

    This case addresses a custody dispute between divorced parents. The father appealed an order affirming the mother’s permanent custody of their son. The court emphasized that the child’s welfare is the primary concern. While the child’s preference is a factor, it shouldn’t be the sole determining factor. The court underscored the importance of stable, long-term custody arrangements, cautioning against frequent changes based on shifting circumstances or a child’s whims, unless the custodial parent is deemed unfit. The court found the initial hearing inadequate and remitted the case for further proceedings, stressing the need for a comprehensive inquiry into the child’s best interests and considering the importance of keeping siblings together.

    Facts

    The parents divorced in 1970, with the mother initially granted custody of their son and daughter. The father violated this order by keeping the son in Pennsylvania, leading to a series of habeas corpus proceedings. Initially, Pennsylvania courts ordered the son returned to the mother. However, a subsequent Pennsylvania order awarded custody to the father based on the son’s preference. The mother then filed a proceeding in New York seeking custody of the son after the father failed to return him following a Thanksgiving visitation. The father removed the son from New York before a full hearing could be conducted.

    Procedural History

    1. 1970: Supreme Court, Monroe County, grants divorce and awards custody to the mother.

    2. 1972: Pennsylvania court orders the son returned to the mother in a habeas corpus proceeding.

    3. 1973: Pennsylvania court awards custody to the father based on the son’s preference.

    4. 1973: Mother initiates proceedings in Erie County Family Court to regain custody.

    5. Family Court awards custody to the mother.

    6. Appellate Division affirms.

    7. New York Court of Appeals reverses and remands.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, in a custody dispute between divorced parents, the child’s welfare is the paramount concern of the court?

    2. Whether a child’s expressed preference for a particular parent should be the determinative factor in awarding custody?

    3. Whether custody arrangements should be stable and long-term, absent evidence of the custodial parent’s unfitness?

    4. Whether siblings should be separated when determining custody arrangements?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because in custody proceedings arising out of a dispute between divorced parents, the first and paramount concern of the court is and must be the welfare and the interests of the child.

    2. No, because while a child’s view should be considered to ascertain his attitude and to lead to relevant facts, it should not be determinative.

    3. Yes, because custody of children should be established on a long-term basis, wherever possible; children should not be shuttled back and forth between divorced parents merely because of changes in marital status, economic circumstances or improvements in moral or psychological adjustment, at least so long as the custodial parent has not been shown to be unfit, or perhaps less fit, to continue as the proper custodian.

    4. No, courts should be reluctant to permit separate custody of siblings.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the child’s welfare as the primary consideration in custody disputes, citing Domestic Relations Law § 70 and relevant case law. The court acknowledged the importance of considering the child’s preference but cautioned against making it the sole deciding factor. The court quoted from the opinion stating, “We believe that custody of children should be established on a long-term basis and should not be changed merely because a child at some time states that he desires it…If it were, then all a court would be required to decide is whether his preference of parent is voluntary and untainted and then follow the child’s wish. This would certainly not be conducive to the proper raising of children.” The court reasoned that children are easily influenced, and prioritizing their whims can be detrimental to their development. It stressed the need for stable custody arrangements, discouraging frequent changes due to parental circumstances unless the custodial parent is demonstrably unfit. The court also highlighted the importance of keeping siblings together to foster familial bonds and provide mutual support. The court stated that “[t]he rearing of a child requires greater stability than a roller-coaster treatment of custody.” Due to the perceived inadequacy of the initial Family Court hearing, the Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order and remitted the matter for a more thorough inquiry into the child’s best interests, preferably before a different judge. The court reiterated that the full faith and credit clause does not apply to custody decrees and the responsibility of courts for the welfare of infants transcends the rule of comity.