New York Law Review

Tag: children

  • Willis v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Amsterdam, 28 N.Y.2d 375 (1971): Duty of Care Owed to Child Participants in YMCA Programs

    Willis v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n of Amsterdam, 28 N.Y.2d 375 (1971)

    When an organization invites children to participate in its programs for a fee, it owes a duty of care commensurate with the special responsibility it has assumed to inspect and guard against dangers of injury to those children.

    Summary

    A 13-year-old girl, Deborah Willis, was injured at an “indoor sleep-in” event organized by the Amsterdam YMCA when a plastic arm from a chair, dislodged by a counselor (Peggy Day) from a shelf while reaching for a pillow, fell and struck her. The New York Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court erred in not instructing the jury that the infant plaintiff was free from contributory negligence and also addressed the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the defendants’ negligence. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s judgment, holding that the plaintiff was entitled to a charge of freedom from contributory negligence and that the YMCA’s duty of care to the children participating in its program required reasonable measures to prevent foreseeable injuries.

    Facts

    The Amsterdam YMCA organized an “indoor sleep-in” for young people for a fee. Deborah Willis, a 13-year-old, participated and was sleeping on the floor about a foot away from the wall. While Peggy Day, a counselor, was retrieving a pillow from a shelf above a built-in rack along the wall, she dislodged a plastic arm of a chair that had been placed under the pillow. The chair arm fell and injured Deborah.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss at the end of the plaintiffs’ case. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants, and judgment was entered accordingly. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The plaintiff appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the infant plaintiff was entitled to a jury instruction that she was free from contributory negligence under the given facts.
    2. Whether the evidence presented was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of negligence against the YMCA and the counselor.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under the facts, the infant plaintiff was not required to exercise any care other than lying down to sleep. The evidence did not support a finding of contributory negligence.
    2. Yes, because the YMCA owed a duty of care to the children participating in its program, commensurate with the special responsibility it had assumed, to inspect and guard against dangers of injury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that contributory negligence should not be charged where there is no or insufficient evidence to support it. Here, the infant plaintiff’s actions of lying down to sleep did not constitute negligence. The Court emphasized the duty of care the YMCA owed to the children participating in its program, noting that the YMCA invited the children onto its premises for a fee, thus assuming a special responsibility for their safety. The Court stated that “in inviting, for a fee, young children to sleep on the floor of its premises, the YMCA owed a duty commensurate with the special responsibility it had assumed to its charges to inspect and guard against danger of injury.” The Court noted that the YMCA should have reasonably expected that care would be taken to ensure that loose objects heavy enough to inflict injury would not be left on the shelf where pillows were stored. The Court cited Oldham v. Hoover, 140 So. 2d 417, 421 (C.A., La., 1962), stating that persons having children entrusted to their care are “charged with the highest degree of care.” The Court found that the precise manner of the accident was not controlling on the question of negligence, and it was not necessary for the defendant to have foreseen the particular consequences of their act or omission, citing 65 C. J. S., Negligence, § 5, subd. [7], p. 528. The Court reversed the order and directed a new trial.

  • O’Mara v. Hudson River Railroad Co., 38 N.Y. 445 (1868): Duty of Care Owed to Children

    38 N.Y. 445 (1868)

    Railroad companies owe a greater duty of care to children, requiring them to exercise more vigilance to avoid injury, recognizing that children may not possess the same level of caution as adults.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard of care owed by a railroad company to a young boy injured while crossing the tracks. The court affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the railroad company was negligent for failing to provide adequate warnings and for entrusting the engine to a fireman instead of an engineer. The court also considered the contributory negligence of the child, emphasizing that a lesser degree of caution is expected from children compared to adults, and the jury was entitled to consider the child’s age and capacity when determining whether he was contributorily negligent. The court found the jury could reasonably estimate the pecuniary value of the boy’s life based on their common knowledge.

    Facts

    An eleven-and-a-half-year-old boy was injured by a train while crossing a public thoroughfare. Evidence suggested that the train’s bell was not rung or whistle blown as required by statute. The engine, known as the “Jones,” was operated by a fireman only, with no engineer on board. The accident occurred as the boy was running an errand for his mother and father. The defendant argued there was no negligence on their part, and that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.

    Procedural History

    The case proceeded to trial, and at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence, the defendant moved for a nonsuit. The motion was denied. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appealed, arguing that there was no proof of pecuniary value to the boy’s life and that nominal damages only should have been awarded. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the lower court’s judgment.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the railroad company was negligent in failing to provide adequate warnings (bell or whistle) and entrusting the engine to a fireman instead of an engineer.
    2. Whether the deceased boy was contributorily negligent, considering his age and capacity.
    3. Whether there was sufficient proof of the pecuniary value of the boy’s life to justify the damages awarded.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the absence of the statutory signal (bell or whistle) and the operation of the engine by a fireman alone, without an engineer, constituted evidence of negligence.
    2. No, because the jury was not bound to require the same degree of caution from an eleven-and-a-half-year-old boy as from an adult, and the question of contributory negligence was properly left to the jury.
    3. Yes, because the jury, acting on their knowledge and without specific proof, had the right to determine that the services of a boy from eleven until twenty-one years of age were valuable to his father and to estimate their value.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the absence of the statutory warning signals (bell or whistle) constituted evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad company. It also determined that entrusting the engine to a fireman instead of an engineer was a failure to exercise the degree of care required of a railroad company when crossing public thoroughfares. The court emphasized that a fireman is not expected to possess the same level of skill and knowledge as an engineer.

    Regarding contributory negligence, the court noted that a lesser degree of caution is expected from children than from adults. The court stated, “The young are entitled to the same rights, and cannot be required to exercise as great foresight and vigilance as those of maturer years. More care toward them is required than toward others.” The court concluded that the jury was justified in considering the boy’s age and capacity when determining whether he was contributorily negligent.

    Finally, the court addressed the issue of damages, holding that the jury could reasonably estimate the pecuniary value of the boy’s life based on their common knowledge, even without specific proof of his earnings or contributions. The court emphasized that the boy was actively engaged in service to his parents at the time of his death.

    The court cited precedent, including Brown v. N. Y. Central R. R. (34 N. Y. 404), to support its holding on negligence and contributory negligence. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff.