New York Law Review

Tag: Child Witness Testimony

  • People v. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d 24, 550 N.E.2d 921 (1990): Facial Challenges to Statutes Protecting Child Witnesses

    People v. Cintron, 75 N.Y.2d 24, 550 N.E.2d 921 (1990)

    A statute allowing child witnesses to testify via closed-circuit television is constitutional on its face if it requires a showing of necessity based on clear and convincing evidence and minimizes infringement on the defendant’s confrontation rights.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of Article 65 of the Criminal Procedure Law, which permits child witnesses in sex crime cases to testify via live, two-way closed-circuit television. The Court held that the statute is facially constitutional, provided it is construed to require a determination of vulnerability based on clear and convincing evidence that the child would suffer severe mental or emotional harm if required to testify in court without the televised procedure. However, the Court reversed the defendant’s conviction because the trial court’s determination of vulnerability was based solely on its observations of the child witness, lacking the requisite evidentiary support.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of attempted rape, sodomy, and sexual abuse involving a four-year-old girl. During the trial, the court permitted the victim to testify via two-way closed-circuit television from a separate room, based on the court’s finding that the child was a vulnerable witness. Prior to this, the child was reluctant to testify and communicated primarily through head shaking. The defendant was ordered to remain in the courtroom during the child’s testimony.

    Procedural History

    The District Attorney proceeded to trial without a pre-trial motion. During trial, the District Attorney applied to declare the child a vulnerable witness under CPL 65.20(10). The trial court granted the application based on its observation of the child’s behavior on the stand. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Article 65 is facially unconstitutional because it allows a witness to testify outside the courtroom and, in some cases, outside the defendant’s presence, violating the defendant’s confrontation rights under the State and Federal Constitutions.

    2. Whether the requirements for determining vulnerability under Article 65 were satisfied in this specific case.

    Holding

    1. No, Article 65 can be construed to withstand a facial constitutional challenge because it can be interpreted to afford the minimum protections required for a criminal defendant’s confrontation rights.

    2. No, the showing of vulnerability was insufficient because the trial court’s determination was based solely on its own observations of the child witness without clear and convincing evidence of severe mental or emotional harm resulting from extraordinary circumstances.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that Article 65 is constitutional on its face when the presumption of constitutionality is applied and CPL 65.20(10) is read to incorporate the requirements of CPL 65.10(1). Citing Coy v. Iowa, the Court acknowledged the importance of face-to-face confrontation but recognized that this right is not absolute and can yield to other compelling interests, such as protecting child witnesses. The Court interpreted Coy as permitting closed-circuit television testimony if an individualized showing of necessity is made and the infringement on the defendant’s rights is minimized. The statute’s provision for two-way simulcast, the possibility of defendant being present in the testimonial room, and the ability for cross-examination mitigate the infringement on confrontation rights.

    The Court emphasized that the determination of vulnerability must be supported by “clear and convincing evidence” that the child will likely suffer “severe mental or emotional harm” as a result of “extraordinary circumstances” if required to testify in open court. The Court found that the trial court’s determination of vulnerability, based solely on its own observations of the child’s demeanor, was insufficient. The court stated, “There must be sufficient record evidence for a reviewing court to determine that the evidence was clear and convincing.” The Court stated the findings must relate to the effect that testifying in court will have on the mental or emotional well-being of the child. The court found the error was not harmless because the child presented damning testimony via closed-circuit television. Lastly, the Court held that the expert testimony was admissible.

  • People v. St. John, 47 N.Y.2d 117 (1979): Admissibility of Child Witness Testimony and Evidence of Uncharged Acts

    People v. St. John, 47 N.Y.2d 117 (1979)

    In cases of sexual abuse, a trial court has discretion to allow child witnesses to testify, even if unsworn, after adequately inquiring into their understanding and intelligence; evidence of similar uncharged acts is admissible to show the defendant’s disposition and the ongoing relationship between the parties.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for deviate sexual practices with his daughters. The court held that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in allowing child witnesses, some unsworn, to testify after assessing their understanding. It further ruled that testimony from neighbor children about similar uncharged acts committed by the defendant upon his daughters was admissible to show the defendant’s disposition and the ongoing relationship between the parties within the home, where the charged acts occurred.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with deviate sexual acts involving his daughters. The prosecution presented testimony from multiple child witnesses, ranging in age from 6 to 12 and a half years old. The trial judge administered oaths to all but the 6 and 7-year-old witnesses. The prosecution also presented testimony from neighbor children who observed similar uncharged deviate acts by the defendant against his daughters. These acts occurred within the defendant’s home.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing child witnesses under 12 years of age to testify, some without being sworn.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in allowing neighbor children to testify about their observations of similar uncharged deviate acts committed by the defendant upon his daughters.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial judge adequately inquired into the understanding and intelligence of each of the witnesses under 12 years old, and the decision to swear them or take their statements unsworn was within the judge’s discretion and not abused. The conviction did not rest solely on the interrogation of the unsworn witnesses.

    2. No, because such evidence involving the ongoing relationship and conduct between the parties is relevant and permissible where the charged acts occurred within the home, open to question concerning defendant’s disposition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 60.20, which allows children under 12 to be questioned even if they don’t understand the oath. The court emphasized the trial judge’s role in assessing each child’s understanding and intelligence. The court found no abuse of discretion in allowing the children to testify, sworn or unsworn, as the judge properly assessed their capacity. The Court further relied on *People v. Henson, 33 Y 2d 63, 72; Richardson, Evidence [10th ed.], § 182* to allow evidence of similar uncharged acts committed by the defendant. The court reasoned that because the acts occurred within the home, the acts were “open to question concerning defendant’s disposition,” and evidence of the ongoing relationship and conduct between and among the parties involved, is relevant and permissible.

    The court stated, “Such evidence, involving the ongoing relationship and conduct between and among the parties involved, is relevant and permissible where the acts charged occur within the home and are open to question concerning defendant’s disposition.” The court’s decision emphasizes the importance of the trial judge’s role in assessing the competency of child witnesses and the admissibility of evidence showing the defendant’s propensity for the charged acts within the specific context of familial sexual abuse.