New York Law Review

Tag: Child Witness

  • People v. Fernandez, 17 N.Y.3d 70 (2011): Admissibility of Reputation Evidence Within a Family

    17 N.Y.3d 70 (2011)

    A witness’s reputation for truthfulness within their family and among family friends can be admissible as evidence, provided a proper foundation is laid demonstrating the reliability of the community’s assessment.

    Summary

    In a child sexual abuse case, the New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court erred in excluding testimony from the defendant’s parents regarding the complainant’s reputation for untruthfulness within their family. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by precluding such testimony, finding that the family and family friends could constitute a relevant community for assessing reputation, and the parents’ testimony laid a sufficient foundation. This decision clarifies that reputation evidence is not strictly limited to residential or professional communities, but can extend to any group where an individual’s character is observed sufficiently to form a reliable reputation.

    Facts

    Defendant was charged with sexually abusing his niece between August and December 2005. At trial, the niece testified to multiple instances of abuse in the defendant’s bedroom. The defendant denied the allegations. The defendant’s parents testified, corroborating his alibi. Defense counsel sought to introduce testimony from the parents that the complainant had a bad reputation for truthfulness among their family and family friends.

    Procedural History

    The trial court sustained objections to the reputation testimony, finding an improper foundation. The defendant was convicted of sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the trial court erred in precluding the reputation testimony. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in precluding the defendant from presenting testimony from family members regarding the complainant’s reputation for untruthfulness within their family and circle of family friends.

    Holding

    Yes, because the family and family friends can constitute a relevant community for purposes of introducing testimony pertaining to an opposing witness’s bad reputation for truth and veracity, and a proper foundation had been laid.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established precedent affirming a party’s right to present witnesses testifying to an opposing witness’s bad reputation for truthfulness, provided a proper foundation exists (citing People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282 (1983)). The court stated, “a trial court must allow such testimony, once a foundation has been laid, so long as it is relevant to contradict the testimony of a key witness and is limited to general reputation for truth and veracity” (citing People v. Hanley, 5 N.Y.3d 108, 112 (2005)). The Court emphasized that reputation evidence may stem from any community where an individual’s associations permit sufficient observation to ensure reliability (citing People v. Bouton, 50 N.Y.2d 130 (1980)). It rejected the argument that family members’ potential bias justified excluding the testimony, stating that credibility is a jury question, not a basis for excluding relevant evidence. The court found the parents’ testimony established an adequate foundation, as they demonstrated extensive knowledge of the complainant and awareness of her reputation within the extended family. Therefore, excluding this evidence prevented the jury from properly assessing the complainant’s credibility, warranting a new trial.

  • People v. Nisoff, 36 N.Y.2d 560 (1975): Corroboration Requirements for Child Testimony in Public Lewdness Cases

    People v. Nisoff, 36 N.Y.2d 560 (1975)

    In the absence of a statutory requirement of corroboration, the scope of appellate review is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence against the accused is satisfactory under legal standards, especially when a child testifies.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for public lewdness, holding that the 10-year-old complainant’s sworn testimony was properly admitted and did not require corroboration. The court emphasized that corroboration is only required when mandated by statute or when the testimony is inherently suspect. The court found sufficient evidence to support the conviction, as the complainant’s testimony was clear and convincing and supported by other evidence placing the defendant at the scene. The court distinguished the case from prior cases where corroboration was required due to suspect testimony arising from matrimonial disputes.

    Facts

    On January 15, 1972, Claire Sullivan (10 years old) and her sister Helen (almost 8 years old) were walking when a car driven by Nisoff stopped. Nisoff asked for directions, then exposed himself and invited the girls to touch him. Claire identified Nisoff as the perpetrator. Helen did not see the exposure but confirmed Nisoff was the driver who asked for directions. A neighbor testified the girls left her house shortly before the incident. Another witness saw the girls near a parked car with one occupant.

    Procedural History

    Nisoff was convicted of public lewdness in the Justice Court of the Town of Queensbury, Warren County, following a jury trial. He appealed, challenging the admissibility of the children’s testimony and arguing that corroboration was required. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the 10-year-old complainant to give sworn testimony.

    2. Whether the trial court erred by allowing the 8-year-old sister to give unsworn testimony.

    3. Whether the crime of public lewdness requires corroboration of the complainant’s testimony, even though not explicitly mandated by statute.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court properly determined that the 10-year-old complainant understood the nature of an oath.

    2. No, because the trial court properly determined that the 8-year-old sister possessed the requisite intelligence and capacity to give unsworn testimony.

    3. No, because the court found sufficient evidence of a clear and convincing variety to support the conviction, distinguishing this case from those requiring corroboration due to inherently suspect testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that CPL 60.20(2) allows the trial court discretion in determining whether a child under 12 is competent to give sworn testimony. The court emphasized that “the infant witness must not only demonstrate sufficient intelligence and capacity to justify the reception of his or her testimony, but it must also be clear that he knows, understands and appreciates the nature of an oath before the trial court may permit the reception of sworn testimony.” The trial court properly assessed the 10-year-old’s understanding of an oath and her ability to differentiate between truth and falsehood. As for the 8-year-old, the court found she had the capacity and intelligence to give unsworn testimony. The court further stated, quoting Wheeler v. United States, 159 U.S. 523, 524, “The decision of this question rests primarily with the trial judge… [and] will not be disturbed on review unless from that which is preserved it is clear that it was erroneous.”

    Regarding the need for corroboration, the court noted that the common law did not require corroboration in offenses against the chastity of women. The court distinguished People v. Porcaro, 6 N.Y.2d 248 (1959), where the court found the uncorroborated testimony of a child insufficient due to the unique factual setting of a matrimonial dispute, making the testimony inherently suspect. The court stated, “in the absence of a statutory requirement of corroboration the scope of our review should be limited to ascertaining whether or not the evidence against the accused is otherwise satisfactory under legal standards.” Here, there was ample evidence to support the conviction including identification by both girls, corroboration of their presence at the scene by other witnesses and no indication that the testimony was inherently suspect. Unlike Porcaro, the testimony here did not arise from a matrimonial dispute.