New York Law Review

Tag: Child Support Standards Act

  • Dutchess County Dept. of Social Services v. Day, 96 N.Y.2d 149 (2001): Applying CSSA Guidelines in Foster Care Cases

    Dutchess County Dept. of Social Services v. Day, 96 N.Y.2d 149 (2001)

    Child support obligations for children in residential or foster care are determined using the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) guidelines, allowing for deviations based on specific, enumerated factors.

    Summary

    This case clarifies that the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) governs parental support obligations even when a child is in residential or foster care. Dutchess County Department of Social Services sought reimbursement from parents for the costs of their child’s residential care. The Court of Appeals held that while Family Court Act § 415 establishes a general duty of support, the CSSA provides the specific framework for calculating child support, including in foster care cases. The court emphasized the need for uniform child support standards and affirmed the Hearing Examiner’s application of the CSSA, including permissible deviations based on relevant factors.

    Facts

    The Dutchess County Department of Social Services (DSS) commenced proceedings against two parents to recover funds spent on their child’s residential care. A Hearing Examiner calculated each parent’s basic child support obligation using the CSSA formula. The Hearing Examiner then deviated from the CSSA amount, considering factors such as the parents’ need to maintain a home for the child, the child’s home visits, and the mother’s temporary inability to work due to surgery. Support orders were issued against both parents.

    Procedural History

    The DSS objected to the support orders, arguing that the Hearing Examiner improperly deviated from the CSSA standards. The Family Court denied the objections, reasoning that Family Court Act § 415 applied, granting broader discretion. Alternatively, the Family Court found the orders reasonable even under the CSSA. The Appellate Division affirmed, agreeing that § 415 applied. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether child support obligations for a child placed in residential or foster care should be determined under Family Court Act § 415, which allows for broader discretion, or under the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA), Family Court Act § 413.

    Holding

    No, because the CSSA provides the specific and uniform standard for determining child support obligations, including in cases involving children in residential or foster care. Deviations are permitted only based on the specific factors enumerated in the CSSA.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that statutes relating to the same subject matter should be construed together. While Family Court Act § 415 establishes a general duty to support relatives receiving public assistance, the CSSA, enacted later, provides a specific mathematical formula for calculating child support. The CSSA mandates that courts “shall” make child support awards according to its provisions (Family Ct Act § 413[1][a]). The court emphasized the need for uniform standards in child support awards, aligning with federal mandates for state child support programs. The court noted the legislative history of CSSA indicating that it “ends the use of different support criteria for awards made to recipients of public assistance from those made to non-public assistance recipients.” The Court held that Section 415 continues to establish support liability when a spouse or stepchild is a recipient of public assistance. The court distinguished Bast v. Rossoff, noting the policy considerations against encouraging parents to track visitation time to reduce support obligations were not relevant in the context of temporary residential or foster care. The Hearing Examiner appropriately considered parent-child visitation in the temporary residential/foster care context. Failing to consider expenses incurred during visitation would abrogate the strong public policy and underlying goal of returning the child home and reuniting the family. The court explicitly rejected contrary holdings in other state courts that had applied Family Court Act § 415 instead of CSSA.

  • Cassano v. Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d 649 (1995): Applying Child Support Standards Act to High Income Cases

    Cassano v. Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d 649 (1995)

    When calculating child support for combined parental income exceeding $80,000 under the Child Support Standards Act, courts have discretion to apply statutory percentages, consider the factors outlined in Family Court Act § 413(1)(f), or use both, but must articulate the reasons for their choice to facilitate appellate review.

    Summary

    In a post-divorce proceeding seeking modification of child support, the New York Court of Appeals addressed how to calculate child support when combined parental income exceeds $80,000 under the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA). The court clarified that while the CSSA provides a formula for income up to $80,000, for higher incomes, courts have discretion to apply a statutory percentage, consider enumerated factors, or both. The court held that the exercise of discretion is subject to review, thus some record articulation of the reasons for the court’s choice is necessary to facilitate review. It emphasized that the decision should reflect careful consideration of the parties’ circumstances and justify any departure from the standard percentage.

    Facts

    The parties divorced in 1986, with the mother receiving custody of their two children. The father was ordered to pay $125 per week in child support. In 1989, the mother petitioned for an upward modification of support based on the newly enacted CSSA, while the father cross-petitioned for a downward modification. A Hearing Examiner found a substantial increase in the parties’ income, with a combined income of $99,944, of which 64.4% was attributable to the father. The Hearing Examiner ordered the father to pay $218 per week, calculated by applying the statutory percentage (17%) to the total income and allocating 64.4% to the father. The father was also ordered to pay his pro rata share of private school costs and unreimbursed medical expenses.

    Procedural History

    The father appealed the Hearing Examiner’s decision to Family Court, arguing that the application of the statutory percentage to income over $80,000 required specific justification. Family Court upheld the Hearing Examiner’s decision. The Appellate Division agreed that reasons were required for income over $80,000, but found that the Hearing Examiner’s consideration of the parties’ circumstances satisfied this requirement. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, when calculating child support on combined parental income exceeding $80,000 under the Child Support Standards Act, a court must articulate a reason for its award when it chooses to apply the statutory percentage.

    Holding

    Yes, because while the Child Support Standards Act grants courts discretion to apply the statutory percentage, consider enumerated factors, or both when calculating child support for income exceeding $80,000, that discretion is subject to review and requires some record articulation of the reasons for the court’s choice.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals interpreted the language of the Child Support Standards Act, particularly Family Court Act § 413(1)(c)(3), which states that for income over $80,000, the court may consider the factors in paragraph (f) “and/or” the child support percentage. The court rejected a reading that would require a needs-based justification for applying the percentage, stating that this interpretation would “read the word ‘or’ out of the section and roll back the calendar to pre-1989 law.” The court concluded that “and/or” gives courts discretion to choose one or both methods. However, because this discretion is subject to appellate review, the court must provide some articulation of the reasons for its choice, reflecting that the court has carefully considered the parties’ circumstances and found no reason to depart from the prescribed percentage. The court found that the Hearing Examiner’s detailed inquiry into the parties’ circumstances, as upheld by the Appellate Division, provided sufficient justification for applying the statutory percentage in this case. The court also affirmed the requirement that the father pay his pro rata share of the child’s unreimbursed medical expenses, as mandated by Family Court Act § 413(1)(c)(5), rejecting the argument that this constituted an impermissible open-ended obligation. The CSSA sought to create greater uniformity, predictability and equity in fixing child support awards, while at the same time maintaining the degree of judicial discretion necessary to address unique circumstances. As the statute directs, step one of the three-step method is the court’s calculation of “combined parental income.” Second, the court multiplies that figure, up to $80,000, by a specified percentage based upon the number of children in the household, and then allocates that amount between the parents according to their share of the total income. Third, where combined parental income exceeds $80,000, the court shall determine the amount of child support for the amount of the combined parental income in excess of such dollar amount through consideration of the factors set forth in paragraph (f) of this subdivision and/or the child support percentage.