New York Law Review

Tag: Chemical Test

  • People v. Washington, 23 N.Y.3d 228 (2014): Duty to Inform DWI Suspect of Attorney’s Contact

    People v. Washington, 23 N.Y.3d 228 (2014)

    When an attorney contacts the police on behalf of a DWI suspect before a chemical test is administered, the police must inform the suspect of the attorney’s communication, unless doing so would unduly interfere with the test’s administration.

    Summary

    Defendant was arrested for DWI after a fatal car accident. While she was being processed, her attorney contacted the police, requesting that they not question or test her. The police, without informing her of the attorney’s call, obtained her consent for a breathalyzer test and administered it. The New York Court of Appeals held that the police violated her limited right to counsel under People v. Gursey. The Court reasoned that because the attorney contacted the police before the breathalyzer was administered, the police were obligated to inform the defendant of the communication so she could decide whether to consult with counsel.

    Facts

    Jonai Washington struck and killed a pedestrian while driving. Police officers noted she admitted to consuming four beers earlier. She failed field sobriety tests and was arrested for driving while intoxicated. At police headquarters, she was read a chemical test authorization form and signed it, consenting to a breathalyzer test.
    Meanwhile, her family contacted an attorney who then called the Sheriff’s Department and was transferred to a sergeant at police headquarters. The attorney stated he represented Washington and asked the police not to question or test her. This call occurred before the breathalyzer test began, but Washington was not informed of the attorney’s call before the test was initiated.

    Procedural History

    Washington was indicted for manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter, and DWI. She moved to suppress the breathalyzer results, arguing a violation of her right to counsel. The Supreme Court granted the motion, suppressing the results. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding that the police violated Washington’s right to counsel by failing to inform her of her attorney’s contact before the breathalyzer test and that the People failed to show that providing such notice would have interfered with the administration of the test. The dissenting justice granted the People leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police are required to inform a DWI suspect that an attorney has contacted them on their behalf before administering a chemical test, even if the suspect has already consented to the test.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statutory right to legal consultation applies when an attorney contacts the police before a chemical test is performed, and the police must alert the suspect to the presence of counsel, whether the contact is made in person or telephonically, unless doing so would unduly interfere with the administration of the test. The suspect could have revoked her consent prior to administration of the test after conferring with counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holding in People v. Gursey, which recognized a limited right to counsel in DWI cases based on the implied consent law. While Gursey primarily addressed situations where the suspect *personally* requests counsel, the Court extended its reasoning to situations where counsel intervenes on the suspect’s behalf *before* the chemical test is administered. The Court reasoned that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194 grants a driver a qualified right to refuse a chemical test, and advice from counsel may be sought to inform that decision. The Court stated that the police must advise the accused that a lawyer has made contact on the accused’s behalf. Once so informed, the accused may choose to consult with counsel or forgo that option and proceed with the chemical test.

    The Court emphasized that the right to counsel is not absolute and cannot be used to unduly delay the administration of the chemical test, referencing the time-sensitive nature of blood alcohol content evidence. However, because the police failed to inform Washington of her attorney’s contact *before* the breathalyzer was administered, and the People did not demonstrate that providing such notice would have been unreasonable, the Court held that her right to counsel was violated, and suppression of the test results was warranted. The operative point is the actual performance of the procedure and, until it occurs, legal assistance may be sought “if such access does not interfere unduly” with the administration of the chemical test.

  • People v. Ayala, 89 N.Y.2d 874 (1996): Appealability of Suppression Orders in DWI Cases

    89 N.Y.2d 874 (1996)

    The People have the right to appeal an order suppressing evidence in a DWI case, even when the suppression is based on a violation of a law other than Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(3) or Navigation Law § 49-a(8), because CPL 710.20(5) allows suppression of chemical tests administered in violation of “any other applicable law.”

    Summary

    Reinaldo Ayala was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI). The arresting officer testified that Ayala admitted to having “a few beers” and agreed to a breathalyzer test, which was administered about two and a half hours after the arrest. Ayala moved to suppress the test results, arguing the test was given more than two hours after his arrest, contrary to the law. The Criminal Court granted the motion to suppress. The Appellate Term dismissed the People’s appeal, deeming it unauthorized. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the People could appeal the suppression order because CPL 710.20(5) permits suppression for violations of “any other applicable law,” not just specific vehicle and navigation laws. This ruling clarifies the scope of the People’s right to appeal suppression orders in DWI cases.

    Facts

    Defendant Ayala was arrested for DWI.
    The arresting officer testified Ayala admitted to having “a few beers.”
    Ayala agreed to take a breathalyzer test.
    The breathalyzer test was administered approximately two and a half hours after the arrest.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court granted Ayala’s motion to suppress the breathalyzer test results.
    The Appellate Term dismissed the People’s appeal as unauthorized.
    A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted the People leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People can appeal to an intermediate appellate court to challenge a trial court’s ruling suppressing the results of a consented-to chemical test in a DWI case when the basis for suppression is a violation of a law other than Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1194(3) or Navigation Law § 49-a(8)?

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 710.20(5) allows suppression of chemical blood tests administered in violation of “any other applicable law,” and CPL 450.20(8) provides the People with the right to appeal orders suppressing evidence entered before trial pursuant to section 710.20.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the plain language of CPL 710.20(5) does not limit the People’s right to appeal only certain suppression orders. The statute permits suppression not only of court-ordered chemical tests, but also tests administered pursuant to “any other applicable law.” The court emphasized that the People’s appeal options under CPL 450.20(8) incorporate the entirety of CPL 710.20. The Court rejected the defendant’s argument for a limited construction, finding no support for it in the statutory language. Since suppression could be based on violations of laws beyond those specifically enumerated, the People’s right to appeal extends to any suppression order grounded in CPL 710.20(5). The court stated that the restriction Ayala would have this Court impose finds no support in the statutory language authorizing the People’s appeal.