New York Charter School Assn. v. Smith, 16 N.Y.3d 73 (2010)
Charter schools are generally not considered public entities subject to New York’s prevailing wage laws under Labor Law § 220, unless they are acting directly on behalf of a public entity in a contractual capacity for public work.
Summary
This case addresses whether New York’s prevailing wage laws apply to charter schools. The New York State Department of Labor reversed its prior position and declared that these laws applied to all charter school projects. Charter schools and supporting foundations challenged this determination. The Court of Appeals held that charter schools are generally not public entities under Labor Law § 220 and are therefore not subject to prevailing wage laws unless they act directly on behalf of a public entity in a contractual capacity. The Court emphasized that charter schools typically contract for their own benefit, not for the benefit of the state.
Facts
In 2007, the New York State Department of Labor (DOL) issued an opinion letter stating that prevailing wage laws applied to all charter school projects, reversing its prior 2000 opinion that charter schools were generally not public entities and therefore not subject to these laws. The Commissioner of Labor notified the Charter Schools Institute and the Commissioner of the State Education Department that it would begin enforcing prevailing wage laws on charter school projects for which bids were advertised on or after September 20, 2007. Foundations supporting charter schools and individual charter schools then commenced legal proceedings challenging the DOL’s new position.
Procedural History
The Supreme Court denied the petitions, holding that the charter agreement was a contract between a public entity and a third party, thus subjecting charter school construction to prevailing wage laws. The Appellate Division reversed, granting the petitions and declaring that charter schools are not subject to prevailing wage laws. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.
Issue(s)
Whether charter schools are considered public entities or third parties acting on behalf of public entities, thus subjecting them to the prevailing wage requirements of Labor Law § 220 for construction and renovation projects.
Holding
No, because charter schools are not explicitly identified as public entities under Labor Law § 220 and typically contract for construction and renovation projects on their own behalf, not on behalf of a public entity.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court applied the two-pronged test from Matter of Erie County Indus. Dev. Agency v Roberts, which requires (1) a contract involving the employment of laborers, workmen, or mechanics to which a public agency is a party, and (2) that the contract concern a public works project. The Court found that charter agreements themselves are not contracts for public work. While charter schools possess some characteristics similar to public entities, they are governed by self-selecting boards of trustees and are exempt from many state and local laws governing public schools. The Court noted that the legislature knows how to subject charter schools to laws governing public entities when it intends to do so. Referencing Education Law § 2853 (1)(g), the court also noted that neither the local school district, the charter entity nor the state is liable for the debts or financial obligations of a charter school. The Court distinguished this situation from Matter of Pyramid Co. of Onondaga v New York State Dept. of Labor, where a private entity was acting to benefit the State. Here, a renovation contract by a charter school is primarily for the benefit of the school itself. The court emphasized that its holding should not be interpreted to mean that every contract involving a charter school is exempt from prevailing wage laws, as there may be situations where the school is acting directly on behalf of a public entity. The Court stated, “[w]hen an education corporation enters into a facilities contract for a charter school, it typically does so on its own behalf, in its own name, and at its own risk.”