New York Law Review

Tag: character evidence

  • People v. Glass, 34 N.Y.2d 451 (1974): The Weight of Character Evidence in Establishing Reasonable Doubt

    People v. Glass, 34 N.Y.2d 451 (1974)

    Evidence of good character, when believed by the jury and considered with all other evidence, may be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to a defendant’s guilt, but it is not, standing alone, automatically sufficient to create such a doubt.

    Summary

    The defendants were convicted of grand larceny and issuing a false financial statement. At trial, they requested a jury charge stating that evidence of previous good character could, standing alone, be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. The trial court refused to include the “standing alone” portion in its charge, and the defendants appealed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that while character evidence is a significant factor, it’s not automatically sufficient to create reasonable doubt; it must be considered in conjunction with all other evidence in the case.

    Facts

    The individual defendants were convicted on multiple counts of grand larceny and issuing a false financial statement. During the trial, the defense presented witnesses who testified to the defendants’ good character and reputation in the community.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted the defendants. The Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the judgments of conviction without opinion. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging the jury instructions regarding character evidence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to charge the jury that character evidence, standing alone, may be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt, and instead instructing the jury that character evidence is not, in and of itself, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.

    Holding

    No, because evidence of good character is but one fact to be weighed with the other facts in the case; its influence depends greatly on the other evidence presented. It is not sufficient, on its own, to create reasonable doubt but may do so when believed and considered with all other evidence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court addressed the argument that character evidence alone can create reasonable doubt, referencing conflicting precedents. The Court of Appeals clarified that while character evidence is a substantial matter and must be considered by the jury, its weight depends on the context of all other evidence. The court cited People v. Trimarchi, stating: “Evidence of good character is not, of itself, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt. Such evidence, in order to raise a reasonable doubt, must be believed by the jury. It then may, when considered with all the other evidence in the case, be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.” The court reasoned that character evidence aims to show the improbability that a person of good character would commit the crime. However, its impact varies based on the strength and reliability of the evidence against the defendant. The court emphasized the importance of viewing the jury charge as a whole, finding no reversible error in this context. The court stated, “Character evidence does not exist in a vacuum, and its value, influence or the weight to be accorded it depends in great part upon the other evidence in the case. If accepted and believed, it becomes a fact to be weighed with the other facts.” The court effectively distinguished this case from others where a different charge was required. Therefore, the trial court’s instruction, viewed in its entirety, was deemed appropriate.

  • People v. Kuss, 32 N.Y.2d 436 (1973): Admissibility of Reputation Evidence

    People v. Kuss, 32 N.Y.2d 436 (1973)

    When a defendant introduces character witnesses, the prosecution, in testing the credibility of those witnesses, may cross-examine them about rumors or reports of the defendant’s prior misconduct, even if those rumors are based on newspaper reports.

    Summary

    Donald Kuss, a town councilman, and Walter Conlon were convicted of taking unlawful fees for Kuss’s vote on a zoning resolution. The prosecution argued Kuss received payments from DWH Corp., facilitated by Conlon, in exchange for Kuss’s vote. Conlon challenged his conviction, claiming the prosecutor improperly cross-examined his character witnesses by asking if they were aware of reports of Conlon’s prior misconduct. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that such cross-examination is permissible to test the witnesses’ knowledge of the defendant’s reputation, provided the prosecutor has a good faith basis for the questions.

    Facts

    Donald Kuss, an Islip Town Board member, voted to change land restrictions on a parcel, increasing its value. DWH Corp., owned by Walter Conlon and the Roseman brothers, benefited from this change. Subsequently, Kuss received payments from Howard Roseman Associates. The prosecution alleged that Kuss, aided by Conlon, sought and received these payments for his favorable vote. Conlon allegedly facilitated the transaction by communicating Kuss’s demands and reassuring the Rosemans regarding the zoning change.

    Procedural History

    Kuss and Conlon were indicted and convicted under Section 1826 of the former Penal Law. The Appellate Division affirmed Kuss’s conviction and affirmed Conlon’s conviction with one justice dissenting. Conlon appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing improper cross-examination of his character witnesses and prejudicial remarks by the prosecutor. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine Conlon’s character witnesses regarding their awareness of reports of Conlon’s alleged prior misconduct as Town Attorney, and whether the prosecutor’s remarks during summation were so prejudicial as to warrant reversal.

    Holding

    No, because the cross-examination was permissible to test the character witnesses’ knowledge of Conlon’s reputation and because the prosecutor’s remarks, while improper, did not warrant reversal given the court’s instructions and the lack of sustained objections for most of the remarks.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that while character evidence cannot be introduced to prove specific acts, it is permissible to cross-examine character witnesses about rumors or reports of conduct inconsistent with the reputation they attested to. This is not to prove the truth of the rumors, but to assess the witness’s ability to accurately reflect the defendant’s reputation. The prosecutor must have a good faith basis for the questions. The court found that the prosecutor’s questions concerning reports about Conlon’s actions as Town Attorney were permissible for this purpose. The court emphasized that the relevant consideration is “the qualifications of the witness to bespeak the community opinion” quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469. The court also found that while the prosecutor’s summation contained improper remarks, most were not objected to, and the court provided appropriate instructions where objections were made. Therefore, the remarks did not warrant reversal. The court emphasized that a rule of per se error in this area of law would be ill-advised.

  • People v. Mullens, 292 N.Y. 408 (1944): Admissibility of Evidence of Prior Bad Acts in Bribery Case

    People v. Mullens, 292 N.Y. 408 (1944)

    Evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible in a criminal trial if its only probative value is to suggest that the defendant has a propensity to commit the charged crime, especially when the prior acts are not directly related to the current charges.

    Summary

    Defendants Mullens and Solomon were convicted on multiple counts of bribery related to state printing contracts. The prosecution alleged Mullens, a Deputy Comptroller, accepted bribes from Burland Printing Co. officers (the Walseys) through Solomon. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, finding that the admission of evidence of collateral transactions, specifically unrelated instances of alleged fraud and corruption, was prejudicial and violated the rule against using character evidence to prove guilt. The Court emphasized that evidence must be directly relevant to the charged offenses, and that admitting evidence of past misdeeds created unfair prejudice, influencing the jury’s verdict.

    Facts

    Mullens, as Deputy Comptroller, was accused of accepting bribes from the Burland Printing Co., facilitated by Solomon, in exchange for securing state printing contracts for Burland in 1935 and 1937. The prosecution presented evidence from Charles and Ira Walsey, officers of Burland, detailing the alleged bribery scheme, including payments made to Solomon. Evidence showed checks were made out to H. Bitterman at Solomon’s request. The prosecution also introduced evidence concerning printing contracts from 1932 to 1939.

    Procedural History

    Mullens and Solomon were convicted on six counts of bribery. The Appellate Division dismissed two counts for insufficient proof but affirmed the remaining convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to review the convictions on the remaining counts related to the 1935 and 1937 transactions.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts and collateral transactions that were not directly related to the bribery charges against Mullens and Solomon.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence of prior bad acts lacked probative value regarding the bribery charges and was unduly prejudicial to the defendants, influencing the jury to convict based on perceived character rather than direct evidence of the crimes charged.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the evidence regarding Solomon’s alleged receipt of funds for removing a subway entrance in 1933, and evidence about the Burland Company’s collusive bidding practices, lacked direct relevance to the bribery charges against Mullens and Solomon. The court cited People v. Robinson, 273 N.Y. 438, 445, noting the jury was likely influenced by this evidence, which suggested the defendants were predisposed to commit such offenses. The court emphasized the fundamental rule that character is not an issue in a criminal prosecution unless the accused makes it one, citing People v. Zachowitz, 254 N.Y. 192. The Court stated: “None of these collateral transactions had any probative force save as thereby it was implied that the defendants were men whose experience had predisposed them to the commission of offenses of the sort for which they were on trial.” The introduction of these extraneous crimes allowed the jury to consider character evidence, which is impermissible. The Court concluded that the improper admission of evidence unduly contributed to the guilty verdict, warranting reversal and a new trial.