New York Law Review

Tag: change of venue

  • Matter of Tyrone D., 24 N.Y.3d 663 (2015): Change of Venue in Mental Hygiene Law Article 10 Hearings

    Matter of Tyrone D., 24 N.Y.3d 663 (2015)

    Under Mental Hygiene Law Article 10, a court may change the venue of an annual review hearing for a dangerous sex offender upon a showing of good cause, which may include considerations related to the convenience of the parties or witnesses.

    Summary

    The case concerns a dangerous sex offender’s request to change the venue of his annual review hearing. The lower courts denied the request, holding that Mental Hygiene Law Article 10 did not allow for a change of venue in these types of hearings. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the statute does allow for venue changes upon a showing of good cause, but affirmed the denial of the motion because the offender failed to establish good cause. The court clarified that good cause could include convenience for parties and witnesses and the offender’s condition. Additionally, the court addressed the issue of waiver, finding that the trial court properly relied upon counsel’s representation that the offender did not want the annual review hearing.

    Facts

    Tyrone D. was committed to a secure treatment facility as a dangerous sex offender. He sought to change the venue of his annual review hearing from Oneida County to New York County. He argued that the change was necessary due to the financial and health limitations of his family, and the convenience of witnesses residing in New York County. The Supreme Court denied the motion, finding that good cause was not established. Tyrone D. then refused to be interviewed by psychiatric examiners, and subsequently, the Commissioner of OMH determined that he remained a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement. At the hearing, Tyrone D., through counsel, waived his right to appear. The Supreme Court found that there was clear and convincing evidence that Tyrone D. remained a dangerous sex offender in need of confinement.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the motion for a change of venue and subsequently issued an order finding that Tyrone D. was a dangerous sex offender. The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision, holding that Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08 authorized a change of venue only for trials, not for hearings. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and ultimately affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Mental Hygiene Law Article 10 authorizes a change of venue for annual review hearings for dangerous sex offenders.

    2. Whether, if a change of venue is authorized, the trial court properly denied the change of venue in this case.

    3. Whether Tyrone D. waived his right to an annual review hearing.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the statute’s language allows for venue changes in both hearings and trials, and restricting this would be unnecessary.

    2. Yes, because the offender failed to establish good cause for a venue change by not identifying specific witnesses, the subject of their potential testimony, and the relevance of such testimony.

    3. Yes, because the court was entitled to rely upon counsel’s representation that the offender did not want his annual review hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court first addressed the interpretation of Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08 (e). The statute states, “[a]t any hearing or trial pursuant to the provisions of this article, the court may change the venue of the trial to any county for good cause, which may include considerations relating to the convenience of the parties or witnesses or the condition of the respondent.” The court determined that the better interpretation was that venue changes were permissible in both hearings and trials. The court reasoned that the inclusion of “any hearing or trial” would be rendered superfluous if the legislature intended to restrict the change of venue to trials. The court emphasized that the statute allows changes of venue for “good cause”.

    Regarding the denial of the venue change, the court found that the offender’s supporting affirmation was insufficient because it failed to identify specific witnesses or the subject of their potential testimony. The Court stated, “the affirmation submitted in support of the motion did urge, generally, that it would be inconvenient and burdensome for unnamed family members and other potential witnesses to travel to Oneida County, but failed to identify a single witness that would testify on petitioner’s behalf. Nor did the affirmation set forth the subject of any proposed testimony — let alone identify any information that would be potentially relevant to the issue of whether petitioner remained a dangerous sex offender in need of confinement.”

    Finally, the court addressed the waiver of the annual review hearing. The court noted that while a more thorough inquiry is typically needed, the trial court was entitled to rely on defense counsel’s representation that the offender did not wish to appear at the hearing. “A lawyer may be trusted to explain rights to his or her client, and to report to the court the result of that discussion.”

  • People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 770 (1981): Demonstrating Prejudice from Pretrial Publicity

    People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 770 (1981)

    A defendant seeking a change of venue due to pretrial publicity must demonstrate, through the jury selection process, that a fair and impartial jury could not be selected because of the publicity.

    Summary

    Ventimiglia was convicted of murder, robbery, and burglary. He appealed, arguing that extensive pretrial publicity prevented a fair trial. His initial motion for a change of venue was denied before trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant failed to create a record during jury selection demonstrating the inability to select an impartial jury due to the publicity. The court emphasized the necessity of a detailed record of jury selection, including questions, answers, and the use of peremptory challenges, to support a claim of prejudice from pretrial publicity.

    Facts

    Defendant Ventimiglia was convicted of second-degree murder, first-degree robbery, and first-degree burglary.

    Prior to trial, there was extensive pretrial publicity concerning the homicide and the defendant’s alleged involvement.

    The defendant moved for a change of venue based on this pretrial publicity, which was denied.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved for a change of venue before trial, which was denied by the Appellate Division.

    Following his conviction, the defendant appealed the judgment, renewing his claim that pretrial publicity prevented a fair trial.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant demonstrated that he was unable to select a fair and impartial jury due to widespread pretrial publicity, thus warranting a change of venue.

    Holding

    No, because the record on appeal did not contain a transcript of the jury selection proceedings, making it impossible to determine whether the extensive publicity prevented the selection of a fair and impartial jury.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the importance of creating a proper record during jury selection to demonstrate prejudice from pretrial publicity. The court stated that after the initial motion for a change of venue is denied, the defendant must attempt to select an impartial jury, and these proceedings must be recorded stenographically.

    The court noted, “At that time counsel could have attempted to establish by his questions and the answers to them that the extensive publicity made it impossible to select an impartial jury, if such was the fact, and upon said record the motion for change of venue could have been renewed and given proper consideration by the court.”

    The court also mentioned the importance of whether the defendant used all of his peremptory challenges during jury selection, as this could indicate the difficulty in finding an impartial jury.

    Because the record lacked a transcript of the jury selection, the court could not determine whether the defendant was prejudiced by the pretrial publicity. The absence of this record was fatal to the defendant’s claim on appeal.

  • People v. Goldswer, 39 N.Y.2d 656 (1976): Constitutionality of Venue Change Based on Impartiality Concerns

    People v. Goldswer, 39 N.Y.2d 656 (1976)

    A statute allowing a change of venue upon the prosecutor’s application due to reasonable cause to believe an impartial trial is impossible in the original county does not violate the defendant’s constitutional right to a jury from the district where the crime occurred.

    Summary

    The defendant, a former sheriff, was convicted in Warren County after the venue was changed from Schoharie County due to concerns about impartiality. The Special Prosecutor sought the change because the defendant, still in office, was accused of misusing his position. The New York Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of CPL 230.20(2), which allows the Appellate Division to change venue if a fair trial is unlikely in the original county. The court held the statute constitutional, finding it did not violate either the State or Federal Constitutions’ jury trial provisions, while cautioning against using venue changes to gain prosecutorial advantage.

    Facts

    The defendant, while Sheriff of Schoharie County, was indicted on 38 counts related to misusing his office, including using prisoners and personnel to construct his home and create campaign signs. Due to the District Attorney’s recusal, a Special Prosecutor was appointed. The prosecutor applied for a change of venue, arguing the defendant’s position as sheriff, the county’s small population, pre-trial publicity, and the sheriff’s office’s role in law enforcement and court security could inhibit jurors.

    Procedural History

    The Special Prosecutor’s motion for a change of venue was granted by the Appellate Division, Third Department. The case was moved to Warren County, where the defendant was convicted of 11 counts of official misconduct. The defendant appealed, arguing that the venue change violated his constitutional right to be tried by a jury from the county where the offenses occurred.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether CPL 230.20(2) violates the New York State Constitution’s guarantee of trial by jury in cases where it has been constitutionally guaranteed.
    2. Whether CPL 230.20(2) violates the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees the right to an impartial jury of the State and district where the crime occurred.

    Holding

    1. No, because prior to the adoption of the State Constitution, the legislature had the power to alter the common-law right to a jury trial in the county where the crime was committed.
    2. No, because the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage requirement is a modified version of the common-law rule, allowing the legislature to define the “district” where the jury is drawn.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while common law traditionally granted the accused the right to a jury from the vicinage (county where the crime occurred), this right was not absolute at the time of the State Constitution’s adoption. Legislative power to alter this right was recognized. The court cited Mack v. People, stating the Bill of Rights should be read “in the light of the law as it was when the bill of rights was adopted.”

    Regarding the Sixth Amendment, the court referenced Williams v. Florida, noting that the framers did not intend to equate constitutional jury characteristics with common-law characteristics. The Sixth Amendment’s vicinage requirement is a compromise, protecting individuals from trial by alien bodies while allowing the government a forum when trial in the county is impractical. The court stated, “Under this expanded vicinage rule the individual is guaranteed a trial ‘by an impartial jury of the State and district’ where the crime was committed and the Legislature is given the power to define or designate the district.”

    The court cautioned that CPL 230.20(2) should not be used to allow the prosecutor to seek a more favorable tribunal. There must be a reasonable basis to believe the original county is not neutral. The transferred venue should reflect the character of the original county, ensuring a fair trial without undue advantage for the prosecution. The court emphasized the importance of a neutral forum and cautioned against construing the statute to permit the prosecution to choose a more favorable tribunal. The court noted, “There must be some showing—at least a reasonable basis for belief— that the county in which the indictment is pending is not neutral between the parties because it is charged with an emotional atmosphere or some other factor which would preclude a fair and impartial trial and determination on the merits.”

  • In re Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241 (1976): Right to Counsel for Alleged Incompetents During Adjudication

    In re Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241 (1976)

    An alleged incompetent person has the right to representation by personal counsel throughout the entire incompetency proceeding, including the right to appeal the initial determination of incompetency.

    Summary

    This case addresses the right to counsel for an individual facing incompetency proceedings. The New York Court of Appeals held that an alleged incompetent retains the right to representation by personal counsel, even after an initial adjudication of incompetency, specifically for the purpose of appealing the incompetency determination. The court reasoned that denying this right would severely limit the alleged incompetent’s access to justice, as a guardian ad litem or committee may not adequately represent the individual’s wishes regarding an appeal.

    Facts

    Two nieces of Olga Aho, an 85-year-old woman, initiated proceedings to have her declared incompetent. A guardian ad litem was appointed. Attorneys who had represented Aho for 15 months prior to the proceedings demanded a change of venue to Schenectady County, where she was residing. The guardian ad litem submitted a report concluding Aho was incompetent and recommended a jury trial. The attorneys representing Aho filed a formal motion for change of venue, which was opposed by the guardian ad litem. The motion was denied, and the matter was set for trial.

    Procedural History

    The attorneys for Aho appealed the denial of the change of venue motion. The Appellate Division denied a stay of the trial. Following a jury verdict, Aho was adjudicated incompetent. Her attorneys appealed, seeking to bring up the intermediate order denying the change of venue. The petitioners moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the attorneys lacked authority post-adjudication. The Appellate Division initially denied the motion but later dismissed the appeals. The Court of Appeals then reviewed the dismissal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether attorneys who represented an alleged incompetent in proceedings which resulted in the adjudication of her incompetency had authority to prosecute the appeal from such adjudication and therein to seek review of the denial of the motion for change of venue.

    Holding

    Yes, because an alleged incompetent person has a right to counsel throughout the entire proceeding, including the right to appeal the determination of incompetency, and the denial of the motion for change of venue necessarily affected the final judgment and was therefore reviewable on appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied heavily on Carter v. Beckwith, 128 N.Y. 312, which recognized the right of an alleged incompetent to legal representation even when the attorney’s efforts are unsuccessful. The court reasoned that depriving a person of liberty and property through an incompetency adjudication requires significant safeguards. Denying the right to appeal with personal counsel would limit the alleged incompetent to a single judicial consideration, which is unacceptable given the gravity of the matter. The court emphasized that a committee or guardian ad litem might not always act in accordance with the wishes of the incompetent. As stated in the opinion, “[I]t is highly important for the protection of the rights of the party that he should be afforded all reasonable facilities for the prosecution of the inquiry…” The court found that the venue issue underlay all that followed, including the transfer of control over the incompetent’s property, and review of that determination, with the aid of counsel, was a significant right. The court clarified that while it sustained the authority of the attorneys to prosecute the appeals, it expressed no view on the attorneys’ right to compensation, directing attention to Carter v. Beckwith, regarding the assessment of legal fees against the incompetent’s property. The Court concluded that the intermediate order denying the motion for change of venue necessarily affected the final judgment because a reversal of that order would strike at the foundation on which the final judgment was predicated, leading to a vacatur of the judgment and re-submission of the issue in a court where venue might properly be laid.

  • People v. Jackson, 25 N.Y.2d 83 (1969): Admissibility of Psychiatric Testimony and Change of Venue

    People v. Jackson, 25 N.Y.2d 83 (1969)

    A motion for change of venue based on pretrial publicity is properly denied where the publicity is largely objective, the jury selection process demonstrates a lack of pervasive prejudice, and the defense expresses satisfaction with the selected jury. Additionally, psychiatric expert testimony is admissible, even if based on hospital records not presented to the jury, provided the expert is thoroughly cross-examined, and incriminating statements made during a court-ordered psychiatric examination are admissible if the defendant raises an insanity defense.

    Summary

    The defendant, convicted of first-degree murder, appealed, arguing that pretrial publicity and the denial of a change of venue deprived him of a fair trial, and that errors were committed in the admission and exclusion of evidence regarding his sanity. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the pretrial publicity was not so prejudicial as to warrant a change of venue, especially since the defense expressed satisfaction with the selected jury. The court also found no reversible error in the admission of psychiatric testimony or statements made by the defendant during a court-ordered examination, given that the defense raised the issue of insanity and the statements were not directly incriminating.

    Facts

    The defendant was accused of murdering Noreen Jones, after having harassed her for three years due to her lack of romantic interest in him. Prior to the murder, the defendant assaulted Jones and her father, leading to an assault charge and probation. On the day of the shooting, the defendant threatened Jones before following her to the police station and shooting her multiple times in front of witnesses. He made incriminating statements shortly after his arrest. The defense pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for first-degree murder and pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity. He was committed to Marcy State Hospital for a mental examination. The defendant’s motion for a change of venue was denied by the Appellate Division. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of first-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial by reason of the publicity attending it and by denial of his motion for a change of venue.

    2. Whether the court erred in admitting certain evidence regarding the defendant’s mental condition, and in excluding other evidence bearing thereon from the jury.

    Holding

    1. No, because the pretrial publicity was not so sensational as to excite local popular passion and prejudice, and the defense expressed satisfaction with the selected jury.

    2. No, because the strict rules regarding expert psychiatric testimony had been satisfied, the psychiatric report was not improperly admitted, and the defendant waived his rights against self-incrimination and to counsel by requesting the mental examination and raising the insanity defense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the change of venue, the Court of Appeals emphasized that it must be shown that the defendant could not obtain a fair trial in the original county. Newspaper comment alone, even if extensive, is insufficient. The court highlighted the objective nature of the pretrial publicity, the thorough jury selection process where jurors asserted their impartiality, and the defense’s failure to use all peremptory challenges, indicating satisfaction with the jury. The court cited People v. Bonier, 189 N.Y. 108, 110-111, for the principle that a defendant cannot complain about the denial of a change of venue if satisfied with the jury.

    Regarding the defendant’s sanity, the court addressed the admissibility of psychiatric expert testimony. Although prior precedent required the presentation of hospital records upon which experts relied, the court noted that CPLR 4515 modified this rule, allowing experts to state opinions and reasons without first specifying the data, subject to cross-examination. The court noted that the tests served simply to rule out organic brain damage. The court also rejected the argument that the psychiatrists’ report was admitted “by indirection,” finding no evidence of this. The court found no violation of the defendant’s right against self-incrimination or right to counsel because the defendant requested the mental exam and introduced the issue of his sanity, and the statements ultimately admitted were not incriminating. The court stated, “It would violate judicial common sense to permit a defendant to invoke the defense of insanity and foreclose the Government from the benefit of a mental examination to meet this issue.”